esthetic Probings of
ontemporary Man

WARREN G. BENNIS

KENNETH D. BENNE
WARREN G. BENNIS
ARTHUR J. BRODBECK
CÉSAR GRAÑA
SAMUEL HIRSCH
NORMAN N. HOLLAND
EDWARD J. SHOBEN
ROBERT N. WILSON

spssi

THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES

Published Quarterly

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues is a group of over a thousand psychologists and allied social scientists who share a concern with research on the psychological aspects of important social issues. SPSSI is governed by Kurt Lewin's dictum that "there is nothing so practical as a good theory." In various ways, the Society seeks to bring theory and practice into focus on human problems of the group, the community, and the nation as well as the increasingly important ones that have no national boundaries. This Journal has as its goal the communication of scientific findings and interpretations in a non-technical manner but without the sacrifice of professional standards.

The Journal typically publishes a whole number on a single topic. An occasional number will be devoted to contributed papers relevant to the purpose of the Journal. Proposals for new issues and individual papers should be sent to the General Editor.

ROBERT CHIN, *General Editor JSI* Human Relations Center, Boston University, Boston 15, Massachusetts

spssi

The Journal of

SOCIAL ISSUES

AESTHETIC PROBINGS OF CONTEMPORARY MAN

Issue Editor: Warren G. Bennis

Preface

When the possibility arose of using one of the numbers of the Journal for an analysis of some selected contemporary art forms that have enrapt audiences, we were enthusiastic at its potentialities. And our cerebral powers were challenged just because too many of the new theater, drama and novels have been accused of being "sick" and at the very least "meaningless." But, no ready body of articles was available, no crew from the behavioral sciences, nor from the arts and humanities stood in the wings ready to leap on stage upon cue. As Bennis points out in his article, special soliciting techniques were used, in itself a fascinating exercise, to gather special articles.

Why should the Journal devoted to the communication of scientific findings and interpretations engage in this extraordinary effort?

As Bennis points out, there is the concern with increasing the communications and relations between the cultures of the humanities and arts and the cultures of the sciences. But inter-cultural understanding is also purposive rather than an end in and of itself? Communication to what end? As we thought about this question of "why," we felt we would disguise or rationalize our subjective wishes into potential audience or reader reactions. Without presuming to instruct the reader as to what he might "get" from the number, we do want to state some of our own alternating reactions and projections. And in keeping with the topic and spirit of this number of the journal, we do not feel that we have to land on one of any number of possible "ends" and reasons for pursuing this topic. We offer three stances or perspectives to use while immersing in the culture of the contemporary theater, cinema and novel.

(a) The "absurd" and "moving" touch us and stir us because they are about the human condition, but *only* of a small sub-group in our society. The characters, portrayals, themes and lack of themes may be realistic but only of a limited segment of the population and of the society. Clinical psychopathologies arouse compassion, challenge our professional skills of understanding and therapy, but are not of us.

(b) One proper job of the artist is to take some small tendencies and aspects of reality and construct a framework of exaggerated grotesqueries. Amplifications bigger than life and beyond reason sledge hammer us with what really are small rocks in our experiences.

(c) How can the alert psychologist see and anticipate the "future" social issues more clearly? Can the analogical conceptual frameworks of the artist help construct a conceptual framework for the research scientist? Since art is communicating to us through a non-technical framework (that is, not our behavioral scientists' accustomed logical jargon), we can examine the presentation of reality for our purposes of converting these understandings into verifiable and non verifiable statements about the conditions of man in our contemporary society. Perhaps we can "see" the social issues that will be a SPSSI domain in the next decade.

Anyone of these three orientations ought to be sufficient justification for focussing our serious attention on the artists presentations. The combination overdetermines the reason for this number. And we confess, the idea of this number seemed like exciting mind stretching in reconciling our professional selves with our social and aesthetic selves. Not good clean fun, but unrelieved grimness seems to be our fate, however.

<div style="text-align: right">

ROBERT CHIN
General Editor

</div>

INTRODUCTION

How the Issue Was Formed

Warren G. Bennis

This special issue devoted to the "Arts and the Social Sciences" was prompted by several considerations. First and foremost was a general interest in the mounting tension between the "Two cultures," a split made plain by C. P. Snow in his 1959 Rede Lecture and fueled beyond sensibilities by the recent Leavis-Snow controversy raging in England.

It is a bit puzzling as to why the Snow debate had taken on so much steam *now* and why it has captivated the imagination of so many intellectuals here and abroad. Certainly the issue is not new. Dryden wrote in 1668:

> If natural causes be more known now than in the time of Aristotle, because more studied, it follows that poesy and other arts may, with the same pains, arrive still nearer to perfection.

And Shelley, over a century and a half ago in his "Defense of Poetry," wrote:

> The cultivation of these sciences which have enlarged the limits of the empire of man over the external world has, for want of the poetical faculty, proportionally circumscribed those of the internal world.

And, as Lionel Trilling points out (1962), Matthew Arnold composed his "Literature and Science" as the Rede Lecture at Cambridge seventy-seven years before Sir Charles gave his *on the same topic.*

No, the issue is not new—or settled. But why the "unexampled ferocity," the outraged attacks and counter-attacks, the prominence of the issue? No one can say with confidence what the reasons are for the current intensification of the fissures between the humanities and the sciences. The unparalleled successes and hegemony of the physical sciences? The need for scientific understanding by politicians and political understanding by scientists? The specter of a depersonalized, bureaucratized, computerized mass society? The grey vision of robot-like scientists, lacking the veins of humanness, ruling the future?

Whatever the reasons, whatever the historical context—whether it is Rousseau attacking the *philosophes* or D. H. Lawrence denounc-

ing psychoanalysis—there is, within all of us, a Romantic Agony, a tension between Reason and Passion that is currently revealed in its contemporary form as the so-called Two Cultures controversy.

*   *   *   *

The Editors of the *Journal of Social Issues* have been concerned with a rather specialized version of this controversy, the oft-noted gap—the misunderstanding—between the social sciences and the arts, what F. Wyatt refers to ruefully as the "no-relationship." (1963) It is bizarre, but probably true, that there appears to be as much antagonism (perhaps more!) between the social sciences and the humanities as there is between the physical sciences and the humanities. It is bizarre because the social sciences and the humanities seem to have so much in common. What Malraux (1961) says for example, that "'art' is the expression of significant relations between human beings, or between minds and things," only a few social scientists would take exception to that statement as a definition of the social sciences. It is true, probably, because the target of inquiry for both is the human condition and this similarity of goal may breed jurisdictional disputes, fruitless arguments over "method," and a "narcissism of petty differences."[1]

For this issue we originally had in mind the relationship between the social sciences and those art forms referred to as the Theater of the Absurd and the New Cinema, most particularly the *Nouvelle Vague* and the New Experimental Cinema. We felt that there are some very significant currents in these artistic productions and that it might be useful to detect some tangencies, some communication—even some integration between the human sciences and these artistic enterprises. We wanted to see if the boundaries between the arts and the social sciences could be restructured so that inputs from one can nourish the other.

Why the New Cinema and the Theater of the Absurd?[2] Partly to pare down our aspiration and partly for a focus of convenience. But for another reason as well. Because these art forms exemplify what Daniel Bell (1963) calls a "revolution in sensibility," whose "common elements lie in the effects which culture (the expressive symbolization of experience) seeks to produce, and in contemporary society these effects I would identify as *novelty, sensation, simultaneity, immediacy,* and *impact.*" These intentions are insidiously cor-

---

[1] There is no denying, of course, considerable differences in style as well as substance of the humanities and the social sciences, but these differences are not of the magnitude to cause the present lack of comprehension or antagonism.

[2] These are unfortunate labels, but no one has supplied different or better ones. Martin Esslin, taking Camus' *Myth of the Sisyphus* popularized the term Theater of the Absurd (1961). For clarification of the New Experimental Cinema see Dienstfrey (1962).

related with certain trends in our mass society, and impart—through the breathless New Cinema and zany Theater of the Absurd—new truths for our times. Or so we reason.[3]

With this in mind we wrote letters to many people who we thought might have something to say on this issue. In order to communicate our focus for this issue, we reproduced the last paragraph of this letter requesting papers for this special issue: (The letter was dated December 6, 1962).

> We would like a contribution from you on any facet of the relationship between the Theater of the Absurd and/or New Experimental Cinema. This article could include such questions as: (1) The sociology of these new artistic developments; e.g. why their acceptance and resonance now? Background, education, "roots" of the artists? (2) What are the social and psychological significances of these works of art? What are they trying to say? Esslin, for example, in his *Theater of the Absurd*, uncovers a number of meanings of this theatrical development: man sinking toward death; man entangled in illusion; man breaking through cold loneliness; man breaching the dead wall of complacency and automatism; man looking for meaning, etc. (3) What are the limitations and potentialities of artistic creations for understanding human behavior? Is new ground being broken or does the new theater and cinema simply expose old wounds? (4) What are the limitations and potentialities of social science for the artists?
>
> But the questions raised here are not limits or constraints to be placed on you; they are only some of our own questions.

About fifty people were asked to submit papers in the first mailing (all told, some 150 people were contacted), thirty from the arts and twenty from the social sciences. The former included directors, writers, critics, actors, and producers. Only a handful were associated with the academy. The latter were academic social scientists who were recommended by the Editorial Board and some outside advisors with a wide overview of developments in the sociology and psychology of aesthetic developments.

The first responses were disappointing. In the first place *none* of those in the "artist" group agreed to write papers. Most of them thought it was "an excellent idea," or "interesting task" or "appealing proposal," but none could do it. The model response was something like this letter received from a movie critic:

> . . . I have had to decline any further writing assignments for this year in order to devote myself to a book. The subject is certainly a fascinating one and demands treatment, but, as I said, I do not feel I am the one to do it just now. . . .

---

[3] These intentions (novelty, sensation, etc.) are equally true of other modern art forms as well as such Action Painting, electronic music, etc.

Another popular response was the following:

> Thank you for inviting me to contribute to the *Journal of Social
> Issues*. This really is not my field. (This, from one of the leading di-
> rectors of French cinema. W.G.B.) A person better qualified to write
> such an article would be ————. He can be found at ————.
> Sincerely yours.

One famous movie critic wrote:

> The topic is much too broad, you don't mention how much ($$$),
> and anyway I have no time for the next 12 months. So it seems hopeless.
> Sorry.

This last letter was received at my office on February 15th 1962,
over two months after my letter had been mailed. I felt that the
author captured my mood, however; it did, indeed, seem hopeless.

The social scientists, for their part, fared no better. They tended
to be more cheerful, hopeful, vague and outrageously irresponsible.
One promised me a paper on Genet, Theater of the Absurd and their
social meaning. After dunning him for almost a year, he tells me that
he wrote it during the summer but submitted it elsewhere. He won-
dered if I might consider another manuscript which turned out to be
nothing more or less than a brilliant paper on "Levels and Meanings
in the Social Sciences with Special Attention to Erikson's Concept of
Identity." When I phoned the writer to tell him that I certainly en-
joyed this paper and would like to have a copy of the paper for my
own files but that it wouldn't be appropriate for this particular issue,
he gruffly responded: "Well, for Godsake, I wish you'd make it clear
what you wanted anyway," and brusquely hung up.

At least five people said they misplaced my original letter due to
(1) painting of offices, (2) moving, (3) going to Europe, (4) return-
ing from Europe, and (5) nervousness. Just the other day (Nov. 2,
1963) a literary critic, to his dismay, found my letter on his cluttered
desk and responded. Three social scientists, having promised papers
(due June 15th, September 1st—"at the latest"—October 15th, and
December 1st, 1963) reneged on their promises.

On August 12th, 1963 I received a letter dated July 30, 1963 from
the secretary to one of the leading American movie directors which
read:

> That son-of-a-bitch Mr. ———————— will be shot at dawn
> for the severe crime of procrastination, in form of unanswered corre-
> spondence. His last words were that he will mail you an article tentatively
> called "Absurd and Senseless Cinema" in the second part of August.
> It will be between 12 and 15 double space pages. Love and Kisses.

The paper, of course, never arrived and I began to ponder on the
true seriousness of the Two Culture problem which was beginning to
grab me personally. Alas.

In any case, we do have an issue devoted to the Arts and the Social Sciences. It is not quite what we had in mind to begin with, but we think the articles are fresh and vital. There is an unfortunate skewing of writers from the academy and from the social sciences. Samuel Hirsch is our only representative from the performing arts, but even he is an academician, holding down the post of Head of the Directing and Acting Department at Boston University's School of Fine Arts. Norman Holland has a foot in each camp, as Professor of Humanities at M.I.T. as well as movie critic of the *Hudson Review*. In addition to compromising on the representation of authors, we have had to relax our strictures for material. It was not possible to restrict this issue to the New Cinema and Theater of the Absurd. The classic theater, modern novel, French Impressionism, were included as well. However, we have given the editorial preference to our original bias.

In conclusion, let us not lose sight of the promise which guided us in putting together this issue. Samuel Butler once said that "The more a thing knows its own mind, the more living it becomes." Both the arts and the social sciences can help us know our own mind and help us become more human. It follows, then, that we need both.

REFERENCES

BELL, D. "The Eclipse of Distance," *Encounter*, May, 1963, pp. 54-56.

DIENSTFREY, H. "The New American Cinema," *Commentary*, June, 1962, pp. 495-504.

ESSLIN, M. *The Theater of the Absurd*, N.Y., Doubleday Anchor, 1961.

MALRAUX, A. "Sketch for a Psychology of the Moving Pictures," *Reflections on Art*, Edited by Susanne K. Langer, N.Y., Oxford Unvi. Press, 1961, p. 326.

TRILLING, L. "Science, Literature and Culture: A comment on the Leavis-Snow controversy," *Commentary*, June, 1962, pp. 461-477.

WYATT, F. "Psychology and Humanities: A study in misunderstandings," *Teachers College Record*, Vol. 64, No. 7, April, 1963, pp. 562-575.

Placing Aesthetic Developments in Social Context: A Program of Value Analysis

Arthur J. Brodbeck

After emerging in the fifties, and slowly accumulating a body of work, a strong public identity has now finally been assumed by two new "movements" in cinema and theatre. Popularly they have been dubbed "the theatre of the absurd" and the "nouvelle vague" cinema, although no one seems altogether happy about the "identification tags." Both have aroused animated interest beyond their point of origin and the gradual diffusion of patterns they contain is now noticeably international. Even the Soviet Union has been caught giving a top award to a film, 8½, that is very near "the new wave," if not squarely of it. America has been a willing "host" to many importations from both movements, and current signs all suggest that the traffic to our shores will increase, although we have not as yet created as many or as distinguished examples as France or England or even perhaps Italy and Argentina. Interestingly enough, although these movements do not seem to have been directly responsible, they have appeared at a time when audiences in America were moving from the palatial to the more *intime* theatres and cinemas that have since provided a modest display case for the succession of works in the *genre*.[1] Yet the characterization of these patterns *as a collectivity* is still somewhat puzzling, if we are to judge both by the lack of consensus among, as well as the growing number of, the interpreters who seek to clarify their content to their audiences. We are often told they are "anti-plays" or "meta-theatre" or have grown out of a system of thought that goes beyond metaphysics to the "pataphysics" associated with Alfred Jarry. We are told they are a Western embodiment of the principles of Zen. Those who have produced them are often content to say only that they are merely what they are, akin to the kind of skirting of issues one found when intelligence was said to be merely what

---

[1] This shift in audience setting has allowed for much more "mass circulation" of special and sophisticated styles in cinema and theatre.

intelligence tests measure. Sometimes we are even told that *any* meaning is to be taken, as if we were being exposed to relatively "pure" projective devices, the outstanding example being Resnais' remarks about his *Last Year at Marienbad*.

Intrigued as the public has been by all of the mystification that surrounds the movements, it has not been content merely to "experience" them. On the contrary, it has asked to have its experience clarified and sometimes, with great alacrity, has turned to the modern social scientist for answers, when they were not forthcoming elsewhere. In some ways, the social psychologist—and the basic data for all of the family of sciences about man is that of social psychology, however differently it is processed by each—is in a more advantageous position than the humanist to appraise events in the humanist's own domain. He is trained to think, first of all, about the social process as a whole and to place art as part of the process within the total social configuration. He is, therefore, less likely to become involved in matters of sheer aesthetic concerns apart from the wider purposes they serve in the total setting. Secondly, he is trained to think and appraise in terms of systematic and depersonalized categories that carry with them public rules for usage. While he may as often as the humanist start with subjective impressions, he goes on to place these under formal rubrics and to find objective indices by which to estimate the strength of tendencies (and relationships among them). What he says may often lack the same elegance of impression associated with "literature," and indeed may often appear "barbaric" to the *literati*, but it makes up for that by being a less privatized statement. Indeed, it is this very matter of language that is at the heart of much of the "theatre of the absurd" and we shall have occasion to refer to it again. Having said this much, however, it is wise to remind ourselves that these features that are the earmarks of the new behavioral scientist are increasingly becoming part of the humanities themselves and, unhappily, we are also witnessing the regression to more intuitive and literary modes of thought among those who are self-identified as behavioral scientists, often shorn of the style that makes "privitization" more than clinically interesting. Clearly, if "a third culture" is emerging, it does not necessarily respect conventional professional alliances and often crosses official boundaries to create unexpected and highly productive coalitions between humanist and social scientist.

By now, it is an elementary procedure in social psychology to search for the meaning of an individual or collective response pattern by placing it fully within its environing context. No part of the context can be overlooked if we are to establish meaning unambiguously. To carry out the contextual method, many of us have found it necessary to conduct a systematic survey from five different but intimately related points of view. These are:

Goal thinking
Trend thinking
Condition thinking
Projective thinking
Alternative thinking.

Indeed, we might say that only *after* all five forms of thinking have
been brought to bear upon a pattern under scrutiny does it emerge
with sufficient clarity, rather than being taken as known at the start.
The order of application cannot be conducted routinely; depending
upon the specific empirical features one encounters as one conducts
inquiry into the meaning of a pattern, the order of thinking may shift
from problem to problem. In short, order of application is itself part
of the empirical contingencies of the inquiry. The method thus allows
for the greatest possible freedom of thought, while remaining rigor-
ously systematic. Futhermore, one may have to work back and forth
several times between the various avenues of approach, rather than
run through each only once. Because the five forms of thinking are
interrelated, one form may be brought only up to a somewhat ambig-
uous point, until explored in terms of the direction offered by another
form, after which we can proceed to pick up the former strain of
inquiry beyond the point of ambiguity at which we were forced to
leave it. Together all five forms of thinking are exhaustive of the
possible ways in which any problem may be approached. No other
way of providing contextualization remains. However, this does not
mean that any one form of thinking can quickly be exhausted in its
empirical application to a specific problem. Indeed, we are often re-
quired to stretch our available scientific capacities beyond the bounda-
ries scientific convention often arbitrarily sets for us, if we are to serve
the interest of what maximum enlightenment ideally requires.

Contextual study can have great scope and it can have great
depth. Ideally, both are required and in some integrated arrangement.
Without understanding which positions in the social structure and
which cultures are and are not producing and attending to these new
aesthetic movements, we do not have a very secure basis for arriving
at penetrating hypotheses. Unfortunately, the psychology of art has
suffered a good deal by having only very thin data about the audiences
that respond to different forms of art. Such scope data, however, still
need to be supplemented by depth studies. It is becoming increasingly
apparent to communication experts that, even when one has a good
estimate of art content and audience characteristics, generalizations
about impact and outcome of the exposure are not always verified, but
require attention to further details, especially the unconscious pro-
cesses. I doubt if anyone would have predicted that *Waiting for Godot*
would have been a smashing success, as it was, at San Quentin. A

great deal of the current inquiry into art in depth appears cut off from scope inquiry, however. Scope study often provides us with some systematic basis for the intelligent selection of concrete persons and art works for depth study, so that such detailed inquiry can be seen as "representative" or "exceptional" with regard to the whole pattern to be clarified. A method by which scope and depth may be integrated has been set forth elsewhere (1, 3).

Customarily, for a symposium, one is not expected to contribute a definitive program of research on a topic, but to offer some useful hypotheses for research scrutiny. The procedure used in the remainder of the essay is that of: (1) acquainting the reader with each of the five forms of thinking; and (2) making a number of selective applications of each form to the two interesting new movements in film and theatre. The goal is to give a representative exemplification of what a fuller program of contextualization would look like. As a kind of prelude to this discussion, however, a social psychological theory of art will be very briefly presented, because in many ways the discussion which follows flows out of it and is often more intelligible when referred back to it. Quite purposively, the theory is stated less formally than it might be, since it is premature at this time to overtighten postulates and hypotheses.

Art as a Clarifier of Mood

In some early studies of mine into attraction toward aggression films, it was discovered that some children who were quite aggressive and quite low in aggression both were attracted toward aggressive films. If the function of art were to vicariously express inhibited impulse, only the nonaggressive children should have sought out vicarious aggressive experience. Instead, some in both groups did. The decisive factor that emerged was one of *worry* about a pattern of behavior. Thus, the children who worried that they were not aggressive enough and those who worried that they were too aggressive were the ones highly attracted to aggressive films, whereas those who did not worry when aggressive or not aggressive showed lowered interest.[2] By now, projective testers too have been discovering that aggressive content to projective tests are obtained from those who are highly aggressive in actual life with a frequency comparable to those who are not. In short, then, what has emerged is *a worry hypothesis*. It does not matter whether one manifests or does not manifest a particular behavior pattern in everyday life, only whether one worries about

---

[2] An interesting complication: Those who were rated highly aggressive by others, but rated themselves as low in aggression, *avoided* seeing aggressive films. At greater depth, the worry phenomena is modified, apparently, even though it may continue to hold after exposure is made.

the actual absence or presence of the pattern, when art is resorted
to as a form of problem-solving about that pattern.

It seems possible to take this lead several steps further in terms
of an analysis of subjective experience. It has long been a common
perception that art "improves upon" experience. It takes what there
is in experience and gives it better form. In so doing, it frequently
simplifies and orders remembered experience into patterns that actual
experience has provided only as murky potentialities and possibilities.
Experience is seldom aesthetically satisfying. Art improves upon it. In
those cases where worry is absent, the subjective components of ex-
perience—the way in which mood and images combine—must have
assumed more satisfying form than the other experiences that issue
in worry.

But the process works both ways. Having had an experience of
form that art provides which is aesthetically moving, a person may
seek to reinstate that "ideal" experience in his actual life, even where
the mood and image relate to intense anger. New patterns of per-
ceiving may develop out of the art image, so that the irrelevant to it
in everyday life is given selective inattention and all that maximizes
the "ideal" form is highlighted. Needless to say, a good deal of such
back and forth movement between art and actual experience may be
highly preconscious.[8]

Indeed, there are those who believe that one only discovers any-
thing new about reality by entertaining some useful and relevant
fantasies by which to explore it. Oftentimes, mood and image appear
in conflict. The image of events one has entertained lead to no clarifica-
tion of feeling about them; hence, the ensuing state of worry and the
resort, in part, to whatever fantasy art may provide that can possibly
add an increment of mood clarification.

While all of this has been stated in the vocabulary of the subjec-
tive life, we have found in principle no difficulty in objectifying it for
research purposes by appropriate, if crude, operational indices. At the
present time, there is no more neglected field of psychological investi-
gation than that of mood, although the work of Nowlis (11) has been
of importance in calling attention to what there is there to be dis-
covered, and physiological research has begun to lean heavily on
mood measurement. In another essay (2) the manner in which mood
may be systematically studied as *a form of value expression* has been
detailed. Extending such analyses, we may say that, through clarifying
mood, art may inadvertently assist in ultimately clarifying values.

Truncated as the presentation of the theory has been, it serves in

---

[8] It is being assumed throughout that subjectivities are composed of moods,
images, or both, but no further "elements." All the rest moves into objective
"expression," such as tacit word use.

any event to indicate a viewpoint which suffuses a good deal of the discussion to follow.[4] It may be useful to place the theory among the five forms of thinking now to be surveyed. As a theory, it belongs under that mode of thinking which we refer to as *condition thinking*, even though it has relevance to much that is to be said under the other tasks of contextualization.

Goal Thinking

What influence are these two new movements seeking to exert in the world? When we ask about the meaning of any response pattern, whether individual or collective, we are required to estimate what outcome is being sought by the person or group through that pattern of responding. Indeed, it is the very fact that responses don't automatically announce their meanings that requires us to be contextual in the first place. By now, part of the elementary introduction to social psychology consists in demonstrating how the same response pattern, as a mere physical act, may have quite different intended (or realized) outcomes in shifting situations. Although it is frequently uphill work to establish unequivocally the preferred outcomes sought by actors in social process, the frontiers before us lie within the emerging social psychology of values.

Elementary as all this may be, current motivational analyses now in wide professional use fall far short of providing the conceptual tools that consistently facilitate a coherent method of contextualization. Some categorical schemes, for instance, list an unending array of terms for outcomes, of uneven levels of generality so that concrete and abstract outcomes receive similar status, and even branch out to include all mechanisms (like projection) as themselves outcomes. Other schemes choose a smaller series of terms and retain comparable levels of generality for each; yet, they are arrived at without a method of prior empirical inquiry of the actual outcomes people *do* seek throughout the social process, so as to insure that the key terms are comprehensive rather than merely economical. As a result, an abitrary series of small number of terms are stretched to do a duty they were not set up to confront. The categories devised by Murray and his associates are an example of the former flaw of lack of economy; the categories of the Yale "social behaviorists" exemplify the latter flaw of lack of comprehensiveness. In particular, the social behaviorists are often vague as to whether and when terms like "aggression" and "dependency" are to be taken as outcomes or as strategies to obtain outcomes. In the terminology we shall use, they confuse the skill motive with all the

---

[4] Those familiar with the writings of Susanne Langer will recognize that her stress on art as "a cognition about feeling" is most compatible with the theory presented here.

rest. Many attempts to get around the specification of value smuggle "hidden" meaning into seemingly descriptive language, so that subjectivities are unwittingly attributed to the actor by the way his operations are verbally denoted. There is, of course, no way in which operations can be measured as to meaning without recourse to study of the subjectivities (experience) of both parties in a social interaction.

Elsewhere, the way in which principles of procedure and principles of content are often left ajar in social science has been shown (5). While all tend now to subscribe to a contextual theory of meaning in principle, the actual *procedures* of motivational analysis do not exemplify or ensure the principle in operation. The demand that the gap calls forth has led to an institutional method of derivation of motives or outcomes, isolating the most highly organized and pervasive ends in the social process in such a way so as to leave no concrete outcome unclassified. The method of derivation is depicted in another context (4). The key terms comprise eight: *rectitude, enlightenment, wealth, skill, respect, power, affection and well-being.* To contextualize any response pattern means to examine it with regard to any actual or potential relationship it bears to all eight. The procedure is called a value-institutional analysis, since there are enduring institutions set up for the maximization of each value by cultural *convention*, and yet, *functionally* the same specializations may shape any social interaction no matter where it is officially located in the social process. There may be "law" in the family, for instance.

The uphill work involved in ascertaining the meaning of any response pattern is not lessened by the analysis; indeed, the categories were not designed for the purpose of making the life of the social scientist less effortful. Instead, ambiguities are brought forward more sharply to be faced and clarified by the categories, rather than overlooked in a mechanical rush for what people can easily agree upon within an empiricism which takes current standards of enlightenment as enduring. Scrutiny of the bearing of any response pattern upon the whole order of existing institutional arrangements is encouraged and the point of highest and lowest relevance becomes clear only by reflection and research about alternatives. Needless to say, some coders experience considerable stress when faced with contextual operations for which their previous training has prepared them only in principle rather than procedure. Often value ambiguities that lie powerfully disguised and entrenched in the coder's culture have to be endured, while seeking to reduce and clarify them in the "privacy" of the personality or professional group.

Art as a set of institutional practices is conventionally a relatively "pure" specialization to skill. By skill, we refer to all practices which have as their principal aim the arranging of available elements into

patterns. Institutions devoted to social etiquette, for example, are clearly rather "pure" skill institutions whose emphasis is perhaps more social than painting or music. Games of all sorts are specialized to skill. The classification of art in this way is perfectly consonant with the theory put forward before which sees art as "improving upon" the organization of experience. Furthermore, since in so doing it may clarify mood and sharpen values, it is far from having a role that cuts it off from all other outcomes men seek. A discussion of some of these matters have been made in other places (7). We will see in a moment how many of the goals of the movements under focus here go beyond simple skill outcomes.

It is this very matter of values that troubles a good many of the artists involved in the new theatre and cinema. Older modes of value thinking have collapsed; they are searching for new modes. We can, as a matter of fact, list this as one of their goals. We would classify it as one specialized to *enlightenment*. It is for this reason, apparently, why many often look upon them as highly intellectualized movements, as if the life of intellect were any less intense in feeling than its opposite. Indeed these artists are characterized by a great distrust for words and a greater reliance on visual modes of experience, on imagery. More is to be said by the feet of a corpse (that refuses to stop growing) coming through a door and disturbing the locus of a marriage, because the image clarifies the feeling or mood of a marital failure more than any amount of verbal discussion. Indeed many of these plays and films can only be understood by "using the language of the heart" by which to discipline the mind. The shift from verbal to visual and metaphorical languages constitutes one of the goals of the group and can be said to be specialized to *skill*.[5]

Rectitude suffuses a good many of the productions, too, in the wish to highlight the discrepancy between words and deeds. We are treated generously to the "absurdity" of people saying one thing while doing another. One of the primary indices of a concern with rectitude is interest in responsibility, personal and social. Hypocrisy is eclipsed in these plays by people whose words mean nothing. An outcome sought, therefore, is to get us to line up our words and our deeds, our principles and our operations, to *be* what we say we *are*.

The images of these films and plays are, indeed, sometimes so bizarre as to arouse high anxiety. Often it is like stepping into the world of the schizophrenic. One of the explicit aims of the artists is to get us to endure anxiety, to face the sources of it that are now realistically at work. The lovers in *Hiroshima Mon Amour* have their affair

firmly embedded in both the Nazi invasion of France and the atomic devastation of Hiroshima. The life of affection is seen to be riddled with the impact of realistically anxiety-producing events. This insistence upon confronting anxiety at work in events today may be said to be specialized to *well-being*. It asks us to sacrifice our illusions of comfort for confrontation with all that challenges it everywhere. It prefers enlightenment to well-being.

Respect enters into some of the aims. The avant-garde is traditionally unhappy with middle-class life and an astringent critic of it. It is exactly this milieux which Ionesco savagely scrutinizes in his first play *The Bald Soprano*. But the aims are also more positive in this regard, too. We are asked to substitute for the respect given to the Absolute (whatever form it may take) a more democratic distribution of respect for all the different empirical perspectives that can be taken upon events. Multiple standpoints within personalities and among them comes in for especially developed treatment. In this regard, we can say that one of the aims of the works is to get us to distribute our respect more democratically.[6] In an essay on other-direction, the wider movement along this path has been emphasized (   ).

Power enters into the art content in the special way in which it looks at language. It sees language as currently used as a method of wielding undue power over the mind by the mechanisms emphasized by Lifton as well as Schein and his associates. It highlights "coercive persuasion." In a way some of these artists often seem to be acting as a kind of antidote to decontextualized abstractions that lull thought to sleep and kill feeling. Antidotes, too, to ritualistic advertising campaigns and thoughtless sloganeering that commercialism may engender. It often does this by a kind of "reverse English," pretending to use what it ridicules. In this aspect alone, although others could be added, the new art movements, however far to the left they may be found to be, do not seem about to follow the path of Satre or of Brecht.

We have only begun to enumerate goals and subgoals that motivate these movements. Those that we have brought to attention should make perfectly clear that there is no mystery of meaning within the new works of art. Indeed, they share perspectives with a wide variety of other movements within art,[7] as well as with other professional groupings. None of their values appear "absurd," but often very realistic and worthwhile. Indeed, one cannot help but have value consc-

---

[6] The respect revolution in which the Negro citizen is now a central participant is given, in *The Blacks*, a remarkably powerful depiction by Genet which leaves no middle-class complacency untouched. The impact of this play on its audience deserves study since it is focussed on a *collective* experience.

[7] With, for instance, the work of Durrell and his "quartet" of novels.

quences if one is creatively productive at all and it is this they are often saying.

Perhaps we can conclude this exercise in goal thinking by calling attention to one very central goal of the movements—namely, contextualization itself. Sometimes these artists seem willing to push the contextual principle so far as to say the meaning of an event is in the sheer experiencing and beholding of it; no words can clarify it further, but could only mislead. We witness here part of what is more or less endemic to aesthetic activities. Contextualism is privatized; only the "poetic image," as Esslin dubs it, can truly communicate. In this sense, it is a contextualism that has not yet acquired "a social self" and hence, lies outside much of the main currents in contextual science, although by no means inimical to them.

Trend Thinking

Contextual study has a time dimension. It asks: from what to what? Hence, any form of stage or phase thinking which relates what is current to what has come before is a form of trend thinking. Generally, most of the interpreters of the two movements see little marked novelty in them, and, on the contrary, trace them back far into the history of aesthetic ideas. In fact, so *few* of the admirers of these new forms have been willing to see them as *discontinuous* with the past that one is rather inclined to explore such a possibility. The historians at Columbia were able to show that, at the time of Columbus, almost all forms of art underwent a drastic change, so as almost to "invent" a new culture. Space exploration is no less a comparable transaction. Indeed, there are reasons to believe that it may well be the schizoid personality that will be best able to endure the requirements of extended space travel. Perhaps the self-acknowledged schizoid "culture" that often seems to be embodied in these plays and films may be looked upon as constituting much of their novelty.

One cannot help but be impressed by the fact that both physical and social science have traveled somewhat similar routes. At the start of the 20th Century, both were shaken by depth discoveries. The hard shell of the atom was pierced and in its place one found a field of forces. At the same time, Freud was able to move beyond consciousness to preconscious and unconscious activity so that the personality, too, dissolved into a field of forces.[8] It is almost as if both were responding to a larger collective force acting upon each to shape its direction. The explosion of science in the 20th Century is in good part

---

[8] One of the few advances made beyond Freud was the American successes in the understanding and treatment of the schizophrenic, initiated in large part by Harry Stack Sullivan. The new art may be incorporating this knowledge.

due to these two major breakthroughs in depth knowledge. They have released all kinds of creative energy. Most of the avant-garde movement in art partakes of the same movement toward depth in the 20th Century. Yet there do not seem to be any eminent analyses of art which link it up by as much scope with physical and social science. Modern art does seem characterized by a wish to go "beyond" appearances, even to empathize with the possible potential "consciousness" within things. And the new cinema and theatre pushes such depth exploration even further in new media, and yet has managed to reach a somewhat wider audience (and uses more *popular* media) than the earlier movements that are considered to have influenced it.

It seems eminently worthwhile to trace the development of modern avant-garde aesthetic movements in terms of these wider configurations that have been at work in the world, all moving in the direction of depth, and to place the new theatre and film in this total 20th Century setting. Arnold Hauser's (8) discussion of cinema provides many suggestive leads as to the place of cinema in modern life as a whole that supports much of the view taken here.

David Bakan at Chicago is now preparing a volume which demonstrates how the religious background of social scientists influences their professional activities, much as he has previously done for Freud. It is not impossible that, as Whitehead once emphasized, the religious, artistic and philosophical heritage of men strongly direct and presage their scientific work. Whitehead thought of this in terms of the life of collectivities over time and not especially in terms of the life history of individuals. But neither proposition necessarily contradicts the other. What Bakan has done for religious background may, in turn, be extended to early exposures to literature and art that compose the personal wider culture of origin.

One of the deficiencies in psychoanalysis is that it does not adequately deal with exposures that come into the family from beyond it, so as to give us a picture of scope that interacts with and shapes depth factors. The first political events that come into focus; the initial exposure to music, theatre, film and literature; the first understanding of an attempt to theorize; all of this is not readily integrated with the traditional concerns. For these reasons, psychoanalysis is much more able to deal with matters of mechanisms that it is with values.[9] As Allan Wheelis has recently accentuated, it is value maladies that are increasingly likely to be brought into the clinic, rather than a failure of mechanism to achieve values clearly preferred. The value problem is squarely faced by the two movements we have con-

---

[9] Freud's movement away from his early concern with mood and affect often appears as a strategic error, since if he had pursued it, the instinct theory might have been modified to handle values and the larger social setting.

sidered. They may, indeed, be reaching for greater depth only as a means of understanding scope, much as Teilhard de Chardin has depicted a current phase in our evolution of consciousness.

By no means, then, does it seem certain that these two new movements can be looked upon as only minor elaborations of trends going far back into history. The attempts of Abel, Esslin and others to do so should be examined with great care. The kind of program of study indicated here may help to sharpen whatever novelty there may be within them and may relate to the emergence of schizophrenic patterns of thought and feeling as a collective and shared experience.

Condition Thinking

Thinking about conditions is part of the program of contextualization that is most frequently emphasized as "scientific." The conditions that produce a movement, that help to achieve its goals and that stand in its way are all to be considered. All conditions can be subsumed under five basic categories. These are: *culture, class, interest group, personality and crisis*. A cultural factor is the *largest* unit of condition specification; it can be both larger or smaller than a national culture. A personality factor is the *smallest* unit by which conditions may be specified, although we may wish to deal wholly with the way one such condition affects another. Factors related to class membership cut across both culture and personality; in turn, factors related to other special groupings (associated with sex or age, religious or professional affiliations, etc.) cut across both class and personality. Hence, both class and interest groupings are intermediate units lying between those of culture and personality. Crisis provides us with a fifth condition, and it may involve all or only some (or one) of the other units. War and economic depression constitute crises; but so, too, do epidemics (well-being) or racial integration (respect), so that we may isolate crises with regard to any of the values.

Using these five fundamental units by which to isolate conditions, one is not likely to get involved in decontextualized details, while the larger conditional context gets short-changed. In this sense, the framework, while heavily behavioral, avoids some of the pitfalls of cruder stimulus-response analysis. A good deal of past experimental social psychology often accounted for none of these major units as they entered into the relations of participants in the study, while a careful standardizing and scrutinization of physical details were observed. As a result, when business men were substituted for college freshmen or an attractive female experimenter "substituted" for a surly male psychologist, results were not readily replicable. The concreteness was more than misplaced; it was magnificently misconceived.

We need to know the characteristics of both the artists and their

audiences in terms of these five categories in order to have a firm basis for building up a theory about the production and consumption of the work of the two movements. We simply don't have the data for the audience, although we may take lots of guesses. The program calls for obtaining such data and keeping it current.[10]

About the men who constitute the theatre of the Absurd, we do have some information. Interestingly enough (and not surprising), they all appear to be marginal men. Although both movements originate in Paris, well over half of the figures are actually born elsewhere and their points of origin scatter widely over Europe. In addition, a high percentage have a history of being vagabonds and delinquents before they reached their creative period. One has the impression, too, that many of them came to creative fruition rather late in life, as compared to those who have carved out "the new wave" in cinema, a movement that seemed in fact to be distinguished by the refusal of a group of young men to "wait" for their rise in a slow-moving authoritative structure that comprised the film industry in Paris. We have, then, both extremes: rather late or very early productivity in the life history. These latter differences may account for a less heavy and pessimistic tone in the cinematic movement than that which often is felt in, for instance, Beckett's work.

All of these factors may explain the high creativity of the movement, as well as some of its shared goals, even though they constitute but rudimentary data. There is reason to believe creativity is promoted by early exposure to diverse perspectives and environments as H. D. Lasswell (9, 10) has proposed. The fact that so many of the artists changed cultures may explain why they have come to see their world in such novel ways and emphasize multiple perspectives within it. One would expect, too, that a prolonged existence "outside" of the Establishment would make one a better objective observer of it, as well as expose one to experiences that might otherwise be hard to come by. We often find that "minority" groups, or children who through illness are kept from active participation, become more perceptive observers of others and have more time for the elaboration of the subjective life than those who early and quickly get immersed in social routines. The late age of entering the productive phase similarly may work in this way. To take initiative or to be given opportunity early in life frequently allows one to escape the disadvantages of becoming "overeducated." There are data about the legal profession that suggests, for instance, that an authoritarian personality deepens and hardens the longer one has been in law. Rules go with less questioning; methods are compulsively routinized; there is less

---

10 We also need to survey how many of these conditions are dealt with in the works of art.

and less awareness of or interest in the subjective life. The ideals that are vivid among the young turn, among the steeled professionals, into hard-bitten cynicism.

It is somewhat more difficult to relate these crude conditions to the detailed value orientations of the movement. The distrust of language may easily be a result of changing cultures, particularly under adverse conditions, as often seems to have prevailed for some of the group. On the other hand, their position on the distribution of respect may arise from having to extend deference to persons of differing cultures and, among the vagabonds, to persons of different class and interest patterns.

One might take the occasion to reflect about the ideal conditions for the production of a creative social scientist. Exposure to the variation within all five conditions will no doubt more and more come to constitute part of the systematic training of the social scientist in the future. Without it, he is in a poorer position to extend respect widely and, hence, may narrow the focus of his theories in ways he does not altogether understand. This may well mean that the training of a social scientist will take a good deal longer than that of his other scientific fellows. The fullness of his training, however, would more than offset the rigidity that often ensues upon taking full command late in life.

We may round off this excursion into condition-thinking by looking at it in somewhat greater depth. Earlier we spoke of art as a clarifier of mood. The mood that distinguishes so much of the current work, and that even sets it off from much which precedes it,[11] is one of *confusion*. The plays particularly (although the films, too) depict endless episodes of *memory failure, loss of identity, disorientation in time and space*. There is a superb vaudeville routine in one of Ionesco's plays in which husband and wife meet at a social gathering and fail to recognize each other. Only gradually in their discussion do they come to realize that they live on the same street, the same house, indeed in the very same apartment, after which they deduce whom they must be. In a grand finale, the episode ends with a grotesquely formal salutation to one another. The scene is played in a tone of high seriousness, for reasons that are rather apparent.

The theory I would like to suggest is that these plays will appeal to those whose positions among the five conditions, or combinations of them, most conduce to states of confusion. Furthermore, the contemporary social setting of such people must be such as to make such

---

[11] The work of Brecht, for instance, is more characterized by *bitterness* than it is by a mood of confusion, a quality that is often "softened" in current revivals. Early work in avant-garde theatre concentrated more on the clarification of moods related to *power* than those related to *enlightenment*, as I use the terms. "Bitterness" relates to a feeling of being deprived of a power position one should have.

confusion worrisome rather than "natural." In addition, where the social setting produces an opposite arrangement (no confusion but stress to worry about the absence of it), we would again expect to find maximum stress of attraction toward this art genre.

Projective Thinking

Projective thinking must be drastically contrasted with trend thinking, however much the two can sometimes be related. It is concerned with anticipatory thought, with some estimation of developments in the immediate, intermediate and far future. Such estimates cannot intelligently be allowed to degenerate into routine repetitions of the past placed forward into the future, unless one is firmly committed to some dogma in the name of "science" that permits no room for the appearance of novelty in human affairs. Insight is itself part of a possible contingency upon which estimations of the future reside, especially insights of a collective nature. Social scientists often seem to have a depressed view regarding their own influence on what they study. They are often amazed to discover that their own findings, when slowly circulated among the type of subjects from which they were obtained, have over time produced a modification of the original discovery. A controversial but apt case of such a state of affairs may be the recent shift in class differences for child rearing patterns in America. If estimations of the future cannot be made simply a matter of repetitious functional associations already known or easy extrapolation of past trends (as in the celebrated hypothesis relating birthrate to other-direction), neither are they to be taken as mere fantasies of what one would like the future to be. Anticipations are to be grounded and disciplined by all of the other four forms of thinking.

One might well ask: How influential will these two movements be in achieving their goals? There is now scattered evidence to indicate that the kind of fantasies we entertain about our personal and collective futures limits and shapes the futures we come to have. Some work by Jean MacFarlane seems to substantiate this view in studies of longitudinal development using projective tests. Art, too, may unconsciously function in this way in the lives of persons or groups. Art images may be endowed with future reference that shapes expectations and modifies practices in the immediate future in a way which makes the art fantasy more likely to eventuate. It is interesting that much of the *science fiction* of the past *about today* has become the *actuality* we now have. The fantasies of love and lovers canned in Hollywood are frequently taken by those moving into adolescence as having referential value to a future state of affairs they make relevant to themselves.

Unfortunately, the fantasies of the two art movements seldom

have explicit future reference. Indeed, they often seem to eschew that period in the duration of time. Not wholly for these reasons, one wants to question very deeply whether their method actually helps them to further their goals, commendable as the goals may be. We know so little about the influence of art upon actuality that any penetrating answer (or even hypotheses) waits upon building up even a small amount of research relevant to the way art may facilitate policy making, the achievement of the artist's value preferences.

Alternative Thinking

This form of thought is most frequently enervated by a discrepancy between goal and projective thinking, when something is *wanted* but is not thought likely to *actualize*, at least without some kind of intervention. Alternative thinking is concerned with ways in which one may move estimated projections closer to goals by changing conditions or, if that is not possible, by modifying goals so that projections can be met with less deprivations and with creative preparation. The search for alternative routes, other than those considered likely to unwind as things are, summons attention back to all the other forms of thinking, too.

Indeed the past may itself be looked upon as a kind of imaginative laboratory for alternative thinking. What if certain latent potentialities had failed to materialize when they did at strategic points in history? How would the evolution of the social order have looked like as compared to what we know it to be? The museums of man are currently undergoing some revitalization by being built and planned in terms of such imaginative alternatives that allow history to have more intimate bearing upon the contemporary self.

One might well speculate whether these two aesthetic movements do not have a formidable competitor (and even ally) in the recent development of science fiction. Both are concerned with the impact of science on human relations, however different the explicitness may be. Both move us into the problem of facing drastically different perspectives. Both are suffused with the dangers men come to live with in a scientific world. Both do not flinch in exposing us to anxiety.

Science fiction, however, works itself out much less as a privatized experience, even though the writer may have to look deep inside himself to depict the image of the future that can be entertained plausibly.[12] In any event, it would repay careful study to make a comparable study of goals for the two developments, both arising as they have at approximately similar periods of time, so that we might estimate how

---

[12] Think of the rich subjective experience necessary to produce Olaf Stapledon's *The Star-Maker.*

the two are merely alternative expressions of the same impulses. Having made such studies, one would be in an especially favorable position to estimate the attraction and impact of each upon various positions in the social order.

Art is part of a larger myth in social orders, if we divide a myth into the three components of doctrine, formula and miranda. Doctrine consists of the most general and abstract visions and postulates about the world (our Declaration of Independence). Formula consists of the rules by which conduct is to be governed, such as the "if, then" statements one is expected to follow (our Constitution). Miranda offers vivid and graphic exemplifications of both doctrine and formula, both negative and positive, so as to compel emotional allegiance to the total myth. Art is relatively specialized, however unwittingly, to the whole via miranda. Within art, by systematic scrutiny, one can find the traces that link it to the larger formula and visions of doctrine. It is often said that art makes politics difficult, if not impossible, since it is continually *experimenting* with miranda, and hence unsettles the emotional stability of a social order. The constant modifications which art induce, indeed, may contribute to the strength of counter-myths, revolutionary turbulence and excessive tension throughout a social order.[13] In terms of myth analysis, the alternative relationship that science fiction bears to democratic doctrine and formula, when contrasted with the new cinema and theatre, would be extremely valuable to make from the point of view of the policy concerns that constitute the wider democratic society. One prediction: science fiction would be found to be less threatening to democratic perspectives, precisely because of its futuremindedness. A method for coding film for its myth components has been devised (1). The recent work on power processes in our society (12) aids here, too.

Some Concluding Remarks

The exercise of contextualizing the two new aesthetic movements in theatre and film has been nowhere near exhaustive; the sketch serves, however, to indicate how extensive the full program of study can be taken to be. It is probably not too extravagent to prophesize that, should one be considering devoting a career to just these two movements, and one must not forget how many careers are still devoted to so much less today, the product of the contextual program could be expected to constitute a rather formidable fundamental contribution to the social psychology of art, rather than some simple survey of a timely topic. Indeed, those of us who have been engaged in

---

[13] Lenin was well aware of this policy aspect of art and encouraged Soviet cinema to further the allegiance to Communist myth.

using the method to deal with various problems in social science find that few of the propositions now fashionable stand up hardily under this systematic confrontation. It exposes how little we have yet found that is so certain as to offer ground for comforting self-congratulations about where we now stand. Unlike the kind of contextualism we have been surveying by way of content, however, one comes away, after using it, viewing and sensing more vividly the scientific path ahead.

REFERENCES

1. BRODBECK, A. J., AND JONES, D. B. "Television Viewing and the Norm-Violating Practices and Perspectives of Adolescents: A Synchronized Depth and Scope Program of Policy Research" in *Television and Human Behavior* edited by Arons and May. N.Y.; Appleton-Century Crofts, 1963.

2. BRODBECK, A. J. "Mood and Feeling in the Classroom" in *The Classroom as a Democratic Experience*, V. Clyde Arnspiger, Follett and Co. Forthcoming: Spring, 1964.

3. BRODBECK, A. J. Review of Glick and Levy's *Living with Television*, Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, Detroit. Forthcoming: Winter Issue, 1963.

4. BRODBECK, A. J. Review of V. Clyde Arnspiger's *Personality in Social Process* in *J. of Ed. and Psych. Measurements*, Spring, 1963.

5. BRODBECK, A. J. Review of Skinner and Holland's *The Analysis of Behavior* in *Modern Uses of Law and Logic*, published at Yale Law School, September, 1962.

6. BRODBECK, A. J. "Values in 'The Lonely Crowd'" in Lipset and Lowenthal, *Social Character and Culture*, New York: Free Press, 1961.

7. BRODBECK, A. J. Review of Seobok's *Style in Language* in *J. of Ed. and Psych. Measurements*, Spring, 1961.

8. HAUSER, ARNOLD. *The Social History of Art*, Vol. 4, Naturalism, Impressionism, The Film Age, New York, Random House, 1958.

9. LASSWELL, H. D. *The Future of Political Science*, New York, Atherton, 1963.

10. LASSWELL, H. D. "*The Social Setting of Creativity*" in Anderson and Anderson *Creativity and Its Cultivation*, New York, Harper, 1959.

11. NEWLIS, VINCENT. "Clinical Impressions of Mood" in *Conflict and Creativity* edited by Farber and Wilson, New York; McGraw-Hill, 1963.

12. ROGOW, A., AND LASSWELL, H. D. *Power, Corruption & Rectitude*. N.Y.: Prentice-Hall, 1963.

A Clinical View of the Tragic[*]

Edward Joseph Shoben, Jr.

Between the elevating literature of failure called tragedy and the morbid literature of failure called the clinical case study, there yawns a wide but puzzling gulf. On first consideration, of course, the breadth of the gulf is far more obvious than its puzzling qualities. What has even a volume like Jean Evans's *Three Men*, to say nothing of the *Case Histories in Clinical and Abnormal Psychology*, edited by Burton and Harris, or the *Great Cases in Psychoanalysis*, assembled by Harold Greenwald, in common with *Antigone* or *King Lear?* The earthy and haphazard language of the psychotherapist's consulting room shows few similarities to the poetry of the tragic stage, and rarely is a neurotic patient touched with the *grandeur d'ame* that Corneille attributed to the tragic hero as his necessary and definitive hallmark. Nor is it possible to find a persuasive connection in the concept of doom as it applies to tragic literature and as it appears occasionally in, for example, some of Freud's reflections on neurotic destiny. *Doom* is a term rich in connotative values, suggesting a somehow foreordained end of a cataclysmic kind toward which the actions of a man lead him in spite of himself and his choices. There is reason to doubt the utility of the idea in our efforts to comprehend the art of tragedy; in psychoanalysis and psychology generally, it simply has no place. Stripped of its connotations, the notion of doom reduces simply to antecedent-consequent relationships leading to some negatively evaluated outcome; it entails no more than a naturalistic conception of behavioral cause and effect. However useful such a straightforward determinism may be in ordering the data of the clinic, it is not the essential stuff out of which tragedies are built or the primary basis on which they may be understood.

Yet it is difficult for one who has often sat in both the tragic theatre and the clinician's office to escape the possibility that the two have serious and interesting points of articulation. The common theme of human failure cannot be ignored. Neither can the ubiquitousness of complex conflict, partly of the individual man's own making. Even

the quality of language seems less than central, for if one admits such plays as *The Death of a Salesman* or *The Crucible* to the tragic canon, the speech, while certainly different from that recorded in therapeutic protocols, is still that of ordinary men. While it makes a genuine and important difference, it is no longer crucial. And if both Medea and Arthur Miller's John Proctor are more clearly endowed than any representative analysand with the *grandeur d'âme* of the tragic hero, there yet must be a point at which their experience, imagined by the playwright, speaks to ours. The tragic hero cannot be so far above us that we cannot identify with him, just as the neurotic patient is never so far below us that we cannot, often poignantly and movingly, find kinship with him. The gulf may be narrower than we thought, and there may be some profit in an exploration of the possible connections between tragedy as a form of literary art and neurotic psychopathology as it reveals itself in the clinic.

That the heart of tragedy is conflict is obvious, but the components of that conflict may be less so. One way to schematize them is as necessity and the human response to necessity of self-conscious effort. What makes the conflict tragic is that the effort always fails. Like the bull in *la fiesta brava*, the tragic hero never wins regardless of his courage, his strength, or his cunning. Necessity is inexorable.

We need pause only briefly, thanks to the work of Professor D. D. Raphael, over fate and character as elements of necessity. The distinction is unimportant, largely because dramatists themselves have apparently rarely drawn it. Oedipus, that favorite tragic figure of the Freudians, for example, was a rash and much too self-assured young man, and his personal failings certainly contributed to his terrible end. But before his birth, the gods had condemned him to murder his father and marry his mother; it was they who fixed in him the characterological weaknesses that would contribute to the fulfillment of their plan, and they insured the accuracy of their prophecy by contriving all kinds of coincidences and improbable events to make the murder and the marriage inevitable. Antigone is not at odds with a supernatural fate at all, but simply with an insuperable political power which overwhelms her. If Macbeth is caught in a web of otherworldly design, he is also a remarkable study in ambition bursting humane bounds. In all cases, disaster is imposed by necessity, whether the necessity is extrinsic in the natural or supernatural world of the tragic hero or intrinsic in his own character.

Opposed to necessity, some inevitable power capable of defeating all antagonists, is an individual who refuses to surrender. The individual may be "good" in some moral sense, like Antigone, or a villain like Richard III; the irreducible fact is his stubborn resistance to inescapable conquest.

It is here that the aesthetic value of tragedy may well reside. For some time now, a certain muzziness has made it difficult to accept Aristotle's notion, unclarified in the *Poetics*, that the pleasure of the tragic drama is a function of its "effecting through pity and fear the catharsis of such emotions." The medical analogy here is faulty on at least two counts. First, in the purgation of noxious substances from the body, it is not the toxins that are cleansed; it is the body itself that is relieved and eased. How then does the sheer arousal of pity and fear "effect the catharsis" of the emotions themselves? Second, even the most violent affects are hardly poisons to be ejected once and for all from the psychic system. There are times when fear is a highly useful and adaptive response, and since Freud's later observations, we have known that the mere evocation of powerful emotions is simply insufficient to effect a "cure" or to produce a greater degree of serenity or an improved equilibrium in the personality. In addition, it is hard to comprehend the desirability of subjecting pity to a cathartic! It seems probable, rather, that tragedy excites two different affects through its distinctive portrayal of conflict. On the one hand, there is a kind of wonder, a self-abasing awe, evoked by the presentation of necessity in the universe. On the other, there is a sympathetic admiration, a pride in humanity, elicited by the struggles of the hero. The hero must, in some meaningful fashion, deserve his dreadful end in order to command our compassion. Were his destiny entirely unmerited, we should only be outraged by the world's palpable unfairness, and to the hero's plight we would respond more with numbed shock than with engaged pity. But even though there is some element of justice, always discernible however subtle it may be, in the unredeemed fall of the hero, his effort of opposition, his blunt and unqualified unwillingness to yield the victory, wins our respect and admiration—for man as a species as well as for the particular tragic character. Even though few of us may rise to the heights of the hero when confronted by similarly hopeless odds, the race to which we belong is no thing of dust and ill assorted chemicals if it can produce such individuals and generate such ideals. As art, then, tragedy may please primarily (which is not the same thing as "exclusively") through evoking an elevated sense of self by means of a heightened awareness of membership in the old proud pageant of man, a tough and noble organism despite his almost catastrophic imperfections.

If this description of the aesthetic process and effects of tragedy is a sound one, then much depends, of course, on the relation of the audience to the play. As spectators, we experience the events of tragedy from a peculiarly safe angle of regard. Entering the dramatic world only in imagination, we do so without restraint, without the defensive inhibitions on our comprehension, our identification, and our commitment that most of us find it necessary to impose most of

the time in our relationships outside the theatre. Knowing that Aeschylus, Shakespeare, or O'Neill will permit us to escape after a fixed period of time, we are willing to attend, with a minimum of partisanship or interfering controversy, to the spectacle of men in the grip of occurrences beyond human control but never out of the reach of human experience. It is thus that we acquire tragic knowledge as well as enjoy the delights of tragic art.

And here we find the first point of articulation between the theatre of tragedy and the consulting room of the clinician. The psychotherapist, like the audience at a play, enters the special world of his patient under conditions of safety. The whole notion of a "professional relationship" implies the maintenance of a kind of perspective on the life of a patient that cannot ordinarily be developed in any other human context of comparable itimacy. The fixing of appointments by clock and calendar rather than by personal need and desire; the relative anonymity of the therapist, who rarely talks about himself; the limitation of contacts to the practitioner's office, and the emphasis on the therapist's discriminating between his emotions and judgments and those of the patient and on his attending to the latter without distortion from the former—all these factors underscore the effort of the clinician to attain something very similar to the calm, god's-eye view of the audience at a tragedy.

The purpose, too, is similar. Knowing that each hour will end and that the termination of the entire relationship is its very goal, freed from the continuous and touchy if often warm demands of living with the patient as spouse or child or business colleague, emphasizing the fact that the patient's life is not deeply entangled with his own, the therapist can suspend the inhibitions that he otherwise protectively imposes on his commitments. He can listen and think and express concern with less distortion from his own needs and wishes; he can devote himself more fully to understanding and to responding empathically because he is appropriately removed from his patient. Like the spectators at *Othello*, he is optimally both remote from the action and involved in it, both moved by the passions that spin the developmental plot and separated from them. Paradoxically, it is by virtue of his very distance from the person to whom he is clinically responsible —one is tempted to say his "aesthetic distance"—that the therapist is relatively free from restraint in his reacting to the affects, the conduct, and the reported behavior of his patient.

Nor is the element of paradox relevant here solely because of its role in the clinician-patient relationship. In his characterization of tragic art, Aristotle pointed out that tragic "incidents have the very greatest effects on the mind when they occur *unexpectedly* and at the same time *in consequence of one another*; there is then more of the marvelous in them than if they happened of themselves or by mere

chance." Tragedy typically seems to work through the portrayal of accidents that somehow seem both reasonable and inevitable and that clearly entail consequences of great import. Similarly, it works through the simultaneous presentation of opposites: the real and the apparent, the human being as agent and as object, chance and design in the shaping of human affairs, the human and the inhuman side by side in the individual man and—by extension—in man as a species. Thus, tragedy seems to make the best of two worlds—that of regularity and probability, and that of the unexpected and the unique, in which a giant accident, itself somehow plausible although outside the laws that govern human interaction, sets in motion a train of lawful events that leads to the tragic *denouement*. If there is any impulse to brush aside the centrality of paradox in the tragic play as merely the theatrical machinery of the dramatist, it may be well to remember, as Joseph Wood Krutch has wryly pointed out, that natural science itself makes occasional obeisance to the unique occurrence outside the regularities of the universe. The cosmology of modern physics, for example, is predicated on a proximity of stars passing in orbit the probability of which is far less than one in a million. Yet the empirically based hypothesis of that highly improbable event is an economical basis from which to generate the system of lawfulness which we successfully either discover in nature or creatively impose on her. This growth of a probabilistic tree of thought from a root of sheer accident is a physical illustration of the kind of paradox with which tragedy inherently deals. Its function seems to be that of heightening a sense of mystery in relation to knowledge, increasing a susceptibility to awe in the face of a necessity that transcends the controls that men can exercise by investigation and thought. It is a reminder that the world is still full of surprises, many of them fatal in their consequences.

The implications for our topic here are complex and may be clarified through a more specific analysis of a single play, *Hamlet*, chosen for its widely acclaimed representativeness of the tragic *genre* at its Renaissance best. When Hamlet discovers that he is the son of a murdered father, the duty defined for him by his culture and his social position is that of revenge. If he accepts the role of avenger, then he becomes its agent, "bloody, bold, and resolute." But Hamlet is a very young man, an orthodox Christian, a highly educated university student, and a person of high social attainments and refinements, "the glass of fashion and the mould of form." Revenge is not congruent to his scrupulous character, and he becomes caught up in a search for the reasons in himself and in the human condition that will account for and justify his failure to act on an obligation that he accepts. No longer the agent of his role, he is the victim of it, and in a state of agony, he must chide himself for the delays produced by the search for justification itself:

> That I, the son of a dear father murder'd
> Prompted to my revenge by heaven and hell,
> Must, like a whore, unpack my heart with words . . .

In soliloquy after great soliloquy, he probes his own feelings and the nature of man almost without restriction, but he never finds the reason for his inability to *be* the avenger despite his full acceptance of the duty of revenge.

It is important to note that Hamlet's required course of action remains clear, as does his overwhelming aversion to it. He never considers the question, for instance for vengeance *vs.* justice. Had Shakespeare permitted him to do so, the play would have fallen from the intensity of tragedy to the heat of mere controversy. As a matter of fact, justice is available to him, and he rejects it. Justice demands only requital, the talionic evening of the score by a death for a death. Catching Claudius, his father's murderer, at his prayers, he has ample opportunity to kill him, but he pauses, thinking,

> A villain kills my father; and for that,
> I, his sole son, do this same villain send
> To heaven.
> Why, this is hire and salary, not revenge.

Revenge must be disproportionate, so the king must be dealt with when he is

> About some act
> That has no relish of salvation in't.
> Then trip him up, that his heels may kick at heaven,
> And that his soul may be as damn'd and black
> As hell, whereto it goes.

Thus, Hamlet fails twice: first in his culturally imposed mission and then in his effort to understand himself as one to whom an accepted obligation is ego-alien in intense degree. As a result, his view of both self and the world becomes distorted. He conceives of men as a self-reproducing form of corruption and turns against Ophelia on the ground that it is far preferable for her to go to a nunnery than to breed sinners. Examining himself, he is forced to a desperate admission of incomprehension:

> Now, whether it be
> Bestial oblivion, or some craven scruple
> Of thinking too precisely on th' event—
> A thought, which, quartered, hath but one part wisdom
> And ever three parts coward—I do not know
> Why yet I live to say "This thing's to do" . . .

But Hamlet's tortured introspection not only supplies him with no answers; it leads him astray. He is troubled, clearly, by neither

bestial oblivion nor cowardice. He is unsparing of himself in thinking about his enterprise, and his courage is clear both in the killing of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern and in the fencing scene toward the end of the play. In war or a direct fight, he shows no queasiness at the prospect of blood. He simply cannot be the man he is and still be the agent of revenge in spite of his adherence to the avenger's code, and this rift in himself eludes his understanding.

For us, the audience, some slender clue to the nature of the rift is provided by the contrast between Hamlet and Laertes,

> What would you undertake
> To show yourself in deed your father's son
> More than in words?

The reply is nasty, brutish, and short:

> To cut his throat i' the church.

Thus, Laertes, who is arrogantly articulate about his "honor" (which Hamlet is not), enthusiastically accepts Claudius's proposal of treachery as the means of revenge. Claudius suggests a fencing bout, counting on the psychological probability that Hamlet, being,

> Most generous and free from all contriving,
> Will not peruse the foils . . . so that with ease
> Or with a little shuffling, you (Laertes) may choose
> A sword unbated, and, in a pass of practice,
> Requite him for your father.

It is as a cheat, then, that the "honorable" man moves not only willingly but eagerly toward his goal of revenge, and no conflict in his values troubles Laertes at all.

But if the spectators, like the therapist who gains insight into one patient by comparing him to others, achieve this modicum of understanding, Hamlet never considers it. It is not until, in the course of the foil-play, he discovers the poisoned wine and the unbated sword which "a little shuffling" has put in Laertes's hand, that he strikes, and then it is simply in self-defense. When, dying himself, he runs Claudius through for the king's part in the treachery of the fencing match, he is achieving only justice, not his duty of revenge. It is at this point that Hamlet puts aside his effort to understand himself and fulfills his socially defined mission through impulse. Although Claudius is already mortally wounded by his blade, Hamlet forces the poisoned wine down his throat in order to accomplish the disproportion that revenge demands beyond justice. At the very last moment, in one of the most startling and dramatic surprises of the play, the hero transforms an act of self-defense into the conscious and direct meeting of a terrible and oppressive obligation.

The cost, however, is fatal. First, justice has made the act of vengeance redundant and hollow; no deed can bring Claudius to death, for he is already, for all intents and purposes, a dead man. Hamlet can only once again "unpack his heart with words" and, for the first time, name the king as a proper object of revenge. As a voluntary act, the pressing of the poisoned wine on his father's murderer is only vainly symbolic. Second, Hamlet, who values above all the man "that is not passion's slave," is forced by the passions of the moment to perform his duty. He acts out of necessity, not a sense of free choice; and in doing so, he must forego all possibility of understanding himself and, indeed, of being in a profound sense true to his own character, which he never knows.

Here, it seems, is the key to the play and to the major impact of tragic art. It is not that Hamlet never once questions his duty of revenge; that is the obligation laid on him inescapably by his world. Rather, it is that he never penetrates the nature of his characterological inability to fulfill his responsibility. To *be* is to be the agent of revenge; to fail in such a role is not to be. *That* is his question, and he never resolves it—not, at least, by any conscious or volitional process. The main implications are two: First, even for one so well endowed as Hamlet in intelligence, personality, and opportunity, the individual man is ill equipped to confront all the demands that the world makes of him. Here we hear echoes of the story of the crucified god, strongly suggesting that when even divinity takes on a human character, it loses its power to behave with complete consistency, integrity, and effectiveness. Second, for all his poignant questioning and his capacity for self-examination, the individual man is always deficient in self-knowledge, always in some degree incapable of being true to himself because he does not and cannot fully know himself.

It seems quite probable that it is this reflection in the mirror that tragedy holds up to nature that partially accounts for its appeal. It is this image of ourselves personified in people who possess a *grandeur d'ame* that we admire that permits us to enjoy the drama of failure in which disappointment, humiliation, pain, and death are dominant themes. This is what Yeats may have had in mind when he spoke of tragedy as breaking the dykes between man and man and what Anouilh meant when he said that tragedy is "restful." For those who constitute the audience, it is both reassuring and productive of insight to discover kinship in mortality with the splendid spirits who are tragedy's heroes. In short, tragedy is aesthetically successful when it evokes the tragic vision, when it persuasively reminds us, as Peter Alexander has put it, of those "realities we should like to forget, if forgetting would abolish them."

Alexander's remark is reminiscent of Freud's response when he was asked whether psychoanalysis makes men happy. "It gives them

back," he answered laconically, "to the unhappiness common to all mankind." The analysand, freed from the distortions of his idiosyncratic pathological defenses, is better able to confront steadily the inevitable fact of his human limitations and to give proper attention to the matter of *style* in living with them. Without minimizing the restrictions on self-knowledge, without surrendering or becoming cynical about unattainable ideals, without falsely gainsaying the presence of evil in the world, we can still live in ways (the plural is important) that permit us to judge honestly that, on balance, we too have been parts of the old proud pageant of man.

Clinical insight in its general character, then, seems strikingly congruent at a number of points to the tragic vision, and the results of psychotherapy may be sensibly thought of as the patient's acquiring in less spectacular form some of the *grandeur d'âme* that marks the tragic hero, one whose behavior has a style that commands human admiration despite its intrinsic imperfections. The difference between the tragic stage and the clinic here is a crucial one, of course, but it underscores the relationship between the two. In tragedy, the heroic proportions of the central character are the mechanism by which the tragic vision is made possible. The spectator can admit to the fact of limitation in himself by virtue of his sharing this disquieting and disturbing characteristic with a figure whom he admires. In the clinic, the acceptance of self as inherently limited is dependent on the discovery and the development of what the patient can admire in himself. The discovery is facilitated by the unconditional positive regard, to use Carl Rogers's term, and the empathic understanding of the therapist. Through the esteem and respect, in spite of his limitations, of a person whom he admires, the patient is able to face those limitations more acceptingly and thus attain to the tragic vision. In this sense, the insight into self as intrinsically incapable of happily turning aside *all* the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune is a prerequisite to developing a degree of *grandeur d'ame* and its behavioral expression in a style of life.

There are three implications of this point of view that warrant discussion. First, the burden placed on the therapist is essentially that, in Reuel Howe's phrase, of "loving the unlovables." Those who visit the clinician's couch, because they are defensive about their own limitations and unwilling to confess the tragic restrictions on their self-knowledge, are likely to be ultimately either inept or manipulatively cruel in their interpersonal relations. Other people are typically perceived as objects of fear or as instruments by which to prove their own defensive dreams of supremacy or unshakeable adequacy. The Don Juan who derogates his amours to his own aggrandisement and the mother who drives her children to achieve what she herself has failed to realize are only two of countless illustrations. Regardless of

any superficial social polish, neurotics are liable, under conditions of intimacy, to show serious interpersonal shortcomings and, hence, to enjoy little love. Yet the therapist must convey a respect and concern for them that authentically approximates love in its depth and, for the duration of the relationship, its constancy. This paradoxical state of affairs is probably resolved by the professional conditions which permit the therapist's taking that calm, god's-eye view of his patient, at once related and removed, that is so similar to that of the audience in the tragic theatre. Loving the unlovables is not unlike admiring a tragic hero like Macbeth or O'Neill's Mannons. It occurs in part because the spectator has sufficient distance from the character to search actively for the traits that are worthy of esteem as well as to be receptive to those that are simply displayed as such. But this resolution of the therapeutic paradox leads to another: In the light of the argument developed here, we are saying that love leads by a direct if complicated series of steps to the tragic vision!

To make sense of this implication, it is important to consider, as our second point, the alternatives to the tragic view. While it may take widely different forms, any other conception of human life involves a denial of limitation, the assertion that Utopia is possible or that the individual, by proper concentration and work, can achieve any goal he sets himself that is not impossible according to physical law. There is evidence that this reading of things, at least in any extreme form, is illusory. For one thing, man differs from other animals not only in aspects of his structure and his marvelous cognitive capacities, but in the complexity of his desiring. From studies of conflict and motivation, we know that his desires can often clash with one another and that the satisfaction of one is not infrequently dependent on the frustration of others. From both clinical data and some experimental work, we have learned that men sometimes have little or no awareness of what they want, a basic proposition of Freud's that has recently been provocatively extended by Norman Brown. At the cultural level, such studies as Shepard B. Clough's *The Rise and Fall of Civilization* strongly suggest that the attainment of high states of civilization—marked by achievements in the arts and sciences, the establishment of human relations based on ideas of equity and justice, and extensive human control over the external environment—is accompanied by a decline in popular vigor that leaves such societies highly vulnerable to attacks from without. Clough's is not a cyclical theory of civilization; it is simply an empirical generalization from history which underscores the limited character of man's most distinctive achievement, the building of complex cultures. As such, it partakes of the tragic vision and questions the alternatives of boundless human potential. To the extent that these considerations are cogent ones, they imply that any attempt by a man to press his independence

beyond some optimal point, to set himself up as entirely self-sufficient, is a flirtation with disaster. Isolation and separateness are among the severest punishments that can be inflicted on human beings, a point demonstrated both by the technical literature of stimulus deprivation and by the poetic literature of tragedy—witness, for example, *King Lear*. But if isolation is the greatest punishment, its greatest preventative and antidote is the gravely tender relation of love, which rests on a confession of need and a response to such a confession in others. Love depends on limitedness and, in both its passionate and its affectional aspects, teaches it. It is in this sense that love leads to and is consistent with the tragic vision.

Finally, this point lays the ghost of tragedy as a form of pessimism, an expression of only the darker moments of human experience. The tragic vision includes not just sombre tones, but warm and gay ones as well. It emphasizes the continuity of human relatedness above all things and defines ways of life that excite a pride in manhood even when necessity triumphs, as it often must, over the individual's efforts to combat it. At its core is the suggestion that in the confession of limitation is the beginning of wisdom, a wisdom as relevant for the clinic as for the theatre and the human life with which both are intimately involved.

French Impressionism as an Urban Art

César Graña

It was one of the aims of Impressionism to reproduce—one is almost tempted to say to "echo"—the shifting visual nuances of the natural world: the world of waters, leaves, branches and fields, to record nature as a mass of light which broke into "highs" and "lows," and burst and shimmered in its many surfaces. For the sociologist, however, the more profound gift of the Impressionists would seem to be their faculty for rendering with unencumbered immediacy observations of the impermanent and the elusive in people's confrontations with one another and with themselves. In this, Impressionism is an art which breathes the air of the modern metropolis.

But one can't, of course, speak of the sociological study of an urban art (nor call an artistic style "urban") without first turning to what sociologists have to say about city life itself. As portraits of a mode of consciousness some urban studies can be read as ethonologies of the semi-autonomous provincialisms of the city; folk reports, so to speak, on the lives of neighborhoods and racial and cultural communities, and their singularities and permanence within the large artifact of the city. Others assume the existence of a general urban mentality dominated by a swift though shallow curiosity, a surfeit of inconsequential sensations, and impersonality, calculation and greed. "Ethnic" and "sub-cultural" studies of the city are relatively recent. But the view of the city as a new spiritual environment emerging after the destruction of primitive and traditional associations and sentiments—with their presumed firmness, directness and depth—has a long intellectual tradition. Speaking of his contemporaries Balzac wrote:

> By virtue of being interested in everything, the Parisian ends by being interested in nothing. . . . He whispers about everything, he is cheered by everything, he mocks everything, forgets everything, sees everything, likes everything, embraces everything with passion, dismisses everything with *insousiance*. . . . In Paris no sentiment can withstand the stream of outside happening, a flow against which no passion can survive. Love there is only desire, hatred only a whim. There is no kin but the thousand franc note. . . .[1]

---

[1] Honoré de Balzac, *La fille aux yeux d'or.* In: *La Comédie Humaine*

Students, not of literature but of sociology, will read these words with a sense of familiarity, sounding as they do like the moral and satirical version of that urban code of life described by George Simmel in a celebrated essay on the metropolitan mind. Simmel, too, as we remember, was convinced of the peculiar power of money to subvert the intimate, the selfless and the traditional in human attachments and obligations. And he, too, believed that the city had caused a revolution in men's perception of each other and of themselves.

> The psychological basis of the metropolitan type of individuality consists in the *intensification of nervous stimulation* which results from the swift and uninterrupted change of inner and outer stimuli. Man is a differentiating creature. His mind is stimulated by the difference between a momentary impression and the one which preceded it. Lasting impressions, impressions which differ only slightly from one another, impressions which take a regular and habitual course and show regular and habitual contrasts—all these use up, so to speak, less consciousness than does the rapid crowding of changing images, the sharp discontinuity in the grasp of a single glance, and the unexpectedness of onrushing impressions. There are the psychological conditions which the metropolis creates. (Italics in the original.)[2]

Of all academic attempts to understand some of the particular properties of the city-bred man, Simmel's shows, perhaps, the finest and most original psychological sense. Nevertheless, it could only have been an excess of intellectual deduction (leading in consequence to a simplification) that made him think of the "metropolitan man" as the uniform creature of the metropolis, rather than as one kind of individual, among others, *made possible* by the metropolis. The urban and the cosmopolitan mentality are not the same thing. The city man may be the master of an uprooted universality of outlook (or, which is not the same thing, a drifter trapped and cornered in the machinery of city life). But he may also be an "urban villager," someone who knows, nothing of the *haut monde* (or the "lower depths") or the arts and the learning of the city, or the social pretentions of the suburbs, yet has no taste for the "natural" values of the countryside. A man who is at home in the pace and the crowding of the city, but who understands the city as a particular collection of streets, of places and of people.[3]

Simmel insisted that the cities were dominated by an emotionally disengaged intelligence (the subjective counterpart to a money eco-

(Paris: André Martel, 1948). Thirty volumes. IX, pp. 346-347. (Translation the author's.)

[2] *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, Kurt H. Wolff, editor and translator, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1950), p. 410.

[3] Herbert Gans, *The Urban Villagers* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

nomy), and an awareness adroit and rapid, but dedicated to precise forms of social and economic power—"the calculative exactness of practical life." He spoke of the despotism of the urban time-table and wondered about the social disarray that would follow if all the clocks and watches of a great city were to go wrong, simultaneously but in different ways, by so much as one hour. But these characterizations also seem too unambiguous and too unrealistically harsh. No great city would be recognizable in such terms alone, nor would the arts of the city, nor, above all, the art of the Impressionists.

Most of the Impressionists were born in Paris, or lived and developed their art there.[4] They were also almost all born at a time, the 1830's and 40's, when a way of life was taking form in that city that would become nearly synonymous with modern cosmopolitanism, and to which their painting would provide a series of offhand and yet unerring commentaries. The Paris of the late years of the 19th century and the early ones of the 20th, the *belle epoque* of princely hostelries, legendary restaurants, of elegance and ease in the midst of the populous excitement of the boulevards, the Paris of the primordial battles of contemporary art, of Picasso and James Joyce, the Paris that sheltered the Lost Generation, the home-ground of the great bohemias, of Montmartre and Montparnasses; all these have been industriously and romantically chronicled. But the ingredients had been there before. Already in the days of the monarchy of Orleans[5] Paris was a center of art, learning, business and high fashion and, like all great cities, of poverty and crime as well. It had famous museums, great restaurants, theatres (several more than London, which had twice the population), a large and intellectually vehement community of students (11,000), coffee shops cradling celebrated literary coteries, dance halls and sideshows. It was city housing, race tracks, railroad stations, public gardens, art academies, palaces of finance, dandys, intellectual vedettes, princes of the market place, kings of the underworld, formidable scientists and celebrated pairs of Siamese twins. In other words, a metropolis.

Visiting Paris in those years Mrs. Frances Trollope found it at once "the city of the living above all others" and speculated as to what made it so. In part, she thought, it was something wondrous and indeterminate, like the "effervescence of its animal spirits." But it occurred to her also that the rousing spell of the city might be explained by the "busy idleness" of a place where so many people had "nothing to do but to divert themselves and others." An earlier English visitor, John Scott, had been equally struck by the number of Parisians

---

[4] Of the great Impressionists, Manet, Monet, and Degas were born in Paris. Pissarro, born in the Virgin Islands, was a Parisian by adoption.

[5] Louis-Philippe of Orleans came to power (by revolution) in 1830 and was deposed (by revolution) in 1848.

who, as he put it, seemed to be "loose from any actual occupation."[6]
It would be simplistic to regard these merely as observations on urban
forms of unemployment or vagrancy. What they suggest, rather, is
something as characteristic of great cities as their massive ordering
and "rationalization." If, as Simmel says, the city is a place of fixed
hours and "regular" occupations, of fixed arrivals and departures, of
men bound by desks and machines, it is also the breeding ground of a
whole accessory universe of freedom and curiosity, of chance experi-
ence and human exploration; the stage of *viveurs* and *luftmenschen*,
of "those who get by," from peddlers, charmers, con men and saloon
keepers, to dispossessed and itinerant intellectuals. Just as it is a world
of strolling and wandering, of by-standers and on-lookers; a market
place, not only of commodities but of social display and of social
observations.

The full and unmixed "metropolitan" response to metropolitan
conditions—objectively activated by a cold-blooded alertness—is no
doubt true of certain specifically urban forms of intelligence. But it is
quite obviously contrary to fact to think, as Simmel tends to do, that
urban quickness and resourcefulness are inseparable from mercenary
boredom, or that the urban detachment of mind cannot escape the
"flat and gray tones" of a deadened imagination.[7] What is equally true
is that cities create new forms of emotion, even emotionality (what
could be more sentimental than the modern urban song) and new
forms of fantasy: the entertainment and catering world of the city, the
night clubs, restaurants and theatres resembling hunting lodges, Poly-
nesian villages, Gypsy caves, imperial ballrooms and Islamic temples,
show that the "mind of the metropolis" demands predictable illusions
with which to ease some of its very actualities. And they induce new
forms of individuality, modulated and discreet in the well-bred, en-
gagingly loud and bawdy in taverns and street corners, reaching
through all the extravagances, oddities and varied singularities of
presence of its several ways of life, "high," "fast" and "low."[8]

In what way was Impressionism an urban art in a manner which

---

[6] This information in this and the previous paragraph is abridged from a
chapter in the author's forthcoming book *Bohemian Versus Bourgeois: The French
Writer and French Society in the Nineteenth Century*.

[7] Simmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 414-415.

[8] Simmel's failure to acknowledge this, though one finds it hard to believe
that he didn't know it, rests on an unclear and one-sided use of the concept of
"individuality." For Simmel "individuality" is a moral fact which refers to the
intrinsic worth of the person because of its standing "in depth" in the community
of "human values," as, for example, a friend, a kin or an elder. It is this sort of
relation that is assaulted by the reign of "objectivity," which in urban terms
always means economic or other impersonal forms of social transaction and power.
It is clear that by "individuality" Simmel does not *also* mean an idiosincratic
disposition towards the world or towards oneself.

is different from that of the Italian or the Flemish Renaissance? After
all, both the Italians and the Dutch painted merchants, apothecaries,
scribes and politicians. Venice bred masters like Carpaccio, Guardi
and Canaletto who recorded the life of its markets, squares and canals.
William Hogarth painted the fishwives, jails and whorehouses of 18th
century London. Rembrandt the masters of the clothguild of Amster-
dam. But, if their motifs were of the city (in some cases one would
rather say of the *town* or the *burg*), they were this in a sense which
is broadly topical and, perhaps, even excessively memorable, either as
human types, or as "situations," or as panoramas of reality. Impres-
sionism speaks of the urban, more yet, of the metropolitan mood, in a
way which recalls Max Weber's distinction between the monumentality
and decisiveness of past forms of art and the tentative "pianissimo"
(the expression is his own) of more recent ones.[9] For what Impres-
sionism does is to open itself to the stimulation of city life in a mercurial
and small-focused way, addressing itself to the psychological detail of
the passing and the mundane with a swift and original curiosity. We
find in Impressionist painting a reflection, almost a translation of the
urban "eye," as Simmel sensed it and judged it, but blended with a
relish at discovering a new taste of reality. There is detachment, even
distance, and some of the nostalgic gazing at the human spectacle,
possessed by men, like Simmel's own figure of The Stranger,[10] who
falter between the appetite for experience and the disenchantment
of the world. But there is also an appetite for the spectacle before the
eye. Impressionism is often aloof, but its aloofness is always intrigued,
amused and even charmed.

But none of these generalities can be understood unless we look
at specific works of the Impressionists' art and compare them with
the art of other periods. Let us examine, for example, *The Wedding at
Canaan* by Paolo Veronese (1528-1588), *The Strode Family* by Wil-
liam Hogarth (1697-1764) and *Chez le Père Lathuile* by Edouard
Manet (1832-1883). The first is, of course, a version of the biblical
banquet, the second is a domestic English scene at tea-time, and the
third the portrait of a conversation between two lovers at an outdoor
restaurant. In *The Wedding at Canaan* we are conscious of an extra-
ordinary determination to translate onto the canvas the movement of
psychological relations as these relations envelope the attendants at
the banquet and even the curious watching it from the distance. There
is a great deal of "stage business" in the picture: musicians tune up,
servants pour wine or march through carrying splendid-appearing
food, people jostle each other and literally hang from the walls of

[9] *From Max Weber*, C. W. Mills and Hans Gerth, editor (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1958), p. 155.
[10] Simmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 402-408.

near-by buildings in their effort to get a look at the scene. The guests, crowded around the table, face one another, reach for one another, lean towards one another seemingly to whisper some important word or to overhear the conversation. But anyone looking at this huge canvas (it takes up a considerable portion of a wall at the Louvre) must be conscious of the lack of an authentic sense of psychological reality in it; the *moment* of psychological contact between people, the "click" of recognition and the flow of reciprocity are not there. Everyone in the picture appears to have frozen in a miscellany of psychological *stances* which, however appropriate-looking, fail to go outside of themselves. There is one exception to this: the figure of Christ seated at the center of the table (and the picture) and looking directly at the viewer. Yet, either because its face is illuminated by a supernatural light, or because it seems to be addressing to us a silent commentary on the opulent secularity of the banquet,[11] this figure becomes the center of a psychological paradox. By virtue of the poignancy of his direct visual engagement of the viewer, Christ is the only truly individualized person in the picture. But just because of the way in which He breaks through and out of the context of the picture, He goes beyond the internal psychological atmosphere of the event and forces us, the viewers, to do the same.

In Veronese the psychological integrity of the picture, such as it is, is broken by the somewhat theatrical intimations of "meaning" addressed to the observer by one of the personages in the scene (one seems to have here a pictorial version of the "aside" to the audience of the classical stage).[12] In Hogarth the sense of dislocation occurs when a realistic presence is surrounded by a pseudo-social contrivance. Strict obedience to the subject in the group portrait of the Strode family would require the family to be sitting around the table eating

---

[11] For those who find the comparison of a New Testament episode with portrayals of domestic or public pleasure uneasy or unlikely, it should be said that, with the possible ironic exception of Christ's presence, *The Wedding at Canaan* is really the representation of a group of feasting Renaissance aristocrats.

[12] The presence of a sacred or transcendental person is not indispensable for this way of organizing psychological perception. What is true of Veronese's *Wedding* is true of *The Drunkards* by Diego Veláquez (1599-1660). This painting, which mixes suggestions of classical antiquity with figures from popular Spanish life, shows a number of bacchic youths—torsos bare in the pagan fashion—surrounded by contemporary-looking drinking companions in Spanish capes and hats. (the date of the painting is ca. 1628). One of the drinkers is being crowned with grape leaves while two others, who occupy the center of the picture, look at the viewer with a benign, self-indulgent leer. One may think of the painting as a scene of folk conviviality or as a vignette of self-debauched pathos. In either case the conspiratorial glances addressed to us by the one of the drunkards deprive us of any experience of psychological concreteness or social actuality which would embrace the picture as a whole, just as they reduce the psychological component of it to a dramatic device in a pictorial fable.

and drinking. Actually it is deployed in semicircle on one side of the table so as to afford the painter a chance to do a full or almost-full frontal semblance of each person. "Tea-time," therefore, is not a realistic moment but an incidental pretext. And not only topically but psychologically as well, for the members of the family, passively making their features available to the painter, show a complete lack of awareness of one another. Even so, there is peculiar a breach in the "portrait" theme of the picture. A house servant, his back turned to the artist, is engaged in doing something actually related to the presumed event taking place in the picture; he is pouring tea for the lady of the house. The realism of his behavior segregates him socially from the others. Indeed, he can behave realistically only because he is a servant, and the only person who is not "having his picture painted." Yet it is the very plausibility and adequacy of what he is doing that exposes the artifice intended and revealed in the painting.

Let us now look at Manet's *Chez le Père Lathuile*. The painting shows two young friends, a man and a woman, sitting in the open air at a Paris restaurant and a waiter standing in the middle distance. The couple, well to the foreground, is completely oblivious to the presence of the observer, the painter. The man looks directly at the woman with the exploratory self-confidence of a person seeking to entice another into embarking on a sentimental adventure (he has visibly the air of a man who is "talking her into it"). The woman looks downward, somewhat obliquely, perhaps at the table, but she is *listening* with a clearly perceptible mixture of amusement, pleasure, diffidence and temptation in her face. By pointed happenstance the waiter in the middle background has stopped in his rounds, coffee pot in hand, to look at the painter and, through him, at us.

There are certain large points of social commentary in *Chez le Père Lathuile*, and other more subtle points of social perception. There have been in the past portraits of social "inferiors," barmaids, page boys, court dwarfs and buffoons, handmaids and trusted factotums. But such portraits, however, affectionate or penetrating, tend to treat their subjects as "conversation pieces," as exhibits of social types, picturesque or sentimental, as in Frans Hals (1580?–1666) and Jean-Baptiste Chardin (1699–1779), disturbing, as in Velázquez or José Ribera (1591–1652), or, in Hogarth, for instance, as household mementoes.[13] It is characteristic of the Impressionists' casualness and worldly detachment, on the other hand, that they disregarded self-consciousness in the handling of social situations which involved people of different classes. In portraying a family (his own) Renoir (Pierre Auguste, 1841–1919) placed a servant comfortably squatted

---

[13] Hogarth painted several portraits of his domestics. He did this, however, in the form of medallions, and outside of any social context.

next to one of the small children in her care. Manet, in *Au café*, catches a barmaid, seen between the heads of two customers, as she treats herself to a mug of beer. It is not surprising, therefore, to discover in *Chez le Père Lathuile* that it is the waiter who stands as the center of the painting. He is the observer's observer. He catches *us* catching the lovers in a moment of intimacy. It is he who really embraces the whole of the scene and throws the events in the picture into the intricacy of psychological dimensions and surprises which it might have in *actual* happening.

The device of permitting one or more of the subjects of a painting to glance directly at the painter, and therefore, at the viewer of the painting, is not a new one. Botticelli (Sandro, 1447–1510) used it, in the form of a self-portrait in *The Adoration of the Magii*, as did Velázquez (in the same way) in *Las Meninas*. We find it in *The Peasant Meal* by Louis Le Nain (1593–1648) in which a little boy wonders at the painter as the latter records the scene. We find it in English painters of the 18th century, like John Copley (1737–1815), who shows his children stealing looks at the artist while the family portrait is made. And in the works of German romanticism, like the *Family Group* by Philip Otto Runge in which three young people pose for the portrait gazing at us, lost in *weltschmerz*.

There is in all these pictures, however, something which keeps them from appearing as a spontaneous moment in time, an event, a *happening*, faithful to psychological reality as that reality materializes within itself or, indeed, as the viewer becomes aware of it. Some, like the self-portraits, are tricks, cunning and elegant asides, as in Velázquez, or quiet gestures of self-esteem (or, as the artist looks upon himself) of self-questioning, as in Botticelli. The child in Le Nain's *Peasant Meal* is by himself convincing enough, but the scene, though honestly documented, is clearly staged. Runge's *Family* is heavy with mood and, for that very reason, cannot escape being a piece of sentimental or even ideological editorializing.

What is different about Manet's waiter in *Chez le Père Lathuile* is the disarming unobtrusiveness of his role as an observer's observer. In earlier paintings the poignancy of the glances directed at us give the exchanges between us and the observer within the canvas an air of complicity which seperates him from his own surroundings. Such a separation was in any case inevitable because of the frequent theatricality, blatant or sophisticated, of pictorial description until the 19th century. Manet's waiter, however, is unexpected. We see him in a "double-take." We are surprised by him, just as he surprises us in the moment of being surprised. And this is possible because he is completely and naturally *in* the picture, a picture in which there are planes of psychological awareness, but no breaks in the context of human reality. Waiter and lovers are both within the same space,

within the same portion of air and of time, physically and mentally. The lovers, while ignorant of our "being" there or of the by-play between the waiter and us, are as concretely present as the waiter or, indeed, as we who contemplate and are being contemplated at a moment of such immediacy, also are.

Having said this we must then recognize that the singularities the Impressionists possessed as artists are not easily separable from the atmosphere of their social perspectives. For it is difficult to believe that they would have attained the same effects or perceive the same realities had they addressed themselves to the conspicuously momentous or symbolic. We could argue, of course, that there have been painters of the small and the intimate before. The subjects of the great Dutch and French masters of *genre* painting, Vermeer (Jan, 1632–1675), Ter Borch (Gerhard, 1617–1681), Chardin, Fragonard (Jean-Honoré, 1732–1806) were pointedly personal and called for attention to modest detail: an army officer and her lady friend enjoy a discreet flirtation in the visiting room, a music lesson is in progress, a young woman writes a letter, another reads one, a servant rests her basket of groceries on the floor, the artist (Fragonard) sits quietly, engrossed in the completion of a miniature. But several qualities distinguish the Impressionists from their predecessors, qualities which are best understood as the product of their urban tastes and their urban vision. One is their uncompromising yet singularly subtle naturalism. In the most accomplished of the Dutch pictorial chroniclers, for example, Jan Steen (1626–1672), Nicolas de Maes (1632–1693), Pieter Breughel (1564–1637), there is the want of ambiguity of the manifestly narrated episode. The Impressionists recorded the unguarded moment too, but their eye was for an unexpected detail of casual pathos: a ballerina adjusts a ribbon on her neck, a lace in her shoe or scratches her back. A washerwoman straightens up from her ironing and breaks into a yawn. There is, then, their expertness at ensnaring in mid-air the specific instant of psychological mutuality and responsiveness among the subjects of the painting. Even in the most poignant psychological exchanges suggested in earlier art one fails to experience this emotion of immediacy and fluidity. There is a feeling of "stop-action," of "holding the picture," never present in the Impressionists who always seem to have caught an event as it is about to dissolve itself into those that follow. Finally, while Impressionists could paint portraits of individuals as individuals, observe people in their aloneness, or describe happenings behind doors, as artists in the past had done, they were the first to paint private moments in public places, the twilight or the awakening of curiosity linking two people in the populous midst of others. In this, if in no other sense, they were surely the painters of the city.

For all the narrowness of Simmel's perception of the city-man's

outlook, his grasp of the mental rhythm of the city is, when applied to the *observers* of urban life, as the Impressionists were, remarkably close to the truth. It is perhaps not without some significance that, in the passage quoted above, he several times used the word "impression." And the more specifically he uses the term the more he reminds us of the particular features of Impressionism. When, for instance, Simmel speaks of "the sharp discontinuity in the grasp of a single glance and the unexpectedness of onrushing impressions," we think of Degas (Hilaire, 1834–1917), of his glimpses of a ballerina's skirt, or her feet, or of a music hall *chanteuse* bawling a popular song at the top of her voice, but seen only in the reflection of a distant mirror, and heard—one senses—through all the disordered noise of the customers. We think of the bouelvards of Pissarro (Camille, 1830–1903) and the sweep of crowds in motion which the Impressionists were the first to paint. Of Manet's front "shot" of horses coming down the home stretch. Or of Renoir (in *The Rowers' Luncheon*) noticing a woman who adjusts her hat as she engages her male companions in earnest but equably flirtatious conversation (the detail could have come from J. D. Salinger). But, more than that, we are able to glimpse at others as they themselves capture a moment of their surroundings in a glimpse. One of Manet's music hall waitresses turns in the midst of a crowed room as she catches sight in the distance, perhaps of a well-known face, perhaps of the hand or even the eyes of a customer wishing to give an order. One of Renoir's coffee-house *habitués* moves her eyes quickly towards a corner of the establishment (unseen by us) as she notices, perhaps a friend, perhaps a curiosity-arousing incident.

It would be tedious and lengthy to document the pleasure taken by the Impressionists in "candid camera" effects. Degas' portrait of Madame Dietz-Monin, for example, in which this lady is seen waving at a friend in the distance with an air half matronly, half little-girlish. Or his "close up" of a beer garden singer, the effort of the song clutching and flooding her throat (it is possible that not until the coming of Impressionism was painting able to suggest sound so convincingly. Compare, for example, Degas' singers with those of the Italian masters or the *genre* painters of the 18th century).

Much more could be said also of the Impressionist artistry for the elusive. For, if they tried by all possible means to trap situations in their momentary singleness, they also understood that such moments must intimate all that is ambiguous and unstated in incidents or faces which attract our curiosity but which we see only in passing. In this the Impressionists are much closer to the reality of the occasional (and in this sense also "glancing") contacts and sights of the city than Simmel's almost wholly dismayed view of them. One example, among many, of the fragility, suspense, and lingering second-thoughts with

which the Impressionists were able to endow their perception of the ephemeral, can be found in Degas' *La femme au crysanthemes*, the portrait of a middle-aged woman of rather undistinguished features, who (as the title of the picture indicates) sits next to a large bouquet of crysanthemums. We find her near the edge of the canvas, while the flowers, huge and colorful, occupy the center of it. Our first dominant "impression," is that of the flowers, which we are tempted to regard as the subject of the painting. But in time our lasting curiosity moves to the woman whose passing thoughts we try to follow in the glance of her eye as she looks toward an unseen point in the distance and as her thoughts and glance literally loose themselves beyond the borders of the painting. In another of Degas' paintings, *Femmes a la terrace d'un Café*, two women face each other across a table. One of them gazes obliquely at whatever she may be seeing (or for all we know, trying not to see) somewhere in the café. Her expression is "thoughtful," but there is no sense of a specific act of thought (or even of an ostensible musing; of "having her mind elsewhere"). She merely "sits there," noncommittally considering the surroundings. The other woman, her thumb placed delicately between her teeth, considers her companion. Only a curiosity trained to watch and perceive such crystalizations of mood in the midst of a flow of sensations could have been capable of such muted and special vividness. Only what must be called the visual appetite of the Impressionists—their desire to look, to grasp through the untiring eye their surroundings, other men, and what the eyes of those others might themselves see—could have created pictures like Renoir's *The Theatre Box* in which our mind is taken on a tour of the *actually unseen* house by means of a psychological relay travelling from us (sitting so to speak in the orchestra) to the occupant of one of the boxes, who is herself looking at us, to another occupant of the same box, whose opera glasses are trained on still someone else. But then one remembers here that Impressionism was the creature of a city which since early in the 19th Century had been called a "glass beehive" dominated by the "consciousness of being observed."[14]

Impressionism then was just that. An art of *impressions*, not only in the visual, but in the human sense and, for that reason it is possible that the technical revolution associated with it may have been an aspect of the latter as well as the former; the tool needed to convey the scope, the mobility and the "velocity" of the social and psychological quality of Impressionist art. Impressionism is a moment in the appraisal of modern life, intrigued and self-entertaining, but also *degagé*. There is in it a sense of curiosity, but also a sense of distance. The distance was made possible by the aloneness and the unanchored

[14] John Scott, *A Visit to Paris* (1815), p. 53.

dimensions of city life. The curiosity was aroused by the compelling assortment of the city's many ways. Impressionism was subjective, but still called to the surrounding outside. It was, perhaps, the last great art before the "closing of the shutter," before art decided to discard all transactions with the *conditions* of the external world. Contemporary art is personal too, but in quite a different spirit. As Daniel Bell has pointed out, it has, in the various forms of "abstraction," abolished all *natural* distance between the artist and the environment. It has done so, however, by ignoring all the given features of the environment, dissembling it at will, and reconstituting it at will on an artificial plane of the artist's own devising. Or, as in Surrealism, it has turned its back to standing reality altogether, finding all meaningful distances and vistas within the expanses of the self alone. In either case today's art represents an ultimate surrender of the traditional view of artistic vitality as a manifestatiton of psychological and social vitality—if by vitality we mean a relationship between the individual and his surroundings in which the individual exerts himself towards the satisfaction of his needs and the expression of his own reality, but acknowledges the terms of the surroundings themselves as a challenge, a stimulus, and an inescapable limitation.

Theatre of the Absurd
(Made in America)

Samuel Hirsch

Please take note: in the special world of the Theatre of the Absurd the word "absurd" means "without sense, purposeless," not "ridiculous." In short, it is a rueful description of modern man's Fall from Grace; his present tragicomic dilemma.

In fact, our modern Hamlet, in this existential condition, might frown, and say: "To be *not*, not not to be, that is the question!" Or, in truth, as Eugene Ionesco (more Lear than Hamlet) has written:

> Absurd is that which is devoid of purpose . . . Cut off from his religious, metaphysical, and transcendental roots, man is lost: all his actions become senseless, absurd, useless. (1)

Well, then, is our world really "absurd"? Or, is this word a handy label to pin on the existential view? Is this a part of the revolt against absolutes, a moving away from provable realism? If we live in an absurd world, when did it happen, and why? What are its roots, who are its gardeners, and what is the nature of its blossoms and fruit?

Martin Esslin, the Moses of the movement, has carved the commandments on the tablet, proclaiming in his book, *The Theatre of the Absurd*, that our present sense of absurdity emerges today from the loss of basic human realities: we have lost God, or our belief in God; we have lost the firm feeling of family and patriotism; we have lost our reason; we no longer have personal connection with our immediate world. And these losses have created a void that has been agonizingly known by Twentieth Century European painters, composers, novelists, poets, and playwrights. Their attempt to articulate the ache of these losses, to restore, or, at least, to evaluate and articulate with passion and purpose a new set of values has given their work a characteristic tone which describes the ultimate absurdity of the human condition. The past fifty years has brought immense changes in science, psychology, and philosophy; since the theatre holds the mirror up to nature, the reflection of these changes has shown the new face of contemporary theatre. This, then is the Theatre of the Absurd.

Now, you may ask, are we, in America, also alienated? Are our losses similarly seen and felt by our writers? And will our theatre follow the form of the absurd shaped by the plays of Beckett, Ionesco, Genet, Adamov, Arrabel, Grass, Pinter and Simpson? Are Albee, Gelber, Kopit, Richardson, and Schisgal Absurdists of the same ritual and persuasion? It may be too soon to know for sure, but there are signs and portents.

Take note: a recent human interest story appeared in the *New York Times*:

Office in Federal Building Has 8 Clocks for 5 Workers

Memphis (AP)—Some offices in Memphis's new Federal Building started out as a paradise for clock-watchers.

The contract for the $13.5 million building called for 365 clocks but did not specify where they were to be placed.

The result was that some offices got more time-pieces than employes. One had eight clocks for five workers.

The General Services Administration, which will manage the building, is removing the excess clocks and storing them until it can be decided where they are needed. (2)

How lost is man in America, in a land where he has too many clocks and cannot tell which time to tell? Or have we too much time to watch? Are there too many clockwatchers? Well, that's a certain kind of dilemma; in America, man is lost in Memphis where $13.5 million paid for a new Federal building with 365 clocks but nobody specified where to place them, and some offices got more timepieces than employees.

Is this foolish, stupid, or absurd? Could it be a description of modern man, lost and devoid of purpose; useless because he has too many clocks to tell him he has too much time—or, no more time? Have we more watches than watchers? In a time of more clocks than clockwatchers what difference does it make to tell time? Does it make sense? Is it absurd?

Well, what says Albert Camus?

A world that can be explained by reasoning, however faulty, is a familiar world. But, in a universe that is suddenly deprived of illusions and of light, man feels a stranger. His is an irremediable exile, because he is deprived of memories of a lost homeland as much as he lacks the hope of a promised land to come. This divorce between man and his life, the actor and his setting, truly constitutes the feeling of absurdity. (3)

This is a deeply-felt comment from a man who, in his time of blackout and slaughter, cried out: "I cannot believe because I cannot see!" This dark anti-credo grew out of a world of ruin and exile, a world where God's gone from His Heaven, and all's wrong with the world.

This thinking, this philosophical speculation came out of the twilight world of European anguish in the wake of two world wars, Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, the human slaughter houses, nuclear fission and mushroom clouds. In the dust and rubble lay the lives and values of an age. And out of the losses "of illusions and of light" came the utterance that gave the content to plays written in a form that was to be called "Theatre of the Absurd." As Esslin noted in his book which titled and defined the work of its avant-garde writers:

> Ultimately, a phenomenon like the Theatre of the Absurd does not reflect despair or a return to dark irrational forces but expresses modern man's endeavor to come to terms with the world in which he lives. It attempts to make him face up to the human condition as it really is, to free him from illusions that are bound to cause constantly maladjustment and disappointment. . . . For the dignity of man lies in his ability to face reality in all its senselessness; to accept it freely, without fear, without illusions—and to laugh at it. (4)

The Theatre of the Absurd, then, was an attempt by man, deeply steeped in existential philosophical concepts, to find meaning in a world which no longer made sense because all moral, religious, political and social sense was nonsense. So, as he struck mocking poses and looked at himself posing, he saw himself, an actor on a stage of distorted mirrors, hearing the derisive laughter of his disbelief. Was it any wonder that the absurdists found fulfillment in the theatre? Their strangeness, their personal oddity and freakishness led the writers to the theatre where, as Lionel Abel points out, in *Metatheatre, a New View of Dramatic Form,*

> . . . the need to be bizarre, eccentric, individual involves the creator in a dialectic, as it perhaps does not involve any other type of creator— painter, poet, or novelist. Admitted that it is an advantage if you want to create to be personally strange: still, in the theatre your personal strangeness has to have an immediate effect on an audience composed of very different persons, who have to react to the play presented before they have had a chance to be converted to it by the intimidating force of cultural opinion . . . it is this dialectic which has made the plays of both Beckett and Genet more available to us than their novels were. If Beckett had not turned to the theatre, he would have remained the eccentric writer of morbid tale in monotonous, if good, prose. If Genet had not turned to the play form, he would have remained a writer of lyrical pornography. (5)

The plays of Beckett, Genet, Ionesco and other *avant-garde* writers in France, Britain, Italy, Spain, and Germany are bold, theatrical, exciting, immediate and urgent; their language is poetic, evocative, nonsensical, non-sequiturish, shocking, and very irritating. They dramatize our own anxieties, our own search for self.

Yet, since they people their stage with characters whose actions

and motives are largely incomprehensible, we cannot identify with
them in the familiar Aristotelian sense. Because we are prevented
from becoming identified and involved, we are then able to accept
them as comic characters. Their predicament is mysterious, unex-
plained, incomprehensible—therefore to be laughed at, comic. Stupid
characters who act in mad ways long have been the target of jeering
laughter in the circus, vaudeville and the theatre.

In the Theatre of the Absurd, Everyman's actions are obscure,
unmotivated, and apparently demented and foolish; therefore, we
must wait until the entire crazy pattern has been played before we
can see the whole image, before we can react to its impact. The
actual meaning is not so important; it is what the happenings of the
play represent, the personal essence of the experience.

The Playwright of the Absurd offers no solution; instead he chal-
lenges us to ask our own questions if we are to know what the image
of the play means. As with Archibald MacLeish's "Ars Poetica,"
". . . A Poem should not mean but be," a Play of the Absurd should
not mean but be! And, right you are if you think you are!

Before turning to the impact of this new movement on the
American theatre, we may be served by Esslin's summation of the
essential elements of the Theatre of the Absurd:

> the abandonment of the concepts of character and motivation; the
> concentration on states of mind and basic human situations, rather than
> on the development of a narrative plot from exposition to solution; the
> devaluation of language as a means of communication and understanding;
> the rejection of didactic purpose; and the confrontation of the spectator
> with the harsh facts of a cruel world and his own isolation. (6)

Meanwhile, in America, while all this European soul-searching
and theatrical experimentation was an on-going process, "not a crea-
ture was stirring, not even a mouse!" We lived through a depression
and two world wars and came out of the sewer covered with fat and
prosperity, two cars in every garage, God's in His air-conditioned,
split-level Heaven, all's right with the American Dream. We believed,
and still believe in the good life, and our national supremacy. Prog-
ress was, and still is measured in terms of money in the bank and
goods on the shelf. Just the other day, the following comforting (UPI)
news arrived from Dallas, Texas:

> Neiman-Marcus specialty store today offered the "ultimate in together-
> ness" in its Christmas catalogue—a "His-and-Her" submarine. The two-
> placer cruises at seven miles an hour and sells for $18,700. (7)

The only crack in our composure appeared when the Russians
flung a man into space and caught us with our rockets down. After
the first shock of disbelief, we plunged into the space race with char-

acteristic American speed and vigor. However, some disillusionment
with our superiority remained. Losing the race is a national disgrace;
Success is ALL! Frustration and failure forced us into a re-examina-
tion of our faults. American Science and scientists were examined,
committees were formed, crash programs were begun. Our competi-
tive spirit was fired and away we went!

Another "spirit of inquiry" appeared in the wash of this spurt
of national purpose and would not be stilled. A new generation of
rebels-without-cause shook and shocked us. Despite the scornful dirty
name of "beatnik" flung at them, they continued to grow beards and
wear the nonconforming black uniforms, and continued to challenge
the Holy Writ of American Success values.

Since the convention of the Absurd originates in a feeling of
deep disappointment, and a sense of the wasting away of purpose
and meaning, the American atmosphere was ready for an attack on
the fundamentals of physically-fit optimism and corn-fed self-suffi-
ciency.

Such a call to arms was sounded for the mobilization of an Amer-
ican Theatre of the Absurd on January 5, 1956, in, of all the unlikely
places, the pleasure domes of Miami, Florida. Samuel Beckett's "Wait-
ing for Godot," first produced in Paris on January 5, 1953, and the
first great success of the post-war European treatre, opened at The
Coconut Grove Playhouse in South Miami with Bert Lahr and Tom
Ewell under the direction of Alan Schnieder, close friend of the play-
wright. This strange play which combines farce and tragedy in star-
tling mixtures, and which refuses to conform to any of the accepted
dramatic conventions of structure, and character, fell far short of its
enthusiastic reception in Europe.

Extravagantly touted in advertising as "the laugh hit of two con-
tinents," the play mystified, angered, and bored the opening night
over-dressed, over-fed and over-liquored audience which had come
expecting side-splitting laughter from the baggy pants burlesque
comedians.

The first waves of laughter following Bert Lahr's and Tom Ewell's
familiar and expected comic burlesque bits, was followed by uneasy
squirmings and silences as the strangeness of the play's inaction and
bewildering conceptual content followed. Nothing seemed to be hap-
pening; the actors were waiting, and so was the audience. When it
was clear that not much was going to happen, that fun and sex games
were not going to take place, and that they had been trapped in a
dead end of mystifying conversations, abstract ideas, and gloomy
speculations about man's fate, they left.

First the aisle seats emptied because they were easy to exit.
Those in the middle were trapped until the intermission. When the
second act began, all but a handful of curious, stubborn first-nighters

had gone. All that remained after this first contact with a new form of theatre experience was the certainty that the familiar experience of identification and empathy would never again be the same.

A season later, when "Waiting for Godot" reached Broadway with another cast (except for Bert Lahr) and with another director, the producer had learned his lesson. He advertised for an elite, intellectual audience and warned them that they were in for a significant event, one that must be taken seriously. This time, critics, while cautious were indeed impressed as they had been advised, and praised it. And the elite audience, self-consciously pleased with its omniscience, and superiority, responded with enthusiasm.

True, it also puzzled, stirred, and infuriated audiences. Debates sprang up over its meanings, debates, by the way, that still flourish unresolved. When Alan Schneider, the original American director, asked Beckett who or what was meant by Godot, he was told, "If I knew, I would have said so in the play." Such evasion led to the happy mystique of speculation and interpretation. Everyone is right, or wrong, depending on his point-of-view and conclusion.

However, there was no doubt about the effect of the play. The form was vividly theatrical. It arrogantly ignored acceptable reality; the playwriting technics of Ibsen and Chekhov were turned topsy-turvey. It whetted appetites for similar fare. "Waiting for Godot" cleared a path in the American theatre for the arrival of Beckett's other plays: "Endgame," "Krapp's Last Tape," and "Happy Days"; Genet's "The Maids," "The Balcony," and "The Blacks"; Ionesco's "The Chairs," "The Bald Soprano," "The Killer," and "Rhinoceros"; and Pinter's "The Caretaker," "The Dumbwaiter," and "The Collection."

After their initial shock of recognition, the young American playwrights turned to this new school with fury and delight. Edward Albee, called "the new Eugene O'Neill" after the opening in February, 1963, of his first full-length play, "Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?," exploded upon the American theatre in 1960 with a short play, "The Zoo Story."

Albee, while denying the label of Theatre of the Absurd hung on him because of plays such as "The Zoo Story," "The American Dream," and "The Sandbox," once described his aims as a playwright: "people should come out of the theatre having suffered an experience of some sort. I think it would be nice sometime if people would leave the theatre and walk off the curb and get hit by a taxicab. . . . Better that way than with the only thought, 'Where did I leave the car?'" (8)

"The American Dream," which Albee wrote as an exercise in imitation of Ionesco's "The Bald Soprano," has been called "a bizarre comedy of family relationships, a social commentary concerned with a loss of values." It deals, in Albee's view, with American paradoxes:

"abundance produces emptiness, satisfaction unhappiness, communication ends in isolation. As for the 'dream,' that is not to be taken as an ideal or a personification of a goal but as the substitute of artificial for real values." (9)

Asked by The New York Times to comment on what was troubling today's playwrights in America, Albee blamed the state of contemporary society, of modern American civilization. He found "a laziness in our attitude to democracy, an irresponsibility to our duties, a self-seeking and callousness that breeds a comparable irresponsibilty on the part of the playwright." This inhibits the playwright "from wanting to write at all; a feeling of what's the use; it doesn't really matter whether you do or don't." (10)

Another inhibitor of the productive artist is the critic's tag of avant-garde. "That avant-garde label can be a trap," Mr. Albee remarked. "He feels he is carrying a banner and every line has to be weighed and measured. He becomes intellectually unsure of himself."

As for the modern artist's role, "All the playwright can do today is to give his vision of the world. Look, the most important influence in the theatre today—and Broadway's not the theatre—is the European influence, especially the French. That includes the Irish French, the Rumanian French and the French French. And I'd add Tennessee Williams. Genet has shown us the different planes of reality, Beckett the breakdown of communication, Williams the cruelties of life. A playwright can only portray what he sees in the world and hope that by setting it down honestly he can upset the audiences enough so that there will be a change." (11)

Brave new words by the most important voice of the new All-American Theatre of the Absurd. Albee unquestionably speaks for the theatre of the 60's, which is presently centered off-Broadway. He leads the band of avant-garde idol-smashers. The label reads: Made In America. The battle is on, the cause is clear, and the manifesto is issued.

The soil of Off-Broadway was ready for the new seed. After the war, and the veterans had returned, converted movie houses, old churches, schools, night clubs, and stores gave showcase opportunities to actors and directors to show their talents and their contempt for the fat cats of Broadway. They proudly presented Shaw, Ibsen, Chekhov, Molière, Pirandello and O'Casey, none of whom represented sure-fire Broadway theatre party choices.

Off-Broadway spurred renewed interest in Eugene O'Neill, and introduced Bertolt Brecht. When Jose Quintero directed "The Iceman Cometh" at the Circle In The Square, in May 1956, O'Neill's reputation was dormant. The remarkable run of "The Threepenny Opera," and "Brecht on Brecht" at the Theatre de Lys sparked the Brecht

blaze that finally ignited Broadway with the arrival of "Mother Cour-
age."

Off-Broadway was receptive to new ideas. As a recent *Time*
article noted:

> Clustered mainly in Manhattan's Greenwich Village, off-Broadway's
> theatre exude the faintly exotic double lure of intellectual climbing and
> Bohemian slumming among asthenic men with beards and girls with
> Lady Godiva hairdos. The playhouses themselves are adventures, or mis-
> adventures; in these pleasure domes, a chair arm may fall off at the
> slightest touch. But seedy surroundings cannot tarnish the bright promise
> that off-Broadway holds out and sometimes spectacularly fulfills. It
> gives new playwrights, directors and actors a voice. On intimate, semi-
> round or full arena stages, old and neglected classics have been given
> fresh airings. When it sticks to what Broadway cannot or will not do,
> off-Broadway is most nearly what it ought to be—the probing, daring,
> dramatic conscience of the U.S. theatre. (12)

The Theatre of the Absurd proved most welcome to the afficion-
ados of Off-Broadway because of its exploration of the most provoca-
tive contemporary idea in modern theatre: the grotesque, disordered,
deeply existential attempt to find the purpose and meaning of man
threatened with nuclear destruction in a world of no purpose and no
meaning. The plays of Beckett, Genet, Pinter, Ionesco brought elec-
tricity and vitality to the tiny, shabby stages, and ignited the audi-
ences with the energy of their probing and searching. They beat with
a sense of everyday life. To quote again from *Time*:

> Genet, who is less an absurdist than a perversely erotic symbolist poet
> of the theatre, is a perfect example of the kind of playwright Broadway
> will still not touch, to its considerable loss. His "The Blacks," now well
> over the 700 mark in performances, is probably the most satisfying work
> of art ever produced on the color question, an unsentimental depth
> probe of a labyrinth of hate-guilt feelings, in which blacks and whites
> literally mask but cannot hide their attitudes toward each other and
> themselves. (13)

Since 1960, Off-Broadway has savagely spawned a talented brood
of young playwrights. The press has given them the community title
of American Theatre of the Absurd: Jack Richardson, Jack Gelber,
Arthur Kopit, Murray Schisgal, and most important, Edward Albee.
Instead of treating the Absurd with the stark seriousness exemplified
by Sartre and Camus, these five share what Albee admires in James
Thurber—"a sense of the ridiculous, a knowledge that the sentences
people make half the time bear absolutely no resemblance to what
people think." "In 'Virginia Woolf,'" says Richardson, "Edward forces
comedy to its knees and pins its hands behind its back. He finds
humor in every hush-hush subject, even humor in hate." (14)

In his "Gallows Humor," Richardson found humor in execution. Gelber, who dealt seriously with dope addiction in "The Connection," laughed at bigotry in "The Apple." Kopit, in "Oh Dad, Poor Dad, Mama's Hung You in the Closet and I'm Feelin' so Sad," made fun of man-eating mothers. Schisgal, in "The Typists and The Tiger," satirizes the clichés of conformity and communication.

The Cherry Lane Theatre, under the aegis of Richard Barr and Clinton Wilder, the producing team which first presented Albee off-Broadway, and currently is producing his Broadway plays, "Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf," and "The Ballad of the Sad Cafe," was the scene several seasons ago of a four week showcase devoted to ten representative works of The Theatre of the Absurd. In an attempt to clarify the purpose of their project, Mr. Barr said each writer's aim was "to break the old mold of language and narrative sequence in the theatre and to emphasize its mystery and truth. This type of theatre usually achieves its purpose by presenting a distorted picture of a world that has gone mad." (15) The schedule included: Genet's "Deathwatch," Arrabel's "Picnic on the Battlefield," Richardson's "Gallow's Humor," Beckett's "Waiting for Godot," and "Endgame," Ionesco's "The Killer," Kenneth Coke's "Bertha," and Albee's "The Sandbox," "The American Dream," and "The Zoo Story."

Since then, Barr and Wilder have begun a yearly revival of "The Zoo Story" and "The American Dream" on the theory that there is always a new audience for the plays of America's leading playwright of the Theatre of the Absurd.

Albee's plays have been played by professional and amateur companies all over America and the world. They have something to say to the youth of today, something about dehumanization, hate, love, the family, sex, loneliness, fear, existence, said in a sardonic voice that evokes raucous, derisive laughter. They know what he means because he speaks their thoughts, points their fingers into the ribs of their elders. And those who are the targets know, too, that the laughter has some of their pain in it.

Now, whether or not the Theatre of the Absurd is on its way in or out, its effect on the contemporary theatre is enormous. Albee's guess is "that the theatre in the United States will always hew more closely to the post—Ibsen/Chekhov tradition than does the theatre in France, let us say. It is our nature as a country, as a society. But we will experiment, and we will expect your attention." (16) In his opinion, the playwrights of the Theatre of the Absurd have forever altered our response to the theatre. Albee adds a postscript:

And one more point: The avant-garde theatre is fun; it is free-swinging, bold, iconoclastic and often wildly, wildly funny. If you will approach it with childlike innocence—putting your standard responses aside, for

they do not apply—if you will approach it on its own terms, I think
you will be in for a liberating surprise. I think you may no longer be
content with plays that you can't remember halfway down the block.
You will not only be doing yourself some good, but you will be having
a great time, to boot. And even though it occurs to me that such a fine
combination must be sinful, I still recommend it. (17)

We are told that we are now in the middle of a "cultural ex-
plosion." Culture and the arts are no longer the special privilege of
the wealthy and the high-brow. Foundations, those unique American
institutions set up by immensely wealthy corporations to cheat the
government out of tax money and assuage their do-good consciences,
have given large sums to artists, composers, directors, architects, play-
wrights and theatres in America to encourage the development of a
national culture. Washington has even recognized the strength of the
ground swell by appointing cultural advisors to the President, and
by forming a new Cultural Affairs Branch of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare.

All is not sweetness and light, however. Distinguished American
prophets of doom have raised their voices, issuing Cassandra-like
warnings that token measures taken to recognize and feed the cultural
needs of our country may be too little and too late.

Last spring, at the annual ceremonial of the American Academy
of Arts and Letters and its affiliated National Institute of Arts and
Letters, Lewis Mumford, the academy's new president, told an audi-
ence of nearly 1,000 in his inaugural address that:

not the exploration of planetary outer space, but the cultivation of
human inner space is the imperative obligation of our time.

We need no Delphic oracle to tell us that the course Western civilization
is now following has already proved massively inimical to life, and that
even the threat of employing the destructive forces governments now
command produces, like the fear of cancer, pathological reactions almost
as dreadful as the disease itself.

Already our technical automations and our political irrationalities have
wiped out two essential conditions for human development: a usable
past, as Van Wyck Brooks called it, and a visible future.

The will to create is being insiduously undermined, the architectural
historian and philosopher said:

Insensate forces that now menace human existence have been reinforced
by those who accept these limitations and degradations as permanent
attributes of modern culture.

These limitations and degradations, he continued:

devaluate human history as an absurdity, oppose every impulse to
psychal health and wholeness of being.

The human spirit has been violated, he said, adding,

> The forces of anti-life now swarming through our inner world, pro-
> claiming that mechanical automatism is superior to personal autonomy,
> that empty confusion is authentic design, that garbage is nourishing
> food, that bestiality and hate are the only honest expressions of the
> human spirit. (18)

Well, in addition to saluting the need to cultivate creative needs
of "human inner space," Mumford has sounded a reaction to a reac-
tion. The Theatre of the Absurd philosophy and action was brought
to life by the rejection of platitudes about life values that were eva-
sions instead of answers. Their plays are angrily intended to shock,
deride, and destroy sugar-coated optimism and bourgeois assumptions
and attitudes.

By "the forces of anti-life," does Mumford mean anti-idea, anti-
theatre? Does he confuse the intended confusion of form of the Ab-
surdist with a desire to set up confusion as a way of life? If "the
human spirit has been violated," as he proclaims, has it not been
attacked in order to tear down the temple of complacency and ac-
ceptance and to build new values better suited to an anxious age in
search of individual worth.

On the other hand, we must welcome these debates. They will
lead to an eventual clarification of our human destiny. Our concep-
tion of ourselves is at stake. Mirrors are being held up before us. What
do we see? So far, we see what we have created, a Frankenstein, a
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, and while we are proud of what we have
discovered, we are also terrified by the power we have unleashed.

The reflection of what we are is to be seen in the looking-glass
held aloft and twirled by the Playwrights of the Absurd. Like the
fat man who sees his gross profile in a mirror and submits to a crash
diet to change his shape, we too, have recoiled from this hideous,
twisted aspect of ourselves. Are we that monster, that idiot, that
foolish grinning ape? Could be, and yet . . .?

Whether or not the Theatre of the Absurd provides a true and
authentic picture of our age is a question for heated debate. But,
whether or not it has influenced playwrights and the entire style of
contemporary theatre is not debatable. The effects of this theatre
are clearly observable. And the facts of Edward Albee's plays are
to be seen in theatres on and off-Broadway, as well as off-America.

Even if it is largely imitative, this new form of playwriting has
immediacy and reaches out to audiences with its freshness and excite-
ment. In the process of reaching the stages of the world, it has forced
directors and actors to find new ways of playing. The theatre artists
are developing a theatricality based on the qualities of improvisation
and physicalization so characteristic of this form. It has also resulted

in a growing body of literature about the Theatre of the Absurd. A new library of critical analysis and evaluation has developed. Critics have followed playwrights, who followed philosophers. Now the Theatre of the Absurd is being followed by audiences.

We cannot go back to the old theatre with the same acceptance and enjoyment. When he was 17, Edward Albee wrote in a poem titled "Nihilist:"

> . . . What causes him to mouth the purple grape
> of life experience, then spit the seeds
> Back at the world? . . . (19)

Now, at 35, Edward Franklin Albee III has spit forth six bitter, angry plays. Now, in the final third of this century, our theatre is beginning to spit back new forms, new playwrights, and new stages.

The effects of all this expectoration may be summed up in two anecdotes reported in a recent Newsweek magazine profile sto.y on Albee:

> Once, at a White House reception, Ethel Kennedy turned on Albee and snapped: "What do you mean writing such dirty, depressing plays? I'll never see a play of yours."
> Albee didn't blink. "How do you do?" he said, politely. "I'll never see a play of yours."
> Recently, in a New York art gallery, Jane Fonda, the actress, spotted Albee, rushed up to him, and gushed: "I loved your play. I think it's so powerful, so gripping, so shattering. What do you think?"
> "Yes," said Albee. "I think it's funny, too." (20)

Call it what you will: dirty, depressing, powerful, gripping, shattering, funny, these plays are here, alive, disturbing and very much a part of our present theatre. Their imprint has been stamped on the theatre of the future.

Who's afraid of the future? Not the Theatre of the Absurd. And not Edward Albee. As he wrote in his first published poem:

> "YOU must let me live!
> I have not as yet begun . . .
> The world has need of life, not death.
> And I have not as yet begun." (21)

REFERENCES

1. "Essay on Kafka," Ionesco: "The Theatre of the Absurd, Martin Esslin, p. xix, quoted from: Eugene Ionesco, "Dans les Armes de la Ville," *Cahiers de la Compagnie Madeleine Renaud-Jean-Louis Barrault*, Paris, No. 20, October, 1957.

2. N.Y. Times, 1963.

3. CAMUS, ALBERT. *Le Mythe de Sisyphe*, Paris: Gallinard, 1942, p. 18.

4. ESSLIN, MARTIN. The Theatre of the Absurd, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961, p. 316.
5. ABEL, LIONEL. Metatheatre, A New View of Dramatic Form. New York: A Dramabook, Hill and Wang, 1963, p. 146.
6. ESSLIN, *op. cit.*, p. 167.
7. Boston Globe, 1963.
8. BOOTH, JOHN, E. "Albee and Schneider Observe: 'Something's Stirring,'" Theatre Arts, March, 1961, p. 24.
9. LASK, THOMAS. "Dramatist In A Troubled World," N.Y. Times, January 22, 1961.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Time, February 15, 1963, p. 63.
13. Ibid., pp. 63, 64.
14. Newsweek, "Albee: Old Man In on Broadway," February 4, 1963, pp. 49, 50.
15. N.Y. Times, January, 1962.
16. ALBEE, EDWARD. "Which Theatre Is the Absurd One?", N.Y. Times Magazine, February 25, 1962.
17. Ibid., p. 66.
18. N.Y. Times, Spring, 1963.
19. Newsweek, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
20. Ibid., p. 49.
21. Ibid., p. 52.

Samuel Beckett: The Social Psychology of Emptiness

Robert N. Wilson

"Bleak" is the word for Beckett, you say? And one can only reply, "Yes," as far as the manifest content of his drama is concerned. But great antipathies *do* often betray intense affinities: no-one could hate man so much if he were not sometime suffused with love for him. Think of those who have savaged man, whose corrosive violence has threatened to reduce him entirely, think of Dean Swift, of Voltaire and of Bernard Shaw. Did they not love human beings utterly? Of course, and the measure of their love resides in their tormented railing against the gulf which divides ape from angel, the impassable and impossible distance between man as he is and man as he could be, between the frail blunderer and his infinite potential for humane grace. They are angry, indeed furious, not with man for being as he is but for his failing to be what he might be, his forfeit of glorious possibility. And so with Beckett: his naked or ill-clad lumps of clay—the people of his drama—mean nothing and cannot horrify us unless they are set against a humanistic ideal of sentient man as core or effective protagonist of a patterned universe.

Perhaps the first thing that strikes us about *Waiting for Godot* or *Endgame* is the stark, barren landscape that is their stage. It is a country of "bare ruined choirs" where we are not at all sure the sweet birds sang late or soon—or ever. Stripped of all that is familiar, comforting, prosaic, they are like the gaunt plains of the moon. An alien atmosphere for alienated men. Man cannot but be estranged from this grim environment, this universe both careless and hostile, whose obdurate mask is consonant with the blank wall dividing person from person and the individual from himself. How strange this terrain, how frighteningly empty of "the apple tree, the singing, and the gold." To gauge how far we have come from the warm provinces of the nineteenth century, recall only the Wessex of Thomas Hardy, where every stone and stile is laden with neighborhood memory, or the meticulously appointed drawing room of the well-made Victorian play, whose furnishings were often more real than its characters.

Beckett starts with a physical setting bereft of the familiar, and goes on to show us a social psychological environment equally strange and naked. As we are never sure of the geography or the chronology of the plays, since the coordinates of time and space are blurred, so we are uncertain about the ordering of human relationships. The ties of man to man are without reasonable form.

Audiences can be infuriated and upset in at least two ways, by the intrusion of what is strange and outrageous or by the omission of what is familiarly expected. The baffled outcries which were waiting for *Godot* probably stemmed from both of these sources. Certainly the callousness and brutality shown one another by Beckett's players are well calculated to shock. Yet even more shocking, and disorienting like the fun-house mirrors at the amusement park, is the absence of recognizable contours in human interaction. This is a world of social and psychological deprivation where the rations— whether of food or love, tranquility or excitement—are perilously short. The characters live in a subsistence economy of the psyche where the world is not so much stage as concentration camp, a concentration camp which moreover lacks both a "normal" environing society and a rationale for its misery.

The milieu of *Godot* or *Endgame* provides few orienting cues: we are left in a mysteriously empty setting, shorn of conventional social landmarks, of recognizable social roles or motivations. Both plays are plotless in any orthodox sense, consisting of men who interact in a void, who have no goals except that of waiting. We are never certain for whom or for what they wait; Godot may be God or a merely secular savior, while the grotesque figures of *Endgame* presumably wait only for death in a world already dead around them. A mood of suspended animation, of perpetual waiting for Godot or something nameless or sometime to come, is captured by an exchange in *Endgame*:

> Clov: Do you believe in the life to come?
> Hamm: Mine was always that. (1)

The waiting bores and tires them, makes them like irritable children too long on vacation. In a de-socialized society they are just barely alive. It seems that something terrible has happened to this world, as if it has become primitive and inhuman while retaining memory-traces of a more normal existence. The un-named threat, the unstated puzzle, remind us of science-fiction in the sustained aura of danger without a face. The world as we know it has broken down, whether through war or natural catastrophe or some collective failure of nerve. So we are left with shreds of meaning, foreshortened patterns of interpersonal relations, the bare skeleton of human intercourse. Here life is pretty clearly meaningless, the machine has run down. As Hamm

quotes in *Endgame*, "Our revels now are ended." Yet *something* persists, some feeble communication and communion.

Let us look at the characteristics of this world and its people, try to see what is missing and what is left. The emptiness of the plays may by contrast help to clarify what it entails to be fully human and to live in society. Several themes are very prominent:

Deprivation

> Hamm: I'll give you just enough to keep you from dying. You'll be hungry all the time. (2)

With the exception of Pozzo's bizarre feast in *Godot*, his picnic basket of wine and chicken, Beckett's people are always hungry. As Hamm says, these individuals give one another "just enough" to sustain existence. Both food and human responsiveness are in short supply; if Pozzo throws the tramps his chicken bones, so the characters throw one another the bare bones of attention and empathy. They give enough of themselves (and their resources, admittedly, are severely diminished) to keep the dialogue in limping motion and maintain a shadowy interaction, but not enough to afford any genuine satisfaction. They do not truly "reward" one another, but proffer instead the thin tokens of minimal concern. There is deprivation on several levels, from the basic material needs (food, clothing) through immediate emotional needs, to, finally, complex social psychological needs for a stable human environment and a coherent world view. Carrots, turnips, bones, and hard biscuits provide the only nourishment. Clothing is odd and scanty, as in the case of Estragon's boots in *Godot*. Even simple artifacts are broken or lost, and pathetically insufficient, as Hamm's toy dog in *Endgame*. (In a sense, the distance between the mutilated toy dog and a real animal may symbolize the disparity between the stunted human interaction of the plays and a real set of social relationships.) On the emotional level, the characters consistently frustrate one another's needs for even the scantiest rewards, like the repetition of a word or a story, or the running of an errand. The world of things is bare and constricted, in *Godot* a formless void, in *Endgame* a box of a room which is never clearly anchored in the landscape.

Hostility

A miasma of hostility and brutality hangs over the scene. We learn of people being beaten, they beat one another in our presence, their bodies carry old scars. Much of the conversation is hostile, upbraiding, insulting. One of the reasons it is not utterly insulting, not so entirely injurious as to rupture the fragile ties between men, is that

the characters' residue of dignity is so tiny. In Beckett's world one cannot afford the luxury of that bristling honor which makes men very sensible of insult. The people are competitive in the petty way of those living at a subsistence level, or of animals battling over extremely scarce resources. They are adult forerunners of the savage boys in Golding's *Lord of the Flies*; the boys of Golding's novel become de-socialized in a state of nature where they lack the restraint of adult supervision, while the men of Beckett's plays are de-socialized because they have lost the organizing framework of a comprehensible social order. In some ways we find here a vivid image of Thomas Hobbes's hypothetical "war of each against all." Only now it is hypothesis no more, but a grim envelope of conduct.

Anarchy

This world is notable for its lack of formal organization, of political or economic patterns. Men can apparently make no appeal to the state or community, to any ordering device outside the flow of transitory interaction. Although *Godot* contains hints of feudal overtones—Pozzo and Lucky rehearse a master-slave relationship, and Godot is said to be master of an estate—one misses any reference to an organized structure of society. Even the seemingly "inevitable" social institution, the family, does not really exist: in *Endgame* Hamm's parents live in garbage cans, and they and their son could scarcely be termed a family group, although there are occasional implications of a familial past. We miss too the network of defined social roles on which routine relationships among individuals rest. Without roles, interaction is shapeless, tentative, tangential; people do not know what to expect from one another. Social roles embody ordered sets of anticipations. Without them, or with only very rudimentary ones, the individual confronts a social universe of chance. He cannot count on how others will behave, cannot gauge his actions to articulate with the actions of his opposite numbers. All that is left here, apparently, are roaming, isolated individuals or isolated pairs of men who share a bitter symbiosis. This social scene is barely recognizable in terms of the informal roles of conflict or uneasy comraderie established by the faltering players.

Enervation

Energy is at a low ebb. Almost any activity is a great chore, and for several reasons: the characters are ill and crippled; they suffer from malnutrition and a pervasive fatigue; they perhaps suffer most of all from lack of motivation, from the absence of any conviction that an effort could possibly be worthwhile. There is, especially, a striking

lack of vitality in the mental functions, a kind of psychological "effort syndrome" which renders thinking harmful and difficult. It is very tiring to think, one is weak and confused; a scrap of logic or a felicitous phrase represents a mighty triumph of the will.

Sexlessness

Except for vague memories of a happier time, heterosexual activity in real life or in fantasy is entirely absent. So deep is the misery of existence that sex and its consequent procreation is viewed as evil. Hamm curses his father, Nagg, for the disastrous impulse which brought him into the world:

> Accursed progenitor! (3) . . . . and again,
> Scoundrel! Why did you engender me? (4)

Beckett strongly implies in *Endgame* that Hamm and Clov, Nagg and Nell, are among the last survivors of a nuclear holocaust; the thought of bringing a child into a world that ends thus horribly is wicked and witless.

There are no female characters in either play with the exception of the pitiful mother, Nell, in *Endgame*. One has the feeling that sexual love would be beyond the capacities of these men, both because it demands more vitality than they possess and because it demands more humanity, warmth, selflessness than they can muster. They find it hard to trust one another, to commit themselves to a love relationship or any other kind.

Yet there is an element of bawdy, the flavor of the music-hall turn or burlesque skit noted by Martin Esslin in his search for kindred vehicles in *The Theatre of the Absurd*. The bawdy is in part the complement of that pronounced undercurrent of latent and not-so-latent homosexuality which distinguishes an all-male society. Passages in both plays are reminiscent of other unisexual settings, notably the military, in their scatological banter and their tenderness edged with assault. Finally, one senses a distinct nostalgia, an evocation of sex once shared but now only dimly recollected. An air almost of post-coital sadness pervades the disjointed memories of what it might have been like to be human.

Hopelessness

With no future, there can be no hope. The exceptions are small, transitory "hopes" for food or the attention of other people. The longer-range hope that Godot will come is significant as the sign of hopelessness: neither players nor audience really believe he will appear, and the portents of his coming are a mad, circular dance without

end. In the sequel, *Endgame*, he who dares hope, even for a moment, is scorned. The plays *seem* to be concerned with the future; they are full of the language of waiting. But they are really about the past, a past where everything and everyone has been tried and found wanting. Hope has been proved to be without foundation. The true pathos of Beckett's stage is that everything has already happened, alternatives have been so thoroughly rehearsed that we are now at an absolutely dead end where to utter a hope is simultaneously to crush it. We are suspended in a dead center of time which offers no chronological basis for hope. Tomorrow and yesterday have a valence equal to today's : zero.

In *Waiting for Godot* the rage which greets Lucky's famous "think" stems partly from the hope implied in his words. He speaks fragments of hope—snatches of religion, reason, poetry—and even in this emasculated form they enrage the other characters, the "realists" who have renounced history and hope. The last word on hope might be Hamm's diagnosis:

> Use your head, can't you, use your head, you're on earth, there's no cure for that! (5)

Beckett's world is like the dreadful prospect which made the Peruvian Indians of Vicos dance and sing dead infants to the grave in celebration of their being spared the ordeal of life.

Meaninglessness

The plays themselves are not meaningless: if they were truly so they would not have their demonstrated power to move and stimulate audiences but would be of interest solely to the clinician. Yet to the people in them the world is truly and ultimately "absurd." Nothing retains any real meaning in our ordinary use of the term, although Beckett must convey this fact in a dialogue which keeps the shadow of logic, a language possessing grammar and syntax. Although Lionel Abel, in his ingenious *Metatheatre*, (6) stresses Beckett's kinship to James Joyce, it is notable that Beckett's language is not ornate or confusing on the verbal plane; the statements are perfectly clear, much like nonsense propositions in traditional logic, but they do not refer to a universe whose interconnections make sense to its participants. This is another reason why thinking is "bad" or impossible: thought requires both mental effort *and* some moral certitude that one's thoughts reflect patterns in the world out there and can have some consequences for action. Meaninglessness is most strikingly exemplified in the fact that the characters have no consequential decisions to make. In a meaningful world the act of choice implies that something will happen one way or another, that it makes a difference

which road is taken. (and also if no road is taken) But here the individual gropes, alone or in concert, for he knows not what. If all thought and action are categorized as futile from the start, then meaning is absent. Life is like a phonograph needle stuck in the same groove forever, in that nothing ever leads to anything else; it is a dreary rehearsal, a shadow-boxing of the psyche, without plot or pilot.

All that is missing in Beckett's world, all the deprivations, afford us a dramatic simulacram of what life is like when certain psychological and sociological imperatives are not met. But in the desolation something is left; there are survivals of human need and social organization. It is almost as if Beckett were telling us: you can frustrate and humiliate men, can cut them off from all that is cherished and familiar, but as long as you leave them breath they will try to act like human beings. Beckett's characters endure. They try, however feebly and grotesquely, to sustain their nerve and their relationship one to another.

Consider the effort to find meaning in the petty affairs of life, an effort like the reflex action of a mortally wounded brute. In *Godot*, when Estragon is trying on his new boots, he speaks:

> Estragon: We always find something, eh Didi, to give us the impression
> we exist?
> Vladimir: (impatiently) Yes yes, we're magicians. (7)

There is communication of a sort. Verbally, it is pre-eminently of the type Malinowski called "phatic communion": a symbolic linguistic activity which binds people together when they have literally "nothing to say." In these plays, nearly all the dialogue has the character of our habitual remarks of salutation, commentaries on the weather, or inquiries after the health of our respondent. That is, the words do not embody an exchange of cognitive content, a message in the strict sense, but consist rather of an emotional affirmation. The speeches recognize the person spoken to as an inhabitant of the same universe of discourse; they say, in effect, "We are human together, and concerned to preserve the intercourse between us."

And Martin Esslin points out that language is only a part of what transpires on stage:

> In the "literary" theatre, language remains the predominant component.
> In the anti-literary theatre of the circus or the music hall, language is
> reduced to a very subordinate role. The Theatre of the Absurd has regained the freedom of using language as merely one—sometimes dominant, sometimes submerged—component of its multidimensional poetic imagery. By putting the language of a scene in contrast to the action, by reducing it to meaningless patter, or by abandoning discursive logic for the poetic logic of association or assonance, the Theatre of the Absurd has opened up a new dimension of the stage. (8)

The players are human too in their occasional flashes of remembered joy, of poignant groping excursions back to a better world. These scraps of memory, indications that man is the time-binding creature Korzybski termed him, betray a striving to be human even in a world where time has dissolved. For they are inclinations, however weak, to preserve the continuity of personal identity. Their homely guise, again, stresses the human scale: the world probably does not end with a bang or a whimper, but with the tranquil recollection of a summer afternoon's outing.

Humor is another residue of the daylight world. It is a bitter, cynical, self-deprecating humor which seems to serve as some defense against the full realization of horror. Or better, it is a vehicle for taunting fate: "If *this* is all you can do to me, and what could be worse, I'll laugh." Beckett's plays could stand as a text for the concept of "gallows humor," that mocking, derisive refusal to be entirely cowed by harsh circumstances. This humor has been the ancient shield of the oppressed and condemned, and in these plays we are all condemned.

At length, and most importantly, there are the continuing relationships of men in pairs. Through the tragic pairs Beckett says that if we cannot love one another at least we can need one another. Research on isolation, sensory deprivation, and mental illness seems to indicate that the essence of being human is to interact with others. Vladimir speaks out an existential affirmation. In a world without meaning, one helps his fellows and finds out what he is doing here, however trivial:

> Vladimir: Let us not waste our time in idle discourse! (Pause. Vehemently.) Let us do something, while we have the chance! It is not every day that we are needed. Not indeed that we personally are needed. Others would meet the case equally well, if not better. To all mankind they were addressed, those cries for help still ringing in our ears! But at this place, this moment of time, all mankind is us, whether we like it or not. Let us make the most of it, before it is too late! Let us represent worthily for once the foul brood to which a cruel fate consigned us! What do you say? (Estragon says nothing.) It is true that when with folded arms we weigh the pros and cons we are no less a credit to our species. The tiger bounds to the help of his congeners without the least reflexion, or else he slinks away into the depths of the thickets. But that is not the question. What are we doing here, *that* is the question. And we are blessed in this, that we happen to know the answer. Yes, in this immense confusion one thing alone is clear. We are waiting for Godot to come—(9)

Although Vladimir's speech may be mock-heroic, and is grossly out of keeping with the brief, tangled style that is his wont, the sig-

nificant thing is that it is spoken. There is, indeed, a curious tenderness threading the edged interaction of the forlorn pairs. The rough banter, the curse, the manifest unconcern do not entirely conceal the very human bondage these men feel.

If there are, then, these several evidences that men endure as men even in extremity, we are still left at the end in no doubt about the nature of the world Beckett perceives. The few strands of hope and comradeship are thin and fragile; experience is basically negative and depriving; it is above all a momentary affair. So Pozzo speaks:

> Pozzo: (suddenly furious). Have you not done tormenting me with your accursed time! It's abominable! When! When! One day, is that not enough for you, one day he went dumb, one day I went blind, one day we'll go deaf, one day we were born, one day we shall die, the same day, the same second, is that not enough for you? (Calmer) They give birth astride of a grave, the light gleams an instant, then it's night once more. (He jerks the rope.) On! (10)

It is patent that *Waiting for Godot* and *Endgame* do not fit the mold of classical tragedy; the protagonists are not noble, are smaller than life, and the reduction in their estate is implicitly assigned to a flawed universe rather than a flawed character. Yet they have the cleansing power of tragedy, the stripping bare of our fates in a phenomenological revelation of lean, driving force. They show us our inhumanity in all its angular gracelessness, but in the showing they set us free. They compel us to ponder anew, to think and feel freshly about what it means to be human and to walk among men—even, in Rupert Brooke's exacting phrase, to "go proudly friended."

Beckett's drama warrants Martin Esslin's incisive conclusion:

> Ultimately, a phenomenon like the Theatre of the Absurd does not reflect despair or a return to dark irrational forces but expresses modern man's endeavor to come to terms with the world in which he lives.— For the dignity of man lies in his ability to face reality in all its senselessness; to accept it freely, without fear, without illusions—and to laugh at it. (11)

REFERENCES

1. *Endgame*, Grove Press, Inc. New York, 1958, p. 49
2. *Endgame*, p. 5
3. *Endgame*, p. 9
4. *Endgame*, p. 49
5. *Endgame*, p. 68
6. ABEL, LIONEL. *Metatheatre*, Hill and Wang, New York, 1963
7. *Waiting for Godot*, Grove Press, Inc., New York, 1954, p. 44.
8. ESSLIN, MARTIN. *The Theatre of the Absurd*, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1961, p. 297.
9. *Waiting for Godot*, p. 51
10. *Waiting for Godot*, p. 57
11. ESSLIN, MARTIN. *The Theatre of the Absurd*, p. 316.

The Puzzling Movies: Three Analyses and a Guess at Their Appeal

Norman N. Holland

Late in 1958, Janus Films released on a largely unsuspecting American public Bergman's *The Seventh Seal* and so started a flood in the art theaters of what seems to be a new genre in film, "the puzzling movie": *Hiroshima, Mon Amour, Les Cousins, The Magician, L'Avventura, 8½*, to name but a few. They all have in common their difficulty, the fact that they leave their audiences baffled, puzzled, and sometimes even frustrated. They raise, then, two questions: What does the individual film "mean"? Why do people like them? A literary critic can answer the first question, meaning, with a tolerable degree of certainty. The second question, appeal, takes us into murkier depths. For the first question, then, I offer three analyses, of *The Seventh Seal* itself, *La Dolce Vita*, and *Last Year at Marienbad*. After the analyses, I shall offer, rather more hesitantly, a guess at the psychological appeal of this kind of movie.[1]

The Seventh Seal

Aside from giving us a masterpiece, Ingmar Bergman in *The Seventh Seal*[2] has created a strange and wonderful paradox: a singularly modern medium treated in a singularly unmodern style—a medieval film. It is medieval in the trivial sense of being set in Sweden of the fourteenth century. More important, *The Seventh Seal* is a

[1] The three analyses are modified versions of my earlier reviews of these films for the *Hudson Review*: "The Seventh Seal: The Film as Iconography," *Hudson Review*, XII (1959), 266-270; "The Follies Fellini," *ibid.*, XIV (1961), 425-431; "Film, Metafilm and Un-Film," *ibid.*, XV (1962), 406-411, copyright© 1959, 1961, 1962 by The Hudson Review, Inc. The psychological "guess" as to the appeal of these films was originally presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Cinematologists at Boston University, April 22, 1963.

[2] *Det Sjunde Inseglet*. Written and directed by Ingmar Bergman. Production Ab Svensk Filmindustri. Photography: Gunnar Fischer. Music: Eric Nordgren. In my fascination for iconographics, I should not neglect to say that the photography and acting were flawless: notably Max von Sydow who played the Crusader; Nils Poppe (Sweden's most popular comedian), Jof; Bengt Ekerot, Death; Gunnar Björnstrand, the squire; and the lovely Bibi Andersson as Mia.

traditional *Totentanz* in which the allegorical figure of Death, robed in black like a monk, carrying scythe and hour-glass, leads the characters away in a dancing line under the dark, stormy sky. Most important, Bergman shows us, as medieval artists did, an allegorical, iconic reality, in Erich Auerbach's term, a figural reality which can be understood only by seeing that it prefigures something beyond itself. "My intention," Bergman writes in a note to the film, "has been to paint in the same way as the medieval church painter," and lo and behold! he has done just exactly that.

The Seventh Seal deals with a Crusader's quest, not in some faraway Holy Land, but in his own fourteenth-century Sweden. After ten years of holy war, the Crusader has returned home, weary, bitter, and disillusioned. On the shore, the ominous figure of Death steps out of a series of striking dissolves to claim him. The Crusader delays, however; he challenges Death to a game of chess. If the Crusader wins, he escapes Death; so long as the game goes on, he is free to continue his quest for certain knowledge of God and to do one significant act during his lifetime. As Death and the Crusader play at intervals through the film, the knight moves on a pilgrimage through Sweden, the land itself ravaged by the Black Death.

Bergman has in mind some obvious modern parallels to his medieval characters: "Their terror is the plague, Judgment Day, the star whose name is Wormwood. Our fear is of another kind but our words are the same. Our question remains." Our plague is intimate, as theirs was, and we too have our soldiers and priests, or as Bergman has called them, "communism and catholicism, two -isms at the sight of which the pure-hearted individualist is obliged to put out all his warning flags." Yet it would unnecessarily limit the universality of Bergman's achievement to call *The Seventh Seal* merely a necroterpsichorean parable for modern times. All men everywhere have always lived with death. Bergman is going beyond the *Totentanz*, trying to answer the further question: If death is the only certainty, where is God?

The Crusader's quest gives us the answer, though the knight himself seems never to learn it—or to learn that he has learned it. Accompanied by his positivistic, materialistic squire, a foil to his own abstractly questioning nature, he looks for certainty about God, for "to believe without knowledge is to love someone in the dark who never answers." Yet what the Crusader finds at first are people who believe in God only as a scourge, the cause of plagues and death, and who respond in kind. Religion for them becomes suppression, cruelty, persecution, the burning of innocent girls as witches, the terrifying realism of the crucifixes in the peasants' churches. In one of the most horrifying scenes ever put on film, Bergman shows us a procession of flagellants: a line of half-naked men lashing one another; monks strug-

gling under the weight of huge crosses or with aching arms holding skulls over their bowed heads; the faces of children who wear crowns of thorns; people walking barefoot or hobbling on their knees; a great gaunt woman whose countenance is sheer blankness; slow tears falling down the cheeks of a lovely young girl who smiles in her ecstasy of masochism. The procession interrupts the gay skit of a group of strolling players and halts while a mad priest screams abuse at the ugliness of his audience, long nose or fat body or goat's face. Glutted with hate, he joyfully proclaims the wrath of God, and the procession resumes its dogged way over the parched, lifeless soil.

Such is religion, Bergman seems to say, to those who see God as hater of life. Art (as represented by a surly, tippling church painter) becomes the representation of death to gratify the people's lust for fear. Living, as shown in a grotesque scene in an inn, becomes a sardonic "Eat, drink, and be merry." Cinematically, Bergman identifies this side of the ledger by great areas of blackness in the film frame and often by slow, sombre dissolves from shot to shot. Musically, the sound track treats even scenes of merrymaking with the *Dies Irae* theme.

The Seventh Seal finds God for us—or at least another certainty than Death—not in the wormwood-and-gall institutional religion of suffering and crucifixion, but in the simple life of a strolling actor and juggler named Jof (Joseph), his girl-wife Mia (Mary), and their baby. As if to make the parallel to the Holy Family even more clear, Jof plays the cuckold in the troupe's little Pierrot-Columbine skit. Jof is also the artist. He is given to visions, and Bergman shows us one, of "the Holy Virgin . . . supporting the Child's faltering steps." Except for the Crusader, Jof is the only one who can see the allegorical figure of Death. (To the Crusader's materialistic squire, for example, Death appears not as an iconic figure, but as a grisly, rotting corpse.) Jof is a maker of songs whose simple melodies provide the sound track for this side of the religious ledger. Cinematically, Bergman gives us the certainty and holiness of life represented by Jof's family in light, airy frames; quick cuts tend to replace the slow dissolves used for the religion of death.

Yet even innocent Jof can be converted to a thief and a buffoon by the death-forces. In the grotesque comic scene at the inn, he is tortured with flames, forced to jump up and down on the board table in an exhausting imitation of a bear, parodying his own ability to leap beyond the ordinary human. An artist stifled in his art, he responds by becoming a rogue: he steals a bracelet as he makes his getaway.

This grim *reductio ad absurdum* proves, as it were, that death and the religion of death cannot be the only certainty. As a mad young girl about to be burned for a witch tells the Crusader, you find God (or the Devil who implies God) in the eyes of another human

being. But the abstractly questioning Crusader says he sees only terror. He seems for a moment to find his certainty of God in a meal of wild strawberries and cream handed him by the gentle Mia, in effect, a communion of life as opposed to the bread and wine consecrated to Death. (To the medieval herbalist, strawberries were a symbol for the Virgin and her perfect innocence because the seeds of this fruit are on the outside; the strawberry, as it were, has no shame.) The Crusader seems also to find his "one significant act": he performs the service of the knight traditional to medieval art, not the colonizer of the Holy Land, but the protector of the Holy Family. He leads Jof, Mia, and the child through the dark wood. As he plays chess with Death, he sees the visionary Jof has recognized the Black One, seen his family's danger, and is trying to escape. To help him, the knight busies Death by knocking over the chessmen, incidentally giving Death a chance to cheat and win. By losing the game, the knight gives up his life to let Jof and Mia escape (in a tumultuous, stormy scene like paintings of the flight to Egypt).

And yet, though the Crusader has pointed the way for the audience, he seems not to have found it for himself. He goes on in his quest for abstract answers. He leads the rest of his now doomed band, a smith, the smith's venereous wife, the squire, and the squire's mute "housekeeper" to his castle. There, in a curiously emotionless scene, the Crusader distantly greets his wife whom he has not seen for ten years, shows her his disillusionment, but says he is not sorry he went on his quest. With the chess game lost and Death near, he knows it is too late for him now to act out the importance of the family himself, but he has learned its worth, though he does not realize its full godly significance. As his wife reads the lurid images of Revelation viii: "And when he had opened the seventh seal," Death, whom they all seem to await, appears. The Crusader asks once more that God prove himself. The mute girl opens her mouth and speaks, "It is finished," the sixth of the seven last words from the Cross. Death gathers them all in, his cloak filling the screen with black.

In short, then, the film answers its question, If Death is the only certainty, where is God? by saying, You find God in life. The opening shots of the film set up the contrast: first a blank empty sky; then the same sky but with a single bird hovering against the wind. Life takes meaning from its opposition to death, just as Jof and Mia's simple love of life takes meaning from the love of death around them—or as a chess game takes form in a series of oppositions.

The chess game is the central image of the film. It dictates much of the incidental imagery such as the knight's castle or the "eight brave men" who burn the witch. The playing (*spela*) of chess matches the playing (*spela*) of the strolling troupe. Both are traditional images

for the transitoriness of life: Death robs us of our roles; Death jumbles the chessmen back in the box. (The two images are juxtaposed, for example, in *Don Quixote*, II.xii.) The characters themselves and the points of view they represent are played off against one another much like pieces in a game.

There are also some particular correspondences (somewhat confused for an American audience by the Swedish names for the chessmen). The Crusader, distinguished by his cross, is the king of the chess game: when he is lost, all the rest are lost, too. It is the juggler Jof who is the knight (in Swedish, *springare*, the "leaper"). Only these two men have visions that go beyond reality, just as only the king and knight can go beyond the chess board. The juggler-knight (the "leaper") is free at all times to jump out of the two dimensions of the board—Jof's powers as a seer are almost exactly parodied by his tormentors' forcing him to jump up and down on the board table in the grotesquerie at the inn. The only other chessman who can rise off the board during the game is the king, and then only when he is castling, i.e., returning home, like this Crusader. All the pieces or characters, of course, in their own moment of death when they are taken from the board can see beyond it. Yet their visions beyond the physical reality of the board, and the Crusader's, are limited to the allegorical figure of Death; the "leaper" can see not only Death, but also the holy life of the Mother and Child.

In other words, it is the artist who has the vision the Crusader seeks in answers to abstract questions. As the church painter (whose murals prefigure the scenes of the film) says, the artist can conceive God with his senses, giving "not the reality you see, but another kind." Jof the juggler is this kind of artist: he hopes his Christ-like infant will grow up to achieve what he calls "the impossible trick," keeping the juggled ball always in the air, above the board, as it were. And Bergman himself is this kind of artist: he has called himself "a conjurer" working with a "deception of the human eye" which makes still pictures into moving pictures.

In *The Seventh Seal*, as in any great work of art, theme and medium have become one. "Art lost its creative urge," Bergman writes, "the moment it was separated from worship," and, by creating in the iconographic manner of medieval art, Bergman has turned the film back to worshipping (though not God, but life). He depicts the real world objectively, with tenderness and joy, but he shows reality as signifying something beyond itself. And in doing so, Bergman has established himself as one of the world's great and original directors. He has lifted the film out of mere physical realism and made his audience of chessmen with tricked eyes see in their own moves something beyond the board.

La Dolce Vita

Three-hour, three-million gross, triple-goddessed, Church-banned, myth-packed, and Totalscoped, about as different as a film could be from *The Seventh Seal, La Dolce Vita*[3] amazes indeed the very faculty of eyes and ears. Eyes and ears are not just the targets, though, but recurring symbols for what author-director Fellini has on his mind. His protagonist, Marcello, is a reporter and would-be novelist, a man questing (admittedly, rather ineffectively) after truth in the form of sounds and language. Indeed, at one point, Marcello rather shame-facedly mumbles something of the sort. As against this basic stance for sound and language, Fellini shows his people preoccupied with seeing, most obviously in the form of the ubiquitous *papparazzi*, the photographers who contrast with the verbal reporter Marcello—they swarm about virtually everyone and everything as though Sartre's flies had been outfitted with flash cameras. Images of seeing and being seen run all through the film, as, for example, the sunglasses everybody wears. Sights in *La Dolce Vita* are mostly Ziegfeldian sights of women, culminating in Nadia Gray's striptease in the final party, but repre-sented earlier, for example, by the pictures of female ancestors in the "haunted castle" sequence, the sight of the magnificently pneumatic Anita Ekberg, or the non-miraculous non-sight of the Virgin Mary in the televised "fake miracle."

Against these images of seeing and being seen, Fellini poises fewer, but far more striking images of hearing. At the home of Steiner, Marcello's intellectual friend, we hear folk songs and poetry and a tape recording of the sounds of nature; conversation reigns supreme. Steiner himself had earlier gone into a church to practice the Toccata and Fugue in D Minor—after the rock 'n roll and other raucous ca-cophonies, you can almost feel the Bach soothe your ear. At one point, Marcello retires to the seashore to renew his work on the Great Italian Novel; he cannot write for the loudness of the song from a jukebox played by a virginal young blond waitress he calls an "Umbrian angel." The song is "Patrizia," which Fellini presses into service later as the music for the striptease; like the Bach, it, too, is played on an organ. The music of the film parodies itself, and the point of Fellini's images of sound seems to be that they fail. It was, of all people, Robinson Crusoe (though he was surely not the first) who

---

[3] Scenario by Federico Fellini, Tullio Pinelli, Ennio Flaiano, and Brunello Rondi. Directed by Signor Fellini; produced by Giuseppe Amato; released in this country by Astor Films. Marcello Rubini is finely played by Marcello Mastroianni, and his photographer-sidekick by Walter Santesso. In addition to the actors identified in the text, the men are: Steiner—Alain Cuny; Marcello's father—Annibale Ninchi. The women are: Emma—Yvonne Furneaux; Maddalena—Anouk Aimée; the nightclub chorine—Magali Noel. The homosexuals I have been unable to identify from castlists.

pointed out that sound and language are the means by which human beings can achieve more than an animal relation with each other. Sound and language in *La Dolce Vita*, however, seem always to fail to create such a relationship. In the "haunted castle" sequence, Maddalena, one of Marcello's light o' loves, seats him in a room and goes outside to talk to him through a speaking-tube arrangement (a kind of "ear of Dionysius"). In the only serious moment of their relationship, we *hear* her propose marriage to him; we *see* her giving herself to another man.

The opening and closing bits (they are scarcely episodes) frame this recurring contrast of sight and sound. The opening (already, in the three years since the film was released, a classic among openings) shows a gilt image of Christ helicopter-borne over the Eternal City, which Fellini renders as a vast flux of running children and rising buildings; a second helicopter follows, carrying reporter Marcello and his photographer sidekick, apparently fishing for a story. Beneath them, they see a far more gripping sight than the Second, airborne Coming: four girls in bikinis sunbathing on a roof. As the helicopter hovers overhead, Marcello tries to speak to them, but they cannot hear one another over the noise of the chopper. The pattern is: the sight of a symbol; the sight of woman; the failure of sound. In the final shots, Marcello and assorted sodomities, usurers, grifters, and fornicators from the striptease party drift down to the sea (in shorts reminiscent of Botticelli). At the sea's edge, some fishermen pull up a huge devilfish, and the camera closes in on its still-staring eye. As Marcello turns to go, the "Umbrian angel" appears on the shore nearby, but there is water between them, and though he sees her and she him, they cannot hear each other for the sound of the waves. He shrugs indifferently and leaves; she turns to watch him go. In a brilliant cinematic touch, Fellini pans the camera as she turns so that the final shot is an extreme close-up of the Umbrian angel staring out at the audience—or us staring at her: the audience has become image, and the image is the audience.

The rough beast from the sea, with its overtones of the birth of some mute and nameless horror from the depths of the unconscious, provoked a good deal of speculation. Surely the most ingenious suggestion was *Sight and Sound's*, that it represents Wilma Montesi. *Time*, following its recent mythy bent, argued for the beast of the Apocalypse rising up out of the sea, the devilfish as antichrist; the opening bit is the Second Coming, and the film as a whole becomes an allegory of the seven nights of destruction in Revelation (the interpretation would be stronger if the film did not cover eight nights). Others suggested an allegory on the *Inferno* with Marcello as Dante, his downward spiral through the sins of contemporary Rome culminating in the ninth circle with the devilfish as Lucifer, complete with

three jellyfish dangling from his mouth. *La Vita Nuova* or the *canzonieri* might be relevant to a film which so stresses the image of woman.

All are possible—what is not possible is to see *La Dolce Vita* as "in the main a study of sexual manners," as *simply* "a sensational presentation of certain aspects of life in contemporary Rome." *La Dolce Vita* seems more tied to reality than Fellini's earlier work, but only "seems." It really has that same strange hankering after myth as his other films. His script for *The Miracle* reached essentially toward the traditional mating in the fields of sun-god and mortal woman. *The White Sheik* with its horseplay on different kinds of hats balanced the impotent male of church and marriage against the absurdly sexual male of the *fumetti* (visual images again). *I Vitelloni* constitutes a parody of the whole male pantheon, while, in *Le notti di Cabiria*, a tawdry and pathetic image of Venus renews herself in water after venal Adonises have chosen and abused her. *La Strada* is the clearest of them all, a classic agon between *eiron* and *alazon* over a (more or less) mute woman that could have come straight out of Cornford's *Origins of Attic Comedy*. *La Dolce Vita* has the same theme and mythic dimension as the others, men overpowered physically, morally, or psychologically by the gorgon-like image of woman. As Steiner says, "I am only this tall," and he holds up his finger. In the "fake miracle" (an earlier form of which appeared in *Cabiria*), an old woman gives us the tip-off. As the television cameras and photographers close in on the two children who have been gulled into saying they saw the Virgin, the crone says, "What does it matter whether it was the Virgin or not? Italy is full of strange cults." And indeed Fellini's Italy is.

The first one we see, the first full episode in the film, is a kind of temple prostitution. The gilt Christ of the opening shots dissolves into the mute sinuosities of a gilt Siamese dancer in a nightclub where Marcello picks up a rich nymphomaniac, Maddalena (and the name, I take it, is not without significance). They ride off in her white Caddy convertible, boredly pick up a prostitute, and drive her home. Fellini goes out of his way to make them go out of theirs, go underground to the prostitute's basement apartment, cross the waters of her flooded basement, and there, in this doubtful chthonic sanctum, make love.

The second is the advent through the air from another land of an Aphrodite Pandemos, Anita Ekberg, cast as a Hollywood love-goddess, Sylvia (again, the name is not without significance). Ritually, she is offered the fruits of the Roman fields (in the form of a giant pizza); then, in an hilarious press conference, she is consulted as an oracle. During the day, she bounds up the endless stairs to the top of St. Peter's, dressed in a parody of a priest's gown. The true aphroditic

rituals, however, took place on the tops of mountains or in caves, and that night, bobbling out of her evening gown, Sylvia leads a revel through the Baths of Caracalla, complete with rock 'n roll Orpheus and a faun in the form of a goatish American actor on whose shoulders she rides. "Why, Federico," Miss Ekberg is said to have remarked during the filming of these sequences, "you are making a fool of me." Despite this insight, Miss Ekberg can take comfort in the fact that Fellini was also making her a goddess. In some rituals, her celestial prototype did indeed ride a goat, and Marcello tells her she is mother, mistress, wife, home, "everything." They ride off in his Triumph, where he makes the old college try, but cannot find a place to go. (Throughout the film, blondes are unattainable—or at least unattainable by Marcello—unlike the brunettes, for example, Maddalena.) Our pandemotic love-goddess, however, seems (again, like Aphrodite) concerned as much with mothering animals as with mothering Marcello; anyway, she howls like a dog on a mountaintop, and in an exquisite sequence picks up a stray white kitten and, holding it before her like a monstrance, glides through the narrow corridors of midnight streets. She strides into the Trevi fountain; Marcello follows: "You're right—I'm on the wrong track—we all are." She puts water in his hair on a mock baptism, and to cap the parody, just then the fountain is turned off. They return to her hotel, where her opposite number, Lex Barker as a dipsoid American actor, awaits them, another mythic figure: "To think he once played Tarzan," sighs a *papparazzo.*

There are other "goddesses"—the missing Virgin Mary in the fake miracle; at Steiner's house, an old artist cries the praises of Oriental women, notably Mother Eve. In the haunted castle sequence, Maddalena standing before a row of matrilinear portraits puts a veil over her face; Marcello seduces a mysterious otherworldly "Lady Jane" with streaks in her hair like antennae; the ghosts, nighttime, the cemetery, the surrounding plutocracy give the whole episode a persephonic aura. Finally, of course, there is the "Umbrian angel," the virgin by the sea, image of a renewal and innocence, a kind of Aphrodite Urania, whom Marcello cannot accept.

In this matriarchal world, men become mere consorts, lover-kings, ridiculous, impotent. The clearest case is Marcello's father who turns up just before the necrotic haunted-castle sequence. An aging lecher, he gets his son to take him to an old-fashioned nightclub, where the walls glitter like a temple's and everywhere there are statues of women. During the conversation, we find he was usually away from home, rather a philanderer and a wine merchant, indeed, "sold wine all up and down Italy." Playing vanishing parlor-tricks with one of the chorines, he is compared to a donkey. Meanwhile, the acts of the nightclub entertainers parody still other aspects of ass-headed Diony-

sus. The first routine shows a triad of mock-ferocious cat-women ridiculing their quite ineffectual male tamer; the second shows us girls in a Charleston routine out of the father's youth; finally, in an exquisite act, the clown Polidor appears as a doddering Pied Piper, awed by the images of woman about him. A few pathetic notes of his almost limp trumpet and he shuffles out, trailing clouds of—balloons. Marcello's father goes to the chorus girl's apartment ("to eat spaghetti"), but suffers a stroke of some kind as they are making love. Pathetic, aging, his face always turned away, he wants only to return to Marcello's mother. In one of the most beautiful moments in the film, sick and exhausted as he is, he stoops and silently smoothes out the bed, removing his last trace; it is as though he had never been. So much for fatherhood.

Throughout the film, from the vulgarized Christ at the opening to the transvestite dance of the homosexuals at the end, man seems weak and helpless. Throughout, women lead men—Maddalena leads Marcello to the prostitute's apartment; Sylvia bounds up the steps of St. Peter's leaving behind clusters of exhausted Romans, and the haunted-castle sequence ends with the old *principessa*-matriarch leading the shamefaced "men" of the tribe off to Mass. Throughout, men seem awed, overcome by women, often trying to make themselves into women, sinking down into women. The men seem unable to get places; they have to clamber, grope, fly, break into places women seem to sink into effortlessly. When men do achieve heights, "rise above it all," they flag and gasp, revealing their impotency—Marcello climbing St. Peter's; Marcello's father up in the chorine's apartment; the cameramen's lights on high platforms shattering and popping in the fake miracle; the insignificance of the helicoptered Christ; the insignificance of our modern Mars—Marcello Rubini.

The exception (for a time, anyway) to all this is Steiner, Marcello's intellectual friend whose short unhappy life forms the most puzzling episode of the film. Unlike the other characters whose lives are dominated by sights and shows, Steiner lives in a world of sound and language. When we first see him, he is returning a Sanskrit text. He offers Marcello jobs in publishing, encourages him in his writing. Steiner, moreover, is a father with a lovely wife and charming children. Homespun, sturdy (Fellini originally wanted Henry Fonda for the part), he alone seems master of his fate. In fact, the whole situation is so goody-goody, it cloys. Then, inexplicably, Steiner commits suicide, destroying not only himself, but his children, destroying, in effect, his own fatherhood, his limited claim to be part of the flow of life, a total suicide. The film gives no particular reason for Steiner's suicide. It seems just one more in the long series of improvisations that make up *La Dolce Vita*. Impulse and improvisation are the ways the other characters work, however—not Steiner. In the first scene in which he

appears, he starts to improvise jazz on the church organ, but at a gentle rebuke from the priest obediently shifts to the Toccata and Fugue, a frozen, "perfected" improvisation, as it were. At his house, he says, "In a work of art, everything is planned and perfect. We need to be a work of art, detached, perfect, in suspended animation," and yet, he also said his own life was too much so (the goody-goody quality of everything associated with Steiner). There seems to be no room in his life for the new, the unexpected. His suicide is the only improvisation left him and, at the same time, the closing or framing of his perfected life. It leaves his wife to be photographed by the *paparazzi*, she, now, image of the *mater dolorosa*. Quite the opposite is the only other sustained human relationship Marcello has in the course of the film, that with his mistress, Emma. Squabbles, flirtations, attempted suicides, reconciliations, their relation is one long series of improvisations as she tries to "catch" him, fix him into matrimony and fatherhood, a Fury valiantly striving to be a hearth-goddess.

The film, then, uses its two central images, sight and sound, to set off men against women. The women are goddesses, mythical, unreal *belles dames sans merci*, the sight of whom bewitches men into a kingdom of improvisation and illusion. Man is impotent, helpless, Marcello's dying father or Steiner, with his sounds and language, frozen, turned into stone by the fixity of his life. (Indeed, sacred to Cybele was a small meteoric stone *acus*, supposed to have fallen from the heavens—an image much more fully developed in Serge Bourgignon's first film *Sundays and Cybèle*, in which the hero's name, Pierre, like Steiner's, means "stone.") Marcello, Everyman, is caught between these two alternatives, male and female, his mistress vainly seeking to play the role of goddess and petrify him into matrimony.

These themes all come together in the final dreary episode, the despairingly hedonistic party that follows Marcello's appearance at the scene of Steiner's suicide. The subjugation of men culminates in the dance of the homosexuals and gigolos, and the image of woman culminates in the striptease (to the same song the Umbrian angel had played on the jukebox). Marcello presides over the dispirited merry-making (the only case where a man is the "leader"), and as the party whimpers to its close he baptizes the departing revellers with feminizing feathers, as though he himself were plucking the chickens of Mother Carey (*mater cara*), a grim parody of the earlier, Ekbergian baptism, just as his white suit is now the negative of the tuxedo he wore in the earlier episode. The effect is rather like snow, perhaps the snow of the ninth circle, perhaps also Joyce's "snow falling faintly through the universe and faintly falling, like the descent of their last end, upon all the living and the dead." This, the last party, gives way to the film's final image of man, a devilfish gasping in air, an eye caught in a net, and the final image of woman, the Umbrian-Uranian angel.

As with any important work, *La Dolce Vita* defines its own art. Fellini's concern about turning people into images finds its expression in what might be called the rotogravure style of the film. Fellini had both sets and costumes of *La Dolce Vita* designed to photograph in exaggerated blacks and whites, so that everything in the film would have the hard, contrasty look of a flash photo. The film itself seems almost to be composed as a series of stills rather than as a moving picture. Fellini's sense of the new, the unexpected, his theme of improvisation, finds its expression in the episodic structure (here, as in *Vitelloni*, this episodic quality seems a weakness of the film; only in *La Strada*, it seems to me, did Fellini overcome this his besetting vice). Fellini's brilliant use of dissolves also suggests a kind of impulse or improvisation (the best example being the opening dissolve where the gilt image of Christ suddenly, startlingly becomes a gilt Siamese dancer). This sense of improvisation, by the way, is not inappropriate for perhaps the only major director in the world who likes working on a chaotic set, who insists a script can only be an outline and "writes" his pictures by improvising on the set, who kills off a character like Steiner who will not accept improvisation.

As in his earlier films, Fellini is getting at a view of man as essentially helpless and abject before the gorgon-like, all-powerful image of woman (in *Vitelloni*, for example, the gallant in the religious-goods shop surrounded by images of the Virgin, or—the most magnificent shot in that film—the half-wit worshipping a statue of an angel by the sea). Here, again, the theme fits a director who will look through thousands of photographs to get an actor with the right image; indeed, he claims to have interviewed 10,000 actors for *La Dolce Vita*, truly a cinematic Ziegfeld. The good, grey *Times* insists on a Fellini "taking the temperature of a sick world," and that is no doubt true, but it is also a Fellini preoccupied with dehumanizing people, making them into things (*Cabiria*) or heroes (*La Strada*) or gods (*The White Sheik*), but in every case, dehumanizing them, making them into images—not an unnatural preoccupation for a man whose work in life is to turn people into celluloid.

Last Year at Marienbad

Perhaps the most difficult of all the "puzzling movies" is *Last Year at Marienbad*,[4] with its obvious affinities to the plays of Becket,

4 *L'Année Dernière à Marienbad*. Director: Alain Resnais. Scenario and dialogue: Alain Robbe-Grillet. Director of Photography: Sacha Vierny. Music: Francis Seyrig. A = Delphine Seyrig. X = Giorgio Albertazzi. M = Sacha Pitoeff. Happily, Robbe-Grillet's screenplay has been published (Grove Press, $1.95); otherwise it would be impossible to remember the order of scenes. The author's introductory essay helps a great deal.

Ionesco, Gelber, Albee, and the rest. We could call *Marienbad*, a "Film of the Absurd" in analogy to "the theater of the absurd," the term popularized by Gelber, which has become the common nomenclature. That usage, I think, is unfortunate. Though Mr. Gelber is one of the nobler practitioners of the art (or non-art), though the term carries with it a certain gallantry, it is nevertheless pretty poor: one might as well call cubism the painting of the absurd, *and* surrealism *and* expressionism. The term covers too much, and it connotes an error: this century is really not much more absurd than its predecessor or the one before that.

"Metatheater" (Mr. Lionel Abel's term) tells us a good deal more. In "metaphysics," "metacriticism," "metapolitics," the "meta-" seems to suggest not only the original Greek that meta-X is X moving toward more-than-X, but also, in modern usage, that meta-X plays, toys, flirts with being X alone. Thus, we tend to assume (in our mimetic tradition) that theater portrays reality. Metatheater takes off from this portrayal-theater and plays against it in the tradition of Pirandello. Because metatheater, insofar as it is successful, destroys its own foundation, the audience's "set" toward a mimetic theater, those troubled by it can take comfort: metatheater should be an unusually short-lived genre.

Metatheater, however, leads us into a Promised Land of which Pirandello offers but a dim glimpse: an imitation of nature for an age of psychology. All metatheater plays (so far as I know) can be explicated as the quite literal and highly realistic playing-out of a psychological (usually psychoanalytic) proposition: Secondary processes of language and number derive from primary processes of sex and aggression (*The Lesson*). Man is a player of eroticized (or cathected) roles (*Balcony*). Language defines its own logic which provides a basis for the displacement and isolation of experience (*Bald Soprano*). Body enslaves mind, each defeating the other, when there is no focus outside the self to do the enslaving (*Godot*). Man connects with other men through spontaneous acts (*Connection*). And so on. In this sense, metatheater is, if anything, far too literal and simple-minded. These psychological propositions stand to the plays as the "morals" do to Aesop or the *Gesta Romanorum*. Metatheater is purely and simply the twentieth-century development of the *Everyman*-tradition, the modern amorality-play.

Quite clearly, I think, *Marienbad* qualifies as metafilm if for no other reason than the confusion and antagonism it has engendered. Dwight Macdonald objected that "one's mind and senses are stimulated" but there is no "affective life": the characters are reduced (in the screenplay, anyway) to A, X, and M. Stanley Kauffmann complained that the film "tries to reproduce actual inner life instead of distilling it," that "Resnais' efforts lead only to duplication of experi-

ence."[5] In the cocktail arena, where, in the last analysis (and analysis is last), the most direct and honest film criticism goes on, reactions varied from outrage to boredom; the stimulus, however, was invariably the same—bafflement. As a way of getting at this bafflement, let me point out that Kauffmann and Macdonald, both of whose judgments of the film, I think, are well thought and felt, are nevertheless giving quite contradictory reasons for their common response, that the film was cold: Kauffmann, that Robbe-Grillet and Resnais are trying to reproduce mental life too literally; Macdonald, that the film is "the pure depiction of scenes and actions without any hint of the psychological processes in the characters."

This dilemma resolves itself once we recognize that the film portrays, not mental life itself, or psychological processes, but propositions about mental life. In short, I am saying this is not film, but metafilm. It will be baffling, incoherent, just as metatheater or a fable of Aesop will be, unless understood as a portrayal of a psychological proposition, but if so understood, it will make perfect sense. Whether it will also seem less cold, I do not know—I suspect not—but at least the emotions arising from bafflement can be sidestepped. Let me concede at the outset that Robbe-Grillet heaps contempt on this kind of analysis (if his phrase "psychological analysis" includes this kind—mine, by the way, does not); he insists that the spectator respond in "pure subjectivities." Fine—but he might have bethought himself that people are uncomfortable when baffled (certainly the audiences were with whom I saw the film). People fear the incomprehensible, and fear was the only subjectivity the film drew out. The authors asked too much —the audience gave too little; in either case, the critical task becomes, not judgment but mediation, explication, analysis.

Clearly, the film has something to do with possibilities, and some of the brethren have claimed that that is the whole point of the film, "reality as an infinite series of possibilities." But isn't reality rather an infinitely decreasing series of possibilities? I believe the Second Law of Thermodynamics said something of the sort, at least until C. P. Snow made a culture of it. And anyway, this film has nothing to do with reality in any usual sense: the corridors of Nymphenburg are hardly life as she is lived. Nor are the possibilities in *Marienbad* very possible. In life, things are either one way or the other; here, they are both. The people cast shadows, but the bushes don't; a violin plays, but we hear an organ, and so on. The style is not that of reality at all, but of dreams or the id:

> The laws of logic—above all, the law of contradiction—do not hold for processes in the id. Contradictory impulses exist side by side without neutralizing each other or drawing apart; at most they combine in

---

compromise formations . . . There is nothing in the id which can be compared to negation, and we are astonished to find in it an exception to the philosophers' assertion that space and time are necessary forms of our mental acts. In the id there is nothing corresponding to the idea of time, no recognition of the passage of time. . . . Naturally, the id knows no values, no good and evil, no morality.

—so Freud in the *New Introductory Lectures*, and so *Marienbad*.

The whole point about possibilities in *Marienbad* is that they are all there, frozen at it were, and this quality comes across in the formal, *haute couture* of the film, its acting which is not acting at all, but posing in the manner of fashion ads or the rotogravure—again, competing possibilities actualized. The atmosphere of the "resort-hotel" and its "park," the formal clothes the guests wear, the recurring performance of a play, the ritualized and prescribed life within the resort—these define a world in which all possibilities (whether known presently or not) have been marked out. The splendiferous baroque tracery of the ceilings and walls represents a style in which the decorator has actualized all the possibilities a given line has.

The key image is games and play. The shuffled deck, the dealt dominoes, the formal shooting-match contain in themselves all possible outcomes; nothing truly unpredictable can happen. In particular, of course, the film uses the so-called *Marienbad* game. Two players set out matches (cards, chips, dominoes, people) in four piles: 1, 3, 5, and 7. Playing alternately, each player can take as many matches as he likes from any one pile; the one who must take the last match "loses." This is, of course, nothing but the old mathematical diversion of Nim, the theory of which Professors Philip Franklin and Hartley Rogers have been kind enough to explain to me. The first step is to write (or imagine) the number of matches in each pile in numbers to the base two, arranging those binary numbers in a column for addition; thus, the *Marienbad* version,

.		1
. . .		11
. . . . .	becomes	101
. . . .		111

To win the game, let the other man start; then remove matches in such a way that the number of units in each column after your move is either even or zero (but do not, near the end of the game, leave your opponent an even number of piles with one match in each). Because, in the *Marienbad* version, the starting arrangement is a winning combination, the one who plays second (M, in the film) can always force a win; the one who plays first (M does this once) can force a win if his opponent doesn't know the system. Resnais and Robbe-Grillet are using the properties of this game much as Bergman used the two-

dimensional properties of chess in *The Seventh Seal*. The film pretends Nim is a true game in which either player could win; actually, once the piles are laid out, the game is as determined as tic-tac-toe—a perfect symbol for possibilities which are not true possibilities, choices which are not true choices.

I suspect that the form of the film, the logic of that quite incredible *mélange* of flashbacks, "objectivized hypotheses," and so on, derives from the series of choices involved in Nim: each match offers one of two choices, to take it or not to take it, limited by the rule that you can take only from one pile at a time, just as one possible event depends on the possibility of the sequence in which it is a part. Thus, 1. A and X had or had not met at Marienbad last year. 2. She agreed to go away with him; she insisted on waiting a year. 3. He did or did not take a photograph of her. 4. They did or did not have a daylight meeting in the park at which she lost the heel of her shoe. 5. X did or did not take her by force in her bedroom. 6. They did or did not have a night meeting in the park at which X, when M confronted the lovers, leaned on a faulty balustrade and fell. 7. M did or did not shoot A at an assignation in her bedroom. All these inconsistent possibilities (and some others) co-exist in the film, discoverable by the different clothes the characters wear for the different possible sequences. And the movement of the film is to reduce or foreclose these possibilities, just as Nim proceeds to its predetermined victory by reducing the number of matches and thus foreclosing possibilities of choice.

Just as X's games of Nim with M (*le mari peut-être*) inevitably end with X's taking the last match, so the film ends by X's leaving the hotel with the lady. As they leave, the screen goes to black; the voice of X says:

> The park of this hotel was a kind of garden *à la française* without any trees or flowers, without any foliage. . . . Gravel, stone, marble and straight lines marked out rigid spaces, surfaces without mystery. It seemed, at first glance, impossible to get lost here . . . at first glance . . . down straight paths, between the statues with frozen gestures and granite slabs, where you were now already getting lost, forever, in the calm night, alone with me.

In short, they have left the world of the unconscious (as described by Freud), where there is no negative, no sense of time, for a world where one can "get lost." It is in this sense that the film is a portrayal of a proposition about mental life, in Robbe-Grillet's terms, "an attempt to construct a purely mental time and space—those of dreams, perhaps, or of memory, those of any affective life—without worrying too much about the traditional relations of cause and effect, or about an absolute time sequence in the narrative." "He offers her the impossible, what seems most impossible in this labyrinth where time is

apparently abolished: he offers her a past, a future and freedom." Indeed, in psychoanalytic terms, by accepting a past one has denied (the repressed), one does achieve this freedom. By accepting time, specifically the fact that time forecloses possibilities, eliminates freedom, paradoxically, one achieves freedom; one escapes the deteminism of the unconscious; A can "get lost."

This explication is not inconsistent with some ingenuities suggested by others, for example, that A, M, and X represent the Oedipal triangle in a recurring dream; or that A is mad, X a psychiatrist, and M her madness; that X is Death, A the Maiden, M a frozen immortality; that X is Prince Charming, A the Sleeping Beauty, and M the Wicked Witch (or Warlock)—all these are aspects or possibilities to what seems to me the informing principle of the film: Acceptance of the past (the repressed or a time-sense) represents release from the inexorable pleasure-principle (the imprisoning resort-hotel) of the id toward the world of decision, the ego. The film is a portrayal of Freud's description of the id, not the id itself—and lest you think I am splitting neurons, remember that a portrayal of the id itself would, in any case, be impossible. The analogy is to metatheater, to allegory and the psychomachia, to Joyce's use of the *Odyssey* or Dante's of Aquinas. Still closer is *The Sound and the Fury*, where, as my colleague Carvel Collins pointed out long ago, Benjy represents the id, Quentin the ego, Jason the superego, partly realistically, but also simply as portrayals of these mythical beasts as described in Freud's 1926 *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article. Metafilm, like metatheater, drops out the realism so that it can only be understood Aesopianly, as the portrayal of a proposition about mental life, not mental life as we experience it.

An explication along these lines may (or may not) ease the puzzlement; it certainly will not answer the judgment that the film is cold because the film certainly is cold. Is that necessarily bad? *Godot*, it seems to me, is undeniably a masterpiece, but it scarcely throbs with the affective life of its characters. Beckett, Ionesco, and the rest of the metatheater mob are playing against our emotional expectations as much as they are playing against our expectation of realism. They ask that we respond intellectually and with laughter; do they ask for more than the merest smudge of emotions? Repeatedly, Robbe-Grillet seems to suggest in his account of the collaboration that he wanted a film addressed exclusively to the senses. I would add (with Macdonald) that the film is directed to the intellect as well, but one thing is clear: the film is simply not aimed at the emotions. What little feeling the film arouses is curiously isolated, scarcely above the level of sensuous response. Just as the intellectual *donnée* is the separation of ego from id, so our emotional response is not at all tied in to the intellectual response. Is that bad? The "tragedies" of Chekhov and

Strindberg call, not for the traditional emotions of tragedy, but for a mocking pity, mostly comic, an emotional response so special that half a century later the ordinary producer is too cautious to play for it. In the same way, metatheater and metafilm (which, I suppose, constitute a metagenre) define themselves in terms of this special *affektlos*, sensuous-intellectual response they call for. Is such a demand bad? Not to me—and I will stick out my cerebrum and call *Marienbad* a metamasterpiece.

The Appeal of "Puzzling" Movies

In fact, despite their difficulty, I would call a great many of these films "masterpieces." Many of them almost dazzle with their richness, their sheer filmic excellence. Individually, they vary widely in meaning from, as we have seen, Bergman's Christian preoccupations to Fellini's paganism to Resnais' sense of binary or primary-process possibilities. As a genre, though, they represent perhaps the only sustained group of films after the advent of sound to be truly and overwhelmingly visual: these films look good like a cinema should.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has recently suggested they are creating a new "Movie Generation" to replace those of us who grew up, cinematically, on the popcorn and cheesecake Hollywood classics of the thirties.[6] Another reviewer calls these films the "undergraduate movies," and there is much truth in the adjective, if we extend it to include not only the four-year kind, but also the perpetual undergraduates on the other side of the lectern. These are indeed films that make their chief appeal to the academic and the intellectual. Above all, they are a literary critic's joy because they enable him to trot out all the erudition he has mustered for reading twentieth-century poetry and fiction: myths, recurring images, metaphysical metaphors, literary parallels, and the rest.

But, to come at long last to the second question we asked at the outset, why should these films appeal to anybody, really? If you stand outside an art theater as the audience comes out from a "puzzling movie," you will hear over and over again in a variety of phrasings and degrees of profanity, "What was *that* all about?" As a local joke has it, one Harvard undergraduate to another, "Have you seen *Last Year at Marienbad*?" The other, slowly, thoughtfully, "I—don't know." The feeling these films almost invariably leave us with is, "It means something, but just what I don't know," and the question I am asking is: *Why should that feeling of puzzlement give us pleasure?*

It doesn't, of course, to everyone. Popular as these films may be among intellectuals and academics, there are plenty of people who

---

[6] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "When the Movies Really Counted," *Show*, III (No. 4, April, 1963), 125.

find them simply boring. At a somewhat more sophisticated level (I am thinking of the usual reviewer for a daily paper), we hear two kinds of complaint. First, these films make just one more statement of the moral and social confusion of the century. Second, we are likely to find a sexual indignation, for these films are rather strikingly casual about such matters. There were, for example, the two proper Bostonian ladies who went to see *The Virgin Spring*. During that appalling rape scene, one leaned over to the other and whispered, "You know, in Sweden, things are like that." And, in fact, sex in these films does tend to be either rape or mere amusement, a kind of bedroom Olympics in which neither the Russians nor the Americans stand a chance—only Common Market countries.

Sex and *mal de siècle*, certainly these films have them in abundance, but the quality that still stands out is the puzzlement they create. Contrast a film-maker like Eisenstein. He uses montage, symbolism, and the rest not very differently from the way the makers of the puzzling movies do, but Eisenstein aims to communicate his socialist and Marxist message; his symbols serve that end. The maker of the puzzling movie, on the other hand, as much as hangs out a sign that says, "Figure it out—if you can." His symbols serve not so much to communicate as to suggest or even to mystify. (Think, for example, of the devilfish at the end of *La Dolce Vita* and all the different interpretations of it.) Yet, despite the intentional mystification, we take pleasure in them just the same—these films are puzzling in more than one sense.

In particular, there are two ways they puzzle us. They puzzle us as to their meaning in a total sense. They puzzle us scene-by-scene simply as to what is going on in a narrative or dramatic way. Let me consider, first, our puzzlement as to meaning—why should these films, that seem almost to hide their own meaning, please us?

To answer that question, it helps to take a detour by way of the joke, an humble, but useful route through aesthetic problems, for the joke will serve as a model or prototype for more respectable literature. In particular, jokes often have the same *riddling* quality as, say, a film by Antonioni. We have to solve some little problem before we "get" the joke—for example, the old saying, "A wife is like an umbrella—sooner or later one has to take a taxi." The riddling form of the joke does two things. First, it draws and holds our attention to the joke. In the case of the puzzling movie, it draws and holds our attention to the film. Second, the riddling form binds our processes of intellection, creating a state of tension or damming up. The riddling form busies us with solving the riddle and so enables less revelant, less presentable thoughts prompted by the joke to sneak up on us, to take us unawares, as it were. So with the puzzling film: its enigmatic promise of "meaning" not only draws and holds our attention to the

film; it also distracts us from the real source of our pleasure in the film, the thoughts and desires it evokes.

This, modern ego-psychology tells us, is the real function of form in art. The neo-classic critics used to say form justifies content. A modern psychoanalytic critic would say, intellectual content justifies form, and then form justifies emotional content. That is, in the case of the joke, its promise that there will be an intellectual meaning, a "point", enables us to relax and enjoy a playing with words and ideas that we would ordinarily dismiss as childish or insane: intellectual content justifies form. At the same time, the play with words and ideas acts as an additional and preliminary source of pleasure. The pleasure in this play unbalances the usual equilibrium between our tabooed impulses and our defenses, and it provides the extra to topple those defenses—we laugh. In other words, the point (or intellectual content) of the joke justifies the form; then the pleasure we take in form allows another kind of content to break through, and we gratify some sexual or aggressive impulse we would ordinarily hold in check.

The same process seems to operate with the puzzling movie. The feeling we have is: "This means something, but I don't know what." "This means something," the first part of our reaction, acts like intellectual content in the joke—it justifies form; it bribes our reason to accept the incoherent stream of images or the incoherent narrative of the puzzling movie. Then, our pleasure in those images, the sheer visual beauty of the films in this genre, acts like form: it allows us to enjoy the forbidden content of the film.

But what is this forbidden content? In the joke-situation, we can usually identify the hidden impulse of hostility or obscenity that the joke works with. The content of the puzzling movie is not so easy to get at.

We can get a clue, though, from the adverse reactions to the films. Those reviewers and audiences for whom the puzzling quality doesn't work complain of two things: the casual attitude toward sex; the feeling that the films express in a peculiarly negative way the moral confusion of the age. For the disappointed critics of these films, the form didn't work, and the fantasies prompted by the film came through raw and repulsive: sexual promiscuity and a fear of moral confusion.

The sex angle is the easier to see. These films are extraordinarily free about such matters—I am thinking of such scenes as Jeanne Moreau's taking a bath in *Les Amants* and *La Notte*; the striptease in *La Dolce Vita*; the scenes of love-making in *Hiroshima*; rape in *The Virgin Spring*, *Through a Glass Darkly*, or *Marienbad*. In effect, the puzzling quality of the films gives us an intellectual justification for gratifying the simplest of visual desires, looking at violent and sexy things. This, I hasten to add, is a crude, first-order effect, but nevertheless a very important part of the appeal of even these very sophis-

ticated and intellectual films. Or, for that matter, their lack of appeal
—read Bosley Crowther.

In effect, the puzzling movies are an intellectual's version of the
old DeMille Bible epic, where we gratify our sexual desires by watch-
ing the wicked Assyrians, Philistines, Romans, or whomever carry on
their grand pagan orgies, but we are justified by the ponderously
moral content of the film. The Biblical frame allows us to gratify
almost shamelessly the seventh and least of the sinful impulses. I say,
"us," but no doubt I do you an injustice: no proper intellectual would
be fooled by the crudity of the moral sop in the DeMille biblio-epic,
and this is not the kind of form the puzzling movie gives us. The
puzzling movie presents itself as an intellectual and aesthetic problem
rather than a moral one, and then perhaps it does fool the intellectual
in the same amiable way that jokes and works of art do; the puzzling
movie engages his intellectual attention and lets the dark underside
of the self (which even intellectuals have) gratify its chthonic wishes.

We can see the process in *statu nascendi*, as it were, in Leslie
Fiedler's remarkable review of a "nudie" movie, *The Immoral Mr.
Teas*.[7] Mr. Fiedler, I presume, has reached the end of his own inno-
cence and knows what he is doing. Even so, he looks at this film and
finds in it "ambiguity," "irreality," "a world of noncontact and noncom-
munication." He treats this jolly and ribald movie as an index to the
American national character, illustrates from it American attitudes
toward the body, and (most strikingly) contrasts the nudity in *The
Immoral Mr. Teas* with the more humane nudity in *Room at the Top*
and *Hiroshima, Mon Amour*. In other words, Mr. Fiedler's astute
analysis has erected such an intellectual "meaning" for this film
(though it is scarcely above the level of a stag movie) that any self-
respecting intellectual could go see it with a clear conscience and a
blithe spirit—of analysis. Mr. Fiedler does it with criticism; the puz-
zling film-maker does it with his camera; but, in either case, the intel-
lectual promise of "meaning" justifies the simpler and more primitive
pleasure.

Leslie Fiedler treats *The Immoral Mr. Teas* in intellectual and
aesthetic terms, whereas the "meaning" that justified the content of
the Biblical epic was its religious and moral "message." This shift
from moral message to intellectual "meaning" is itself a source of
pleasure in the puzzling movie, particularly for the intellectuals to
whom the puzzling movie makes its chief appeal. After all, moral and
religious issues have a strong and perhaps frightening emotional over-
tone. Aesthetic and intellectual "meaning" seems much more manage-
able. The notion that the moral confusions of this most trying of
centuries can be shifted over to the very kind of aesthetic and intel-

---

[7] Leslie A. Fiedler, "A Night with Mr. Teas," *Show*, I (No. 1, October,
1961), 118-119.

lectual puzzle that highbrows are adept at is itself a very comforting
hope indeed. And again, confirmation of this source of pleasure comes
from those in the audience who find no pleasure in this displacement.
The films clearly deal with moral problems. Those in the audience
who cannot accept their translation of moral issues into intellectual
ones see the puzzling movies as merely expressing moral problems
without answering them, and these critics say the films just prove the
sickness of the century.

So far, then, we have found three sources of pleasure in the way
these films puzzle us as to meaning. First, we feel that somehow this
film "means something," and that promise of content, a "point," en-
ables us to take pleasure in the seemingly incoherent and puzzling
visual form of the film. That preliminary visual pleasure in form com-
bines with a less acceptable source of visual pleasure in content:
peeping at some very erotic scenes. The combination of these plea-
sures from form and from content unbalance and override our usual
inhibitions. At the same time, these films displace moral and social
inhibition into aesthetic and intellectual demands for "meaning," some-
thing that intellectuals at least find much easier to resolve, and the
puzzling quality so provides still a third source of pleasure.

This kind of economic analysis, however, seems highly abstract.
Somehow, we are missing some of the essential quality of these films.
Let's see if we can get closer by looking at the second source of puz-
zlement: not now as to total "meaning," but scene by scene, the simple
narrative riddle of, What's going on?

I have suggested that one of the brute, root sources of pleasure
in these films is simply that of looking at sexual scenes. Yet sex in
these films has a peculiar and special quality. I mentioned Jeanne
Moreau's bath scenes in *Les Amants* and *La Notte*—the first occurs
in the context of a casual affair; in the second, her husband is simply
bored by the sight. Similarly, the husband is bored by Romy Schnei-
der's long and lovely bath scene in the Visconti episode of *Boccaccio
70*, a visual feast but an emotional fast. The striptease in *La Dolce
Vita* and virtually all the sex in that film is without any emotion but
simple desire. Again, there is simply lust or hate in the rape scenes
of *The Virgin Spring* or *Rocco and his Brothers*. The same quality
shows in those seductions tantamount to rapes by the heroine of
Through a Glass Darkly and by the nymphomaniac at the hospital in
La Notte. The opening love scenes of *Hiroshima, Mon Amour* set out
another casual love affair; the woman's voice drones on the sound
track throughout the sequence much as the narrator's voice drones on
in *Marienbad* debating with itself whether it took the woman by force
or not. *The Seventh Seal*, perhaps the finest film in the genre, seems
to vary this emotionless pattern, but not really: Bergman, as we have
seen, isolates sex *cum* love in the juggler and his wife, those who

escape Death; while the Crusader and his wife, the squire and his girl (rescued from rape), the blacksmith's wife seduced by the actor, they all show the same dogged lovelessness which seems to be the distinctive feature of human relationships in the puzzling movie.

This emotionlessness does not confine itself to sexuality, either. Think, for example, of the cryptic face of Max von Sydow in *The Seventh Seal* or Monica Vitti's classical mask in the Antonioni trilogy. These films are cryptic on the simple level of, What's he thinking? What's he feeling? The suicide of Steiner in *La Dolce Vita* reveals some underlying emotional reality his aesthetic and intellectual life had screened, but what? The disappearance of Anna in *L'Avventura*, her earlier cry of "Sharks!" in the swimming sequence—these tell us something about her inner life, but what? The long, circling walk of the lovers in the last third of *Hiroshima, Mon Amour*, the fashion-plate style of *Marienbad*, the disguises in *The Magician*, all show us cryptic outward actions as a substitute for inner emotions not revealed.

All through the puzzling movies, in other words, we are seeing events without understanding their emotional meaning. We are simply not permitted to become fully aware of what is going on emotionally. This sensation, though, is not by any means a new one, special to the puzzling movies. In fact, these films duplicate an experience we have all had, one which was at one time irritating, even frightening, a constant reminder of our own helplessness in the face of forces much bigger than we. I am thinking, of course, of the child's situation, surrounded by a whole range of adult emotions and experiences he cannot understand. "What's that man doing, Mommy?" is a not inappropriate comment on the whole genre of "puzzling movies."

Typically, the child does not even have the words with which to grasp these adult emotions and experiences, a circumstance these films duplicate by happenstance. That is, they are all foreign-language films which put us again in a position where the big people, the ones we see on the screen, have all kinds of complex experiences which they speak about in a language we cannot understand (at least those of us who bestowed our time in fencing, dancing, and bear-baiting instead of the tongues). Even for those who spent some time with the tongues, these films make us regress, grow backward, into children a second way by their intensely visual and filmic quality. They take us back to the picture-language of the comic strip, of children, and of dreams.

There is still a third way these films take us back to the child's frame of mind: in sexuality. The child's dim awareness of adult sexuality very much resembles the sexuality of the puzzling movies. He can see or, more usually, imagine the physical act, but he cannot feel the whole range of complex emotions and experiences the adult knows as love. Rather, the child understands the act of sex as something

associated with violence and danger, as we see it, for example, in *The Virgin Spring, Rocco and his Brothers, La Dolce Vita, Hiroshima, Mon Amour, Last Year at Marienbad, Les Cousins*, and the rest. The child is aroused at his sexual fantasies and a bit afraid at his own arousal, as indeed we ourselves tend to be at a puzzling movie. Further, the child's general uncertainty about the adult world finds a focus for itself in his uncertainty, arousal, and fear at this particular area of adult life—sexuality. It serves as a nucleus for his total puzzlement at adult emotions and actions, just as the sexuality in the puzzling movies serves as the nucleus of the total atmosphere of mysterious, baffling emotions and motivations.

In various ways, then, the puzzling quality in the story level of these films takes us back to a childhood situation of puzzlement, but presents it now as an intellectual and aesthetic puzzle rather than an emotional one in real life. "This event obviously says something about the emotional life of these people, but I don't know what, and it's only a film anyway." The film puzzles, disturbs, presents us with an emotional riddle, but puts it in an intellectual and aesthetic context. Further, it transforms the emotional puzzle into precisely the kind of puzzle that an "undergraduate" audience might feel it could solve, an intellectual and aesthetic puzzle, involving binary numbers or Roman myths, instead of an emotional puzzle. In other words, not only do these films take us back to childhood disturbances; they seem to say we can master those disturbances by the strategies of our adult selves, our ability to solve aesthetic and intellectual puzzles.

The puzzling movies hold out to their intellectual audiences the possibility of mastering childish puzzlement by the defenses of the adult intellectual. For example, most intellectuals have a good deal of curiosity. In technical jargon, infantile curiosity became sublimated into the intellectual and aesthetic curiosity of the adult. Now the puzzling movie comes along and enables us to do or think we can do just what our life-style has been wanting to do all along: solve the riddle of emotions and sexuality by purely intellectual means.

The puzzling movies play into the intellectual's life-style in another way. It is very typical of the highly intellectualized person that he puts up a barrier between emotional experience and the intellectual problems with which he concerns himself. The puzzling movie enables him to do this again—to put aside the emotional mysteries of the film and see it coldly, in intellectual terms, *Marienbad* being the most obvious example. In short, the puzzling movies, precisely because they are puzzling, take us, as any great work of art does, along the whole spectrum of our development from infancy to adulthood; or, at least, they do for most of their "undergraduate" audience.

There is, though, one special reaction that deserves notice: some critics feel no uncertainty at all—at least on the narrative level. The

usual review of an Antonioni film, for example, in a film magazine or a literary quarterly will tell you scene by scene and scowl by scowl what each of the characters is thinking at every given moment." For this kind of viewer, there is no mystery in the puzzling movie, or, more properly, his careful observation of the film enables him to say that he has seen everything there is to be seen. There is no mystery— he understands the emotional riddle. This response offers a variant but no less pleasurable way of overcoming that residue of childish bafflement in us—instead of shifting it to an adult intellectual problem, the critic simply says it doesn't exist at all: there is no puzzle. I have seen it all and understood it all: there is nothing to be puzzled— or frightened—by. And this procedure is no less satisfying than the other ways the puzzling movie works.

To bring them all together, the puzzling movie turns its puzzling quality into pleasure in two large areas. First, it presents itself as an aesthetic mystery: What does it "mean"? As in a joke, the oblique promise of a "point" enables us to relax our demand for coherence and take pleasure in the incoherent visual form of the film. Then, that visual form lets us take pleasure in the sexual content and, at the same time, shift any moral qualms we might have to intellectual and aesthetic qualms. Second, the puzzling movie presents us with a mystery on a simple narrative or dramatic level: What's going on? This second kind of mystery duplicates a child's feeling of bafflement at the adult world around him, but translates that pre-verbal emotional bafflement into an aesthetic mystery that a sophisticated, intellectual audience, no longer children, can feel confident about solving, even if doing so is as complicated as our three analyses.

There is a lesson here about movies in general, for all movies take us back to childhood. They give us a child's pleasure in looking at things, which we, as sophisticated moviegoers, respond to in our demand that the film be true to its medium, that it be visual. Similarly, the film takes us back to a pre-verbal stage of development; and, again, as critical audience, we demand that the picture make its point, not through words on the soundtrack, but through pictures. Most important, however, there is that certain feeling most people have, that looking at a film is somehow "passive." In fact, of course, the film involves no more passivity than reading a novel or watching a play, and yet there is something akin to passivity in the cinematic transaction.

Wolfenstein and Leites, in their classic study of the psychology

---

8 See, for example, Joseph Bennett, "The Essences of Being," *Hudson Review*, XIV (1961), 432-436, on *L'Avventura;* or, in general, Ian Cameron, "Michaelangelo Antonioni," *Film Quarterly*, XVI (No. 1, Fall, 1962, Special Issue), 1-58, particularly 37-58.

of the movie audience, find part of that sensation of passivity in the audience's "peering with impunity" at the big people on the screen:

> What novels could tell, movies can show. Walls drop away before the advancing camera. No character need disappear by going off-stage. The face of the heroine and the kiss of lovers are magnified for close inspection. The primal situation of excited and terrified looking, that of the child trying to see what happens at night, is re-created in the theater; the related wish to see everything is more nearly granted by the movies than by stage. The movie audience is moreover insured against reaction or reproof from those whom they watch because the actors are incapable of seeing them. The onlooker becomes invisible.[9]

The actors, in short, can't fight back, and that is one way the film seems a "passive" medium.

The other side of the coin is that we can't provoke the actor. Unlike the stage situation where the length of our laughter, the solemnity of our listening will affect the actor's performance; unlike the television situation where we can turn the box off, get up for a beer or whatnot, we have no such effect on the film which grinds away its twenty-four pictures a second as relentlessly as Niagara Falls. We are powerless, as we were when we were children, to change the doings of the "big people." Now, though, we are immune; the giants on the screen cannot affect us, either. Our regression is safe, secure, and highly pleasurable.

This regression to the safe but powerless child, it seems to me, is the reason people feel watching a film is somehow "passive": the big people cannot act on us; we cannot act on them. This regression, of course, is a key source of pleasure not only in the puzzling movies, but in all films, and especially those which, like the puzzling movies, make their appeal visually, that is, those in which the pre-verbal element of the film is especially strong.

In fact, we could define filmic achievement in terms of what it does with this visual, pre-verbal element in the situation of safe helplessness induced by the motion-picture format. In the case of silent comedy, the action on the screen says to us, in effect, "This mysterious pre-verbal world of violence and disaster is really harmless—it's all right." Eisenstein's films and others of the montage school say, "This mysterious pre-verbal world you see is meaningful. You understand it, and you respond to it emotionally and morally." The puzzling movie says to us, "This mysterious pre-verbal world you see, though you don't understand it right away, still, it can be solved." The puzzling film pleases us because it is, in the last analysis, as all art is, a comfort.

---

[9] Martha Wolfenstein and Nathan Leites, *Movies: A Psychological Study* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950), p. 289.

Man and Moloch

Kenneth D. Benne

The lives of most contemporary men are lived on the sufferance of some bureaucratic organization or another. This is true, in the first instance, of a man's vocational life. His talents are employed, or not employed, by some bureaucracy in advancing its goals or enhancing its image. If employed, he is provided by the organization in turn with means to draw on the products of other bureaucratic organizations in sustaining him in the rest of his life. Bureaucratic organizations are thus primary factors in contemporary man's employment as worker. Increasingly, he must reckon also with bureaucracies in his non-worker roles—as citizen, as student, and as client in quest of health, recreational and welfare services as well.

Moreover, the organizations which environ his life are endowed with earthly immortality as legally corporate persons—an immortality to which biologic man cannot reasonably aspire. They are made up of men but possess a continuity and character which extend beyond the life spans of any or all of the men who for a time occupy positions within their pyramidal structures. Being pyramidal in structure, to men living on their middle or lower slopes, the decisions of the organization—decisions which affect fundamentally their employment or non-employment, their status as workers or non-workers, indeed, as men—are shrouded in mystery. Perhaps the mystery enshrouds those on their upmost pinnacles as well.

It is not surprising that these corporate persons—these quasi-human giants on whom our lives basically depend—have received increasing attention by scientific students of man and society over the past three generations of mortal men. But it may be doubted whether these studies have plumbed the mysteries of corporate organizations. Nor is it surprising that temples, schools of administration and management, have developed to instruct men in manipulating, if not always in comprehending, these mysteries. Polemic writings of justification and attack upon bureaucracy are vast in bulk but only meagerly enlightening.

Some writers of imaginative literature too have attempted to assay the inner reactions of men to organizations which make a more

or less total demand upon their lives. The most insightful literature has been written from the standpoint of men dependent upon but in some degree estranged from a bureaucratic system.

This essay is an examination of four novels which portray and probe human responses to bureaucratic organization. Its aim is to glean suggestions concerning both the power and meaning of total organizations in human lives. Each novel will be analyzed in turn and a meta-scientific postcript ventured in conclusion.

The Total Demand and the Insatiable
Quest for Fulfillment

I have for a long time read Franz Kafka's *The Castle* as a study of a man (K.), intricated yet fundamentally estranged, within a bureaucracy. Most interpreters and critics move, too quickly as I see it, to the ontological and theological significances of Kafka's work. These significances are undeniable. Any deep examination of contemporary man and organization involves the examiner in ontological and theological questions. But to allegorize too quickly the experiential foreground of K.'s organizational involvements may rob Kafka's work of its power to illuminate the social plight of contemporary man.

Kafka's hero, K., finds himself in a village huddled near the Castle which is the principal employer of people in the village and the determiner, usually by indirection, of the life-patterns of the village people. K. has been employed by the Castle to serve as land surveyor in the village. He has come to receive instructions concerning his work and legitimation of his status. The action of the novel is taken up completely with K.'s abortive and frustrated attempts to find some authorized representative of the Castle who can clarify his task and recognize and validate his status as a Castle employee. The action moves in a dream sequence, from one conspiracy by K. to make contact with the Castle to another conspiracy, from one frustration to another. The "rational" content of K.'s conspiracies—trying to clarify his job assignment—diminishes as the nightmare "progresses." The content of seeking contact—any contact—with those on whom he fundamentally depends, who presumably have him, his interests and his future in mind, becomes more prominent in K.'s plotting. The increasingly desperate purpose of contact with the Castle is to validate his status. And his status in the Castle comes to coincide more and more with his very existence as a man. Non-acceptance by the Castle become equivalent to Nothingness. Assurance of his acceptance by someone in the Castle becomes a very condition of personal existence and self-acceptance.

The novel as Kafka left it is incomplete. As it stands, it ends with K.'s complete isolation from human contact. Frieda, to whom for a

time K. had given conditional love and from whom he has received anxious love in return, has rejected him and turned to Jeremiah, one of his dismissed assistants from the Castle, whom she is nursing in her room at the inn—"within it seemed to be bright and warm, a few whispers were audible, probably loving cajolements to get Jeremiah to bed, then the door was closed." According to Max Brod, Kafka's confidant and literary executor, Kafka planned a concluding chapter which he did not live to write. As Brod describes the plan—

> He (K.) was not to relax in his struggle, but was to die worn out by it. Round his deathbed the villagers were to assemble and from the Castle itself the word was to come that though K.'s legal claim to live in the village was not valid, yet, taking certain auxiliary circumstances into account, he was to be permitted to live and work there.

Kafka had apparently seen no resolution of K.'s struggle for unconditional acceptance by the organizational power that controlled his life, unless death be taken as resolution.

When the dynamics of K.'s relationships with the Castle and with other people in the village are probed more deeply, several aspects of K.'s plight are thrown into sharp relief. The demand of the Castle upon him, though nominally a vocational demand, becomes a total demand, at least as K. perceives it. The demands of the organization upon K. frustrate and distort his aspirations, choices and actions throughout the range of his life. This is true, even though these demands are cloudy and unclear. That the demand is total lends desperate importance to the quest for its clarification. And, because the demand is seen as total, the quest for clarification becomes an agonized quest by K. for the meaning of his life and for ultimate validation of himself as a person.

K. is quite aware of the desperate anxiety with which the clouded yet total demand of the Castle infuses his life.

> In this life it might easily happen, if he were not always on his guard, that one day or other, in spite of the amiability of the authorities and the scrupulous fulfillment of all his exaggeratedly light duties, he might —deceived by the apparent favor shown him—conduct himself so imprudently that he might get a fall; and the authorities still ever mild and friendly, and as it were against their will, but in the name of some public regulation unknown to him, might have to come and clear him out of the way. And what was it, this other life to which he was consigned? Never yet had K. seen vocation and life so interlaced as here, so interlaced that sometimes one might think they had exchanged places. What importance, for example, had the power, merely formal up till now, which Klamm exercised over K.'s services, compared with the very real power which Klamm possessed in K.'s bedroom? [Klamm was K.'s superior in the Castle who had written him vague messages commending him for work he had not done. K. had taken Klamm's mistress,

Frieda, into his own bed as one of his strategies for winning an en-
counter with Klamm, a *bona fide* representative of the Castle.] So it
came about that while a light and frivolous bearing . . . was sufficient
when one came in direct contact with the authorities, one needed in
everything else the greatest caution, and had to look around on every
side before one made a single step.

In effect, K. deifies the system of the Castle. The graded ranks of
the Castle's personnel become avenues toward the godhead which,
by assumption, resided in the Castle's upper reaches. One's nearness
to the top becomes a measure of one's reality and one's worth. It is
not that K. is unaware of the bureaucratic stupidities and mistakes
which seem empirically to mark the Castle's mode of operation. But
awareness of these only deepen the mystery which clouds the "real"
motives and plans which faith in the deity force him to believe are
available, if he might only encounter those nearer to the top of the
system.

Yet the system operates consistently to frustrate his quest for
contact with those who might reveal the concern of the Castle for
him and its plans for him. Alienation becomes a way of life for K. And
heightening alienation only augments the vigor of his efforts for en-
counter with personifications of the system which put him under
some total demand for service to purposes of which he is unaware.

All of K.'s life activities become operations to reduce the anxieties
of his alienated state. The usual antidotes to alienation do not work
for him. Thus the joys of sex and companionship with Frieda are al-
ways subsidiary to her possible usefulness in effecting for him a face-
to-face encounter with Klamm, her former lover. Sex and companion-
ship cannot reduce his alienation since it is rooted deeply in his
estrangement from the Castle. Similarly, his other peer relationships
in the Village have in them no solace for him. For these relationships
are all undertaken for their possible instrumental value in facilitating
his upward movement in the system.

Nor do K.'s frequent, vivid, frank and logical analyses of his own
motivations and condition help him toward a management of his
alienation through understanding it better. His verbal catharses lead
to no relief because the "right" persons are not available to hear his
confessions. His logical analyses lead to no insight. They serve merely
to vary the pattern and augment the intensity of his persistent struggle
to meet the determiners of his destiny face to face.

Deep resentment is mixed with K.'s adulation of the Castle, a
resentment which he scarcely dares acknowledge to himself. The
amiability of the Castle serves only to augment this resentment. As
Kafka puts it—

By the fact that they had at once amply met his wishes in all unimpor-
tant matters—and hitherto only unimportant matters had come up—

they robbed him of the possibility of light and easy victories, and with that of the satisfaction which must accompany them and the well-grounded confidence for further and greater struggles, which must result from them. Instead, they let K. go anywhere he liked—of course only within the village—and thus pampered and enervated him, ruled out all possibility of conflict, and transposed him to an unofficial, totally unrecognized, troubled and alien existence.

His very manhood is threatened by the blandishments of the Castle. He seeks encounter, challenge and conflict. He is taken care of with a bland and impersonal kindness which meets his creature needs but fails to recognize or to honor his deeper needs to be taken seriously as a man. He is taken as a manipulable instrument of the Castle's purpose just as K. takes the villagers in his abortive associations in the village.

This resentment is most clearly portrayed in his treatment of the assistants, Arthur and Jeremiah, with whom the Castle has provided him. It may be flattering to have assistants. But the provision of the assistants for work that has not been defined is a frustration to a man compelled to prove himself and "make good." Moreover, Arthur and Jeremiah behave as clowns, seeking always to cajole and entertain him. But K.'s plight is a serious matter to him. And the clowning of his assistants only underlines his doubts about his adequacy, about his status and about himself. It is small wonder that he beats his assistants, and shuts them out in the cold. When he dismisses them finally, Jeremiah, freed from the inhibitions of his former role relationship—one never speaks openly with his boss—is able to tell K. that his and Arthur's instructions from the Castle have been to get K. to take himself less seriously, and presumably as a result to accept his amiable management by a kindly bureaucracy without question or challenge.

K.'s central quest is to validate himself as a man and a person. He seeks this validation through rising into the Castle to confront those (or perhaps the One) who, he continues to believe, command the bases for an adequate validation. The more vigorously he seeks the critical encounter, the more effectively it is denied him. In his resulting alienation from the system on which he yet depends for his life, his desperate attempts to reduce alienation pervert his human relationships in sex and companionship, distort the fruits of his logic and self-analysis, divert his energies from productive work, and leave him in complete isolation from himself and from other people. So ends K.'s unequal struggle with the Moloch who lives in his Castle.

Moloch Unmasked but not Mollified

The organizational world portrayed by Joseph Heller in his *Catch-22* seems, at first glance, a vastly different place from Kafka's

Castle. And so it is in many respects. It is peopled by Americans rather than Europeans. It is filled with a riotous, farcical abundance and variety of action where the actions in *The Castle* are marked by a somnambulistic sameness. The occupants of the upper reaches of Heller's bureaucracy are on open and frequent public display where Kafka's castellans are seen only momentarily and dimly.

Yet Heller's Yossarian seems no nearer to a resolution of his struggles with the total institution which dominates his life than was Kafka's K. with his Castle. The universe of Heller's *Catch-22* is a bomber squadron based on a mythical Mediterranean island during World War II. Yossarian is a captain and a bombardier who is discovered malingering in the squadron hospital as the novel begins. Yossarian's struggle with the bureaucracy in which his life is imbedded —a struggle which persists throughout the novel—is to leave it. He has flown a number of missions well above the number required for home leave in most squadrons of the 27th Air Force of which his squadron is a part. But Colonel Cathcart, the commanding officer of this squadron, in his efforts to impress the generals above him, moved by an unwavering yen to become a general himself, keeps raising the number of missions required by personnel in his squadron. Yossarian's ineffectual attempts to bend the system to his individual purpose provides the central thread of the novel on which its numerous and varied demonstrations of the inanities of military organization are strung.

Where Kafka's K. assumed a lucid and rational plan which guided the affairs of the Castle, however inaccessible this plan might be to him, Yossarian (and Heller too) makes no such assumption about his Air Force. (It is fair, I think, to assume an identification between the author and Yossarian.) As a matter of fact, he has "seen through" the system. The functional rationality with which its operations are publicly presented and justified offers no barrier to Yossarian in seeing the deep and unrelieved irrationality which permeates the organization and motivates those vested with responsibility for its decisions.

The treatment of Colonel Cathcart may be used as an example.

> Colonel Cathcart was a slick, successful, slipshod, unhappy man of thirty-six who lumbered when he walked and wanted to be a general. He was dashing and dejected, poised and chagrined. He was complacent and insecure, daring in the administrative stratagems he employed to bring himself to the attention of his superiors and craven in his concern that his schemes might all backfire. . . . Colonel Cathcart was conceited because he was a full colonel with a combat command at the age of only thirty-six; and Colonel Cathcart was dejected because although he was already thirty-six he was still only a full colonel.

This scheme of motivation is carried through the portrayal of Colonel Cathcart's decisions and actions throughout *Catch-22.* He has

accepted the system of his bureaucracy as reality, with its rules, formal and informal, and the validation which upward mobility provides to persons in the system. His primary effort is to manipulate the system in service of his own upward mobility. He gives no serious thought to the task purposes of the organization except to use its stated patriotic purposes to justify publicly decisions taken on quite other grounds. Colonel Cathcart's motivation is typical of nearly all of the "leaders" within the system as Heller portrays and Yossarian envisages them.

A glance at a few of these "leaders" will show the variations on the basic motivational theme which Colonel Cathcart so clearly, stupidly and anxiously exemplifies. A major expenditure of libidinal energy by General Dreedle, operational wing commander of the 27th Air Force, is designed to offset the efforts of General Peckem to dilute or to take over his organizational power. General Peckem is ostensibly in command of services to troops—bringing U.S.O. entertainers to them and cajoling or threatening them to attend the entertainments which he has arranged. His real efforts are devoted to augmenting his power by seeking to make operational command organizationally subsidiary to his department of services to the troops. His chief weapon in his prolix struggle with General Dreedle is his unrelenting devotion to enhancing the public image of the air force by making it to seem more patriotic or to be more photogenic. (General Dreedle is more appealing to the reader since he is partly moved by a passion not derived from the status game of the organization—his implacable hatred of his son-in-law and aide, Colonel Moodus.)

One incident in the unrelenting struggle between the two generals may be useful both in illustrating their differing styles of "leadership" and in introducing the Wintergreen theme.

The U.S.O. troops were sent by General P. P. Peckem, who had moved his headquarters up to Rome and had nothing better to do while he schemed against General Dreedle. General Peckhem was a general with whom neatness definitely counted. He was a spry, suave and very precise general who knew the circumference of the equator and always wrote "enhanced" when he meant "increased." He was a prick, and no one knew this better than General Dreedle, who was incensed by General Peckhem's recent directive requiring all tents in the Mediterranean theater to be pitched along parallel lines with entrances facing back proudly toward the Washington Monument. To General Dreedle, who ran a fighting outfit, it seemed a lot of crap. Futhermore, it was none of General Peckem's goddam business how the tents in General Dreedle's wing were pitched. There then followed a hectic jurisdictional dispute between these overlords that was decided in General Dreedle's favor by ex-P.F.C. Wintergreen, mail clerk at Twenty-Seventh Air Force Headquarters. Wintergreen determined the outcome by throwing all communications from General Peckem into the wastebasket. He found them too prolix. General Dreedle's views, expressed in less pretentious literary

style, pleased ex-P.F.C. Wintergreen and were sped along by him in zealous observance of regulations. General Dreedle was victorious by default.

The power of ex-P.F.C. Wintergreen which is manifested here and at other junctures in *Catch-22* is borrowed from his location at a control point within the flow of paper exchanges which furnishes a nervous system to the bureaucratic giant for whose entertainment and edification the drama of *Catch-22* is enacted. Wintergreen is always running afoul of the system. His almost continual ex-P.F.C. or ex-Corporal status attests to this. He is thus free from the status motivation which keeps most of the movers and shakers of the system active. In spite of, perhaps because of, this, he can from time to time offset the schemes of the movers and shakers. His decisions to beat the system are undertaken on private grounds—in this case, it is his literary taste that moves him, in others, his concern for a black market deal. But his existence provides a needed inspiration for all the others, lowly and estranged within the organization. He reenforces a hope, necessary for their psychological survival, that the system can be beaten without enslaving one's self in the status elevation-and-maintenance game which preoccupies those on the upper slopes of its slippery pyramid.

Yossarian is no less estranged within the system in which his life is involved than is K. in his. Yet, where K. idealizes his system and continues to seek the rational purpose which operates, he believes, at its core, Yossarian has lost the idealism and surrendered the quest. In fact, Yossarian seems to believe that the quest has been completed. He has seen through the antics of the denizens of his air force. He has explained to himself, like a "good clinician," their individual antics by radically separating their public statements and posturings from their private motivations. The latter are taken as real, the former as phony. "Seeing through" the system in this way has helped him to rationalize his unshakeable desire to leave it. Yet it has not explained the hold of the system over him and others—the dependence which makes leaving it so difficult, which makes his very struggle with the system meaningful for him. Explaining, in personality terms, the antics of Cathcart, Dreedle, Peckem or Wintergreen in seeking to manipulate the power of the system for subjective and irrational purposes does not explain the power of the system over them or over Yossarian. Moloch is only partly unmasked. Nor is his power diminished by this attempt at unmasking. What is accomplished rather is a vision of power that is diabolic rather than divine, malevolent rather than mysteriously beneficent. This transvaluation permits Yossarian to render his efforts to escape the system moral rather than immoral, to make his malingering within the system feel meritorious rather than guilty.

Actually, Yossarian projects no alternative image of the divine or the human to bolster his resistance to Moloch. The grounds of his resistance, as he expresses these, are as individual, subjective and private as are Colonel Cathcart's grounds of anxious affirmation. He doesn't want to die. He is afraid of dying. These professed grounds for wanting to escape, being private and individual, defeat in advance the formation of any collective action to contravene the demands of the system, to build joint power against the power of the system where it is seen as unjust. (His professed grounds of wanting to leave also provide the novel with its title. Being emotionally incapacitated is adequate ground for leave, according to air force regulations. But not wanting to die is evidence that Yossarian is eminently sane. Therefore, his very efforts to plea his need for home leave furnish justification that the regulation does not apply to him. This is a prime example of the catch—the use of organizational regulations to contravene their ostensible purpose.) In fact, words with a collective reference for justifying actions, words like "justice," are foresworn in Yossarian's vocabulary (he has debunked such terms as "public relations" lies in himself as well as in others), just as collective concepts are eschewed by him and individual concepts used exclusively in explaining the behavior of persons within the system. If defense of his wish to live were to be attempted, Yossarian would probably claim that it is "natural" in some primitive and biologic sense. Yossarian's vision of the "natural" place to which he might go in escaping from the air force is not developed—he is mainly trying to get away not to go anywhere—but in so far as his mythic "Sweden" is portrayed, it is a Rousseauistic place of nature with girls to make love to and sun to bask in, all free of charge.

Actually, it is doubtful that Yossarian's analyses of his own motivations and values are more accurate than his explanations of the behavior of others in his institution. For example, he is a loving man. The first words of the novel, along with many others of his actions throughout the novel, support this aspect of his character. "It was love at first sight. The first time Yossarian saw the chaplain he fell madly in love with him." Yet life within the system led him to curtail his love. The curtailment grew in part from his desire to save himself from grief, to preserve himself from the loss of loved ones, which death—and his air force was dedicated to death as were the opposing military forces also—would be bound to bring him. If Yossarian must curtail his love within the system of which he is a part, so must he curtail his other interpersonally generated feelings and emotions— hate and awe and respect. This outrage to the feelings of being a loving man creates protest reactions in him—sitting naked in a tree during the military funeral of a friend, receiving a military decoration in the ranks but also in the nude, pretending illnesses he doesn't

have, etc. But these protests are not direct or authentic expressions of his feeling. They are as much posturings, as much shot through with "public relations" lies and role playing, as are Cathcart's shows of the hardness and decisiveness befitting a general, Peckem's patriotism, or the protested devotion of Milo Minderbinder—the nonpareil black-marketeer posing as mess officer—to free enterprise. It is the direct meeting, the encounter, of person with person, which Moloch denies to Yossarian as he moves among his fellow men. And he is as much Moloch's victim in his efforts to escape as Cathcart is in his efforts to curry favor and move upward. The difference lies in Yossarian's refusal to sacrifice the humanity within himself to Moloch's world of pervasive make-believe.

Yossarian resists becoming a cell in the environing tissue of lived lies which surrounds him, a tissue of lies which makes truth or even the idea of truth problematic and unreal. His great temptation came in an offer from Cathcart that he join the production line of lies by going home to do public relations work for the air force and, thereby, to gain his proposed aim of escape from his squadron and its mortal missions. It is interesting that his temptation came after his dead friend Nately's whore had stabbed him in outraged grief—a genuine interpersonal emotion. Part of his lie would have been to convert the stabbing verbally into the deed of a Nazi assassin. Yossarian resisted the temptation, after temporarily agreeing to the plan, and decides at last to desert.

Part of Yossarian's ineffectuality arises from his denial of the love that was within him with all of the pains of grief that love given would have brought to him. For denial of love is also a refusal to develop a valid counter-collectivity to resist the anti-human thrust of Moloch's power. Another psychological factor militated against the growth of any effective resistance around Yossarian's protests within the system. Life in Moloch's presence is life shorn of time perspective. Life is lived from mission to mission, from leave to leave. No firmly envisaged human future grows to become a focus of resistance to the dehumanization of persons with which the system threatens its inmates. An abbreviated time perspective, a debunking of all ideals including his own, and a denial of love combine to make Yossarian's protest against Moloch ineffectual and to render escape to some dimly envisaged other place, where hopefully but doubtfully Moloch is absent, the only way out for him.

Moloch in Mortarboard

Catch-22, since it portrays reactions to an institution dedicated to death, leaves us in some doubt as to how far Yossarian's relations with his institution derive from its mortal purpose and how far they stem

from other aspects of its avid and all-encompassing organization of human life and effort. Bernard Malamud's *A New Life* provides a study of the effects upon an instructor of total organization in a college, the avowed purpose of which is to augment rather than to destroy life—for its students at any rate, if not its faculty.

Actually, Malamud provides a setting more like Kafka's *Castle* than Heller's *Catch-22*. Malamud's Castle, a state college in the Pacific Northwest, has its village in the small town in which the college is located. (Heller's "village" is almost completely a whorehouse for the personnel of the air force.) In *A New Life*, S. Levin, thirty years of age, has come from New York City as an instructor in the English Department of the state college. He has sought to leave behind him a period of alcoholism which marked his unsuccessful earlier attempt to cope with the stresses of urban living. His graduate study of English after this breakdown had brought him a modest vision of a new life as a college teacher of English and a professed idealism concerning humanistic studies as an ingredient in the maintenance of a free and democratic society. Success in his new college post is thus important for him both as a way of living down the failure of his past and as a way of serving his educational ideal.

Levin wears a beard when he comes to the college. In the beginning it serves him as a physical symbol of the *new* status he hopes, along with many inner doubts about it, he has attained. It becomes within the college also a symbol of the estrangement from its collective life that he is both unable and unwilling to overcome. From what factors does Levin's estrangement stem? In part his estrangement arises from the bureaucratic organization of the life of the college and its extension into the village life surrounding it. In part, it stems also from the character structure which Levin has brought to his new assignment.

We may look first at the college. It is an institution dedicated to producing the technical competences in prospective agricultural, engineering and scientific personnel which employing organizations are willing to hire. English, like the other humanities, has become a service department to the core technical departments of the college. The main courses taught are required courses in Freshman English. Grammar and composition furnish the main content. The "literature" read has mainly to do with scientific and technological matters.

Gilley is the professor in charge of Freshman composition and Levin's immediate superior. Gilley has accepted fully the values and regulations of the college and of the function of the English department as defined by the powers that be. He has laid out the work in "Comp" like a good bureaucratic manager in a way to make minimum demands upon the thinking or intellectual powers of the instructors.

He works assiduously in keeping the departmental machine running smoothly. He is kindly, amiable and paternalistic toward "his people." His chief aim in life is to become head of the English department—a post which is being vacated at the end of Levin's first year by the retirement of Professor Fairchild. This promotion will shore up his shaky self-esteem against feelings of inadequacy in his roles of husband and scholar.

Levin has been fully informed of the department's expectations concerning its employees' behavior by Professor Fairchild in an orientation interview after his arrival. Students should learn *The Elements*, Fairchild's frequently revised textbook in English grammar. But, just as important as teaching what they are supposed to teach, instructors should not "upset the applecart" of the system—in the college or in the village. Sexual improprieties are very serious. But just as serious are revolutionary or unusual ideas and teaching practices. Duffy, one of Levin's predecessors, was used by Fairchild as a terrible example of the latter. Before his well-deserved dismissal—which was called not exactly a dismissal by Fairchild in bureaucratic soft-talk—he had been unpunctual, he had graded papers on the floor of his office, he had used *The Communist Manifesto* as reading material in his classes. His sexual peccadilloes were only hinted. Fairchild's well-intentioned warnings did not save Levin from being drawn into struggle with the college.

Levin's ineffectual encounters with the system center on two issues. One is the selection of a new department head. The other has to do with an affair which developed between him and Gilley's wife. In both, Levin finds himself in opposition to Gilley who becomes for him a personification of the system against which Levin is compelled, not primarily through his own volition, to assert his not too robust ego.

It is mainly Levin's vision of the importance of scholarship in the humanities which leads him to espouse, cautiously and after much soul-searching, the candidacy of Professor Fabrikant against Gilley for the leadership of the department. Fabrikant leads the life of a hermit within the department and college, continuing to write and publish scholarly papers, even though these activities are not highly prized by the officials of the institution. There is no evidence that Levin has understood, valued or even read Fabrikant's writings. He does value the fact of Fabrikant's persistence without support in his scholarly activities. Levin rejects Gilley's indifference to scholarship. Scholarship has personal importance for Levin as an ideal if not as a practice. But he also rejects Gilley's kindly paternalism. Levin sees this, rightly no doubt, as related to Gilley's wish to gain the headship of the department. It is hard for the reader to assess Levin's motivations fully. Levin is as confused as the reader concerning the persistent and continuing well-springs of his conduct. His actions seem to

flow out of segmented responses to immediate situations with little deliberate attention to other parts of himself or to consequences.

His affair with Gilley's wife, Pauline, stems in part from sexual hunger and her availability. But it stems also from his growing enrollment against Gilley and the system which Gilley symbolizes for him. The picture of Levin driving away from the college and the village at the end of the novel in his antiquated Hudson with a pregnant Pauline and the two adopted Gilley children (Gilley was as sterile in bed as in scholarship.) represents a sardonic victory of the system over a rather passive Levin whom the system has elevated to the status of an active rebel against it. The burden of proof for winning the new life he sought has been placed entirely upon Levin with new obstacles to the achievement heaped upon him. Gilley has become head of the English department. President Labhart of the college has terminated Levin's services "as of today, in the public interest, for good and sufficient cause of a moral nature." The president refers to his former instructor in justifying his own action, as a "frustrated Union Square radical."

Actually, Levin was frustrated but not by choice a radical. The character brought to his unequal combat with the college system was one foredoomed to failure. Levin begins and ends his career as an "existentialist" hero, always on eager and naive lookout for changes in his experience. His hopes in such changes are not for actual changes in the conditions and overt patterns of his life which frustrate his professed ideals. His hopes begin and end with fresh perceptions and evaluations of himself and his situation. He is not identified with any regulations of society. In fact, he seems incapable of unqualified and sustained identification with any collectivity, beyond himself, indeed with himself. (It is difficult to see Levin as a devoted family man. Many of his doubts about union with Pauline stem from a realistic acceptance by Levin of this defect in himself and remain with him as he drives away with her and the children into an unknown future.)

Levin's real concern is with his socially non-conforming and "existential" self. It is this concern that brings him into predictable conflict with the college and department which has no regard for Levin's self or that of any other employee, and with the system's perceived representative, Gilley. Since Levin seeks only changed perceptions—he has learned before coming to the college to regard hope beyond such inner change as dangerous and unrealistic—he can never hope to find any permanent solution to his problems. The fate assigned him was that of an observer of psychological reality drawn into the responsible role of rebel, not by his volition but by the need of the system to sacrifice those who do not respect the regulations on which its authority rests in the maintenance and continuation of its power.

The importance of regulations in the maintenance of the college

system is illustrated at many points in *A New Life*. An example is that of one of Levin's students who is suspected of having cribbed a theme. Gilley is moved to zestful search, along with Levin and other colleagues, to locate the source from which the student's theme was copied. This assumed breach of regulations releases far more ingenuity and research on the part of the members of the department than do the problems of their teaching or, most certainly, the lures of their scholarship. Catching the delinquent student is identified with maintenance of high standards. The standards of conduct of a student (or a faculty member) with respect to institutional regulations are vastly more important than standards of excellence in teaching or scholarship in assessing his worth. Gilley is disappointed when Levin gives up the search after a few days and decides to give the student an A for his theme. Gilley later transfers the student from Levin's class, on the student's request, on the grounds that good teacher-student relationships are very important in teaching.

Levin's mode of adapting passively to the shifting and immediate demands of life makes robust encounter with the stultifying effects of Moloch on education impossible for Levin to choose and to will. He is drawn into unequal combat with the system in his efforts to play on the edges of struggle. If Moloch has no robust opponents to devour, he must take his meal from such human material as is available to him.

Moloch Ministers to the Mad

Levin did not choose to achieve heroism and risk a rebel's punishment. These laurels were thrust upon him by the Castle and village of the college which had called him to a new life. His unwilled rebellion served to strengthen the power of the system. It is doubtful that his experience augmented his own wisdom and stature as a man. Nor did others around Levin gain clarification through vicarious participation in his drama.

McMurphy's heroism and rebellion are of a different quality in *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest*. In Ken Kesey's novel McMurphy, weary of work on a penal farm where he has been serving a jail sentence, wangles commitment to a state mental hospital as a putative psychopath. Like the state college in which Levin sought his new life, the scene of McMurphy's crucifixion is also in the Pacific Northwest. The personification of the bureaucratic system of the hospital is Nurse Ratched, known to her patients as Big Nurse. McMurphy swaggers into the well-lubricated social system of Miss Ratched's ward—an over-masculine hedonist, a gambler and a con man.

McMurphy is, at the beginning, a man who plays life for the kicks it may provide. He is a tall talker, accustomed to use his wits and eloquence to draw from people around him the means to support him

in his amiable vagrancy. McMurphy finds his fellow inmates docilely resigned to playing the role of "patient" assigned them by the organizational system of the hospital. They are varied in personal make-up, in physique and temperament, in the illusions and rationalizations with which they present their psychic wounds to the world or seek to conceal them. But they are alike in their lack of hope, in the futility with which they view the future, and in their conviction that they can do nothing to shape their environment to their individual or collective purposes.

McMurphy likes laughs. He finds himself among persons unable to laugh. McMurphy has an exaggerated view of his ability to fight and talk his way out of any situation. He finds himself with people in despair. His efforts to change the system of the ward to accommodate and support him in his hedonic way of life become, not without hesitation and struggle on his part, increasingly a life commitment. Since he cannot change the social system of the ward without changing the people in it toward greater self respect and greater belief in life and its potential victories, McMurphy's mission becomes a therapeutic enterprise. His therapeutic mission inevitably counters the official therapeutic program of the hospital. He is drawn into deepening conflict with Big Nurse, maintainer of the hospital's system of services, routines and regulations. This conflict, moving inexorably toward McMurphy's destruction—a decimation accomplished in the name of ministering to his madness—defines the central theme of the novel.

The author tells his story through the person of one of the patients, Chief Bromden. Bromden is a tall and powerful Indian—actually a half-breed. His white mother had vitiated the strength of his father, a tribal chief, to resist efforts of the white "Combine"to buy the land of his tribe. With the tribe's loss of place had come destruction of their way of life. Bromden has been a personal casualty in this collective death. He finds evidence of the "Combine" and its clever will to destroy men within the organization of the hospital. To Bromden, the hospital is literally a machine designed to make men little and weak, to reduce their self-assertion against whatever opposes their way of life, to tame them into shadow men. Bromden has for many years sought to protect himself against this debilitation by feigning deafness and dumbness. This cover has permitted him to move invisibly among both patients and staff, hearing and observing both acutely and distortedly.

The use of Bromden's eyes and ears and voice by the author lends a hallucinatory quality to the whole novel. The reader must discount the credibility of the narrative even as he is led to identify deeply with Bromden and with McMurphy, Bromden's hero and savior. Yet the author's device permits the reader to see the ways in which efforts by those in charge of the hospital to maintain its system and reputa-

tion run counter at critical points to the therapeutic aims and intentions of its leadership. The rules and regulations of the organization come to be identified with, at any rate indistinguishable from, therapy. Those who question the rules and regulations are seen, automatically and no doubt quite honestly, as resisting therapy themselves and endangering the therapeutic process for others.

There is a deep horror in the self-government sessions of the patients as described in the novel. Big Nurse maneuvers "group" decisions into the service of organizational efficiency and smoothness of operation. The professed therapeutic aim of increasing the ego strength of the individual patients through responsible participation is thwarted by these decisions and by the processes through which the decisions are reached. Big Nurse is unable to see the conflict between the two aims. The horror is enhanced by her unctuous use of therapeutic jargon and values to justify her actions undertaken in service of organizational efficiency and reputation. She seems unable to distinguish her role as priestess of Moloch from her role as minister to patients in quest of healing.

The author seems uncertain about how to treat the motivations of Big Nurse. At times, her sense of responsibility to maintain the smooth operation of the organization with which her life and career are identified seems to be recognized as a powerful factor in her struggle with McMurphy, the "troublemaker" in the system. At other times, her actions are interpreted primarily as personal power operations or as the "surgical" moves of a castrating female against a potent male. (Perhaps the author's use of Chief Bromden as his mouthpiece gets in his way here.) As the components of organizational loyalty and responsibility in her motivation are stressed, Big Nurse becomes a tragic figure along with her antagonist, McMurphy, con man turned prophet of humanity and crucified savior. When her personal motivations are emphasized, the struggle tends to become a meaningless melodrama with Big Nurse on the side of the bad guys and McMurphy on the side of the good.

McMurphy gets hooked into the role of therapist to his comrades and rebel against the total therapeutic organization, just as Levin had the role of rebel thrust upon him. The difference lies in the conscious volition which enters into McMurphy's decision to make the role his own, contrasting with Levin's passive drifting into it. When he makes his choice, McMurphy is well aware of the fate which lies before him. He has been drawn reluctantly into a fight with the hospital orderlies. His fighting is no longer an assertion of his individual rights or interests against the system. He is defending an old patient, whose dignity as he sees it, the orderlies are demeaning. Chief Bromden moves out of his self-imposed isolation to join McMurphy in the battle. Both are diagnosed as in need of "help" and given a series of

electric shock treatments. When McMurphy returns from his treatment to Nurse Ratched's ward, he accepts fully the role of a leader in rebellion against the system for the good of all the patients who have drawn hope and self-respect from him.

His final act of rebellion includes bringing a whore into the hospital to help a buddy uncertain of his sexual identity. This is a more serious offense than any of his former rebellions, since publicity was unavoidable and the public image of the hospital was at stake. The treatment prescribed for his illness now is a lobotomy. Bromden cannot endure the thought of his hero, a vital and self-loving man, living the life of a vegetable. With a pillow he smothers McMurphy in his sleep. The Chief, a man again, tall and self-respecting, escapes the hospital and moves to build a new life, after touching earth again at the place where once his tribe had lived.

McMurphy, like Yossarian, was a loving man. He made the discovery only as his responsibility to the other patients for the hope that he had kindled in them came home to him. Unlike Yossarian, McMurphy did not deny his love. He acted on it, fully aware of the fate that might well follow from the action.

There is more hope in McMurphy's struggle with Moloch than in the struggles of K., Yossarian or Levin. We know that McMurphy gained stature as a man. We know also that Chief Bromden achieved rebirth through the sacrifice of his hero. Perhaps other patients too were helped on their way to recovery of manhood. Unfortunately, Kesey's novel does not give us any insight into the effects of McMurphy's sacrifice upon the system of the hospital, including its chief protagonist, Nurse Ratched. We may be certain that Moloch has not been routed. We do know that one victim escaped his power.

Concluding, Meta-Scientific Postscript

There are few, if any, firm conclusions that my analysis of these four imaginative probings of man and organization supports. The most nearly firm conclusions, at least to me, are meta-scientific rather than scientific in character. This does not mean that they are, therefore, of small concern either to scientific students or to practitioners of organizational life. For these meta-scientific conclusions point to assumptions which underly the definition of the priority problems of organizational behavior to be studied and to be solved and to the definition of criteria by which the adequacy of solutions may be judged. And the bases of their definitions are frequently the least probed elements in the thinking of scientists and practitioners alike.

There operates within the relations of men with bureaucratic organization a demonic power which I have called Moloch in this essay. This power rests on two claims which organizations tend to

make upon the men within them. The first is an overweening claim to the total allegiance of member men. When the perpetuity and success of an organization are taken as ultimate goods, this claim acquires rational plausibility. The second claim of the organization is that it provides an adequate validation of the worth of a man in it. Success in the system is taken as a measure of the personal value of the system's members.

Both of these claims are tempting to men in our historical period. Total allegiance is attractive to men torn by multiple and conflicting loyalties, not the least galling of which is loyalty to one's self and to the potential humanity that lies within that self. By its usual definition, the relationships within a bureaucracy are impersonal and "business-like." When men accept as valid, whether consciously or unconsciously, the claims of an organization to serve as an object of total allegiance and to provide validation of their personal worth by criteria of success within the organization, men are alienated from themselves. To pledge oneself to an impersonal existence is to foreswear human existence. For it is the genius of human life to live personally and interpersonally—to love, to hate, to aspire to a more than arbitrary meaning in life, to grow according to the pattern of one's unique potentialities. And it is this genius of his life from which the devotee of Moloch has alienated himself. (It should be noted that Moloch's total demand also perverts the functional impersonality and rationality of bureaucratic relationships.)

A life of alienation from one's self, achieved through deification of any human organization, is a life of despair, of self-destroying frustration, and of poisoned interpersonal relations. Kafka's K. provides a classic demonstration of this truth. A more shallow K., who has accepted the organization's claims without question or questing, lives in perpetual ambivalence and anxiety upon the surface of life. Colonel Cathcart in *Catch-22* is a K. who has not undertaken or has foresworn a quest for *his* identity and for the meaning of *his* life. The temptations of Moloch are particularly insidious for some members of the helping professions. Latter-day K.'s like Professor Gilley and Nurse Ratched may mask from themselves their desperate attempts to find self-validation and self-fulfillment in their organizational careers, in the guise of helping others—students or patients—an enterprise which connotes interpersonal encounter and exchange. But their helping efforts are perverted into a kind of role playing—a role playing designed to shut out from themselves the despair that infuses their personal lives as they remain true to Moloch.

Levin's attempt to shield himself from encounter with the demonic powers of organized life through living within the circumference of his personal sensibilities proved a forlorn attempt. Such attempts must fail unless those who try to live in this way foreswear

a life of action in bureaucratized society. Men and women with a desperate and anxious investment in the regulations of an organization must victimize those who live among them and remain indifferent to the rules. Indifference to a system is a greater threat to its devotees than rebellion. For rebellion acknowledges even as it challenges the importance which indifference denies. Yossarian's rebellious attempts to escape his organization rest on an acknowledgement of the futility of any or all attempts to change a dehumanized system. This acknowledgement is also an acknowledgement of Moloch's unimpeachable power. Its lack of realism derives from its failure to recognize that bureaucratic organization has become a universal way of life in contemporary civilizations. No mythic places of nature to which one may escape exist except in the imaginations of civilized pseudo-primitives.

McMurphy's rebellion in love is the most hopeful response examined in this analysis. It is hopeful because it faces and does not deny Moloch's dehumanizing power, though this power operates beneath the mask of giving help. McMurphy's response is hopeful because it is based on an acceptance of the human potentiality and need for love, for interpersonal encounter, for fraternity which live and move within himself. It is these human potentialities and needs which both those committed to Moloch and those who would individually escape his power, in their different ways, deny or discount. McMurphy's rebellion is hopeful because it recognizes that a collective power, organized to fulfill deep human potentialities and needs, is required to counter the power of Moloch, a power organized to curtail and frustrate these very potentialities' and needs. To counter the power of Moloch in one organization with the power of another organization based on Moloch's dehumanizing claims is still to serve Moloch. And it is to reject the possibility of rehumanizing man's corporate life.

Both scientific students and practitioners of organizational life might well review the assumptions which shape their definitions of the problems they seek to understand and to solve. Should they find that they are enlisted unwittingly in the service of Moloch, they might well ask themselves what McMurphy would do in their place.

Biographical Sketches

Issue Editor

WARREN G. BENNIS is Professor of Industrial Management at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has published in the field of human relations. His most recent publication is a forthcoming volume with E. Schein on Interpersonal Dynamics. He is a member of the Society of Cinematologists and is the Advisory Editor for Irwin Dorsey series in behavioral sciences.

Other Contributors

KENNETH D. BENNE is Berenson Professor of Human Relations at Boston University. He earned his Ph.D. degree in the philosophy of education at Columbia University. For many years he has been concerned with the theoretical, philosophic and methodological aspects of bridging between theory and practice, between research processes and processes of applying research findings and methods in practice settings. His more recent publications include: *Education in the Quest of Identity and Community*, *The Improvement of Practical Intelligence* (revised, 1964, co-author), *The Planning of Change* (co-author and co-editor), and *T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method* (co-author and co-editor).

DR. ARTHUR J. BRODBECK is a social psychologist, specializing in the personality-culture analysis of values. He has a B.S. from the University of Chicago and an M.A. and Ph.D. from the State University of Iowa. He has taught in the psychology departments of Boston University, University of Illinois and Wesleyan University. During the initial year of operations, he was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford. In recent years, he has collaborated closely with Harold D. Lasswell at the Yale Law School as Research Associate and Consulting Psychologist. In addition, he is acting as Research Associate to the University of Chicago this year within their Department of Research Psychiatry. He has contributed articles to many books and professional journals within the social sciences.

CÉSAR GRAÑA has taught at the University of California and the University of Illinois and is an Associate Professor in the Social Sciences at the University of Chicago. His articles on the sociology of art and literature

have appeared in the *Journal of Aesthetics, Social Research* and other publications. He is the author of *Bohemian Versus Bourgeois: French Society and the French Man of Letters in the Nineteenth Century* to be published by Basic Books in the Spring.

SAMUEL HIRSCH, A.B., A.M., University of North Carolina; Associate Professor, Chairman, Department of Acting and Directing, Division of Theatre Arts, School of Fine and Applied Arts, Boston University; Teaching Fellow and Instructor in Drama, University of North Carolina; Graduate, Neighborhood Playhouse School of the Theatre, New York City; Assistant Professor of Drama, Associate Director of the Ring Theatre, University of Miami, Florida; Producer-Director: Casablanca Players, Biltmore and Roosevelt Playhouses, Musicomedy Festival, Florida; Featured TV actor: *U.S. Steel Hour, Edge of Night;* Founder-Director, Actors Playhouse, Hotel Bostonian; Managing Director, Falmouth Playhouse; Resident Director, Berkshire Playhouse; President, New England Theatre Conference.

NORMAN N. HOLLAND, Associate Professor of English at M.I.T., likes to use ego-psychology in literary criticism. The author of *The First Modern Comedies, The Shakespearean Imagination,* and a yet-to-be-published survey of psychoanalytic criticism of Shakespeare, Dr. Holland was for two years "The Film Critic" on WGBH-TV (Boston), and his subsequent film reviews for the *Hudson Review* are highly regarded in literary circles.

Currently professor of psychology and education and director of clinical training at Teachers College, Columbia University, EDWARD JOSEPH SHOBEN, JR. is also editor of the *Teachers College Record.* Four times a divisional president and twice a member of the Council of Representatives of the American Psychological Association, he is co-author (with L. F. Shaffer) of *The Psychology of Adjustment* and has just published (with Floyd L. Ruch) *Perspectives in Psychology.*

ROBERT N. WILSON is Professor of Epidemiology in the School of Public Health and Professor of Sociology at the University of North Carolina. He has taught at Cornell, Harvard, and Yale. He served for three years on the staff of the Social Science Research Council, and in 1956-57 was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. His major research interests have been in aesthetics and medicine. Among his publications have been *The Give and Take in Hospitals* (with Temple Burling and Edith M. Lentz), *Explorations in Social Psychiatry* (edited with John A. Clausen and Alexander H. Leighton), and *Man Made Plain: The Poet in Contemporary Society.*

BENNE, KENNETH D., Man and Moloch, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, No. 1, 97-115.

This article analyzes four contemporary novels. Each novel probes the reactions of men intricated within bureaucratic organizations which make a more or less total demand upon the allegiances of their denizens. A demonic power is released by this total demand, combined with the organizational claim that the self-worth of the individual can be judged adequately by criteria of "success" within the organization. This demonic power the author has called "Moloch." Various rites of exorcism revealed in the novels are noted and discussed. Kafka's *The Castle*, furnishes a prototypic model of a man's struggle with Moloch in any total organization. Heller's *Catch-22*, probes operations of Moloch in an air-force squadron. Malamud's *A New Life* portrays the ways of Moloch in college and Kesey's *One Flew Over the Cuckoo Nest* in a mental hospital. A concluding meta-scientific postscript offers anti-demonological advice to both students and practitioners of organizational life.

BENNIS, WARREN G., Introduction: How the Issue Was Formed, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, No. 1, 3-7.

In trying to bridge the gap between the social sciences and the arts, an attempt was made to dwell on the aesthetic probings of contemporary man through the New Cinema and the Theatre of the Absurd. After writing to a large number of potential contributors to the topic, with intriguing responses and no-responses, we finally achieved an issue devoted to the Arts and Social Science.

BRODBECK, ARTHUR J., Placing Aesthetic Developments in Social Context: A Program of Value Analysis, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, No. 1, 8-25.

The emerging artistic patterns that constitute Theatre of the Absurd and Nouvelle Vague cinema require, if they are to be intelligently comprehended, rather rigorous social contextualization to remove the mysteries surrounding them. Accordingly, they are scrutinized by five different, although related, forms of analysis: *goal, trend, condition, projective* and *alternative* inquiry. The goals of the emerging patterns are highlighted by the use of a contextual procedure embodied in value-institution methods of motivational research. By so doing, it is discovered that the goals of the two movements are found to be anything but "absurd" and, on the contrary, embody aims widely shared with many other currents in contemporary social process. Contextualization, albeit of a more privatized kind, is itself one of these overriding goals. The trend toward depth analysis in much of modern physical and social science is seen also to be at work in these movements. A "schizoid" cast may be the outcome of the shift from absolute to multiple perspectives that the new movements represent and grows out of scientific developments. A theory of art as a clarifier of mood is sketched and the production and consumption of the newer art is postulated as arising out of a mood of growing *confusion* related to demands for enlightenment when multiple perspectives are entertained. The reduced emphasis upon the future in the art fantasy, however, raises serious doubts about how effective it may be in modifying the events it depicts. In this regard, it is compared with science fiction as an alternative expression of the same impulses more systematically disciplined. The role of art as miranda supporting the doctrine and formula of social myth is discussed and the consequences for political process of new art movements is indicated. A general aim of the discussion is to stimulate a more penetrating social psychology of art, by providing a framework for it and applying it to the new movements in theatre and cinema.

GRAÑA, CÉSAR, French Impressionism as an Urban Art Form, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, No. 1, 37-48.

French Impressionism represents more than a technical revolution in painting. Although the Impressionists found in nature a subject matter which allowed eloquent play for their use of color and light, Impressionism may also be regarded as an intellectual perspective directing the eye to certain complex yet ephemeral aspects of modern social experience, particularly urban experience. By comparing Impressionist painting to literary descriptions and sociological accounts of city life, it is possible to show that Impressionism, besides being an accomplishment of artistic craft, was a technique for the portrayal of that mixture of curiosity and detachment, intensity and obliqueness which characterizes social encounters in a modern metropolis.

HIRSCH, SAMUEL, Theatre of the Absurd (Made in America), *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, No. 1, 49-61.

The Theatre of the Absurd reflects European existential despair following two World Wars, poverty and Fascism. "Absurd" means "without sense, purposeless." It describes modern man's tragicomic dilemma.

Martin Esslin's definitive text, "The Theatre of the Absurd," claims that it "does not reflect despair or a return to dark irrational forces but expresses modern man's endeavor to come to terms with the world in which he lives. It attempts to make him face up to the human condition as it really is, to free him from illusions that are bound to cause constant maladjustment and disappointment . . . for the dignity of man lies in his ability to face reality in all its senselessness; to accept it freely, without fear, without illusions—and to laugh at it."

Leading European playwrights are Beckett, Ionesco, Adamov, Genet and Pinter. Americans are Richardson, Gelber, Kopit, Schisgal, and Albee, who dealt with American paradoxes: "abundance produces emptiness, satisfaction unhappiness, communication ends in isolation . . . and the American Dream is a substitute or artificial for real values."

Contemporary theatre has been changed by this movement. Theatre of the Absurd (Made in America) is disturbing, vital, and is finding receptive audiences, playwrights, and new styles of acting and directing.

HOLLAND, NORMAN N., The Puzzling Movies: Three Analyses and a Guess at their Appeal, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, No. 1, 71-96.

Since 1958, intellectuals have been finding pleasure in a group of movies, puzzling, difficult, but not impossible to analyze. *The Seventh Seal*, for example, contrasts a vision and religion of life with the worship of death. By setting off sights against sounds, *La Dolce Vita* foils the verbal and aural arts of men with the gorgon-like, all-powerful image of woman. *Last Year at Marienbad*, an instance of "metafilm," dramatizes a primary-process, id-world of possibilities that co-exist even when mutually exclusive.

Decipherable they may be, but why should such puzzling, abstruse movies appeal? As in a joke, the oblique promise of an intellectual "point" enables the audience to regress and enjoy a playfully incoherent form; the pleasure from the form of the film undoes defenses against its (usually) sexual content. The films also isolate moral and religious issue as unemotional intellectual or aesthetic puzzles. Finally, in the cinematic situation of safe regression, mystery at a simple narrative level (What's going on?) allows repetition and intellectual mastery of a child's preverbal puzzlement at adult emotions.

SHOBEN, EDWARD J. A Clinical View of the Tragic, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, No. 1, 26-36.

The tragic event is defined by a conflict between necessity (which evokes awe in the spectator) and a hero's refusal to surrender to it (which elicits sympathetic admiration). In the tragic drama, the conflict can be enjoyed because the audience perceives it from a "safe" angle of regard. By analogy, the psychotherapist, protected by the restrictions of his professional relationship, may also commit himself more fully to his patient by virtue of the safety of his position. An analysis of *Hamlet* as a representative tragedy suggests that the characterological flaw in Hamlet, taken as a kind of Everyman, is an inherent inability to know himself fully, thus, we can never be completely true to ourselves. Clinical insight seems to overlap with this aspect of the tragic vision—the perception of self (and of humanity) as inescapably imperfect yet capable of struggle after the manner of the tragic hero. The relationship of the tragic vision to love, conceived as an expression of and response to limitedness, is explored.

WILSON, ROBERT N., Samuel Beckett: The Social Psychology of Emptiness, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, No. 1, 62-70.

The plays of Samuel Beckett, specifically *Waiting for Godot* and *Endgame*, present us with a barren physical and social universe from which familiar coordinates of time, space, and human relatedness are absent. This meaningless world may be analyzed from two points of view: as emphasizing, by omission, the social and psychological imperatives of organized human life; and as an illustration of the persistence of certain characteristically human qualities even in a very impoverished framework of action. Beckett's drama is marked by deprivation, hostility, anarchy, sexlessness, and hopelessness. It is the worst of all possible worlds. Yet even in this miasma of futility, the protagonists strive for interpersonal rewards, for minimal order, for a shred of dignity and a modicum of love. The effect of the plays may be seen as a recalling to our attention of what it means to be fully human.

SUBSCRIPTION FORM

Please check:

NEW SUBSCRIPTION ☐

RENEWAL ☐

Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues
Institute for Social Research
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Name ....

Street Address ....

City and State ....

☐ Please begin this subscription to the *Journal of Social Issues* with Volume
XVIII, No. 1. I enclose $5.50 for my subscription to Volume XVIII
(4 numbers).

☐ I enclose...............for a subscription for..........years, beginning
with Volume...................., Number 1.

Total Enclosed: $......................

BACK NUMBER ORDER FORM

The Journal of Social Issues
Acme Printing and Reproductions
611 South Maple Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Name ....

Street Address ....

City and State ....

Please send me the following previous issues of the *Journal* (Specify Volume and
Numbers): ....

....

....

Total Enclosed: ....
(Payment *must* be enclosed with all orders of $3.00 or less. Make checks
payable to: *Journal of Social Issues*.)

Schedule of Prices

Number of copies ordered	1	2-9	10-24	25-49	50-199	200-299
Price per copy	$1.50	$1.00	85c	70c	65c	60c

(Prices are the same for regular numbers and supplement numbers.)

Previous Issues

The Journal of
SOCIAL
ISSUES

Negro American
Personality

THOMAS F. PETTIGREW
DANIEL C. THOMPSON

KURT W. BACK
WILLIAM F. BRAZZIEL
BERT BROWN
MARTIN DEUTSCH
EDGAR G. EPPS
JACOB R. FISHMAN
HELEN MacGILL HUGHES
IRWIN KATZ
ROBERT KLEINER
DONALD L. NOEL
SEYMOUR PARKER
JAMES M. ROBINSON
IDA HARPER SIMPSON
FREDRIC SOLOMON
PATRICIA WALY
LEWIS G. WATTS

spssi

THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES

Published Quarterly

© Copyright 1964 by The SOCIETY FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
STUDY OF SOCIAL ISSUES

A Division of
THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
Annual Subscription: $5.50   Single Copy $1.50

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues is a group of over a thousand psychologists and allied social scientists who share a concern with research on the psychological aspects of important social issues. SPSSI is governed by Kurt Lewin's dictum that "there is nothing so practical as a good theory." In various ways, the Society seeks to bring theory and practice into focus on human problems of the group, the community, and the nation as well as the increasingly important ones that have no national boundaries. This Journal has as its goal the communication of scientific findings and interpretations in a non-technical manner but without the sacrifice of professional standards.

The Journal typically publishes a whole number on a single topic. An occasional number will be devoted to contributed papers relevant to the purpose of the Journal. Proposals for new issues and individual papers should be sent to the General Editor.

ROBERT CHIN, *General Editor JSI* Human Relations Center, Boston University, Boston 15, Massachusetts

---

---

spssi

The Journal of

SOCIAL ISSUES

NEGRO AMERICAN PERSONALITY

Issue Editors: Thomas F. Pettigrew and Daniel C. Thompson
Editorial Committee Consultant: Irwin Katz

Introduction

Thomas F. Pettigrew and Daniel C. Thompson

"To separate [Negro children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race," wrote Chief Justice Earl Warren in his 1954 public school desegregation opinion, "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." With this historic statement, the study of Negro American personality formally and directly entered the societal dialogue over racial change.

Seldom has a single research area become so intimately intertwined with a social issue of such vast significance. But social psychology and other disciplines concerned with Negro American personality have not as yet fully risen to the challenge. Though the Negro has hardly been slighted in social research, there is much basic work still to be performed. Consequently, in the tradition of the *Journal of Social Issues,* this number attempts to focus fresh attention upon this socially-relevant subject. It does not attempt to be complete in its coverage or single-minded in its approach. Rather, in keeping with the state of the area today, it presents an array of different problems and types of data from various psychological, sociological, and psychiatric perspectives. Case studies, field surveys, and experimental work are all represented; and all of them point to the urgent need for more intensive interest in this research realm.

The first paper discusses three past deterrents to a rounded scientific understanding of Negro American personality: (1) the preponderance of previous research in this area is directed at narrow concerns without general theoretical relevance; (2) special methodological problems inherent in this research are typically not surmounted; and (3) there is a great need of a penetrating social psychological theory of Negro American personality. The remaining eight papers of the issue represent empirical attempts aimed at eventually overcoming these difficulties; the first five focus upon Negro youth—from pre-school to medical school, while the final three center upon Negro adults.

1

Studies of Negro Youth

One of the most striking features of Negro socialization is the impoverishment of the social environment in which it often occurs. Deutsch and Brown isolate the effects of this impoverishment on one measurable aspect of the total personality, intelligence test performance. Their findings involving family instability and the absence of formal pre-school learning experience suggest a "cumulative deficit" hypothesis. If borne out in later research, such an hypothesis indicates that past thinking on this subject has, if anything, underestimated the corrosive effects on young children of impecunius ghetto living.

To alter such conditions, four young Negro college students set out on February 1st of 1960 to attack segregation at a Greensboro, North Carolina lunch counter. This Quixote-like expedition sparked the now famous sit-in protest demonstrations throughout the nation and established one of the more important bench-marks in the entire desegregation struggle. Solomon and Fishman provide a psychiatric portrait of one of these four history-making youths. Particularly important is their documentation of the intersection of personal psychosocial development with contemporary social change.

The case study results of Solomon and Fishman become all the more remarkable when judged within the perspective provided by the next three papers. Brazziel administered the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule to students in two Negro colleges in the South. Consistent with previous research, his data reveal a modal pattern low in dominance and autonomy and high in deference, a pattern particularly pronounced in his deep South sample. The survival value of such a personality pattern when dealing with racist whites is obvious; indeed, Katz, Robinson, Epps and Waly provide experimental evidence that such a pattern particularly tends to exert itself in behavioral interaction with whites under conditions of stress. Thus, under test instructions their southern Negro student subjects express significantly less hostility with a white tester and significantly more hostility with a Negro tester than under neutral instructions.

Finally, a report on Howard University medical students by Back and Simpson delineates and describes three diverse reactions to racial discrimination within the medical profession. For one segment of the sample, the issue is apparently not salient; for another ("the optimists"), the issue provides a protected clientele—in a classic instance of Franklin Frazier's "vested interest in segregation" by part of the Negro elite; yet for a third segment ("the pessimists"), the issue creates difficult barriers impeding their active participation in wider medical circles.

Studies of Negro Adults

The Back-Simpson distinction between "optimists" and "pessimists" directly involves group indentification, a critical variable in the study of Negro American personality and the focus of the next two articles. Noel analyzes data from probability samples of Negro adults in Bakersfield, California and Savannah, Georgia, samples which formed part of the Cornell Study of Intergroup Relations. Measuring group identification with short opinion scales comprised of fixed-alternative items, he finds positive group identification strongest among relatively tolerant, upper-status Negroes who are members of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (N.A.A.C.P.) and have experienced maximal interracial social contact.

Interestingly, Parker and Kleiner, reporting on an extensive survey in Philadelphia, obtain in one realm directly opposite results from those of Noel's. Defining group identification in terms of responses to questions posing hypothetical racial situations, these investigators find that such identification decreases with higher status. At least part of this conflict in findings is due to both theoretical and empirical differences in the conceptions of "group identification" employed by the two studies.

The final paper by Hughes and Watts centers upon the "self-integrators"—the Negro families who take up residence in predominantly white suburban communities. It provides case study views of nine such families in the Boston area; and the findings serve as a healthy reminder that by no means are all Negroes residing in poverty-stricken ghettoes. Indeed, if Brazziel's submissive personality pattern represents the personality scars of the past and Solomon and Fishman's protesting student reflects racial change in the present, perhaps, hopefully, Hughes and Watts' self-integrators foretell the future.

Negro American Personality: Why Isn't More Known?[1]

Thomas F. Pettigrew

From tattoos (Haines & Huffman, 1958) to tongue-rolling (Lee, 1955, 1956), an incredible variety of psychological studies of the Negro American has been conducted in recent decades (Dreger & Miller, 1960). We know, by way of esoteric examples from thousands of projects,[2] that Negro albinos have especially severe personality problems (Beckham, 1946), and that many Negro female college students dislike their given names (Eagleson, 1946).

Yet many of the most basic and important personality questions about Negro Americans have not received even tentative answers. To quote Klineberg's (1944, p. 137) assessment two decades ago, "the field of Negro personality has yielded few definite conclusions." Three reasons for this singular failure are: (1) a great bulk of the personality research performed on the Negro American so far has been directed at narrow, "practical" problems, devoid of theoretical perspective; (2) many studies have not overcome special methodological problems; and, finally, (3) there is a great need for a *social psychological* theory of Negro American personality, an interactionist theory that takes into account both the unique history and present socio-cultural position of the group as well as subtle personality dynamics. Without attempting to survey what *is* known in this area, this paper offers a brief discussion of each of these deterrents to a rounded scientific understanding of Negro American personality, and suggests a number of critical areas for future research.

---

[2] Knox (1949, 1952) estimated that by 1950 approximately 500 M.A. and Ph.D. theses were being written in the United States on subjects related to the Negro American; but psychological projects were less frequent than those in such fields as education and social work which stress applied problems.

The Narrow Framework of Previous Research

Basic questions cannot be answered if they are not asked in the first place. And many basic personality questions concerning the Negro have not been asked. Instead, attention has been concentrated on such areas as intelligence which are related but not central to personality. The popularity of such research can be traced to the century-long debates over racial superiority and inferiority. Up through the 1920's, the vast majority of these psychological studies supported the theories of white superiority. Empirically and theoretically inadequate, the race literature of the period was characterized by intelligence test studies that interpreted the usually higher white IQ's as evidence of inherent intellectual differences between the races. The 1930's witnessed a sharp change. Though still crude in some respects, a new series of more rigorous race studies appeared that emphasized environmental factors and answered racists' claims. In this sense, there was a defensive quality to these newer studies; but less defensive, more carefully controlled research of the past two decades has replicated and confirmed the basic findings and conclusions of the 1930's. (For an excellent example, see the Deutsch and Brown paper in this issue.) In the meantime, however, interest in the deeper, more focal problems of personality suffered.

Another trend diverting interest from central personality problems has involved a focus upon Negro "adjustment." Much of this research superficially defines "adjustment" in terms of tests standardized on whites, without relating the problem to the complex, changing social environment to which Negro Americans must "adjust" themselves. Thus, Anderson (1947) and Boykin (1957) found large segments of their Negro samples scored in the "maladjusted" range for white populations on standard personality tests and uncritically interpreted this as evidence of widespread "maladjustment" in their Negro groups. And Hammer (1953), on the basis of a white-standardized projective measure, reported an average rating of "severely neurotic" for his sample of grade-school Negro children.[3] Such extreme results are reminiscent of data from the 1840 census, which indicated free Negroes were over ten times more likely to be mentally ill or feeble-minded than enslaved Negroes. Once the census data were shown to be grossly inaccurate, a clergyman made a pithy comment applicable to some modern studies: "It was the census that was insane, and not the colored people" (Litwack, 1961, pp. 40-46).[4]

[3] Other examples of this trend include: Engle (1945), Felton (1949), Smith (1961), Sumner (1948), and Wheatley and Sumner (1946). One adjustment study (Altus & Clark, 1949) reversed the typical findings and found a southern white sample considerably more maladjusted than a southern Negro sample.

[4] According to the recent calculations of Postell (1953), the mental illness

A third trend has been more productive. After treating Negro patients, a number of psychotherapists have written persuasive and remarkably consistent analyses of Negro personality (e.g., Adams, 1950; Bernard, 1953; Frank, 1947; Heine, 1950; Hillpern, Spaulding, & Hillpern, 1949; Kardiner & Ovesey, 1951; Kennedy, 1952; McLean, 1949; Myers & Yochelson, 1948; St. Clair, 1951; Sclare, 1953; Shane, 1960; Sullivan, 1941). Such papers offer invaluable hypotheses for rigorous testing, testing yet to be conducted.

Further testimony to the narrowness of the problems attacked to date is our relative ignorance concerning the personality dynamics underlying the present Negro American protests to end all racial segregation. There has been much speculation concerning the effects of Supreme Court rulings and the emergence of African states upon the new self-esteem and militancy revealed by these protests. And an old term has been re-coined—"the New Negro."[5] But little solid work on this important phenomenon has yet been published.[6] A recent exception is a study by Gore and Rotter (1963). They found Negro college students in the South who are ready and willing to participate in public protests differ sharply from their less-willing peers in the degree to which they believe that their fate lies in their own control rather than chance. In this issue, Solomon and Fishman provide case study data which support this finding.

Likewise, the other side of the protest coin, ambivalence over integration, begs for intensive research. Johnson (1957) has explored this problem in an upstate New York community and noted the intense ambivalence between lassitude and militancy, avoidance and "whiteward mobility," self-hatred and race pride. Apprehensions and reluctance over integration have also been found among graduate students at a Negro university (Amos, 1955), Negro teachers in South Carolina (Doddy & Edwards, 1955), and Negro students in northern public schools (English, 1957). Moreover, newly desegregated facilities in today's South—such as lunch counters, schools, and theaters—typically receive sparse Negro patronage. Segregationists immediately

and feebleminded rate of slaves was roughly 18 times greater than that reported by the 1840 census.

[5] Each new generation of Negro Americans since the Civil War has been tagged "the New Negro," for each in its own way challenged the second-class status assigned it in American society. (See, for instance, the post-World War I volume, *The New Negro*, by Locke, 1925.) Consequently, the present use of the term is misleading, for it implies that today's protesting young Negro is a sudden and strange mutation, rather than the product of maturation he actually is.

[6] An extensive study along these lines conducted at Cornell University by Professors Edward A. Suchman and Robin Williams is currently being prepared for publication, as is a more modest effort at Harvard University by the author. Data reported on by Noel in this issue are from the Cornell study. A summary of what is known to date is given in Pettigrew (1964).

point to such data as evidence that "their Nigras didn't want all this desegregation anyway—only the agitators from up North wanted it." Survey and other data, however, suggest that the majority of southern Negroes do desire desegregation as a symbol of their personal worth and dignity but are fearful of exercising their new privileges. The precise personality dynamics behind this complex situation need to be delineated; and the psychological paradigm of avoidance learning, with its vicious circle of fear keeping the subject from discovering the changed conditions, appears to be a good theoretical starting place for this research.

Methodological Problems of Negro Personality Research

Even when investigators ask crucial questions, their research faces two unusually formidable obstacles. First, the race of the interviewer is a complicating and not as yet fully understood factor. And, second, special problems of control are inherent in this research. Not only are there some relatively unique variables that must be considered (e.g., migration history, skin shade, differential experience with the white community, etc.), but even such apparently simple factors as education are not easy to control. Consider briefly the problems presented by these two types of complications.

"Got one mind for white folks to see, 'nother for what I know is me . . . ," go the lyrics of an old Negro folksong (Ames, 1950, p. 194). Many white researchers have learned the truth of these words with Negroes of all ages. Pasamanick and Knobloch (1955) found that Negro children only two-years old revealed restricted verbal responsiveness when examined by a white person. Trent (1954) discovered that both white and Negro kindergarten children reacted differently to a mother-identification test depending upon whether the experimenter were white or Negro.[7] Working with Negro college subjects in a perceptual recognition situation, another study (Whittaker, Gilchrist, & Fischer, 1952) noted reactions of suppression, denial, and anger to the presentation of racially derogatory terms when the experimenter was Negro, but not when the experimenter was white. More refined experimental evidence for this phenomenon is presented in the Katz, Robinson, Epps, and Waly paper in this issue.

Similarly, public opinion surveys using both Negro and white interviewers have obtained sharply diverse results with equivalent samples of Negro adults, particularly on questions concerning the race issue. The classic study on this problem was conducted in Memphis in

---

[7] Another study has demonstrated the effects of a Negro experimenter upon the galvanic skin responses of *white* subjects (Rankin & Campbell, 1955).

1942 by the National Opinion Research Center (Cantril, 1944, pp. 114-116). In response to the question—"Would Negroes be treated better or worse here if the Japanese conquered the U.S.A.?"—almost twice as many respondents answered "worse" to white interviewers (45%) as to Negro interviewers (25%). Two recent poll studies confirm and extend these findings. Price and Searles (1961), with data gathered in North Carolina, report significant differences not only in response to militant items about sit-ins and school desegregation but even to an informational item. Again Negro respondents gave the more militant and informed answers to the Negro interviewers. The other recent study of this phenomenon was conducted in Boston; it found that Northern Negroes, particularly females, also gave significantly more militant responses to Negro interviewers (Pettigrew, 1964).

At first blush, one might think that the problem could be easily solved by using only Negro interviewers with Negro subjects—a type of "separate but equal" solution. But actually the problem is not that simple.[8] Many types of situations and questions unrelated to the race issue are not subject to the phenomenon (Dorfman & Kleiner, 1962; Price & Searles, 1961; Riess, Schwartz, & Cottingham, 1950). More important, there is no guarantee that the more "truthful," candid answer is always made to the Negro interviewer. Perhaps, many Negroes sense that the educated Negro investigator expects them to assume a militant, enterprising posture; thus, the unbiased result often falls roughly midway between the data collected by Negroes and whites. Or, as in such clinical settings as the New Orleans study of Rohrer and Edmonson (1960), Negro and white investigators can uncover different, though supplementary, aspects of their subjects' personalities. Further systematic research on this methodological problem is obviously needed, especially along the lines suggested by Katz, *et al.*, in this issue.

Equally vexing is the problem of control. Regardless of whether Negroes alone are studied or comparisons between Negroes and whites are made, nomothetic research—as opposed to individualistically-focused idiographic methods (Allport, 1961)—requires control over such gross sociological variables as education and socio-economic status if it is to tease out the subtleties of personality. But this raises special problems.

Take the case of education. Since a large majority of Negro Americans have received their formal training from the separate but

---

[8] Of course, the problem of interviewer bias with white respondents is not simple, either (Cantril, 1944, pp. 107-18; Hyman, 1954). But the problem of *racial* interviewer bias is especially serious in studies with Negro subjects because of (1) the importance and salience of the race issue for most Negroes and (2) the strong tendency among many poorly and moderately educated Negroes to attempt to meet the perceived expectations of the investigator (Hare, 1960).

distinctly unequal schools of the South (Ashmore, 1954), even the approximation of a respondent's educational opportunities becomes a complicated matter. Leave alone the more difficult task of equating the educational backgrounds of Negroes and whites, the problem of educational matching is complex enough just for a reasonably homo-

FIGURE 1

MEAN VOCABULARY SCORES OF ADULT NEGROES
BY EDUCATION AND REGION OF TRAINING *

FORMAL EDUCATION

* VOCABULARY TEST OF TEN WORDS WITH FIVE ALTERNATIVES FROM WHICH TO CHOOSE THE NEAREST SYNONYM FOR EACH; ADAPTED FROM MINER (1957). THE SAMPLE IS REPRESENTATIVE OF ONE WORKING-CLASS NEIGHBORHOOD IN BOSTON, MASS.

geneous Negro sample in one neighborhood of a northern city. Figure 1 illustrates this with recently obtained Boston data (Pettigrew, 1964). Note at each educational level, particularly after grade school, the pronounced vocabulary superiority of the northern-trained over the southern-trained respondents. Indeed, southern migrants who graduated from high school resemble in their scores northern natives who had only some high school, and migrants who attended college resemble natives who had only graduated from high school. If the

common practice of merely equating for the number of school years completed is followed in such a sample, personality differences due to educational distinctions may well wash out more subtle and important contrasts between northern and southern Negroes.

Socio-economic status presents similar difficulties of control. Though the economic position of the Negro has risen since 1940 in absolute terms, the ratio between Negro and white incomes has barely inched up during these years of prosperity. Consequently, many Negro Americans still live on such a fringe of poverty that comparable white controls are often non-existent. For instance, Moses (1947) attempted to examine the crime rates of Negroes and whites in Baltimore in four socio-economically equated districts; but he ran into trouble securing two white areas realistically as destitute as his two Negro areas. Moses finally settled on white areas with considerably more home ownership, thus vitiating his finding that the Negro areas had more crime. Related problems arise when socio-economic distinctions are made in research dealing exclusively with Negroes. Careful indices of socio-economic status devised on all-white populations frequently do not transfer easily to Negro populations, leading to the use of *ad hoc* and sometimes questionable measures. In their article in this issue, Parker and Kleiner offer one method for meeting this problem.

Not surprisingly, then, many studies of Negro American personality have floundered on the rocks of insufficient controls. As previously noted, one type of dubious procedure is the unqualified use among Negroes of personality measures standardized on white populations. In one study of Negro college students in Little Rock, Grossack (1957) employed the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. He compared his test results with the standard norms calculated largely on northern white students, though his sample was southern, had undoubtedly received a poorer secondary education, and had lower socio-economic class origins. Consequently, Grossack's explanations of his many differences solely in terms of the racial status of the Negro Southerner lose force in light of the probability that regional, educational, and socio-economic factors also account for much of the distinctiveness in his results. Brazziel, in this issue, meets this problem with a variety of intra-group comparisons.

The finding that Negroes score relatively high on the F-scale of authoritarianism (Greenberg, Chase, & Cannon, 1957; Middleton, 1959; Smith & Prothro, 1957; Steckler, 1957) must also be interpreted with caution. Thus, Smith and Prothro (1957) administered the scale to two southern college samples, one Negro and one white, which they considered comparable despite the relatively deprived educational backgrounds and lower class origins of the Negroes.

A second type of control difficulty arises when investigators ignore

the significance of the southern sub-culture. To illustrate, Karon (1958), in his projective test study of Negro personality, and Carson and Rabin (1960), in their study of verbal communication among Negro and white children, had only three groups in their research designs: northern whites, northern Negroes, and southern Negroes. Both studies revealed their southern Negro samples as quite distinctive; but the regional, as distinguished from the racial, factor cannot be ascertained as long as southern whites are not also tested.

Three further studies demonstrate that these controls are more than mere methodological niceties. Eagleson and Bell (1945) gave the Allport-Vernon Study of Values schedule to a sample of Negro college women in the South; they reported that their results, when compared with the predominantly northeastern white female norms of the test, indicated an unusually low emphasis upon aesthetic concerns. But later Gray (1947) gave the Study of Values to white college women in the South and obtained data strikingly similar to the earlier study. The key variable in these data, it appears, is regional sub-culture and not race. A final example is provided by an interesting investigation of northern children's predictions of their teachers' attitudes toward Negro students (Amos, 1952). At first glance, the data indicated that Negro children were so involved in the issue that they were less accurate in their predictions than their white peers, and perceived their teachers as being far more prejudiced and rejecting than they actually were. Reasonable as this finding seems, however, further analysis holding socio-economic status relatively constant revealed the phenomenon to be more a function of status than race.

In short, then, our understanding of Negro personality has been held back less by the lack of energetic research than by a sparsity of rigorous techniques and designs styled for the problem. The area needs a general methodological uplifting as well as concentrated research upon such special concerns as race of interviewer bias.

The Need for a Social Psychological Theory of Negro American Personality

There are, of course, as many Negro American personalities as there are Negro Americans. As Allport (1961) and others emphasize, each individual has his own unique personality, particularistically shaped by his special endowments and experiences. But the ubiquity of racial prejudice in the United States guarantees that virtually all Negro Americans face at some level the impersonal effects of discrimination, the frightening experience of being a black man in what sometimes appears to him as a white man's world.

Virginia Axline (1955, p. 624) captures the significance of this common Negro American experience in an incident from her play

therapy sessions. A small Negro boy came to the playroom each week, sat at the table, propped back his chair, placed his feet upon the table, and folded his arms majestically over his chest. Week after week, the child would come to the playroom, repeat the procedure, and sit with an impassive expression on his face until the session ended. Finally, he asked the therapist if she knew what he had been playing. Eagerly, she told him she did not know. Whereupon the child announced proudly, "I've been playing white man!"

It is precisely this translation of societal racism into human terms, this consequence of racial discrimination upon the Negro's personality, that calls for a social psychological theory. On the one hand, this theory must consider the particular historical and socio-cultural forces propelling the group; on the other, it must isolate the "marks of oppression" that these societal forces sear into the inner recesses of the individual Negro's personality. In addition, this theory must specify the mediating mechanisms for the interpenetrating effects of each of these sets of factors upon the other. A tall order, admittedly, but nothing less than these specifications is required by the problem. Let us briefly sketch sample features of such a theory of Negro American personality.

Historical and Socio-Cultural Forces

Though slavery, poverty, and segregation have also been experienced by other groups, the history of Negroes in the United States is nevertheless unique. And much of this historical uniqueness bears important personality implications. For instance, a number of theorists have tendered interesting speculations concerning the special effects of slavery upon Negro Americans.

Tannenbaum (1947) maintains that slavery in the United States, when compared with that of Latin America, had an unusually crushing impact, because it did not officially recognize the slave as a human being. Spain and Portugal had centuries of experience with slavery prior to the founding of the New World, hence Iberian law had time to evolve a special place for the slave as a human being with definite, if limited, rights. By contrast, England had no previous involvement with the "peculiar institution," and so its law, followed in the American colonies, treated the slave as mere property—no different legally from a house, or a barn, or an animal. And this property orientation toward the slave, point out Kardiner and Ovesey (1951, pp. 42-47), destroyed any semblance of "reciprocity of feeling between master and slave." Thus, many of the devastating and dehumanizing aspects of slavery in the United States, argues Tannenbaum, can be traced to its legal roots.

Elkins (1959) extends this thinking in his consideration of the

"Sambo" caricature of southern slaves. He stresses the importance of slavery on the large, cotton plantations as a *closed* system, with little chance of manumission, emphasis on survival, and a single, omni-present authority; and he draws an analogy between this situation at its field "gang" worst and the concentration camps of Nazi Germany. The profound personality change of Nazi internment, as independ-ently reported by a number of psychologists and psychiatrists who survived, was toward childishness and total acceptance of the Nazi SS guards as father-figures. As Elkins points out, the typical person-ality produced by this extreme modern-day closed system is strikingly similar to the Sambo caricature. Racists readily believed that the Sambo personality was simply an inborn racial type. Yet no anthro-pological data have ever shown any personality type in Africa even vaguely resembling Sambo; and the concentration camps moulded a similar syndrome in a wide variety of Caucasian prisoners. Nor was Sambo merely a product of "slavery" in the abstract, for the less crushing Latin American system never developed such a type.

Bastide (1950, pp. 240-247) applies psychoanalytic theory to the social structure of the large slave plantation and arrives at speculations which supplement the theorizing of Elkins. Slavery totally disrupted the slave's family pattern and cast him into the role of a child. The inevitable result, argues Bastide, was the adoption of the planter and his wife as parent-substitutes by many of the slaves, and the develop-ment of a type of oedipal conflict: desire for the mother-figure and hatred for the father-figure. The planter responded by attempting to divert this desire for his wife by permitting, indeed encouraging, his slaves to have the greatest sexual liberty among themselves: openly erotic games, wide-spread promiscuity, and polygamy. This pattern, Bastide feels, is the historical root for the sexual fears of white racists and the relatively free sexual patterns of some elements of lower-class Negro society today.

Finally, McClelland (1961, pp. 376-377) believes that slavery in all its forms lowered the need for achievement in slaves—a contention completely compatable with Elkins' ideas. Stripped of their African heritage, Negroes in bondage were placed in a completely dependent role. All of their rewards came, not from individual initiative and enterprise, but from absolute obedience, a pattern that severely depresses the need for achievement.

Present-day socio-cultural considerations determine the extent to which these personality scars of slavery are still manifest. Consider, for example, the measurement of McClelland's concept, need for achievement, among Negroes today. Three studies indicate lower-status Negroes have less need for achievement than lower-status whites, using samples of southern children of both sexes (Merbaum, 1960) and northern boys (Mussen, 1953; Rosen, 1959). But more

significant is the fact that upper-status Negro boys reveal unusually high levels of need for achievement (Rosen, 1959).

This sharp reversal of the older pattern in achievement motivation is just one symptom among many that Negro America has been shaking off the legacies of the past during the last two decades at a rate faster than any other period since emancipation. After a half century of mass migration, the Negro is now half northern and three-fourth's urban. Social class differentiation has been rapid in recent years within Negro circles throughout the United States, and a large, stable middle class has formed. Not only have these sweeping structural changes led to the usual modifications in health (Johnson, 1949), family size (Lee & Lee, 1952; Valien and Fitzgerald, 1949), and child rearing practices (Davis & Havighurst, 1946; Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957), but important shifts in attitudes toward whites (Cothran, 1951; Westie & Howard, 1954), racial discrimination (Banks, 1950), and desegregation itself (Frazier, 1957a) have also resulted. Indeed, five articles in this issue alone—the papers by Brazziel; Back and Simpson; Noel; Parker and Kleiner; and Hughes and Watts—further document these changes. Clearly, an adequate theory of Negro personality must embrace these on-going historical and socio-cultural processes.

"The Mark of Oppression"

Recent economic and educational progress of the Negro American is often described in glowing terms: more consumer buying power than that of Canada, a larger percentage of college attenders than in the British Isles, etc. But such glittering statements must not blind us to the continuing societal features of greatest psychological importance. Negro American gains have their psychological meaning *relative* to the standards of other Americans, not Canadians or Englishmen. Stouffer (1962, pp. 13-38) demonstrated in his World War II studies of the American soldier that relative, rather than absolute, deprivation is the key to understanding much of social motivation. When we apply this thinking to the Negro, we must remember that he judges his living standards, his opportunities, indeed, even judges himself, in the only cultural terms he knows—those of the United States and its "people of plenty" (Potter, 1954).

Complicating the problem further is the degree to which the Negro and America have accepted each other. After fourteen generations on American soil, the Negro's roots are firmer than even those of the most direct descendant of Mayflower stock.[9] And, as Landis

---

[9] Negroes took an active part in the explorations of America prior to Jamestown; and they landed in Virginia in 1619, one year before the landing of the Mayflower at Plymouth Rock.

(1955) correctly points out, the Negro today is accepted throughout the New World as belonging, as being thoroughly American, in a way blacks are not thought of as being English or South African. Paradoxically, the Negro American has been segregated, discriminated against, and kept from full citizenship, yet is considered an alien only by the most extreme racists, white and black.

In setting up a social psychological framework for evaluating "the mark of oppression" upon the Negro American, then, these two features must be considered: he is severely deprived relative to the abundance about him, and he fully accepts the society and is fully accepted by the society as belonging. From this vantage point, findings from a spate of investigations on the personality effects of discrimination become more understandable. Most notable among these are the studies of self-identity in young children. Following the classical work of the Clarks (1947, 1950), a series of researches, using a wide assortment of projective and direct techniques in a variety of segregated southern and integrated northern nursery and school settings, have consistently arrived at the same critical conclusions (Goodman, 1952; Morland, 1958; Stevenson & Stewart, 1958; Trager & Yarrow, 1952).[10] Racial recognition in both white and Negro children appears by the third year and rapidly sharpens each year thereafter. But of special significance is the tendency in all of these studies for Negro children to prefer white skin. They are usually slower to make racial distinctions, frequently choose white dolls and white friends, and often either identify themselves as white or show a tense reluctance over "admitting" that they are Negro.[11] Moreover, young children of both races soon learn to assign realistically poorer houses and less desirable roles to the Negro dolls. This early "mark of oppression" is well illustrated in the behavior of a small Negro boy in Lynchburg, Virginia. When asked (Morland, 1958, p. 137) if he were white or colored, he hung his head, hesitated, then murmured softly, "I guess I'se kinda colored."

[10] The Clarks' work was among the social science references cited in the famous footnote 11 of the historic school desegregation opinion of the United States Supreme Court, rendered on May 17, 1954.

[11] Much of this direct manifestation of "self-hate" disappears by seven or eight years old, but similar studies with older samples still find definite symptoms of it (Goff, 1950; Mann, 1958; Steckler, 1957; Yarrow, Campbell, & Yarrow, 1958). Studies focusing on skin color shade preferences among Negroes also reach similar conclusions (Landreth & Johnson, 1953; Marks, 1943; Seeman, 1946). Directly related to these data are thirty written answers of young Negro southern children to the question: When did you first discover that you were a Negro? (Weaver, 1955). Research in the 1960's may reveal that subsequent events have heightened racial pride among Negro children; Mayo and Kinzer (1950) obtained evidence that such changes were already underway among Negro high school students by 1948.

Ubiquitous as the racist pressures are that produce these effects, not all Negroes react to them with "self-hate," or, for that matter, any limited set of particular responses. To account for this vast variety of reactions to discrimination, two social psychologists have offered tentative theories. Allport (1954, pp. 142-162) suggests that the key variable may be the individual's typical means of handling blame. In reacting to the frustrations and indignities of racism, one Negro will follow his basic personality leanings toward directing blame outward and react with such extrapunitive responses as aggressiveness, obsessive suspicion, or prejudice against other groups. And another, directing blame inward, will react with such intropunitive responses as withdrawal, clowning, or sympathy with all victims of misfortune.

In a more extensive analysis, Milner (1953) maintains that full awareness of his social devaluation does not usually impinge on the Negro until early adolescence. Just how he bears up under this severe emotional stress, argues Milner, is largely a function of the degree of ego-strength that he has developed in his earlier, family-centered years (see also: Ausubel, 1958). The ego-strong Negro may come out of this stressful encounter harboring some self-hatred, but he generally manages to dissociate his basic personality from his socially-defined role of "Negro." By contrast, the "psychologically vulnerable" Negro, crippled by weak ego development from earlier family disorganization, is more likely to fall prey to mental illness, drug addiction, or crime, depending on his particular life history. Consequently, Milner feels that segregation has its most fundamental influence on Negro personality in the manner in which it affects Negro family functioning.

Such speculations block out the dimensions of the needed social psychological theory of Negro personality. And they offer hypotheses worthy of the type of longitudinal testing demonstrated by Rohrer and his colleagues (1960).

The Search for Mediators

The need for this third requirement of an adequate theory is illustrated in a study by Wilson and Lantz (1957). They found Negro mental illness admission rates to Virginia state hospitals had more than doubled from 1914 to 1954, an increase greater than that of the white rates. Wilson and Lantz "felt" that the rapid increase was "due in large degree to segregation and to the uncertainties" of culture change. But without further data, such a conclusion is obviously unsubstantiated. What is missing is a specification of the precise mediators by which segregation and culture change cause more Negroes to be admitted as mental patients.

This search for mediators is the most challenging theoretical and empirical task facing investigators in this field. One fruitful realm,

as Milner suggests, is the study of the Negro family. As Frazier (1957b, pp. 306-333), Kardiner and Ovesey (1951, pp. 43-47) and others point out, slavery wreaked havoc upon Negro family life, and this initial disorganization has been sustained in part to this day by mass migration, rapid urbanization, and continuing poverty. The most studied aspect of this disorganization has been the perpetuation from slavery of the dominant role of the mother in many lower status Negro families.[12] Indeed, a sizeable portion of working class Negro youth still grow up without a stable father-figure present in the home.[13]

Here, then, is a mediator—the disorganized family—created and maintained by racial oppression and directly shaping the Negro personality. Just how the absence of the father, for example, shapes personality has recently received considerable research attention. Thus, Mischel (1961) showed that father-absent children tend to seek immediate gratification, even to the point of preferring small rewards at once rather than considerably larger rewards later. And D'Andrade (1962) demonstrated that they perceive less sex role differentiation than father-present children. Moreover, the young boys among them are markedly more submissive and dependent (Bach, 1946; Lynn & Sawrey, 1959; Sears, 1951; Sears, Pintler, & Sears, 1946; Stolz, 1954). This behavior either continues, or, more typically, is later vigorously defended against by exaggerated masculine behavior. Burton and Whiting (1961) persuasively contend these data are evidence that the father-absent boys have strong primary identifications with their usually overprotective mothers and must later in our relatively patriarchal culture develop a conflicting, secondary identification with males.

Save for the D'Andrade investigation, none of these studies has been conducted on Negro Americans. Yet a number of investigations point to the applicability of this sex-identity problem among lower-class Negro males. Two MMPI assessments of widely different populations—Alabama jail prisoners and Wisconsin working-class veterans with tuberculosis—found Negro males scored significantly higher than white males on the Mf scale of femininity (Caldwell, 1959; Hokanson & Calden, 1960). Psychotherapists have noted the prevalence of pseudo-masculine defenses among neurotic Negro male patients (e.g.,

[12] However, fundamental structural changes in Negro family patterns are also occurring, with gradual adoption of class-related white patterns (Frumkin, 1954; Middleton & Putney, 1960).

[13] In a representative sample drawn in 1961 of Negro adults in a working class, Boston neighborhood, 21 per cent reported having had no father living in the household during childhood (Pettigrew, 1964). And the 1960 Census reveals that only two-thirds of non-whites under 18 years of age live with both parents as compared with nine-tenths of such whites.

Kardiner & Ovesey, 1951; Sclare, 1953). And, finally, a survey employing TAT stimuli with a representative national sample revealed Negro males to be unusually high in need for power and dominance (Veroff, *et al.*, 1960). This is apparently a compensatory reaction to their typically lowly role, for it too grows partly out of the broken home situation. The same study demonstrated that high need for power is a typical personality trait among men, Negro and white, who were raised by only one parent as opposed to men from intact homes.

The possibilities provided by the father-absent research for understanding certain aspects of Negro personality are worth further attention. Deutsch and Brown provide in this issue evidence of the effects of father absence on I.Q. scores. In addition, high rates of schizophrenia and crimes against persons among lower status Negroes may have part of their personality roots in the matriarchal situation; for the strong-mother, weak-father family pattern seems to be related to schizophrenia (Kohn & Clausen, 1956), and patriarchal societies which separate young boys from their fathers tend to have higher rates of crime against persons (Bacon, Child, & Barry, 1963). Follow-up research on these suggestive leads is obviously indicated.

Summary

Why isn't more known about Negro American personality? Three answers to this question are: (1) the narrowness and "practical" orientation of many of the studies on the problem; (2) the methodological difficulties inherent in this research and the widespread failure to overcome these problems; and (3) the need for a broad social psychological theory of Negro American personality. The type of theory required must treat not only the unique historical and socio-cultural forces behind the group and the subtle reflections of these forces within the Negro's personality, but it must also specify the mediating mechanisms transmitting the interpenetrating effects of each of these sets of factors upon the other.

A better understanding of the Negro American personality, then, will require more broadly-conceived, methodologically-rigorous, and theoretically-guided research. Hopefully, such attention will be attracted to this area, for the study of Negro personality not only offers unique opportunities for attacking basic problems in the general field of personality but also contributes to a specific area of maximum social importance.

REFERENCES

ADAMS, W. A. The Negro patient in psychiatric treatment. *Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.*, 1950, 20, 305-310.

ALLPORT, G. W. *The nature of prejudice*. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954.

ALLPORT, G. W. *Pattern and growth in personality*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961.

ALTUS, W. D., AND CLARK, J. H. Some sectional differences among Negro and white illiterate soldiers. *J. soc. Psychol.*, 1949, 30, 97-104.

AMES, R. Protest and irony in Negro folksong. *Sci. Soc.*, 1950, 14, 193-213.

AMOS, R. T. The accuracy of Negro and white children's predictions of teachers' attitudes toward Negro students. *J. Negro Educ.*, 1952, 21, 125-135.

AMOS, R. T. The dominant attitudes of Negro teachers toward integration in education. *J. educ. Psychol.*, 1955, 46, 470-476.

ANDERSON, W. E. The personality characteristics of 153 Negro pupils, Dunbar High School, Okmulgee, Oklahoma. *J. Negro Educ.*, 1947, 16, 44-48.

ASHMORE, H. S. *The Negro and the schools*. Chapel Hill: Univer. North Carolina Press, 1954.

AUSUBEL, D. P. Ego development among segregated Negro children. *Ment. Hyg., N. Y.*, 1958, 42, 362-369.

AXLINE, VIRGINIA M. Play therapy procedures and results. *Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.*, 1955, 25, 618-626.

BACH, C. R. Father-fantasies and father-typing in father-separated children. *Child Develpm.*, 1946, 17, 63-79.

BACON, MARGARET K., CHILD, I. L., AND BARRY, H. A cross-cultural study of correlates of crime. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 1963, 66, 291-300.

BANKS, W. S. M. Rank order of sensitivity to discrimination. *Amer. social. Rev.*, 1950, 15, 529-534.

BASTIDE, R. *Sociologie et psychanalyse*. Paris: Presses Univer. de France, 1950.

BECKHAM, A. S. Albinism in Negro children. *J. genet. Psychol.*, 1946, 69, 199-215.

BERNARD, VIOLA W. Psychoanalysis and members of minority groups. *J. Amer. Psychoanal. Ass.*, 1953, 2, 256-267.

BOYKIN, L. L. The adjustment of 2,078 Negro students. *J. Negro Educ.*, 1957, 26, 75-79.

BURTON, R. V., AND WHITING, J. W. M. The absent father and cross-sex identity. *Merrill-Palmer Quart.*, 1961, 7, 85-95.

CALDWELL, M. G. Personality trends in the youthful male offender. *J. crim. Law Criminol.*, 1959, 49, 405-416.

CANTRIL, H. (Ed.) *Gauging public opinion*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer. Press, 1944.

CARSON, A. S., AND RABIN, A. I. Verbal comprehension and communication in Negro and white children. *J. educ. Psychol.*, 1960, 51, 47-51.

CLARK, K. B., AND CLARK, MAMIE P. Racial identification and preference in Negro children. In T. M. Newcomb & E. L. Hartley (Eds.), *Readings in social psychology*. New York: Holt, 1947. Pp. 169-178.

CLARK, K. B., AND CLARK, MAMIE P. Emotional factors in racial identification and preference in Negro children. *J. Negro Educ.*, 1950, 19, 341-350.

COTHRAN, T. C. Negro conceptions of white people. *Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1951, 56, 458-467.

D'ANDRADE, R. G. Father absence and cross-sex identification. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard Univer., 1962.

DAVIS, A., AND HAVIGHURST, R. J. Social class and color differences in child-rearing. *Amer. social. Rev.*, 1946, 11, 698-710.

DODDY, H. H., AND EDWARDS, G. F. Apprehensions of Negro teachers concerning desegregation in South Carolina. *J. Negro Educ.*, 1955, 24, 26-43.

DORFMAN, ELAINE, AND KLEINER, R. J. Race of examiner and patient in psychiatric diagnosis and recommendations. *J. consult. Psychol.*, 1962, 26, 393.

DREGER, R. M., AND MILLER, K. S.   Comparative psychological studies of Negroes
     and whites in the United States. *Psychol. Bull.*, 1960, **57**, 361-402.
EAGLESON, O. W.   Students' reactions to their given-names. *J. soc. Psychol.*, 1946,
     23, 187-195.
EAGLESON, O. W., AND BELL, ELEANOR S.   The values of Negro women college
     students. *J. soc. Psychol.*, 1945, **22**, 149-154.
ELKINS, S.   *Slavery*. Chicago: Univer. Chicago Press, 1959.
ENGLE, T. L.   Personality adjustments of children belonging to two minority
     groups. *J. educ. Psychol.*, 1945, **36**, 543-560.
ENGLISH, W. H.   Minority group attitudes of Negroes and implications for guid-
     ance, *J. Negro Educ.*, 1957, **26**, 99-107.
FELTON, JEAN S.   The Cornell index used as an appraisal of personality by an
     industrial health service: 1. The total score. *Industr. Med.*, 1949, **18**,
     133-144.
FRANK, J. D.   Adjustment problems of selected Negro soldiers. *J. nerv. ment.
     Dis.*, 1947, **105**, 647-660.
FRAZIER, E. F.   The Negro middle class and desegregation. *Soc. Probl.*, 1957a,
     4, 291-301.
FRAZIER, E. F.   *The Negro in the United States*. (Rev. ed.) New York: Macmil-
     lan, 1957b.
FRUMKIN, R. M.   Attitudes of Negro college students toward intrafamily leader-
     ship and control. *Marriage Fam. Living*, 1954, **16**, 252-253.
GOFF, REGINA M.   Problems and emotional difficulties of Negro children due to
     race. *J. Negro Educ.*, 1950, **19**, 152-158.
GOODMAN, MARY E.   *Race awareness in young children*. Cambridge, Mass.:
     Addison-Wesley, 1952.
GORE, PEARL M., AND ROTTER, J. B.   A personality correlate of social action.
     J. Pers., 1963, **31**, 58-64.
GRAY, SUSAN W.   A note on the values of southern college women, white and
     Negro. *J. soc. Psychol.*, 1947, **25**, 239-241.
GREENBERG, H., CHASE, A. L., AND CANNON, T. M.   Attitudes of white and
     Negro high school students in a west Texas town toward school integration.
     J. appl. Psychol., 1957, **41**, 27-31.
GROSSACK, M. M.   Some personality characteristics of southern Negro students.
     J. soc. Psychol., 1957, **46**, 125-131.
HAINES, W. H., AND HUFFMAN, A. V.   Tattoos found in a prison environment.
     J. soc. Ther., 1958, **4**, 104-113.
HAMMER, E. F.   Negro and white children's personality adjustment as revealed
     by a comparison of their drawings (H-T-P). *J. clin. Psychol.*, 1953, **9**, 7-10.
HARE, P.   Interview responses: Personality or conformity? *Publ. Opin. Quart.*,
     1960, **24**, 629-685.
HEINE, R. W.   The Negro patient in psychotherapy. *J. clin. Psychol.*, 1950, **6**,
     373-376.
HILLPERN, ELSE P., SPAULDING, I. A., AND HILLPERN, E. P.   *Bristow Rogers:
     American Negro; a psychoanalytic case history*. New York: Hermitage
     House, 1949.
HOKANSON, J. E., AND CALDEN, G.   Negro-white differences on the MMPI. *J.
     clin. Psychol.*, 1960, **16**, 32-33.
HYMAN, H. H.   *Interviewing in social research*. Chicago: Univer. Chicago Press,
     1954.
JOHNSON, C. S.   The socio-economic background of Negro health status. *J. Negro
     Educ.*, 1949, **18**, 429-435.
JOHNSON, R.   Negro reactions to minority group status. In M. L. Barron (Ed.),
     American minorities. New York: Knopf, 1957. Pp. 192-212.

KARDINER, A., AND OVESEY, L. *The mark of oppression: A psychosocial study of the American Negro.* New York: Norton, 1951.

KARON, B. P. *The Negro personality.* New York: Springer, 1958.

KENNEDY, JANET A. Problems posed in the analysis of Negro patients. *Psychiatry,* 1952, **15**, 313-327.

KLINEBERG, O. *Characteristics of the American Negro.* New York: Harper, 1944.

KNOX, E. O. The Negro as a subject of university research in 1948. *J. Negro Educ.,* 1949, **18**, 489-497.

KNOX, E. O. The Negro as a subject of university research in 1951. *J. Negro Educ.,* 1952, **21**, 484-491.

KOHN, M. L., AND CLAUSEN, J. A. Parental authority behavior and schizophrenia. *Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.,* 1956, **26**, 297-313.

LANDIS, RUTH. Biracialism in American society: A comparative view. *Amer. Anthropologist,* 1955, **57**, 1253-1263.

LANDRETH, CATHERINE, AND JOHNSON, BARBARA C. Young children's responses to a picture and inset test designed to reveal reactions to persons of different skin color. *Child Develpm.,* 1953, **24**, 63-80.

LEE, E. S., AND LEE, ANNE S. The differential fertility of the American Negro. *Amer. sociol. Rev.,* 1952, **17**, 437-447.

LEE, J. W. Tongue-folding and tongue-rolling. *J. Hered.,* 1955, **46**, 289-290.

LEE, J. W. A study of the inheritance of certain tongue characteristics in 72 pairs of Negro twins. *J. Hered.,* 1956, **47**, 17-19.

LITWACK, L. F. *North of slavery: The Negro in the free states, 1790–1860.* Chicago: Univer. Chicago Press, 1961.

LOCKE, ALAIN. *The new Negro: An interpretation.* New York: Boni, 1925.

LYNN, D. B., AND SAWREY, W. L. The effects of father-absence on Norwegian boys and girls. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.,* 1959, **59**, 258-262.

MANN, J. H. The influence of racial prejudice on sociometric choices and perceptions. *Sociometry,* 1958, **21**, 150-158.

MARKS, E. S. Skin color judgments of Negro college students. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.,* 1943, **38**, 370-376.

MAYO, G. D., AND KINZER, J. R. A comparison of the "racial" attitudes of white and Negro high school students in 1940 and 1948. *J. Psychol.,* 1950, **29**, 397-405.

McCLELLAND, D. C. *The achieving society.* Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand, 1961.

McLEAN, HELEN V. The emotional health of Negroes. *J. Negro Educ.,* 1949, **18**, 283-290.

MERBAUM, ANN D. Need for achievement in Negro children. Unpublished masters dissertation, Univer. of North Carolina, 1960.

MIDDLETON, R. Negro and white reactions to racial humor. *Sociometry,* 1959, **22**, 175-183.

MIDDLETON, R., AND PUTNEY, S. Dominance in decisions in the family: Race and class differences. *Amer. J. Sociol.,* 1960, **65**, 605-609.

MILNER, ESTHER. Some hypotheses concerning the influence of segregation on Negro personality development. *Psychiatry,* 1953, **16**, 291-297.

MINER, J. B. *Intelligence in the United States.* New York: Springer, 1957.

MISCHEL, W. Father-absence and delay of gratification: Cross-cultural comparisons. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.,* 1961, **63**, 116-124.

MORLAND, J. K. Racial recognition by nursery school children in Lynchburg, Virginia. *Soc. Forces.,* 1958, **37**, 132-137.

MOSES, E. R. Differentials in crime rates between Negroes and whites, based on comparisons of four socio-economically equated areas. *Amer. sociol. Rev.,* 1947, **12**, 411-420.

MUSSEN, P. H.   Differences between the TAT responses of Negro and white boys. *J. consult. Psychol.*, 1953, **17**, 373-376.

MYERS, H. J., AND YOCHELSON, L.   Color denial in the Negro: A preliminary report. *Psychiatry*, 1948, **11**, 39-46.

PASAMANICK, B., AND KNOBLOCH, HILDA.   Early language behavior in Negro children and the testing of intelligence. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 1955, **50**, 401-402.

PETTIGREW, T. F.   *A profile of the Negro American.* Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand, 1964.

POSTELL, W. D.   Mental health among the slave population on southern plantations. *Amer. J. Psychiat.*, 1953, **110**, 52-54.

POTTER, D. M.   *People of plenty: Economic abundance and the American character.* Chicago: Univer. Chicago Press, 1954.

PRICE, D. O., AND SEARLES, RUTH.   Some effects of interviewer-respondent interaction on responses in a survey situation. Paper read at Amer. Statist. Ass., New York, December 30, 1961.

RANKIN, R. E., AND CAMPBELL, D. T.   Galvanic skin response to Negro and white experimenters. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 1955, **51**, 30-33.

RIESS, B. F., SCHWARTZ, E. K., AND COTTINGHAM, ALICE.   An experimental critique of assumptions underlying the Negro version of the TAT. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 1950, **45**, 700-709.

ROHRER, J. H., AND EDMONSON, M. S. (Eds.)   *The eighth generation: Cultures and personalities of New Orleans Negroes.* New York: Harper, 1960.

ROSEN, B. C.   Race, ethnicity, and the achievement syndrome. *Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 1959, **24**, 47-60.

ST. CLAIR, H. R.   Psychiatric interview experiences with Negroes. *Amer. J. Psychiat.*, 1951, **108**, 113-119.

SCLARE, A. B.   Cultural determinants in the neurotic Negro. *Brit. J. Med. Psychol.*, 1953, **26**, 278-288.

SEARS, PAULINE S.   Doll play aggression in normal young children: Influence of sex, age, sibling status, father's absence. *Psychol. Monogr.*, 1951, 65, No. 6 (Whole No. 323).

SEARS, R. R., PINTLER, MARGARET H., AND SEARS, PAULINE S.   Effects of father-separation on preschool children's doll play aggression. *Child Develpm.*, 1946, **17**, 219-243.

SEARS, R. R., MACCOBY, ELEANOR E., AND LEVIN, H.   *Patterns of child rearing.* Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957.

SEEMAN, M.   A situational approach to intragroup Negro attitudes. *Sociometry*, 1946, **9**, 199-206.

SHANE, M.   Some subcultural considerations in the psychotherapy of a Negro patient. *Psychiat. Quart.*, 1960, **34**, 9-27.

SMITH, C. U., AND PROTHRO, J. W.   Ethnic differences in authoritarian personality. *Soc. Forces.*, 1957, **35**, 334-338.

SMITH, P. M.   Personal and social adjustment of Negro children in rural and urban areas of the South. *Rural Sociol.*, 1961, 26, 73-77.

STECKLER, G. A.   Authoritarian ideology in Negro college students. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 1957, **54**, 396-399.

STEVENSON, H. W., AND STEWART, E. C.   A developmental study of racial awareness in young children. *Child Develpm.*, 1958, **29**, 399-409.

STOLZ, LOIS M.   *Father relations of warborn children.* Palo Alto, Cal.: Stanford Univer. Press, 1954.

STOUFFER, S. A.   *Social research to test ideas.* New York: Free Press, 1962.

SULLIVAN, H. S.   Memorandum on a psychiatric reconnaissance. In C. S. Johnson

(Ed.), *Growing up in the black belt*. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1941. Pp. 328-333.

SUMNER, F. C. Neurotic tendency and socio-economic status of Negro college women. *J. soc. Psychol.*, 1948, **28**, 291.

TANNENBAUM, F. *Slave and citizen: The Negro in the Americas*. New York: Knopf, 1947.

TRAGER, HELEN G., AND YARROW, MARIAN R. *They live what they learn*. New York: Harpers, 1952.

TRENT, R. D. The color of the investigator as a variable in experimental research with Negro subjects. *J. soc. Psychol.*, 1954, **40**, 281-287.

VALIEN, P., AND FITZGERALD, ALBERTA P. Attitudes of the Negro mother toward birth control. *Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1949, **55**, 279-283.

VEROFF, J., ATKINSON, J. W., FELD, SHEILA C., AND GURIN, G. The use of thematic apperception to assess motivation in a nationwide interview study. *Psychol. Monogr.*, 1960, **74**, No. 12 (Whole No. 287).

WEAVER, E. K. How do children discover they are Negroes? *Understanding the Child*, 1955, **24**, 108-112.

WESTIE, F. R., AND HOWARD, D. H. Social status differentials and the race attitudes of Negroes. *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1954, **19**, 584-591.

WHEATLEY, L. A., AND SUMNER, F. C. Measurement of neurotic tendency in Negro students of music. *J. Psychol.*, 1946, **22**, 247-252.

WHITTAKER, EDNA M., GILCHRIST, J. C., AND FISCHER, JEAN W. Perceptual defense or response supression? *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 1952, **47**, 732-733.

WILSON, D. C., AND LANTZ, EDNA M. The effect of culture change on the Negro race in Virginia as indicated by a study of state hospital admissions. *Amer. J. Psychiat.*, 1957, **114**, 25-32.

YARROW, MARIAN R., CAMPBELL, J. D., AND YARROW, L. J. Acquisition of new norms: A study of racial desegregation. *J. soc. Issues*, 1958, **14**, 8-28.

Social Influences in Negro-White Intelligence Differences[1,2]

Martin Deutsch and Bert Brown[3]

This paper reports on some aspects of experience that influence the development of intellective functions in children. The social experiential variable is often treated in the psychological literature in a most macroscopic manner. It has been one of our purposes to break down the attributes of social experience along what might be called social environmental and developmental dimensions.

As regards the social environmental, the attempt has been to analyze racial group membership by some of its psychological properties, to determine some of the components of social class, and to determine something of the interaction of the two, particularly as it impinges on intellectual achievement and growth.

On what we are calling the developmental dimension, the focus has been on identifying "experience groups" in terms of language, perception, learning, general intellective functioning, and to a lesser extent, self, attitudinal, and motivational variables. These variables, in turn, have been broken down into more specific components for measurement and for evaluation of interrelationships.

The data have been collected on cross-sectional samples, but the work is closely associated with a large-scale longitudinal study which attempts to manipulate mediating environmental variables and to measure any subsequent behavioral modification or facilitation in intellectual growth. The cross-sectional study referred to is a large social class and race analysis, involving first and fifth grade children,

which we colloquially refer to as "The Verbal Survey"—a term which is something of a misnomer, as the range goes beyond verbal measures.

This report is concerned with the intellectual test differences between Negro and white first and fifth graders of different social classes—though the focus in this report is largely on the lower class. Two more specific independent variables of special significance are presence or absence of father in the home, and whether the child had an organized pre-school experience.

The data reported in this paper are from a sample of 543 urban public school children stratified by race, grade level (first and fifth graders) and social class, as measured by the Institute's twelve point SES scale. This scale is derived both from prestige ratings of occupation as well as education of main breadwinners and yields a weighted index of these factors for each subject in the sample. The distribution of index scores is broken down into twelve levels and subsequently trichotomized into three socio-economic strata. SES comparisons reported in this paper are made among three distinguishable social class levels, I, II, and III, where level I represents the lowest group on the continuum and III the highest. Housing condition for these S's was evaluated along a six point continuum from "Sound, with all plumbing facilities" to "Dilapidated" following from the technique suggested by the U.S. Census of Housing.[4] The weighted SES index score correlates .27 with the housing condition index for a sample of 292 children within the larger group of 543. The magnitude of this correlation is low but significant for the sample size on which it was obtained.

The intelligence test used was the Lorge-Thorndike, Level I, Primary Battery for first graders, and Level 3 for fifth graders. Both forms, as described by the authors, are essentially non-verbal (Lorge-Thorndike, 1959). Level I uses pictorial items only to measure abstract thinking, pictorial classification and pictorial pairing. Level 3 uses picture classification, pictorial analogies, and numerical relationships. This test was selected because of the inclusion in its standardization population of a much better than usual representation of the lower social class categories. It was given in small groups, during school hours, by trained examiners on the Institute's research staff.

The SES data were gathered by mailed questionnaires and home interviews. The SES items were only a part of the interview schedule. The rest of the items had to do with home conditions, daily routine, and aspirations of both parents and children. The appropriate items here are now being collated into a "deprivation index" for purposes of identifying the sources of inter- and intra-class variation.

Table 1 presents results of a three-way analysis of variance using

---

[4] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Housing*, 1960, Nos. 274-276.

Lorge-Thorndike I.Q. scores as the dependent variable. It can readily be seen that fifth grade I.Q. scores do not differ significantly from scores achieved by first grade children. Differences between scores of Negro and white children can be seen to be highly significant

TABLE 1

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE[*] AND CELL MEANS ON LORGE-THORNDIKE
INTELLIGENCE TEST PERFORMANCE BY GRADE,
RACE AND SOCIAL CLASS
$(N = 543)$

Source	Sum of Squares	d.f.	F	Sig.
Grade	634.429	1	3.153	N.S.
Race	10,119.416	1	50.296	$p < .0001$
SES	14,429.344	2	35.859	$p < .0001$
Within	106,834.966	531		
Total	137,656.866	542		

[*] *Note.*—Interaction terms have been omitted from the table, as none reached significance.

TABLE 1 (*continued*)
MEAN LORGE-THORNDIKE I.Q. SCORES FOR SES GROUPS, RACE
GROUPS WITHIN SES GROUPS AND TOTAL RACE GROUPS

Group	$\overline{X}$	S.D.	N
SES I			
White	97.24	15.35	104
Negro	91.24	13.25	157
Total	93.63	14.43	261
SES II			
White	105.59	14.88	68
Negro	94.87	14.70	111
Total	98.94	15.67	179
SES III			
White	114.92	12.05	52
Negro	102.57	14.53	51
Total	108.81	14.70	103
Total Race Groups			
White	103.88	16.12	224
Negro	94.32	14.53	319

Note.—Two-tailed t-tests for differences between total race groups and SES levels significant at $p < .01$.

$(p < .0001)$ and are equally strong between SES levels. Examination of the secondary tables of means and sigma's for subgroups within each of these variables indicates the direction and magnitude of these differences. Clearly, the means for white children are significantly higher than are mean I.Q. scores for their Negro counterparts and the relationship is documented by t-test differences between race

groups reaching significance at $p < .01$. Similarly, inter-level differences are significant for SES groups at $p < .01$. While the analysis of variance does not indicate a significant race by SES interaction, inspection of the means shows: (1) that Negro children at each SES level score lower than white children, and (2) that Negro-white differences increase at each higher SES level. While children in each racial group show gain in I.Q. with ascending SES level, gains for the white group appear to be considerably greater.

These results are consistent with other data (Kennedy, 1963; Anderson, 1962; Eells, 1951) and could reflect the ascending isomorphism between social class and the item content of intelligence tests. Nevertheless, such results are usually predictive of school achievement, although their meaning with regard to individual potential may be questionable.

It is extremely interesting to note this more sharply defined escalation of the white majority group child's I.Q. through the three social class steps. In the lowest class, where social deprivation is most homogeneous and the influence of race is attenuated by the pervasiveness of poor living conditions, there is somewhat less difference, as has been mentioned, between Negro and white.

To summarize: (1) a linear relationship exists between SES and performance level for both Negro and white groups, and (2) within this linear relationship the absolute increase in I.Q. is greater for the white group than it is for the Negro.

The interpretation put forth here for these data is that the influence of racial membership tends to become increasingly manifest and crucial as the social class level increases. The hypothesis we would advance has to do with increased participation in the cultural mainstream, and the differing conditions under which Negroes and whites participate (Deutsch, 1963). The weight of color and resulting minority status, it is postulated here, results in much less participation by the Negro, while the lowest class status operates similarly for the white as well as for the Negro. In other words, it is much more difficult for the Negro to attain identical middle or upper-middle-class status with whites, and the social class gradations are less marked for Negroes because Negro life in a caste society is considerably more homogeneous than is life for the majority group. This makes it extremely difficult ever really to match racial groups meaningfully on class status as the context and history of social experience are so different.

There is support for the "participation" hypothesis in some social background data. These data indicate that there are fewer variegated family activities, such as eating together or taking trips, in the Negro as opposed to the white group. These differences are especially apparent at the lower SES levels. It may well be that such

TABLE 2

INCIDENCE OF FATHER'S PRESENCE IN THE HOME BY RACE WITHIN SES GROUP
(N = 543)

Condition	SES I				SES II				SES III			
	White		Negro		White		Negro		White		Negro	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Father present in home	(88)	84.6	(88)	56.1	(61)	89.7	(80)	72.1	(52)	100.0	(44)	86.3
Father *not* present in home	(16)	15.4	(69)	43.9	(7)	10.3	(31)	27.9	—	0.0	(7)	13.7
N =	(104)		(157)		(68)		(111)		(52)		(51)	

Note.—χ^2 for SES × father condition = 28.01, 2d.f., p = < .001
χ^2 for Race × father condition = 39.152, 1d.f., p = < .001

family experiences operate differentially at the higher SES levels, but our current data for the SES III group are incomplete and there is no indication that the differences would reach statistical significance.

This information demands that we probe even more carefully into background variables as possible sources of some of the variation in intelligence scores found in different population groups.

One of the most striking differences between the Negro and white groups is the consistently higher frequency of broken homes and resulting family disorganization in the Negro group. Indeed, Table 2 indicates that this phenomenon varies directly with social class and with race, both at $p < .001$ by χ^2 test.

We are *not* here considering the very real historical, social and economic antecedents of this condition, but are instead simply making an empirical observation. Since in the vast majority of cases, the home is broken by the absence of the father, this is used as a rough indicator of family cohesiveness. The absence or presence of the father has been shown in other studies to relate to need achievement and aspiration levels, especially of boys (Ausubel, 1963; Deutsch, 1960).

Table 3 presents the results of a four-way analysis of variance of Lorge-Thorndike scores, using sex, grade, race, and presence of father as independent variables.

As can be seen, significant differences are obtained on the race and presence of father variables, with white children scoring higher than Negro, and children coming from homes where fathers are present having significantly higher scores than children from fatherless homes. None of the interaction terms was statistically significant. (SES could not be included in the analysis of variance because in our Class III sample there were no white fatherless families. Thus, by dropping SES III's from this analysis, the N here becomes 440.)

To get at the influence of father's presence on intelligence score within groups, several additional comparisons were made. Because the absence of significant interactions in the data might relate to the strong pull exerted on the scores by race differences, the data from the Negro sample were subjected to specific analysis within grade and SES. Special attention was paid to lower SES, as the number of homes without fathers was largest in this group, and the comparisons, thus, were more meaningful.

Table 4 presents the comparisons for first and fifth grade Negro children in the lowest two SES groups.

As is seen from Table 4, a consistent trend within both grades at the lower SES level appears, and in no case is there a reversal of this trend: for males, females, and the combined group, the I.Q.'s of children with fathers in the home are always higher than those who have no father in the home. In addition, a constricted range of performance, as reflected in standard deviation units is found

among fifth graders without fathers in the home, as opposed to both first and fifth graders in homes where fathers are present.

Differences between first and fifth grade children, controlling for father in home, are not significant, and they are not reported here in tabular form. Within the Negro lower-class, there is a consistent decrement in I.Q. level from the first to fifth grade, there again being

TABLE 3

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE[*] ON LORGE-THORNDIKE INTELLIGENCE SCORES
BY SEX, GRADE, RACE, AND PRESENCE OF FATHER IN THE HOME
(SES Groups I and II only, N = 440)

Source	Sum of Squares	d.f.	F	Sig.
Sex	8.726	1	< 1.000	N.S.
Grade	404.317	1	1.882	N.S.
Race	2,580.069	1	12.013	< .01
Father in Home	954.073	1	4.442	< .05
Within	91,490.127	424		
Total	101,313.415	439		

[*] *Note.*—Interaction terms have been omitted from the table, as none reached significance. The obtained F value in each case was less than 1.00.

MEANS FOR RACE GROUPS[**]

Group	$\bar{\mathrm{X}}$	S.D.	N
Negro	92.75	14.02	268
White	100.72	15.91	172

MEANS FOR FATHER CONDITION[**]
(Combined Race Groups)

Condition	$\bar{\mathrm{X}}$	S.D.	N
Father in Home	97.83	15.25	317
No Father in Home	90.79	14.18	123

[**] *Note.*—t-tests for differences between race groups and father condition significant at $p < .01$.

no reversals in direction in sex or father-in-home categories. (In comparisons made between first and fifth graders in the white lower-class sample, there is a non-significant increment in score from first to fifth grade.)

While the specific interaction term for this break in the previous four-way analysis of variance did not reach statistical significance, the data in Table 4 are presented for the purpose of identifying cells in which I.Q. differences, as predicted by family stability, are greatest. Also the specific descriptive data are revealing in that there is no reversal of trend even though the analysis of variance did not yield statistically significant results.

Further analysis will reveal if the Negro score decrement from first to fifth grade is accounted for by the greater proportion of broken Negro homes. This also might account for some of the differences between Negro and white intelligence scores.

A weakness in these cross-sectional data is that there is no reliable way of knowing how long the fifth grade children have lived in homes without fathers, or whether this has been a recurrent or a consistent condition. But it is reasonable to assume that on the average

TABLE 4

PERFORMANCE ON THE LORGE-THORNDIKE INTELLIGENCE TEST AMONG LOWER AND LOWER MIDDLE (SES I AND II) NEGRO CHILDREN WITH AND WITHOUT FATHERS PRESENT IN THE HOME

	Group	Father Present			Father Absent		
		$\overline{X}$	S.D.	N	$\overline{X}$	S.D.	N
	Grade 1						
	Male	95.55	15.74	31	87.71	21.70	28
	Female	94.50	10.39	10	88.20	12.19	5
	Total	95.24	14.51	41	87.78	20.40	33
SES I							
	Grade 5						
	Male	90.81	13.14	26	83.41	9.65	17
	Female	95.19	14.73	21	87.70	9.75	20
	Total	92.77	13.89	47	85.73	9.81	37
	Grade 1						
	Male	98.35	12.18	26	92.80	18.64	10
	Female	99.27	12.99	15	—	—	—
	Total	98.68	12.33	41	92.80	18.64	10
SES II							
	Grade 5						
	Male	94.78	15.12	23	91.75	15.67	16
	Female	90.25	17.19	16	93.00	12.27	5
	Total	92.92	15.89	39	92.05	14.65	21

the fifth graders have had more fatherless years than the first graders. If this is tenable, then what we might be tapping is the cumulative effect of fatherless years, and if so, this might explain why the first grade differences are not significant: they are simply not significant yet. This hypothesis is supported by the limited variance reported in Table 4 for fifth grade children from fatherless homes in contrast to the greater variance shown among children on the same grade level but coming from homes in which fathers are present.

A second, and perhaps more parsimonious, explanation for this finding is that I.Q. tests at the fifth grade level may tap more responses which directly relate to the role of the father in the family structure for both boys and girls. This might have particular reference to the cohesiveness of the family and the variety of activities in which the

family participates, and most specifically simply reflect the quantity of verbal interaction engendered through the medium of family organization and activity.

Another background variable which might relate to intelligence test performance is the amount and timing of schooling the child has had. As with the father variable, it was thought that the more opportunity the child has for adult-child contact, conversation, and experiential variety, the more positive the influence on his performance.

TABLE 5

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON LORGE-THORNDIKE INTELLIGENCE
SCORES BY SEX, RACE, AND PRE-SCHOOL EXPERIENCE
(Grade 5, SES I and II only, N = 246)

Source	Sum of Squares	d.f.	F	Sig.
Sex	128.204	1	< 1.000	N.S.
Race	1,785.477	1	7.873	< .01
Pre-School Experience	1,619.750	1	7.143	< .01
Within	43,083.956	238		
Total	50,027.132	245		

Note.—Interaction terms have been omitted from the table, as none were significant. The F value in each case was less than 1.00.

MEANS FOR RACE GROUPS

Group	$\overline{\mathrm{X}}$	S.D.	N
Negro	90.90	13.89	144
White	99.82	16.40	102

MEANS FOR PRE-SCHOOL CONDITION[*]

Condition	$\overline{\mathrm{X}}$	S.D.	N
Pre-School Experience	97.42	15.72	152
No Pre-School Experience	90.65	14.32	53

[*] *Note.*—N's for Pre-School Condition reduced from total N for fifth grade due to missing data.

Also Fowler's analysis (1962) pointed out the importance for the child of cognitive stimulation and practice in the early years. As was seen in Lee's study (1951) of I.Q. differences between Negro children born in Philadelphia and those who migrated there from the South, consistently higher I.Q. test scores were obtained by children who had the longest residence in the presumably more fostering northern environment. Lee's data also show a consistent difference in favor of Negro children who had a kindergarten experience, as compared with those who did not. Therefore, an experiential variable selected for analysis in the present study was whether or not the

child had any formal pre-school educational experience. Because of the variety of types of pre-school experience—some children had nursery and no kindergarten, others reversed—the variable was treated dichotomously as "some pre-school experience" or "no pre-school experience."

Table 5 reports results of a three-way analysis of variance of Lorge-Thorndike scores for fifth-grade children by sex, race, and pre-school experience.

TABLE 6

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON LORGE-THORNDIKE INTELLIGENCE
SCORES BY SEX, RACE, AND PRE-SCHOOL EXPERIENCE
(Grade 1, SES I and II only, $N = 194$)

Source	Sum of Squares	d.f.	F	Sig.
Sex	17.283	1	< 1.000	N.S.
Race	1,152.579	1	5.817	< .05
Pre-School Experience	609.235	1	3.074	< .10
Within	25,162.214	186		
Total	27,148.326	193		

Note.—Interaction terms have been omitted from the table as none were significant.

MEANS FOR RACE GROUPS

Group	$\overline{X}$	S.D.	N
Negro	94.90	13.92	124
White	102.01	15.27	70

MEANS FOR PRE-SCHOOL CONDITION*

Condition	$\overline{X}$	S.D.	N
Pre-School Experience	100.03	13.99	112
No Pre-School Experience	94.48	16.24	23

* *Note.*—N's for Pre-School Condition reduced from Total N due to missing data.

As can be seen, race differences are significant at the $p < .01$ level, and so are pre-school experience differences. Those children who have had pre-school experience score significantly higher than those without. Again, the interaction terms were not significant.

Table 6 presents the same analysis for the first grade group. Here, while the significant race difference in test performance prevails ($p < .05$), the difference as predicted by pre-school experience is not significant, although *directionality* is still apparent. In other words, presence or lack of pre-school experience at grade 5 more highly differentiates intelligence test scores than it does at grade 1. Neverthe-

less, at grade 1 it is still differentiating ($p < .10$), though not within the conventional limits of statistical significance.

This finding is consistent with those for the father-in-home variable, and, therefore, lends support to the cumulative deficit hypothesis previously advanced: that deprivational influences have a greater impact at later developmental stages than at earlier ones.

The effect of the father-in-home variable on I.Q. for this sample has been shown in the data presented here. What is less easily measurable, but may nonetheless exist, is the potential systematic lowering of Negro children's I.Q. by the greater prevalence of broken homes in Negro SES groups I and II. In our samples, for example, there is a significantly greater frequency of broken homes among the Negro group, as compared with the white, and it is hard to estimate what the overall effect may be of this family instability in the development of the Negro child. From these data, it is quite conceivable, if not probable, that one effect would be the systematic lowering with age of I.Q. scores of the children where markedly unfavorable social conditions exist.

The data presented here represent only a small portion of those we have collected on the children in the various samples. When one surveys the entire mass of data, what is striking is the fact that on most of the *social* variables, the Negro group shows greater deprivation. This is true within social class categories, with the possible exception of Social Class II, and even here the factors associated with racial discrimination and caste are still quite operative; the class and caste discussion of Dreger and Miller (1960) is an adequate recognition of this problem. The conclusion is inescapable that the Negro group is a socially deprived one, and that whatever other measures and functions are sensitive to social effects will also reflect this deprivation.

We are now attempting to measure the ingredients of deprivation with the aim of developing a typology of deprivation which organizes experience in developmentally relevant groupings that can be related to sources of socially determined group variation in I.Q. performance. It would seem probable that when behavioral scientists have been able to classify and measure the elements and variables in social deprivation, the observed differential in intelligence test scores between Negro and white samples will be accounted for.

The present data on family cohesion and pre-school experience represent two possible environmental modifiers of intelligence test performance that would seem to account for a portion of differences found between ethnic, class or experiential groups. If these are influential variables a positive implication is that they are amenable to social intervention and change.

REFERENCES

ANASTASI, A. *Differential psychology*. New York: Macmillan, 1958.

ANDERSON, W. F. Relation of Lorge-Thorndike Intelligence Test Scores of public school pupils to the socio-economic status of their parents. *J. exp. Educ.*, 1962, **31**(1), 73-76.

AUSUBEL, D. P., AND AUSUBEL, PEARL. Ego development among segregated Negro children. In A. H. Passow (Ed.), *Education in depressed areas*. New York: Teachers College Bureau of Publications, Columbia Univer., 1963, pp. 109-141.

DEUTSCH, M. Minority group and class status as related to social and personality factors in scholastic achievement. Society for Applied Anthropology, Monograph Number 2, 1960.

DEUTSCH, M. The disadvantaged child and the learning process: Some social, psychological and developmental considerations. In A. H. Passow (Ed.), *Education in depressed areas*. New York: Teachers College Bureau of Publications, Columbia Univer., 1963, pp. 163-179.

DREGER, R. M., AND MILLER, K. S. Comparative psychological studies of Negroes and whites in the United States. *Psychol. Bull.*, 1960, **57**, 361-402.

EELLS, K. et al. *Intelligence and cultural differences*. Chicago: Univer. of Chicago Press, 1951.

FOWLER, W. Cognitive learning in infancy and early childhood. *Psychol. Bull.*, 1962, **59**, 116-152.

KENNEDY, W. A. et al. *A normative sample of intelligence and achievement of Negro elementary school children in the southeastern United States*. Monogr., Soc. for Res. in Child Development, 1963 (20) Number 6.

KLINEBERG, O. *Negro intelligence and selective migration*. New York: Columbia Univer. Press, 1935.

KLINEBERG, O. The intelligence of migrants. *Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 1938, 3, 218-224.

KLINEBERG, O. Negro-white differences in intelligence test performance: A new look at an old problem. *Amer. Psychologist*, 1963, **18**, 198-203.

LEE, E. S. Negro intelligence and selective migration: A Philadelphia test of the Klineberg hypothesis. *Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 1951, 16, 227-233.

LORGE, I., AND THORNDIKE, R. I. *Lorge-Thorndike Tests of Intelligence*, Specimen Test Booklet. New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1959.

SCHWEBEL, M. Individual differences in learning abilities. *Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.*, 1963, **33**, 60-71.

U.S. Bureau of the Census. *U.S. Census of Housing*, 1960, 3, City Blocks, Series HC (3), Nos. 274-276.

WHITEMAN, M. Intelligence and learning. Paper presented at the Arden House Conference on Pre-School Enrichment of Socially Disadvantaged Children, Arden House, Harriman, N.Y., December 17, 1962.

Youth and Social Action: II. Action and Identity Formation in the First Student Sit-in Demonstration[1]

Fredric Solomon and Jacob R. Fishman

Since 1960, we have been studying some relationships between social change, adolescent and student personality development, and the social behavior of this age group. This is our second report on the student protest movement against racial segregation—the "sit-in" and "freedom-ride" movement. In our first paper, we discussed certain aspects of the desegregation movement in Washington, D.C. area. The present paper focuses upon the development of the very first sit-in in the South at Greensboro, N.C., on February 1, 1960. A third paper will describe and discuss "non-violent" behavior and ideology.

The recent efforts of students against segregation have produced social change on a scale and at a rate such as to make this non-violent movement unique in American history. As a result, Negroes are now admitted on an equal basis to thousands of eating places and hundreds of places of recreation, libraries, bus and railroad terminals, and churches. Tens of thousands of demonstrators have been arrested, 95 per cent of whom were students. Many of these students were white. The largest number of demonstrators are between 18 and 19 years old.[2] Thus, this movement appears to be a significant social development from which there may be much to be learned about American youth.

We have been asking ourselves the following questions: What kinds of people are these students? What is their psychological, social, and cultural background? What sort of identity and outlook on life do they have? What are the dynamic factors that motivate them to action and risk-taking on behalf of their beliefs? What can this tell us about identity formation and ego integration or distintegration?

[1] An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, Toronto, Canada, May, 1962.

[2] Developments in 1962 and 1963, since this paper was first prepared, include a broadening base of participation in "nonviolent direct protest." Younger students and older "adults" have become increasingly involved.

How does it contrast with social behavior of adolescents in other situations?

We have been attempting to find answers to these and other questions by means of direct observation of group activities and extensive group and individual interviewing. To illustrate some of our findings, we would like to describe and discuss an 18-year-old Negro student who, together with his three close friends from the freshman class at the Negro college in Greensboro, N.C., sat-in one day at a segregated down-town lunch counter and thus *began* the sit-in movement in the South.

John is a college student with good grades, good manners, and high intelligence. He appears serious and highly goal-directed. We interviewed him over several hours, 18 months after the first sit-in. At that time, he was heavily involved in movement activity but continuing his excellent work in school. We were impressed by the depth of feeling he focused around his experiences.

As far back as he can remember, John was puzzled by and was resentful toward the segregated school he attended. He grew up in a border city in which there were rather few outward signs of segregation, except for the completely separate school systems. He recalls wondering, "What was wrong with me mentally that they were keeping me here," referring to the all Negro grade school. John was 13 when he was told of the Supreme Court decision outlawing segregated schools. "My father told it to me as if *he* was getting a raise or something; as if *he* was getting a chance to go to school." He recalls that his father spoke at length of what it meant to have an opportunity for a good education. Although John was a little worried about being accepted into an all-white school, the Supreme Court decision "gave me a good feeling. . . . It made me look up. . . . All along, I had felt I was as good as anyone else, but now it's reconfirmed." The next autumn after the Supreme Court decision, he was entered into a newly integrated junior high school. He was determined to get to the top of the class, and he did, which boosted his morale. He recalls that his father's pep talks were very helpful. He would give a dollar bill to the child with the best grades at each report card time.

John is the third in a family of six children. His parents have a stable marriage. His father had wanted to be a physician, but had to leave his medical studies because of severe respiratory illness. He now works as a carpenter. John recalls that there "wasn't much talk outside my family about segregation." But the need for Negroes to register to vote and the importance of the Supreme Court decision were very big issues *inside* the home, and his father talked about them at length. His father had been a member of the NAACP, but not a leader. The only demonstration his father had ever taken part in was a labor strike in 1942. Both of John's parents were originally from

North Carolina and there is a considerable section of the family that still lives in Greensboro.

John, himself, had several significant experiences in Greensboro during his adolescence. He spent many summers there, as well as his whole junior year of high school. During the summer immediately following the Supreme Court decision, at age 13 while visiting his grandmother in Greensboro, he had tried to get served in a nearby segregated donut shop by going in the front door. Traditionally, Negroes in the South are not served in a "white" restaurant if they go through the front door and sit down. They are expected to come around to the door near the kitchen and buy food to carry out and eat elsewhere. He found that he sometimes got served in spite of the general custom, particularly when business was slow. If he were ever asked to leave, however, he would promptly do so. This was not actually a sit-in therefore, but it did involve deliberate testing of the environment. John remembers clearly that whenever he went South during his adolescence, he always felt that the whole system of segregation was designed to say over and over again "Negroes, you don't do this, Negroes, you don't do that. . . . Somebody was thinking I was inferior, I wasn't good enough to walk in the front door." His grandmother never told him not to go in the front doors to the restaurants, but she merely repeated how "You'll never change it, it's been going on for years." He recalls, "she seemed neutral, but deep-down I felt she would be more comfortable if I stopped doing it because she didn't think it was right and anyway something might happen. But I thought it was right." He was contemptuous of his grandmother's generation and their fearfulness. "I began to see what those people were made of deep-down." His tone of voice was bitter when making this statement.

At the age of 15, he began to read stories about Gandhi. John was deeply interested in him, wondering to himself, "What makes a guy like this tick. . . . He goes to prison and then gets out and then he does the same thing again immediately. . . . He was a pretty amazing guy to me, so faithful to his people. . . . I began to wonder sometimes why couldn't I be a Gandhi myself, doing something for the race." Gandhi was a "hero of mine," along with Frederick Douglass. It was in 1956–1957 when John was 16, that he first heard of Martin Luther King, Jr., who became another profound "hero." During this year, John's whole family had moved to Greensboro because his father had had trouble finding work in their home city. John was enrolled in the segregated high school in Greensboro and was "depressed all the time."

He felt the segregation as a "great pressure—it hit you in the face all the time. . . . At the end of the year, I was glad to leave, but there were people who had lived there all their lives and were

going to stay there. . . . It made me feel awful." During this year, he began to follow the events of the bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, which was turning out successfully under King's leadership. King came to speak in Greensboro while the boycott was still on; John admired him greatly. While hearing King speak, he recalls, "He gave you the feeling you'd been sitting down all the time. . . . He was speaking the truth. He kind of made you feel as normal people would just *have* to do something to better conditions. He was saying don't hurt anyone, no revenge even while you are fighting the bad conditions. . . . I began to wonder why my father had never done something to change conditions." All in all, during this junior year in high school, while he was 16 and living in Greensboro, segregation had constantly made him "disgusted and frustrated—you just hate to think about the pressure on you." Back in his home city for the last year of high school, John joined the NAACP, but did not take a particularly active role.

He chose to enroll at A & T College in Greensboro partly because his brother was there, and partly because he thought he had a good chance to get a scholarship. When he arrived there in the fall of 1959, he noticed that there were other Negroes from the North and border states as well as many from North Carolina. He describes the general attitude at A & T College about segregation as follows: "Things have been like this for the last hundred years," or "It's not down my alley." John says the majority of students were not race conscious and perhaps afraid for their parents' jobs if they were to participate in anti-segregation activities. "The only students who would ever *say* anything about segregation were the 4 of us." He and 3 friends from the Freshman class had many "bull sessions" about intellectual and social issues, including segregation. John's three friends were all from North Carolina. All four were on scholarships. All of these young men had previously been members of the NAACP and had participated in some voter registration campaigning. None of them had ever heard of the Congress of Racial Equality, however, nor had they heard of anything resembling a sit-in demonstration elsewhere in years past. Passive resistance was something that they had heard about from King, read about in Gandhi—and the idea struck responsive chords in their religious background.

In their "bull sessions," the events of the boycott in Montgomery and the school crisis in Little Rock were gone over in detail. "But we were aware that there was nothing coming out of these bull sessions—no good was coming from them even though we stayed up sometimes until 5:00 A.M. There were many words and few deeds; we did a good job of making each other feel bad." Apparently, the job of making each other feel bad consisted of taunting each other with racial stereotypes and even racial epithets; this seems to have

been a group effort to bring into painful awareness the latent feelings
of shame and anger which each of these young Negroes had been
partially suppressing for years.

During the early morning hours of February 1, 1960, the four
youths were discussing the issue of whether the color of one's skin
meant inferiority. Someone remarked that Negroes were often thought
to have "strong backs and weak minds." This goaded them all into
considerable anger. But soon the group was involved in a less charged
discussion of the extent and variability of segregation in the city of
Greensboro. The proposition was voiced that the Negro in the South
must find places to spend money in order to lead to more places
in which to make money. After a while the group agreed with this
in the abstract. Suddenly one of them said, "How about lunch down-
town tomorrow?" John immediately chimed in "It's on me!" Later
one of them asked, "You guys aren't serious about trying to eat down-
town, are you?" Months later, John confided to the interviewers, "We
had to avoid looking bad to the other guys." Therefore, he and his
friend consolidated their position, daring the others to come along.
A straight-forward question, "Are you or aren't you a man?" was put
to each member of the group, and they all agreed to meet the next
afternoon for what was to become an important development in the
history of race relations in the United States.

Although they spoke to no one else of their intention beforehand,
the group expected that they would all be arrested if they sat down
at a lunch counter and refused to leave when asked to do so. "We
didn't know what the legal charge would be, but we knew it was
too much out of the ordinary—an unheard of flouting of custom."
They were also fearful of physical violence and, therefore, elected
John to go first because he was the tallest. They sought to minimize
these risks of arrest and violence as well as to enhance their case,
by being as courteous as possible to everyone. They wore coats and
ties and planned to be gentlemanly and dignified, no matter what
happened.

As John was sitting at the lunch counter of the variety store with
his three friends, he got into a brief discussion with the waitress who
asked him to leave. He told her he'd just purchased tooth paste in
another part of the store and wished to spend the change from the
toothpaste purchase now at the lunch counter. She was unmoved
by his cleverness, and the four Negroes waited at the counter, un-
served, reading school books for the next one and one-half hours, until
the store closed. The mixed reactions of others to their action became
clear to them even while they were sitting at the counter. Within
a few minutes, a very anxious Negro woman came out of the kitchen,
where she was a cook's helper, and shouted at them, "You know
you're not allowed here! It is because of people like you that the

race is behind and can't get ahead!" John says he felt like crying after this woman had denounced them in this fashion. Yet, almost immediately a white woman sat down next to him. She whispered, "You're doing a good job. It should've been done 100 years ago." A while later, another white woman sat down among the demonstrators and gave them similar encouragement. There was a large crowd of police and other whites standing around the lunch counter and outside the store by this time. The whites shouted epithets and phrases like, "You'll starve, niggers," and "You'll never get it." The police stood by with their billy clubs pulled out, looked menacingly at the Negro students, but, surprisingly, did not arrest them.

As he walked back toward campus, John noticed "I felt entirely different about myself. At the end of that first sit-in, I didn't feel nearly as guilty as [I] had felt prior to it. [M.] and I both felt great. He felt just like I did—you know, before the sit-ins, I felt kinda lousy, like I was really useless. I was ashamed at how those young kids in Little Rock were braving it out . . . at last, we felt we had *done* something, not just talk about things, like in those bull sessions."

This description highlights some of the factors we have described in our previous report on the group in the Washington, D. C. area. These include: (1) The impact of the Supreme Court decision on the conscience and consciousness of both white and Negro Southerners; (2) The importance of the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. as a new kind of ego ideal for young Negroes; (3) The effect on Negro personality of the long cultural tradition of social inferiority, passivity and displaced aggression in relation to the white majority; and (4) The combined effects of that tradition with religious traditions of martyrdom and moral superiority as reflected in the style of social protest chosen by the Negro students—a style of passive resistance, a method in which the young demonstrators take risks, release aggression, but remain "nonviolent" and morally superior in relation to the infuriated white opponents.

In regard to his family, John told us that he was rather unusual among the student demonstrators he knows, in that his parents openly approved of his actions, once they had heard about them. Most demonstrators against racial segregation—be they white or Negro— report that their parents are opposed to segregation but are also vigorously opposed to any *risk-taking* action by their children to change segregation patterns.[8] The reaction of John's grandmother was typical: She warned him that he would never change things. . . . It's been going on for generations. On the other hand, she never

[8] In data collected after this paper was written (i.e., in 1962 and 1963) the authors have found a sharp reversal of this pattern. Parents, like virtually all Negroes, now openly support the student demonstrators.

actually said, "Do not do it" as a command. She communicates on one level that his actions in testing segregation in the Donut Shop will do no good, while still leaving open the secret wish that it would do some good.

Similarly, John's availability to identify with and act out his father's own aspirations is clear both on unconscious and conscious levels. His father, coming from a family of teachers and educators, had the high goal of a career in medicine, was a devoted family man, and was a relatively strong figure in the family. However, his father was a frustrated man, coping with his social inferiority as a Negro and with his physical disability, both of which served to keep him from his self-assertive goals. Among the siblings, John was closest to and most in touch with his father. His father compensated for his own frustrations by identifying with his son's life. His father's needs for assertion are acted out by John through his scholastic achievements and in the sit-in movement. John identifies, therefore, not directly with his historical father, but rather with an ego ideal of what he wishes his father would have been.

In the present discussion we wish to emphasize affect, acting out, and the successful resolution of the identity crisis of late adolescence. The term identity crisis has been used by Erik Erikson to denote that period in the life cycle when a person must work hardest at the task of achieving self-delineation and ego-identity with some reasonably comfortable view of his past, present, and future. Issues of self-identity are not buried, by any means, at the end of late adolescence, but in order for an individual to enter adulthood without serious psychopathology he must have been at least partially successful at resolving his identity crisis.

Yet, John and his friends were not satisfied with proceeding smoothly toward becoming what they considered to be complaint Negro professional men. Unlike others on their campus, they were unable to contain their bitter feelings about segregation and social inferiority. Their "bull sessions" served to mobilize long-standing feelings of shame and anger which had been contained and even turned inward on themselves. (These are the feelings that seemingly had caused the "depression" John complained about when he was sixteen.)

These affects of shame, anger and self-depreciating depression found expression and consequent tension release through the sit-in action. In refusing to leave the "Whites Only" lunch counter, these students were acting out their anger at segregation and simultaneously acting out their wish for adult, masculine identities free of indignity and shame.

The first sit-in, like many others we have studied, was spontaneous, impulsive, and risk-taking; its orientation was clearly toward

action in the place of further reflection or words. In these respects, it resembles typical acting out behavior of adolescence. Furthermore, there were elements in the behavior which were derived from conscious and pre-conscious aspirations of their parents as well as from problems of childhood. In describing an element of acting out in the sit-in movement, we are suggesting that there are other forms of acting out quite different from what is usually termed "anti-social acting out." Certainly, these acts are risky, rebellious, and often illegal by local standards; and the demonstrators often wind up in jail. Yet, they do not see themselves as outcasts, hoodlums, beatniks or anything of the kind; in fact, they are eager to avoid being labeled as troublemakers. Instead, they see themselves as an elite, as leaders who have felt called upon to take risks and expose themselves to danger in order to achieve something on behalf of their people, and by so doing to prove themselves and their ideals. Over and over again in our contacts with sit-in demonstrators, we have heard the statement or implication that they saw themselves doing society's moral work. Therefore, we have chosen to describe this aspect of the behavior as "pro-social acting out." This concept is perhaps applicable to the behavior of some student groups elsewhere in the world, as well as to certain other activities of American Youth.[4]

In summary, we have tried to illustrate in a case history of one of the originators of the student sit-in movement, how an emotionally healthy adolescent can, in Erikson's phrase, find his life history intersecting with history. We have tried to show how some of the characteristic psychodynamic needs and strengths of late adolescence have found expression in these demonstrations. We have noted some of the factors responsible for our subject's identity formation, including his crucial participation in this movement.

It is our hope that research into these complex psychosocial interrelationships will contribute to an increased understanding of student political and social actions, of adolescent developmental psychology, and of factors which may possibly determine the choice of a pro-social role versus one of delinquency or asocial behavior.

A Follow-up Note

The bulk of the data on which this paper is based was obtained in November 1961. In September 1963 (three and a half years after the first sit-in demonstration) "John" was interviewed again.

When seen at this time he appeared a great deal more anxious and constrained than when interviewed earlier. He had been passing

---

[4] We feel that this concept of pro-social acting out is closely related to what Erikson has recently described as "the sense of and the capacity for Fidelity." (Erik Erikson, "Youth: Fidelity and Diversity," Daedalus, Winter, 1962).

through a crisis in his living—indeed, an identity crisis—in which it had become impossible for him to continue in his dual roles of full-time pre-professional student and full-time (40 hours per week) civil rights demonstrator. He had been walking the picket line daily in downtown Greensboro for all of his Sophomore, Junior and Senior years, had received mediocre grades in his courses, had been trying to get by on 3 to 5 hours of sleep each night, had often forgotten meals, etc.—until March 1963, when he fell ill and required medical care. Upon recovery, he took a responsible job in his home city for the summer.

In the interview he was quite concerned about whether he really wanted a professional career for himself or whether this was "only" to satisfy his father's wishes. All in all, he was quite preoccupied with "independence"—not only in his personal decision-making but in his style of antisegregation activity as well. Regarding the latter, John reported that the 40 "active" white and Negro students in the Greensboro area have conducted their own program of demonstrations and negotiation, with some limited success, while vigorously avoiding advice from any "outside" source (including the notoriously independent Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee!). John rebels at "anyone trying to tell us what to do" in civil rights protest strategy, just as he worries whether a profession is his own interest or not.

At the time of this writing, the choice between resuming his studies while strictly limiting his civil rights activities and leaving school to become a "professional integrationist" has been resolved in favor of the former course. But somehow, John felt little cause for optimism in either of the alternatives. The interviewer sensed a mood of quiet despair and gloom in this young man. It is not possible—nor, perhaps desirable—for us to attempt an "explanation" or "formulation" of this change in the state of John's affect. At present, all that can be added are the following observations:

(1) Several other "veterans" of the student civil rights movement whom we have followed over these three years have become similarly depressed when they reach the age of 20 to 23; their gloom and anxiety are most noticeable during periods of relative inactivity in the movement and are often centered around personal choices for the future.

(2) Some of the possibly contributing elements which seem common to this group of young men are:

(a) There are many defeats and only partial successes in the tedious dealings with the white South about segregation;

(b) There are many Negroes who do *not* get actively involved in the civil rights movement, thus adding to the frustration of those idealistic and perfectionistic young leaders; and

(c) The demonstrators' families are almost all in poor economic straits and have members with serious social or health problems. The young men feel internal pressures toward somehow helping their own families—the fact that they are "doing something for the Race" only temporarily relieves their grief over being unable to change their families' circumstances (and their guilt over their desire to escape).

(3) The use of the term "veteran" in observation number one above brings to mind the problems of combat heroes returning from military service. A parallel exists to the leader in a youth movement who finds that once he has returned to the "real world" (i.e., the world outside the movement) he is only one more job applicant in an overcrowded market. The contrast is most acute, perhaps, for a young Negro who has been accorded great prestige and responsibility within the movement—far in excess of what he can expect his social (and especially vocational) "worth" to be once he has left or curtailed his movement activities. Unlike those in the labor movement of the 1930s and 1940s, a young "organizer" for civil rights action has no vocational role to which to look forward that has relevance to the ideals and goals of his current involvement.

REFERENCES

1. FISHMAN, J. R., AND SOLOMON, F. "Youth and Social Action: I. Perspectives on the Student Sit-in Movement," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1963, 33, 872-882.
2. SOLOMON, F., AND FISHMAN, J. R. "Youth and Social Action: III. Nonviolence in the South, a Psychosocial Study," presented at the American Psychiatric Association Annual Meeting, St. Louis, Missouri, May 1963.
3. SOLOMON, F., AND FISHMAN, J. R. "Youth and Social Action: IV. Student Peace Demonstrators in Washington, D. C." presented at Howard University Conference on Youth and Social Action, October 1963, Washington, D. C.
4. ERIKSON, E. *Young Man Luther*, Norton, N.Y.C., 1958.
5. ERIKSON, E. "The Problem of Ego Identity," J. of Amer. Psychoanalytic Assoc., 1956, 1, 56-121.
6. ERIKSON, E. "Youth: Fidelity and Diversity," Daedalus, 1962, 91, 5.
7. LAQUER, W. Z. *History of the German Youth Movement*, Basic Books, N.Y.C., 1962.

Correlates of Southern Negro Personality

William F. Brazziel

How and at what price has the American Negro accommodated to his caste status in American society. How can we estimate the impact of this social system on Negro personality development and change? Clearly this problem is relevant to the more general concern of sociologists, psychologists and educators with the issue of how social structure and personality development interact. Yet, while a good deal of cross-cultural research has been generated very little work has been done comparing the personality structure of different Negro sub-cultures and their relevance to the social system.

A review of the literature reveals a small number of excellently conceived studies which made use of psychoanalytic and projective techniques to investigate the dynamics of emotional disturbances caused by caste sanctions. Most of these, however, used relatively small size samples (25–50 cases) to which such techniques are necessarily limited. Few studies have attempted to identify types of character formation resulting from the problems faced by Negro youth and the substructure of emotional upheaval resulting therefrom, and still fewer have investigated these dynamics in the increasingly large Negro urban, middle class group.

Some early studies which utilized objective paper and pencil instruments, while quite adequate sample-wise, were seriously hampered by the validity of the instruments used. Klineberg (1944) noted in his review of research in the area: "satisfactory research in this field will have to wait until psychologists have devised more adequate measures for the study of personality." (p. 138) Dreger and Miller (1960) compiled a review of studies of Negro personality done since 1944. In the area of temperament and personality, they noted that most instruments with the exception of the Murray TAT had been seriously questioned with regard to the cultural aspects of their validity. They concluded that the self-concept seems to suffer in the Negro subculture but that this research needed further cross-cultural support.

Several researches have reported similar findings with respect to the direct effects of discrimination on the personalities of Negroes: namely, the lowering of self-esteem, various forms of hostility impulses. There is some consensus among investigators that the most

46

serious emotional problem of the American Negro is the control over felt needs for aggression. (Dollard, 1937, Guba et al., 1959, and Havighurst, 1951). Other types of secondary effects that have been posited are apathy, hedonism, shortened time perspective, and delinquent behavior. More specifically, with regard to the middle class Negro, other effects posited are self hate, success and cleanliness phobias and an overconformity to white ideals in sex.

Purpose

This study sought to explore some of the differences in need structure between samples of Negro and white college students. In addition, comparisons were made between differing groups of Negroes in order to assess the influence of such demographic factors as geographic residence, social class and occupational choice. The instrument chosen for this purpose was the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS, Edwards, 1953). By employing a forced-choice technique in which persons are asked to choose between items matched for social desirability values, the EPPS provides some internal control over test-taking attitudes; particularly, the tendency to project a favorable self-image. Unfortunately, however, the measurement of item social desirability value was based upon white student samples.

Procedure

A total of 262 Negro students completed the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. The group consisted of 87 students from the college of education and 53 from the college of liberal arts of a Negro institution in the lower-south and 52 students from the division of education and 70 students from liberal arts and business administration divisions from a Negro institution in the upper-south. The entire lower-south sample of 140 students were residents of the state in which the institution was located and consisted of both rural and urban students. The upper-south sample (122 students) was composed entirely of residents of the large metropolitan area (687,000 persons) in which the institution was located. Both were state institutions and admitted all graduates from state-approved high schools. The instrument was administered in groups of 20–25 students and the t test was used to identify significant differences. Data for the white normative college sample was derived from liberal arts colleges drawn from all parts of the country (Edwards, 1959).

Findings

The need structure of the total group from both institutions (262 students) differed significantly (.01 levels of confidence) from the white norm group in 8 of 15 variables yielded by the instruments.

This data is presented in Table 1. The majority of the variables were of a type involving direct ascendance-submission in human relationships, i.e., deference, dominance, etc. Grossack conducted (1957) a similar study with the EPPS using a smaller group of lower-south Negro college students.

TABLE 1

A COMPARISON OF MEAN SCORES OF NEGRO COLLEGE STUDENTS AND
NORM GROUPS ON THE EDWARDS PERSONAL PREFERENCE SCHEDULE

Need Variables	White-Norm		Negro Upper-South		Negro Lower-South	
	M	F	M	F	M	F
Achievement	15.7*	13.1	14.0	12.0	12.8	16.2*
Deference	11.2	12.4*	13.6	12.8	18.0*	12.0
Order	10.2	10.2	11.0	11.3	13.0	13.0
Exhibition	14.4	14.3	14.4	14.0	13.5	13.3
Autonomy	14.3*	12.3	10.0	10.0	12.2*	9.9
Affiliation	15.0	17.4*	14.8	17.0	15.6	16.3
Intraception	16.1	17.3*	16.0	16.0	17.0	19.9*
Succorance	10.7	12.5*	11.0	13.0	10.7	12.3
Dominance	17.4*	14.2	13.0*	10.3	12.0	11.0
Abasement	12.2	15.1*	12.6	12.5	12.7	12.6
Nurturance	14.0	16.4*	14.3	15.0	16.4	18.8
Change	15.5	17.2*	15.0	16.4	16.0	16.0
Endurance	12.7	12.6	13.6	13.1	16.2	18.8*
Heterosexuality	17.7*	14.3	15.5*	11.0	12.0*	8.0
Aggression	12.8*	10.6	12.0	11.0	12.0	11.0
Consistency Score	11.5	11.7	11.3	11.0	11.5	11.5
N	760	749	60	62	60	80

* This mean is significantly larger (at the one percent level) than the corresponding mean for the opposite item.

Sex Differences

When sex comparisons are made for the lower-south group, females exhibit significantly higher needs for achievement, endurance and intraception, but are lower in deference, autonomy and heterosexuality. This finding parallels that of Grossack (1957). On the other hand, there are only two significant differences between the sexes in the upper-south sample; the females score lower on needs for dominance and heterosexuality.

Most significant concerning sex difference, perhaps, is the relative absence of such differences in this group when compared to the norm group. Sex differences are present in twelve of fifteen variables in the general college norms but are revealed in only two instances in the upper-south and six instances in the lower-south. It must be further noted that the pattern of sex differences does not coincide with the norm group.

Achievement differences, for instance, are reversed in this sample with women revealing the higher need. Deference is also reversed with men exhibiting a higher need. Endurance which was not significantly different according to sex in the norm group is revealed as significant in the lower-south sample in favor of women. This pattern of ascendance on the part of women might give some credence to the widely asserted belief that one result of the attrition of the caste system is the suppression of the dominant, driving tendencies on the part of the Negro male and the subsequent emergence of the matriarchal family pattern. It tends to support the notion that the deference shown by the Negro college student is the result of a great fear of showing a real need for aggression.

Social Class Differences

To achieve a useful dichotomous measure of social class, the EPPS need scores were grouped according to the occupation of the parent or guardian. Professional, managerial, farm owners and skilled laborers constituted a middle income group; and semi-skilled, farm tenant and day laborers constituting a lower-middle income group. Table 2 contains the data for this analysis.

The upper-south, middle-income group revealed significantly higher needs for achievement, order and dominance and lower needs for nuturance. The lower-south middle-income group revealed higher needs for order and endurance and lower needs for autonomy and nuturance.

When the data were grouped according to rural-urban, only the lower-south group revealed differences. They were higher in nurturance and lower in exhibition than their urban counterparts.

Sex differences by social class were not pronounced. Lower-middle income females in the lower south group revealed higher needs for nurturance and endurance than their male counterparts. Both social classes in this region revealed higher female needs for achievement. Middle income males in the upper-south group scored higher on dominance.

Discussion

Perhaps the most revealing lesson of these data is that there is more than one south and more than one Negro college student. The findings of the study suggest that Negro students from the upper-south urban areas where caste sanctions are less severe when compared to lower-south students, seem to be motivated by need structures which are more similar to their white liberal arts counterparts. The first hypothesis of this study, that the Negro student as a group

TABLE 2

SOCIAL CLASS DIFFERENCES ON THE EPPS

| | Upper-South | | | | Lower-South | | | |
| | Middle Income | | Lower-Middle Income | | Middle Income | | Lower-Middle Income | |
Variables	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Achievement	15.0*	14.0*	12.0	12.0	13.3	16.0	13.5	16.3
Order	12.0*	12.0*	10.0	10.6	15.0*	15.2*	12.0	12.3
Autonomy	10.0	11.0	8.5	8.9	9.8	9.9	11.0*	12.1*
Nuturance	12.0	13.0	15.3	15.5*	14.0	15.6	16.4*	18.8*
Dominance	13.0*	10.5*	10.0	10.3	12.0	11.0	12.0	12.0
Endurance	64.3	14.1	12.8	12.9	17.0*	19.8*	15.0	17.0

* This mean is significantly larger (at the 1 percent level) than the corresponding mean.

would differ significantly, must, with the exception of the heterosexual variable, be rejected or at least severely qualified. The results for the lower south sample of this study differ only slightly from the findings of Guba, Bidwell and Jackson (1959) who studied 110 Negro college students along with three other college types but the pattern of differences is quite similar. Using the EPPS these researchers also found significant differences in thirteen of the fifteen variables as compared to the eight found in the present total group of this study and to the one difference revealed for the urban, upper-south liberal arts group. It is also important to note here that the broader criterion of the .05 level of confidence was used in the tests of the Guba et al., study as compared to the more restrictive .01 level for the present study. The second hypothesis of the study: that the need structure would vary significantly with the demography of the samples studied can thus be regarded as tenable.

Portraits of the lower-south Negro college student as a deferent, orderly, submissive, intraceptive, persistent person with low needs for heterosexuality and exhibition focus perhaps the workings that the forces of environment have wrought. While the attributes listed above might, with the exception of submissiveness, seem worthy goals for personal development, their adequacy of fit must be questioned when it is noted that the needs for aggression for this group was comparable to white students while the need to defer was high and to dominate and have autonomy low. This unique syndrome of conflicting needs is consistent with the findings of Dollard (1937), Kardiner and Ovesey (1951) and Karon (1958). It could be as these authors have suggested that regardless of social class, one of the more difficult lessons that the Negro adolescent must learn is to suppress his aggressions and to erect a facade of contentment with the status quo of the caste system.

Sex differences which portray the lower-south Negro female as more ambitious, persistent and intraceptive than her male counterpart present a familiar theme to most students of matriarchal Negro life and its exigencies. However, the deference, dominance and sex patterns which in this study show male ascendancy offers an interesting commentary on the fact that these attributes are often associated with the Negro female in the studies of low income groups usually with a conjectural note that the middle classes might present a different picture.

To one who has worked with or observed closely the rural deep south Negro adolescent, the total of two differences revealed in this study might seem surprisingly small although one would expect the greater degrees of reticence and nurturance which they revealed in relation to their urban counterparts. It seems, then, that beneath their gentle and almost over-polite manner, rural student's needs to assert

themselves are present in at least the same degree of intensity as urban students.

The writer's observations of the dynamics of sit-down demonstrations greatly substantiated this thesis. Passive resistance seemed to have caught the energies of deep south rural students in no small measure because of less suitable outlets in a hostile land for pent-up aggressions against the caste system. Here was a way to fight back. This opportunity to resist persecution and oppression is also held by Karon to be a contributing factor in the significant differences in the types of psychiatric disorders found in northern and southern Negro patients.

Since the revelations of the researches of Davis, Havighurst and others, attunement to social class differences in motivation and achievement have become rather widespread. The portraits presented in this study of the lower-middle income student as a rather disorderly and highly nurturant person in relation to his middle income counterpart can best be understood by those familiar with the unscheduled, highly communal and ofttime chaotic life in the lower income Negro groups. The need to have meals organized, to keep letters and files according to some system and even to have written work neat and organized all suggested as criterions of order by the instrument would perhaps seem foreign to the participants of the "latch-key," "large family—little money" groups from whence the lower-middle income family sample was drawn. To help friends when they are in trouble, to treat others with kindness and sympathy and to show a great deal of affection toward one another all as suggested as criterions for nurturance by the instrument, assume high priority and is perhaps one of the few beautiful things in the life of a poverty-yoked and often troubled people.

The significantly low needs for achievement in the upper-south low middle-income group and for endurance in the lower-south group can perhaps be interpreted in the same light as above. The criterion tasks of writing a great novel, solving problems and puzzles, being a recognized authority, etc., as suggested by the instrument might seem unrealistic to an adolescent to which the prospect of simply graduating from college presents a formidable, financial and academic challenge to say nothing of finding employment in the overcrowded Negro teaching corps or in the often hostile educational, governmental, and industrial structure of a wider society.

Conclusion

Caste sanctions, as investigated in this study, undoubtedly make a difference in the need patterns of Negro college students.

The areas most affected are those personal attributes which serve

as equipment for relating in an ascendance or submission pattern to others. Generally, middle income students from urban areas in the upper-south who were preparing for careers in business and industry seemed less affected than were lower-south students in most categories.

John Dollard observed in his *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (1937) that the southern Negro's approach to the caste system correlated most closely with the method he had worked out for relating to his elders as a child. Staunch, self-directive adult types were usually products of democratic-permissive homes, churches and schools. Submissive, deferent, accommodative types were products of rigid and harshly authoritarian social institutions. While this is perhaps an over-simplification of an extremely complex development, the thesis merits study by those who work to develop the talents and aspirations of Negro youth.

Interesting problems for study in this area might include the effects of caste sanction on need structures of white youth and the unresolved questions of the impact of institutions upon need structure. Further investigation in the years to come, might also attempt to ascertain the degree of change in ascendency-submission patterns as Negro youth gain more fully their rights as human beings in a democracy.

REFERENCES

Davis, A. *Social Class Influence on Learning.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948.

Dollard, J. *Caste and Class in a Southern Town.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937.

Dreger, R., and Miller, S. "Comparative Studies of Negroes and Whites in the United States," *Psychological Bulletin.* 1960, pp. 57, 361-403.

Edwards, A. L. Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. New York: Psychological Corporation, 1953.

Grossack, M. "Some Personality Characteristics of Negro College Students." Journal of Social Psychology, 1957, Vol. 46, pp. 125-131.

Guba, E., Jackson, P., and Bidwell, C. "Occupational Opportunities and the Teaching Career." *Educational Research Bulletin,* 1959, XXXVIII, #1, pp. 1-13.

Havighurst, R. *Developmental Tasks and Education,* New York: Longman-Green Company, 1951.

Kardiner, A., and Ovesey, L. *The Mark of Oppression.* New York: Norton Company, 1951.

Karon, B. *The Negro Personality.* New York: Springer Company, 1958.

Klett, C. J. "A Study of the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule in relation to Socio-Economic Status." Unpublished Doctor's Dissertation. University of Washington, 1956.

Taylor, B. H. "The Use of the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule in Establishing Personality Profiles for Three College Majors." Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Washington, 1957.

The Influence of Race of the Experimenter and Instructions Upon the Expression of Hostility by Negro Boys[1]

Irwin Katz, James M. Robinson, Edgar G. Epps, and Patricia Waly

Introduction

It was recently demonstrated that the efficiency of Southern Negro college students on a verbal task can be influenced by both the race of the experimenter and the evaluate significance of the task. Katz, Roberts and Robinson (1963) found that when digit-symbol substitution was presented as a test of eye-hand coordination, Negro subjects scored higher with a white administrator than they did with a Negro administrator. But when the same task was described as an intelligence test, there was marked impairment of performance with the white tester, while subjects who were tested by the Negro experimenter showed a slight improvement. The present study deals with the effect of these experimental conditions upon the arousal and expression of hostility.

There is reason to believe that emotional conflict involving the need to control hostility may have a disruptive influence on the performance of Negro students when their intelligence is evaluated by a white person. Sarason et al. (1960) have described the test-anxious child, whether Negro or white, as one who typically reacts with strong unconscious hostility to the adult tester, whom he believes will in some way pass judgment on his adequacy. The hostility is not openly expressed, but instead is turned inward against the self in the form of self-derogatory attitudes, which strengthen the child's expectation of failure and desire to escape from the situation. Thus, he is distracted from the task before him by fear of failure and an impulse to escape.

A number of studies support the view of blocking of aggressive impulses as detrimental to intellectual efficiency. Lit (1956), Kimball

(1953), and Harris (1961) found that scholastic underachievement was associated with difficulty in expressing aggression openly. Rosenwald (1961) reported that students who gave relatively few aggressive responses on a projective test suffered greater impairment in solving anagrams after a hostility induction than did students who had shown less inhibition on the projective test. Goldman, Horwitz and Lee (1954) demonstrated experimentally that the degree to which hostility against an instigator was blocked from expression determined the amount of disruption on three cognitive tasks.

With respect to Negroes, it is known that segregation engenders a feeling of intellectual inadequacy (c.f. Dreger and Miller's, 1960, review of empirical evidence), hence they should be prone to experience test situations as threatening. Hostility would tend to arise against the adult authority figure from whom an unfavorable evaluation was expected. The Negro student's hostility might perhaps be stronger against a white tester than against a Negro tester, since the former might be expected to compare him invidiously with members of the advantaged white group. However, previous research suggests that aggressive impulses against a white person will usually be strongly inhibited (Yarrow, 1958; Winslow and Brainerd, 1950; Karon, 1958). There is also evidence (Berkowitz, 1962) that when there are strong restraints operating against openly aggressive behavior, even its expression on projective tests will be blocked to some extent.

In the present experiment, hostile expression was measured by means of a questionnaire that was disguised as a concept formation test. Negro students at a segregated high school in the South were given the questionnaire by either a Negro or a white experimenter, with instructions that described it either neutrally or as an intelligence test. Then scores were compared with those obtained previously by the same subjects in an informal, all-Negro setting. It was predicted that when neutral instructions were used, levels of hostile expression in the Negro-tester and white-tester groups would remain the same, but when intelligence test instructions were used, hostility scores would *increase* under a Negro experimenter and *decrease* when the experimenter was white.

Method

Subjects and Procedures. The subjects were 72 male students at a Negro high school and junior high school in Nashville. They ranged in age from 13 to 18 years. Volunteers for the experiment were recruited in classrooms with an offer of one dollar for participating for an hour in a research project. The study was done on two successive days. The first day all subjects met after school in a large room and

were administered the hostility scale by the assistant principal of the school. They were told that the purpose of the questionnaire was to aid in evaluation of a proposed new method for teaching vocabulary. Afterwards, they were given their assignments for the following day. For the second session the entire sample was divided into four groups of equal size. Each group was tested by either a white or a Negro adult stranger, with instructions that described the task as either an intelligence test or a research instrument. The two testers worked simultaneously in different rooms, and ran the two instructional conditions in quick succession, to prevent subject contamination. Both experimenters introduced themselves as psychologists from local universities (Fisk and Vanderbilt) and gave oral instructions.

The neutral instructions stated in part:

> Yesterday you did some vocabulary items. Today you will do a slightly different version of this task for me. It is *not* a test. I am doing research on the meaning of certain words in American speech. To a psychologist, the meaning of a word refers to how it is used by people who speak the language. So I want you to show me how you use these words. Your answers will not be shown to your teachers. Yesterday you had a practice warm-up. It will not be scored. Today's answers are the ones that count. So answer what you think is correct today.

The intelligence test instructions were in part:

> Yesterday you were given a vocabulary test. Today you will do a slightly different version of this test for me. I am interested in this vocabulary test because it will show me how intelligent you are. I am doing research on mental ability, and I want to see how bright you boys are at ——————— School. This test will show your knowledge of words, your ability to recognize abstract concepts, and your general intelligence. It will show whether you could succeed in college, or in your chosen field of work. But your individual scores will *not* be shown to your teachers. They will be used only for research on intelligence. Yesterday you had a practice warm-up . . . (rest of instructions same as neutral conditions).

After the instructions were given, a hostility questionnaire was administered which was the same as the one used the previous day, except that the items were arranged differently.

The Hostility Scale. The instrument used to measure hostile expression was based on a test that had been developed by Ehrlich (1961) to study the influence of aggressive dispositions on concept formation in Northern white adolescent boys. Our test had 58 items, each consisting of four words, with instructions to "circle the word that does not belong with the others." Twenty-nine items contained only nonaggressive concepts; elimination of a particular word resulted in a better concept than did elimination of any other word,

e.g.: TUNNEL, BRIDGE, FERRY, TOLL. In the remaining 29 items, one word had an aggressive meaning, one was nonaggressive, and two were ambiguous, e.g.: HOMERUN, HIT, BASH, STRIKE. Here the subject could select an aggressive concept by eliminating HOME-RUN, or a nonaggressive concept by dropping BASH. Out of a total of 58 items in our test, 47 were taken from Ehrlich's 84-item test. He found scores on his test to be related to ratings of overt aggression, as well as to hostility scores on a TAT-like projective test. The present version evolved from a preliminary tryout of the original instrument on a sample of Southern Negro college students, under neutral instructions. Items which did not appear to be suitable were dropped, and some new ones were added.

A subject's hostility score consisted of the total number of critical items in which he had included the aggression word, regardless of whether he had used the correct concept. In addition, a score indicative of the level of intellectual functioning was obtained by totalling the number of correct concepts attained on neutral items, and on aggression items. To study the effect of the experimental conditions, change scores were obtained by substracting each subject's scores on the pretest from his scores on the post test.

Results and Discussion

The main findings of the experiment are presented in Table 1. It can be seen that there was a significant interaction effect of the two variables, Race of Tester and Test vs. Neutral Instructions, on changes in hostility scores from the previous day ($p < .025$). The group means reveal that in the Neutral condition the change scores of subjects who had a white administrator were only slightly different from those of subjects who had a Negro administrator. But when test instructions were used, the White Tester group expressed *less* hostility than previously, while the Negro Tester group showed an *increase* in hostile expression. This difference between groups was significant ($p < .01$). Thus the experimental prediction was supported.

There were no significant effects of the experimental conditions on changes in the number of correct concepts attained on neutral items, on aggression items, or on all items combined. Within each of the four experimental groups, there were no correlations between the various measures of conceptual accuracy and hostility change scores. Finally, several items in a post-experimental questionnaire, which were intended to elicit information about the subject's emotional state and perception of the situation, failed to reveal any group differences.

Our interpretation of the results in Table 1 is that both task

administrators instigated hostility in subjects when they announced
that they were testing intelligence; when the experimenter was
Negro, students revealed their annoyance by forming aggressive
concepts, but when he was white the need to control hostile feelings
resulted in avoidance of aggressive words. The latter finding is rem-
iniscent of a study by Clark (1955) in which arousal of the sex drive
in white male college students brought about a *reduction* in the mani-
fest sex imagery of their TAT responses. This view of the data is of
course inferential, since all that is actually known about the White
Tester-Test Instructions group is that their hostility scores *declined*
from pretest levels. There is no direct evidence of increased emotional

TABLE 1
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE AND GROUP MEANS FOR EFFECTS OF RACE OF
TESTER AND INSTRUCTIONS ON HOSTILITY CHANGE SCORES

	df	MS	F
Race of Tester	1	29.39	2.10
Instructions	1	.89	.84
Race $\times$ Instruc.	1	88.89	6.34**
Error (within)	68	14.01	

	Group Means Instructions		
Race of Tester	Test	Neutral	Difference
White	—2.11	—0.11	2.00
Negro	1.39	—1.06	2.45*
Difference	3.50***	.95	

Note.—N = 18 for all groups.
* $p < .07$
** $p < .025$
*** $p < .01$

conflict in this condition. Assuming that our interpretation is correct,
the results suggest that inhibited hostility may have contributed to
the behaviorial impairment that Katz, Roberts and Robinson observed
in Negroes who were tested intellectually by a white experimenter.
Why then were there no effects in the present experiment on concep-
tual accuracy? Our belief is that the task was not an appropriate one
for revealing the disruptive effects of emotional conflict. It has none
of the usual features of tasks on which impairment has been found to
occur under stress. For example, it was not speeded, and it did not
involve complex learning, coordination of responses, or problem
solving.

Finally, the results provide a methodological critique of previous
research on Negro personality which did not take into account possi-
ble effects of the race of the investigator on subjects' responses. For

example, the bulk of studies on Negro aggression that were reviewed by Dreger and Miller (1960) apparently were done entirely by whites.

REFERENCES

BERKOWITZ, L. *Aggression, a social psychological analysis*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.

CLARK, R. A. The effects of sexual motivation on phantasy. In D. C. McClelland (Ed.), *Studies in motivation*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955, pp. 44-57.

DREGER, R. M., & MILLER, K. S. Comparative psychological studies of Negroes and whites in the United States. *Psychol. Bull.*, 1960, **57**, 361-402.

EHRLICH, M. *The selective role of aggression in concept formation*. Unpublished doctoral thesis. New York University, 1961.

GOLDMAN, M., HORWITZ, M., & LEE, F. J. Alternative classroom standards concerning management of hostility and effects on student learning. ONR Technical Report, 1954.

HARRIS, I. *Emotional blocks to learning*. Glencoe: Free Press, 1961.

KARON, B. P. *The Negro personality*. New York: Springer, 1958.

KATZ, I., ROBERTS, O. S., & ROBINSON, J. M. Effects of difficulty, race of administrator, and instructions on Negro digit-symbol performance. ONR Technical Report, 1963.

KIMBALL, BARBARA. Sentence-completion technique in a study of scholastic under achievement. *J. consult. Psychol.*, 1952, **16**, 353-358.

LIT, J. *Formal and content factors of projective tests in relation to academic achievement*. Unpublished doctoral thesis. Temple Univer., 1956.

ROSENWALD, G. The assessment of anxiety in psychological experiments. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 1961, **63**, 666-673.

SARASON, S. B., DAVIDSON, K. S., LIGHTHALL, F. F., WAITE, R. R., & RUEBUSH, B. K. *Anxiety in elementary shcool children*. New York: John Wiley, 1960.

WINSLOW, C. N., & BRAINERD, J. E. A comparison of the reaction of whites and Negroes to frustration as measured by the Rosenzweig Picture-Frustration Test. *Amer. Psychologist*, 1950, **5**, 297. (abstract)

YARROW, MARIAN R. (Issue editor) Interpersonal dynamics in a desegregation process. *J. soc. Issues*, 1958, **14**, Whole No. 1.

The Dilemma of the Negro Professional*

Kurt W. Back and Ida Harper Simpson

The position of the Negro in the United States can be and has been conceptualized as a question of overlapping group membership and conflicting norms. Negroes feel that the official standards of the society promise them equal rewards, depending only on effort and ability, while at the same time they are forced to adapt to the realities of being a disfavored minority.

This conflict becomes especially acute if the Negro becomes a member of a different community within the society with its own strict standards, such as a profession. Negroes entering professions become in one sense members of the privileged minority within the country and are confronted with a very specific set of norms, more specific than the general norms of American culture but compatible with them. This set of norms is even more clearly opposed to the norms of intergroup relations within the society than would be true for the non-professional. These different standards give the Negro professional a conflict of self-identification which he has to resolve in some way. An additional condition is that, as he enters one of the higher-status groups in the occupational hierarchy, his membership in a minority group may be an advantage or disadvantage in his career. The Negro writer may get an easier entree to a publisher if he is willing to write about the Negro problem. Similarly, a segregated community of Negroes gives the Negro professional a protected clientele in many ways. On the other hand, he may still feel his disadvantages because of his race in competition with members of the majority group. Finally, he can try to accept the universalistic standards of his profession completely and try to become a professional who happens to be a Negro.

Because of the economic and social status of the Negro, a smaller

proportion of Negroes than whites enters professions. What we are interested in here, however, is what happens to the selected group which does enter professions, even though it is relatively smaller than the corresponding white group. Let us look first at the kind of distribution of whites and Negroes into the different professions. To summarize the differences in distribution between professions over the 24 categories into which the Census divides professionals, we are using Duncan's Index of Segregation (1955). This index is derived simply by taking the absolute differences of the percentages in each category,

TABLE 1

INDEX OF SEGREGATION** BETWEEN PROFESSIONAL OCCUPATIONS
(Male Only)

	1950			1960		
		Protected and Non-Protected Occupations			Protected and Non-Protected Occupations	
	Total Professional	Between	Within	Total Professional	Between	Within
Region:						
Northeast	39.34	4.24	35.10	28.93	2.01*	26.92
Middle West	34.94	15.81	19.13	28.51	10.95	17.56
West	40.77	7.93	32.84	26.83	1.88	24.95
South	47.94	35.30	12.64	44.18	32.60	11.58

* Against hypothesis: i.e., whites are more concentrated in "protected" occupations.

** The possible range of the index is from 0.00 to 100.00.

Source: U.S. Summary, Census of Population, Volume II: *Characteristics of the Population*, 1950.

U.S. Census of Population Final Report PC (1)-10, U.S. Summary, Detailed Characteristics, 1960.

summing them, and taking half the difference. It describes what percentage of the two groups would have to switch positions in order for the two distributions to be equal. Thus the higher it is, the more difference between the two distributions, and in a sense the more segregation. In Table I under the heading of Total in both those indices for the four regions of the country and for the two census years of 1950 and 1960, we see that segregation is highest in the South, with little difference in the other three regions. We also see that the difference between the South and the other regions has been accentuated during the fifties. While there was a considerable drop outside the South, there was hardly any drop in the Southern states.

In order to see further what this difference in distribution means for the Negro professional, let us classify the occupation into two types. In some professions Negroes would have to compete directly

with whites and are thus particularly vulnerable to discrimination. In other professions the Negro professional may concentrate on a Negro clientele and thus be protected and even favored. We shall therefore separate the professions into two kinds: those with a high chance of a special clientele, the protected *professions*, and the others. The former includes the following categories: authors, editors and reporters, clergymen, college presidents and professors, dentists, lawyers and judges, physicians and surgeons, and teachers. The other professions remain in the *unprotected* category. We can now analyze the segregation index as to whether it derives from the fact that Negroes are more frequently in the protected professions or whether the difference occurs within these categories. We do this by recomputing the index, just taking the two large categories for effect between groups measured and attributing the remainder to the effect within the groups measured.[1] These figures are shown in the remaining columns of Table 1. We see here clearly that in the South the segregation is due to the different distribution in the two types of professions, while in the other areas, especially in the Northeast and West, this typology makes little difference, and what segregation there is occurs within these categories. The Middle West occupies an intermediate position, probably partly because of its Southern fringe and partly because of virtually segregated conditions in some of its larger cities with the recent Negro influx. However, it is closer to the other two Northern regions than to the Southern region. Consequently we may surmise that segregation means something different for the professional in the North than in the South. In the North differences in the professions' distributions occur because of the Negro's disadvantage in competition with white professionals in many fields. In the South it occurs mainly because Negroes cannot enter those fields where they are in direct competition and concentrate on the fields where they are protected, serving directly the Negro clientele. In those fields, however, they may not feel any threatening competition and even have some advantages from the segregated position, although achieved at a psychological cost. This is the situation described by Franklin Frazier in *Black Bourgeoisie* (1957).

A Study of Negro Medical Students

In order to see how this different pattern of segregation relates to the identification of the Negro professional by race and by occupa-

---

[1] This technique was developed by Winsborough (1959); cf. its description (as index of dissimilarity) in Duncan, Scott, Lieberson, Duncan and Winsborough (1960).

tion, we shall investigate more intensive data about one profession, that of medicine. The physician falls on the borderline of the protected and non-protected occupations; in fact, on the index there are proportionately slightly fewer Negroes than whites in the South, more in the Midwest, and hardly any difference in the two other areas. In his occupational pattern he can work with a protected clientele or in direct competition with white physicians. Being a high-status occupation with a definite professional code and values, medicine is also a good example of an arena in which a conflict between the different standards of the professional and the Negro can occur. To understand the professionalization of the Negro professional, therefore, it becomes important to see under which conditions he assumes these different kinds of orientation, and what the consequences of these orientations will be for his future career. We shall give now an example of these possibilities, based on a group of medical students. The present study was undertaken with the Negro students at Howard Medical School in Washington. As part of a study of specialization of medical students, all of these students completed a long questionnaire about background, career plans, personality, values, and other aspects of the medical vocation. Negro students also completed a special section discussing certain aspects of their identification as a Negro. Almost 80 per cent of all students completed this questionnaire.

Index of Orientation

Perception of relative status of Negro medical students is a two-step process. First, the question is whether he is conscious of differences in professionally relevant concerns; that is, whether he perceives or denies the conflict. If he has this clear consciousness, then he can view the conflict as resulting only in disadvantage or in possible advantage in his professional career. To ascertain these different attitudes, the students were given a list of nine specialties and asked whether it was an advantage for them to be Negroes in this specialty, there was no difference, or a disadvantage. On the basis of the answers to this question the students were divided first into two groups of racial saliency: *low*, if they saw no difference in any of the nine specialties, and *high*, if they saw any difference. The high group could be further divided into two groups: optimists and pessimists. If he saw nothing better, only that in some specialties he had a worse chance, he was called a pessimist. If he felt that he had a better opportunity in some specialties, he was called an optimist. In the group of Howard students we found 30 non-racially salient students and 156 racially salient students. Of the latter, 80 were pessimists and 76 optimists.

Hypotheses to Predict Conflict

Three characteristics have been used as explanation for the evaluation of racial status: population density, socio-economic status, and ambiguity. We shall discuss them in turn, especially in regard to relevance for each part of evaluation, saliency of race status, and optimism- pessimism.

For Marx and Engels, population density was one of the crucial factors in the development of class consciousness among the proletariat, who, by being separated in certain residential areas in large cities, saw the sharp contrasts between their situation and that of the capitalists (Michels, 1955). Mass movements aimed at improving the status of Negroes, as Frazier (1937) and others observe, are initiated and find their greatest following in large cities, but not necessarily because their status is poorer. The population density explanation of group consciousness suggests the high-salient Negroes are more likely to come from large cities, but it does not suggest any hypothesis for optimism and pessimism.

The socio-economic status explanation holds that as Negroes improve their status occupationally and financially, their means to cash in on more status opportunities improve; but since such status rights are all too often ascriptively defined, Negroes are denied the opportunities they might objectively afford. Such denials lead to feelings of deprivation. Accounts of status deprivation in Southerntown by Dollard are of middle-class Negroes (1957); they felt keenly their inability to enjoy status rights taken for granted by their white counterparts. Searles and Williams (1962) find that student participants in the sit-in movements in restaurants in Piedmont North Carolina came from higher social class families than students who did not participate. Following the reasoning of the socio-economic status explanation, we would predict that racial consciousness will be heightened in improved socio-economic status. However, the protest activity of middle-class Negroes shows essentially optimism for the future, while Negroes in lower socio-economic status, if they feel their racial status to be salient, feel also its handicap for advancement.

The ambiguity of racial status hypothesis holds that one is most likely to accept without question one's status when it is clearly defined, be the rights accorded the status favorable or unfavorable. Clark (1958) in his study of racial identification and self-hatred among Negro children found that Negro children from the South tended to have higher racial identification and to be more accepting of themselves than Negro children from the North. Vander Zanden (1963) uses a similar line of reasoning to explain non-violent protests against racial discrimination in the South. From this hypothesis we predict that Negro medical students whose earlier experiences have involved

the least ambiguity will be most racially salient, but those who had the most ambiguity in status will be the most pessimistic.

These hypotheses, though derived from different theories, are not necessarily contradictory. Since the data for this study were gathered for other purposes, our measures for variables of the above hypotheses are not always the best. Nonetheless, our tests are suggestive though not conclusive explanation of the kinds of structural factors associated

TABLE 2

Socio-Economic Characteristics, Residence and Undergraduate College of Different Racial Saliency Groups

	Saliency (Percent)				
	Low	High			
		All	Optimists	Pessimists	N = 100%
Population Density					
Residence before College in Place:					
a. 250,000 and over	16.8%	83.2	39.3	43.9	107
b. less than 250,000	15.0%	85.0	42.5	42.5	80
Socio-Economic Status					
Father's Annual Income:					
c. $5,000 and over	14.1%	85.9	52.1	33.8	71
d. less than $5,000	15.8%	84.2	34.2	50.0	114
Prestige of Father's Occupation					
e. white collar	11.3%	88.7	46.4	42.3	97
f. blue collar	20.2%	79.8	34.9	44.9	89
Ambiguity of Status					
Location and Type of Undergraduate College:					
g. Non-South public	14.0%	86.0	27.9	58.1	43
h. Non-South private	12.0%	88.0	46.0	42.0	50
i. South public	6.7%	93.3	40.0	53.3	15
j. South private	20.8%	79.2	41.6	37.7	77

with different career evaluations among Negro medical students. Data pertinent to the test of the hypotheses are given in Table 2.

(1) *Population Density.* Using residence in a city of 250,000 or more before going to college as a measure of population density, we see that size of city is related neither to racial saliency nor to evaluation. Density by itself does not seem to produce consciousness of race.

(2) *Socio-economic Status.* We have measures for two tests of the socio-economic status hypothesis: father's annual income, and prestige of his occupation. Income makes no difference in racial consciousness, but it does in optimism. Students whose fathers have annual incomes of $5,000 or more are more likely than those with

fathers who make less than $5,000 to be optimistic about their career chances relative to whites, as is seen in a comparison of lines (c) and (d). When status is measured by prestige of father's occupation, the relation is different; students of blue collar fathers are less likely than those of white collar fathers to be racially conscious. However, among the racially conscious, the sons of white collar fathers are more optimistic (compare lines (e) and (f)). High parental income and occupational prestige are associated with optimistic career evaluations. The pessimists appear to be ambitious young men who have had to watch financial matters cautiously to pursue their education. Their economic limitations coupled with their ambition may have sensitized their racial evaluations. Thus the lower-class upwardly mobile youth may be less conscious of his race, as he has had the possibility to advance himself. But if he is conscious of his race, he is most pessimistic about his relative chances.

Ambiguity of Status and Exposure to Conflicting Norms

We have one measure of different kinds of exposure to the status conflict, and that is the kind of undergraduate college attended. We distinguish by source of support (public or private) and location (South or not) four kinds of institutions. Southern colleges would expose the student to a more consistent status definition. In the private colleges, however, this may be in effect a preparation for the protected occupation. These are the schools which the black bourgeoisie attends (Frazier, 1957). On the other hand, in Northern colleges, Negro students are subjected to more ambiguous experiences; especially in the publicly-supported institutions, state or municipal, there may be a strong norm for racial equality among faculty and students which is frequently contradicted by actual social and economic conditions.

Comparison of lines (g) through (j) tends to support this hypothesis. Graduates of Southern private schools are least likely to express racial saliency, and those who do are most optimistic. Graduates of Northern public institutions are the most pessimistic for their future careers. Graduates of Northern private schools express saliency of the racial issue as much as the graduates from public colleges, but they are more optimistic. The small number of graduates from Southern public institutions feel the racial issue most strongly and are inclined to be pessimistic. It is likely that these students who were able to enter medical school after attending Southern Negro colleges are somewhat unusual and have overcome a great degree of hardship which is reflected in their attitudes. Attendance at a private college, in the South

and to a lesser degree in the North, is indicative of expectation of a protected career.

Racial Consciousness and Career Decisions and Preferences

What effects, if any, do these racial orientations of Negro medical students have upon their career decisions and preferences? Five aspects of a career, some for which we have more than one measure, are used to observe the effect of racial orientation on career: time of

TABLE 3
RACIAL SALIENCY AND CAREER PLANS AND COMMITMENT

| | Saliency | | | |
| | Low | High | | |
		All	Optimists	Pessimists
a. Decided to become physician *after* high school	25.9%	57.1%	64.9%	50.0%
b. Very strong commitment to medicine as a career	37.9	44.9	50.7	44.0
c. Field of medicine interested in:				
General Practice	41.7	30.0	28.6	31.4
Internal Medicine	8.3	20.0	21.4	18.6
Obstetrics	12.5	14.3	14.3	14.3
Surgery	8.3	15.7	24.3	7.1
All with Negro clientele (i.e., the four specialties listed)	70.8	80.0	88.6	71.4
d. Given great deal of thought to specialty choice	43.3	50.0	53.9	46.3
e. Quite certain of specialty choice	35.5	48.1	55.3	44.3
f. Prefer to practice medicine in area other than South	50.0	56.8	48.0	66.7
g. Would *not* like to practice medicine in South	55.6	71.5	60.8	75.3
h. Preferred size of place to practice in:				
250,000 or more	73.3	59.0	56.6	61.3
50,000 - 250,000	16.7	23.1	26.3	20.0
smaller than 50,000	10.0	17.9	17.1	26.3
i. Average number of features considered as highly important for job Mean	6.70	7.53	7.83	7.26
N* = 100%	30	156	76	80

* Numbers vary somewhat because of no anwsers.
To save space the complementary percentages are omitted, e.g., 74.1% of all low-salient respondents decided to become physicians before or during high school.

decision to enter medicine; commitment to medicine as a career; decisions on choice of specialty; preferences for location of practice; and evaluations of job characteristics. Relevant data are given in Table 3.

The three groups are sharply distinct in their career plans and expectations. The students who were not conscious of race differences in their career chances made the earliest decision to become physicians, but were least committed to medicine as a career or to any specialty choice. They also checked in a list of job features the fewest features as indispensible or important for their medical careers. The non-salient group represents the picture of a detached group who made an early but not well considered occupational decision to which they feel little commitment, and who have neither given much thought to their future nor made plans for it. Among the racially salient students the optimists provide the strongests contrast. Two-thirds of them had only decided to enter medicine after high school, but the optimists are now the most strongly committed to medicine and to their careers; they have given the most thought to their specialty and are now most certain of their specialty choice.

The field of medicine in which the students intended to work and the location of their future practice give some clues on the nature of the motivation of the different groups. The specialty choices of the optimists are the most likely to have a definite Negro clientele, and the choices of non-salients are the least likely to have a definite Negro clientele. Specialties included in the classification of definite Negro clientele are general practice, internal medicine, obstetrics and gynecology, and surgery. The differences in the pessimists and the optimists stem mainly from the more frequent choice of surgery by optimists, which is the only appreciable difference in the specialty choices.

The students were asked a question on the geographic area where they would prefer to practice and where they did *not* want to practice medicine. The pessimists wanted to practice in areas other than the South; the optimists chose the South as a place to practice most often, though only slightly more than the non-salient group. The non-salient youths tended to have the least commitment to a particular geographic area for their practice. These findings tend to dovetail the status ambiguity findings. In addition, the non-salient group preferred to practice in a large city, while the optimist tended to prefer a small town.

Discussion

These data were collected from all classes of Howard Medical School in 1958. When the freshman class graduated in 1962, Gunnar Myrdal (1962) delivered the commencement address exhorting the

group to give up the idea of a protected clientele if they want to assert equal rights in other ways. From our data it seems that he talked mainly to the group which we have called the optimists. Their own background is a segregated society, but they represent that part of the Negro group who have achieved the best possible terms within that situation. In addition, their white-collar background is most likely to reflect occupations where Negro clientele is certain, the preponderance of optimists is even more pronounced. This group in turn has decided after long deliberation on a medical career, especially one in which they can repeat the pattern of taking advantage of segregation; in a specialty with mainly Negro clientele, in a town of a size unlikely to have another Negro physician, and especially in the South. They give the picture which Frazier describes in *Black Bourgeoisie* of coming from the established Negro upper or middle class, attending a college of the United Negro College Fund, or if more prosperous and able an integrated Northern private college, deciding on medicine as a career relatively late but now planning to have a secure career.

The other groups represent two contrasts to this approach: apathy and uncertain struggle. The non-salient group can be said to represent apathy; in fact, the manner in which they were defined—giving no-difference responses to a series of questions—can be indicative of apathy by itself. A composite picture gives an almost classic stereotype: growing up in a low-income family, early decision to become a physician, without much commitment to the profession or definite career plans, attendance at a Southern private college; all these characteristics fit the progress of the intelligent, passive member of the minority group. Within this framework, he does not need to worry about racial difference in career chances. On the other side, the pessimist does worry about his reduced chances as a Negro. He was likely to be educated in a non-Southern state or municipal university with its inherent status ambiguity and conflict. He has not given as much thought to his future as the optimist, but is definite that he does not want the segregated, protected practice. He is least likely to prefer surgery, and especially, he is definite about not practicing in the South.

The realities of professional segregation in the South and discrimination in the North, as shown in Table 1, interfere at all points with true professional identification. Expression of belief in equality of chances is seen not as acceptance in the professional community, but as an expression of apathy. The students who expressed a realization of the difference would either manipulate the situation for their own advantage or be conscious of the ambiguities and conflict inherent in the disadvantage. This last group—which are now the pessimists —are likely to be the agents of change, of making possible identification as professionals on a universalistic point of view, watched by the apathetic group and sometimes fought by the opportunistic optimists.

REFERENCES

CLARK, K. B., & CLARK, MAMIE P. Racial identification and preference in Negro children, in *Readings in Social Psychology*, E. Maccoby, T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley (Eds.), 3rd edition. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1958, 602-611.

DOLLARD, J. *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, 3rd edition. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957.

DUNCAN, O. D., & DUNCAN, BEVERLY. A methodological analysis of segregation indexes. *Amer. Soc. Rev.*, 1955, 20, 210-217.

DUNCAN, O. D., SCOTT, W. R., LIEBERSON, S., DUNCAN, B., & WINSBOROUGH, H. H. *Metropolis and Region*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1960, 63-66.

FRAZIER, E. F. *Black Bourgeoisie*. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957, Chapter III: "Education and the Black Bourgeoisie."

FRAZIER, E. F. The impact of urban civilization upon Negro family life. *Amer. Soc. Rev.*, 1937, 2, 609-618.

MICHELS, R. The origins of anticapitalistic mass spirit, in *Man and Contemporary Society*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955, 741-747.

MYRDAL, G. Getting America moving: excerpt from address. *New Republic*, 1962, 148, 15-20.

SEARLES, RUTH, & WILLIAMS, J. A., JR. Negro college students' participation in sit-ins. *Social Forces*, 1962, 40, 219.

VANDER ZANDEN, J. W. The non-violent resistance movement against segregation. *Amer. J. of Soc.*, 1963, 68, 544-550.

WINSBOROUGH, H. H. Variations in occupational and industrial composition by city size, M. A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1959.

Group Identification Among Negroes: An Empirical Analysis*

Donald L. Noel

Some kind of positive group identification or loyalty is a prerequisite for the stability of any specific group in a multi-group environment. Indeed, "society—social structure of every sort—rests upon loyalties: upon attitudes and actions directed at supporting groups, ideas, and institutions" (11, p. 5). Nevertheless, despite the universality of group loyalty, social scientists who study minority groups have generally stressed negative group identification—variously labeled withdrawal, rejection or self-hatred. Actually a minority group provides its members an abundance of both gratifying and depriving experiences and group identification—positive as well as negative—is a product of these experiences. Minority group members are, then, caught in a conflict which theoretically gives rise to "a typically ambivalent attitude . . . toward their own group" (16, p. 177).

This ambivalence implies that group identification is a multi-dimensional phenomenon which cannot be adequately characterized in terms of a single continuum ranging from group self-hatred to group pride (see also 1, p. 492). Moreover, a survey of the literature reveals discussion of several types of both positive and negative group identification. The various types of pride (ethnocentric, nationalistic, militant and non-defensive) appear to be largely independent but the various types of self-hatred (personal, general, segmental and defensive) appear to be intrinsically related, perhaps scalable. We suggest, then, that group identification and its positive component are multi-dimensional while group self-hatred may be uni-dimensional. A brief review of the various types of group identification generally supports this contention.

Ethnocentric group pride or chauvinism has been discussed by

many writers (e.g., 2, 13 and 18) and may be characterized as the tendency to assert or defend the in-group, right or wrong, and to accept positive stereotypes about the in-group. *Nationalistic* pride is illustrated by Negroes whose race pride is "built on the contemporary achievements of Negroes *in the caste system*" (19, p. 93) and is linked to ethnocentric pride via the Negro who manifests pride in the positive acts (as defined by whites) of any Negro anywhere. Both nationalistic and ethnocentric pride imply a tendency to clutch at any and all straws in an attempt to combat an underlying feeling of inferiority.[1] *Militant* group pride, a type originally suggested by Rose, centers around the expression of identification via concern with protest and is exhibited by participants in the sit-in movement, the NAACP and other minority protest organizations and activities. Finally, *non-defensive* group pride is exhibited by the individual who "shows satisfactions derived from group membership, without claiming race superiority or showing excessive defensiveness" (13, p. 176). Such ideal group loyalty is rare, particularly in minority groups.

Widespread negative identification, on the other hand, is unique to minority groups. Lewin, who introduced the concept of group self-hatred, views antipathy toward one's own group as a resultant of (1) the adoption of majority attitudes and values; and (2) the inability to escape membership in the group even though membership results in severe restrictions on personal opportunity (16, pp. 164, 176-177, 189, and 191-192). Lewin alludes, without elaboration, to the existence of several varieties of self-hatred (16, pp. 186-187) and subsequent writers have systematized this area to some extent. In particular R. B. Johnson's concept of the generalizability of the self-hating sentiment appears to be a useful mode of classification (15, pp. 236-238). Using this concept, which is implicit in Lewin, we can distinguish personal, segmental and general disparagement or self-hatred.[2] *Personal* self-hatred is focused on rejection of one's self and can readily be explained in terms of Meadian social psychology as the incorporation of the negative attitudes and responses directed toward the minority individual by members of the majority group. *Segmental* disparagement involves the rejection of a specific segment of the in-group (e.g., the "lower class") while *general* disparagement involves rejection of

---

[1] Thus Rose says that "the blatant, nationalistic claim to the cultural achievements of Negroes with whom there is no cultural contact . . . indicates an unconscious assumption . . . that race is important for achievement . . . and a feeling that they are inferior and must hunt far afield for something to be proud of" (19, p. 92). See also (18, pp. 268-269).

[2] Lewin's concept of self-hatred is misleading as a generic label inasmuch as most types of negative identification refer to rejection of the group and not the self *per se*. Thus we prefer group disparagement to group self-hatred as a generic label.

the entire in-group with the exception of one's self and perhaps one's intimate in-group associates. Both general and segmental disparagement are explicable in terms of the scapegoating mechanism. Although the majority group may be too powerful to be attacked by a minority individual prevented from attaining personal goals because of his minority status, the in-group provides an alternative outlet for aggression—and group disparagement is one means of expressing this aggression.

A fourth type of negative reaction to group membership, *defensiveness*, is characterized by a tendency to deny any disadvantages in group membership and refusal to perceive any differences between the minority and the majority group (13). This type also manifests some elements of group pride and therefore appears to constitute a mild form of *ambivalence* in contrast to the severe ambivalence of those who manifest both strong group pride and constant group disparagement. A number of writers (e.g., 13, 15 and 18) discuss this response and generally conclude, like Lewin, that ambivalence is commonplace among minority persons.[3]

An Index of Group Identification

The theoretical expectation of widespread ambivalence demands that a thorough empirical analysis of minority group identification utilize independent measures of group pride and disparagement. Accordingly group identification is assessed in the present study via separate three item indices of *militant* group pride and *general* disparagement. Group pride is manifested by a negative response to two or all three of the following items:

1. I don't worry much about the race problem because I know I can't do anything about it.
2. Do you ever get the feeling that it is just not worth fighting for equal treatment for Negroes in this town?
3. Negroes shouldn't go in business establishments where they think they're not wanted.

Group disparagement is manifested by an affirmative response to two or all three of the following items:

1. Negroes blame white people for their position but it's really their own fault.

[3] Grossack recognizes the existence of an ambivalent type but he argues that both disparagement and ambivalence are less common than they are generally considered to be (12, 13). The opposite of ambivalence, *neutrality* or the absence of both positive and negative group sentiments, is a theoretically possible type of group identification but is probably rarely found among the members of any stable group.

2. Negroes are always shouting about their rights but have nothing to offer.
3. Generally speaking, Negroes are lazy and ignorant.

The items in each of these sub-sets are significantly related to each other and the two sub-sets are inversely related with a chi square value (46.6) significant beyond the .001 level.[4] This relationship is subject to challenge, however, as an artifact of response set.

Inasmuch as militancy is established solely by negative responses and general disparagement by positive responses, our *Identifiers* (i.e., persons who manifest group pride but not disparagement) conceivably could include a sizeable proportion of "naysayers" and our *Disparagers* (i.e., persons who manifest group disparagement but not pride) a sizeable proportion of "yeasayers" (see 6). If this were true only the *Ambivalents* (i.e., persons who manifest equivalent amounts of pride and of disparagement) would be validly identified by our index. The data indicate, however, that response set is of negligible importance in the present measure of group identification. The responses of Identifiers ($n = 229$) and Disparagers ($n = 106$) to each of nine items requiring a positive or negative response indicate that Disparagers affirmed only two of the items significantly more often than the Identifiers while the reverse, contrary to the response set hypothesis, occurred four times.[5]

The current need in studies of group identification "is to describe and measure the variables—in personality tendencies, in group structures, and in the total situation—that determine the extent of group solidarity and group withdrawal" (23, p. 224). Thus, data collected as part of the Cornell Study of Intergroup Relations from a probability sample of 515 Negroes in Bakersfield, California and Savannah, Georgia have been analyzed to test various hypotheses regarding the relation of group identification to certain aspects of personality structure and the social milieu.

Personality and Group Identification

Himelhoch has advanced the general hypothesis that among the members of a disprivileged group "the personality needs which foster prejudice toward out-groups also engender prejudice toward the in-

---

[4] The chi square test of significance is used throughout this paper and a relationship is considered significant only if it attains the .05 level of significance as determined by two-tailed analysis.

[5] The total of six significant differences greatly exceeds chance expectation but the nine items were *not* chosen to attain significant differences. Rather they were chosen by the criteria of relevance (i.e., requirement of positive or negative response), availability, and the lack of previous use in the data analysis.

group" (14, p. 80). Inasmuch as frustration and authoritarianism have reigned as the major psychological correlates of out-group prejudice for the past twenty-five years, we shall test this hypothesis by examining the relationship of each of these two variables to group identification.

As regards frustration, Lewin maintains that:

A person for whom the balance [of forces toward and away from group membership] is negative will move as far away from the center of [group] life as the outside majority permits. He will stay on this barrier and be in a constant state of frustration. Actually he will be more frustrated than those members of the minority who keep psychologically well inside the group (16, p. 193).

TABLE 1

FRUSTRATION IS NEGATIVELY RELATED TO GROUP IDENTIFICATION

Group Identification	Frustration				
	General[a]			Race-linked[b]	
	Yes (216)	No (299)		Yes (298)	No. (217)
Identifiers	32%	53%		37%	55%
Ambivalents	37	34		37	32
Disparagers	31	13		27	12
	$\chi^2 = 32$; $p < .001$			$\chi^2 = 22.7$; $p < .001$	

[a] Respondent is considered to experience "general" frustration if he *agrees* with the following item: Sometimes I feel so frustrated I just feel like smashing things.

[b] Respondent is considered to experience "race-linked" frustration if he agrees with the following item: When one Negro does something wrong, the whole Negro race suffers for it.

Although Lewin recognizes that adjustment to the group is conditioned by personality factors, he clearly stresses the causal priority of group identification in its relation to personality. This interpretation has been challenged by subsequent empirical studies and indeed the relationship *per se* has been challenged (22, pp. 304-308). The Cornell data do not allow us to establish causal priority but they clearly support the Lewinian hypothesis as regards the relation of frustration and group identification. Both parts of Table 1 indicate that the frustrated are more than twice as likely as the non-frustrated to be Disparagers.

The second of the two items indexing frustration is especially interesting in that it approximates a pure measure of the frustration attributable to the fact of racial group membership. Negroes who believe that "the whole race suffers whenever any Negro does something wrong" are much more likely to manifest negative group iden-

tification than those who do not share this belief, and it was thought
that this might account for a large part of the relationship between
general frustration ("smash things") and group disparagement. This
was not the case, however, as the "smash things" item significantly
differentiates the identification types in both partials of the "race
suffer" item.

Previous empirical studies of Jews and Negroes (13, 14 and 18)
indicate that authoritarianism is also positively associated with group
disparagement and Radke-Yarrow and Lande report a similar asso-
ciation between authoritarianism and ethnocentric group pride. The

TABLE 2

AUTHORITARIANISM IS NEGATIVELY RELATED TO GROUP IDENTIFICATION

Group Identification	Authoritarianism[a]	
	High (247)	Low (268)
Identifiers	28%	60%
Ambivalents	40	30
Disparagers	32	10
	$\chi^2 = 66.5$; $p < .001$	

[a] Respondent is rated high in authoritarianism if he gives the indicated
response to 2 or all 3 of the following items: (1) children should obey *every*
order their parents give *without question* even if they think the parents are
wrong (agree); (2) Some say you can't be too careful in your dealings with
people while others say that most people can be trusted. From your experience
which would you agree with more (can't be too careful); and (3) Prison is too
good for sex criminals. They should be publicly whipped or worse (agree). This
third item was not asked in Bakersfield so the following item was substituted:
When things go wrong for me, I usually find it's my own fault (disagree). This
substitution weakens the overall relation with group identification because the
substitute item is positively related to self-hatred as well as to militancy.

data presented in Table 2 confirm the positive relation between au-
thoritarianism and disparagement, but the qualitative distinction be-
tween militant and ethnocentric group pride is clearly demonstrated
by the negative relation between authoritarianism and the present
index of pride. Where Radke-Yarrow and Lande observe that "the
[ethnocentric] individual who '*thinks*' his group is best also accepts
many of the stereotypes directed against it, and 'hates' it, and, on
occasion, resists identification with it,"[6] the Cornell data suggest that

[6] See 18, p. 268; emphasis added. It seems reasonable to hypothesize that
the extent of group disparagement among ethnocentric individuals is a function
of the in-group's position in the power structure of the total society. Ethnocentric
persons are generally authoritarian and, inasmuch as authoritarians tend to iden-
tify with the strong and reject the weak, such persons might logically be expected
to reject a weak (minority) in-group as well as weak out-groups. This implies
that group disparagement is rare in the majority group and more common among

the individual who expresses a willingness to militantly *act* in behalf of his group is rarely beset by such ambivalence. The relationship between group pride and authoritarianism shown here also implies a relationship between group pride and generalized prejudice significantly different from that generally reported (see 4, pp. 153-154).

Generalized Prejudice and Group Identification

Studies of the relationship between in-group and out-group attitudes have been confined almost entirely to majority group persons. Moreover, these studies have focussed exclusively on ethnocentrism which posits a positive association between in-group glorification and out-group rejection by definition. Adorno, *et al.*, make this explicit by stating that:

Ethnocentrism refers to group relations generally; it has to do not only with numerous groups toward which the individual has hostile opinions and attitudes but, equally important, with groups toward which he is positively disposed (2, p. 102).

Several writers have generalized this relationship to the entire genus of group pride. Thus Bierstedt says that "prejudice 'for' entails almost inevitably prejudice 'against'" and that:

It is unreasonable to ask us both to take pride in our own groups and their accomplishments and at the same time to refrain from considering them superior. It is the superiority in which we take the pride. And if our groups are superior they must be superior to something that is inferior. . . . (3, pp. 473, 469; see also 9 and 20).

However, the inverse relation between in-group and out-group attitudes which is characteristic of ethnocentrism should not be considered inherent in group pride inasmuch as pride is multi-dimensional. Indeed, other writers hypothesize very different relations between in-group and out-group attitudes. Lewin, for example, argues that identification with the in-group is positively associated with friendly relations with out-group members (16, pp. 166-167). Rothman stands between Bierstedt and Lewin with the claim that data collected from some 200 Jewish adolescents clearly support the hypothesis of "no correlation between in-group identification and either out-group attitudes or out-group associations" (22, p. 309, and 21). Rothman cautions that minority group identification is complex and many sided but neither he nor Bierstedt nor Lewin explicitly argue that different types of in-group pride might relate differently to out-group attitudes.

low status minority groups (e.g., Indians and Negroes) than among those of higher status (e.g., Jews and Japanese-Americans).

The Cornell data allow us to test these competing hypotheses by relating our measure of group identification to an index of generalized prejudice. The index of generalized prejudice was formed by combining indices of anti-white and anti-minority prejudice. Anti-white prejudice was measured by three social distance items which ask:
Do you think you would ever find it a little distasteful:

1. to eat at the same table with a white person?
2. to dance with a white person?
3. to have a white person marry someone in your family?

TABLE 3

AMONG NEGROES GENERALIZED PREJUDICE IS NEGATIVELY ASSOCIATED
WITH GROUP IDENTIFICATION

	Group Identification		
Generalized Prejudice[a]	Identifiers (229)	Ambivalents (180)	Disparagers (106)
High	18%	25%	42%
Medium	28	42	32
Low	54	33	26
	$\chi^2 = 39.2, \ p < .001$		

[a] Respondent is classified high in generalized prejudice if he exhibits both anti-white and anti-minority prejudice, medium if he exhibits anti-white or anti-minority prejudice but not both, and low if he exhibits neither kind of prejudice. The indices of anti-white and anti-minority prejudice are described in the text.

Anti-minority prejudice was measured by the following items:

1. This country would be better off if there were not so many foreigners here.
2. Generally speaking, Mexicans are shiftless and dirty.
3. Do you think you would ever find it a little distasteful to go to a party and find that most of the people are Jewish?

Respondents are considered prejudiced on either measure if they give an affirmative answer to two or all three of the items with the single exception that a Bakersfield Negro is considered prejudiced toward whites if he endorses even one of the "distastefuls."

Combining these two indices reveals a positive association ($p <$ .001, $C = .31$) between anti-white and anti-minority prejudice and also allows us to isolate three degrees of out-group rejection. When out-group rejection is then related to in-group identification the data, presented in Table 3, manifest the positive relation hypothesized by Lewin. Identifiers are twice as likely as Disparagers to score low on generalized prejudice and only half as likely to score high. The positive relation between group disparagement and out-group rejection is well established (e.g., see 8, 14 and 18), but the relation between

out-group rejection and group pride is apparently a function of the type of group pride. Moreover, where Rothman suggests that heightened minority group identification (type unspecified) may deteriorate intergroup relations by promoting separation and social insulation, the present data suggest that a *militant* group pride uncontaminated by group disparagement is functional for the integration of the total society.

Social Structure and Group Identification

A basic proposition of sociology in general and reference group theory in particular asserts that the groups we (aspire to) belong to exert a significant influence on our actions and attitudes. This should be no less true of attitudes toward in-groups *per se* than of attitudes toward other objects. Thus it is our purpose in this section to analyze the effect upon group identification of differential location in the social structure as indexed by region, social class, interracial contact and organizational participation.[7]

In light of the regional variations in the pattern of race relations in the United States, it seems reasonable to hypothesize a more negative group identification among Southern Negroes than among those in other sections of the country. This is not substantiated, however, as Bakersfield and Savannah Negroes distributed among the three group identification types in an almost identical manner. Nevertheless, there are distinct but cancelling regional tendencies with respect to the components of group identification. The difference regarding group pride is in the expected direction although not significant ($p < .10$); but, contrary to our hypothesis, the Bakersfield respondents are significantly ($p < .01$) more likely to manifest group disparagement than are the Savannah respondents. This community difference remains unexplained although it might be that the existence of more effective organizations for combatting discrimination in the Southern community may partially account for the reversal of our expectation.[8] This possibility plus the significant relationship between

[7] Basic sociological variables such as sex, marital status, and age bear no sizeable relation to group identification (with the single exception that even when education is held constant Negroes aged 55 or over are more likely to manifest group disparagement than are younger Negroes).

[8] Analysis of field worker's notes indicate that Savannah Negroes are better organized to combat discrimination than Negroes in Bakersfield and this is substantiated by the fact that 95 per cent of the Southern but only 58 per cent of the Western respondents felt that the local NAACP Chapter was doing at least a "fairly good" job. The figures were 41 and 20 per cent respectively for a "very good" job. Consistent with this idea of community variations in organizational effectiveness, previous studies are inconsistent in their findings regarding regional differences in group disparagement among Negroes (see 23, pp. 213-215).

group identification and participation in protest organizations, shown
in Table 4, suggests that organizations which successfully combat
discrimination may minimize self-hatred in the minority community
in general.

If we make the seemingly reasonable assumption that Negro
Americans generally participate in all-Negro organizations, we may
hypothesize that membership in organizations in general (i.e., re-
gardless of type) is positively associated with group identification.
This is consistent with Grodzin's observation that loyalty to the group
is founded upon loyalty to the various constituent sub-groups (11,
p. 29). The data support the hypothesis when membership in at least
one organization is the only criterion applied. However, when mem-
bers of the NAACP are deleted from the sample and the data re-

TABLE 4
MEMBERSHIP IN THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED
PEOPLE IS POSITIVELY ASSOCIATED WITH GROUP IDENTIFICATION

	NAACP Member	
Group Identification	Yes (77)	No (438)
Identifiers	60%	42%
Ambivalents	34	35
Disparagers	6	23
	$\chi^2 = 13.4, \ p < .001$	

analyzed, the relationship is no longer significant although it does
approximate significance ($p < .10$).

Social class as an important dimension of social structure has also
frequently been posited as a major determinant of group identifica-
tion. Generally it has been argued that upper-class minority persons
are more likely to exhibit group disparagement than are lower-class
persons.[9] The rationale for this belief stresses that members of the
upper class see lower-class behavior as the cause of prejudice and
discrimination and, therefore, they blame the lower class for their
own low *intergroup* status. This implies that lower-class persons less
often view either their own behavior or that of the upper classes as
the cause of prejudice and discrimination and, therefore, they manifest
group disparagement less frequently. As Table 5 indicates, the Cornell
data do not support this position. When we use education and occu-
pation as separate indices of class status, the data not only indicate
that upper-class Negroes are significantly more likely to identify with
the in-group (a topic rarely discussed in the literature) but also that

[9] See 5, p. 510; 19, pp. 64-66; and 24, p. 314. On the other hand, Gros-
sack (13) diverges from general opinion by hypothesizing that the less privileged
strata are most likely to disparage the in-group.

they are *less* likely to disparage the in-group than are lower-class Negroes.

Two cautions pertaining to the interpretation of the relationship between class and group disparagement are necessary. First, attitudes toward the in-group—whether minority or majority—may simply reflect inter-class hostilities (see 23, p. 219 and 19, p. 91). Thus, since it has been suggested that class distinctions are more important in the Negro than in the white community (7, p. 416), it is conceivable that our index of group disparagement is primarily measuring inter-class hostility. Although we cannot completely partial out the effect of the class

TABLE 5

SOCIAL CLASS, AS MEASURED BY EDUCATION AND OCCUPATION, IS ASSOCIATED POSITIVELY WITH GROUP IDENTIFICATION

	Social Class				
	Education[a]		Occupational Status[b]		
Group Identification	High (105)	Low (410)	High (53)	Medium (99)	Low (147)
Identifiers	72%	37%	77%	41%	40%
Ambivalents	24	38	19	43	37
Disparagers	4	25	4	15	23
	$\chi^2 = 45.7; \ p < .001$		$\chi^2 = 27.2; \ p < .001$		

[a] High education category includes high school graduates and those who attended college; all others are classified as low in education.
[b] High occupation category includes professionals and proprietors, and white collar; medium includes skilled and semi-skilled workers; and low occupational status includes laborers and domestics. N is reduced to 299 because not all respondents were employed.

factor in the present study, it is clear that in-group disparagement is not entirely attributable to class because a considerable proportion of Negroes endorse statements which relate to (alleged) shortcomings primarily due to their own class. For example, over 20 per cent of the upper status Negroes—who should initiate and lead an action program—agree that "Negroes are always shouting about their rights but have nothing to offer." A second caution regarding the class-disparagement relationship concerns the fact that we are dealing with general self-hatred (i.e., disparagement) and, therefore, cannot confidently draw conclusions about personal self-hatred. It is not usually clear which type of self-hatred is being discussed in the literature, but Frazier indicates the relevance of the distinction in stating that the repression by upper-status Negroes of hostilities felt toward whites results in a self-hatred "which may appear from their behavior to be directed towards the Negro masses but which in reality is directed against themselves" (10, p. 226). This distinction offers a possible but

not convincing explanation of the contradiction between our finding
and the expectation derived from the literature.

While most minority persons must of necessity maintain certain
functional contacts with members of the dominant group, a much
smaller proportion experience intimate interpersonal contact across
group lines. Reference group theory suggests, however, that these
few will be particularly disposed to self-hatred due to the *relative*
nature of status and deprivation. That is, Negroes who experience
intimate interracial contact will be more aware of their own lack of
opportunities and privileges, as compared to their white friends, and,

TABLE 6

INTERRACIAL SOCIAL CONTACT IS POSITIVELY RELATED TO GROUP IDENTIFICATION,
BUT FRIENDSHIP CONTACT IS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY RELATED
TO GROUP IDENTIFICATION

	Interracial Contact			
	Social[a]		Friendship[b]	
Group Identification	Yes (77)	No (438)	Yes (236)	No (279)
Identifiers	55%	43%	42%	46%
Ambivalents	38	34	37	33
Disparagers	8	23	20	21
	$\chi^2 = 9.0; p < .02$		$\chi^2 = 0.89; p < .70$	

[a] Respondent is classified as having social contact with whites if he does
something of a social nature (e.g., going to a sports event together or visiting
in each other's homes) with any of the whites with whom he has contact.

[b] Respondent is classified as having friendship contact with whites if he
considers his closest white contact a friend as opposed to being someone he just
knows to speak to.

therefore, more likely to express resentment of their status via group
disparagement. Table 6 indicates that the available data definitely
do not support this theoretical derivation. Indeed, participation in
informal social relations with whites proves to be associated positively
with group identification. The attribute of having at least one white
friend as opposed to none does not manifest this relationship to group
identification but neither does it support the derived hypothesis. The
"friendship" index is, moreover, a questionable indicator of interper-
sonal intimacy as it is not related to anti-white prejudice whereas
social contact is negatively related ($p < .001$) to prejudice.

Summary and Conclusions

Data collected from 515 Negroes in two American communities
provide an opportunity to test a number of hypotheses regarding the
correlates of minority group identification. A review of the literature

suggests that group identification is a multi-dimensional phenomenon and, therefore, our findings cannot be generalized beyond the confines of *militant* group pride and *general* disparagement. However, within the limits of this pattern of group identification, the Cornell data justify three major conclusions.

First, the data confirm Himelhoch's hypothesis that among minority persons the personality characteristics associated with rejection of (i.e., prejudice toward) out-groups are also correlates of rejection of the in-group. Both authoritarianism and frustration manifest strong negative relations to group identification. Second, this is paralleled by a striking similarity of the social correlates of out-group and in-group attitudes among Negroes. In contradiction of prevalent hypotheses, education, occupation and interracial (social) contact are positively related to group identification and organization membership and age also bear approximately the same relation to group identification as to anti-white and anti-minority prejudice.[10] The similarity of social correlates is less clear-cut with respect to sex, marital status and region. However, the Cornell data indicate that the relation of sex to prejudice is highly variable dependent upon the dimension of prejudice involved and that the marital status and regional correlates of prejudice toward whites do not extend to prejudice toward minority out-groups.

Consistent with the first two conclusions, the third conclusion is that in the population studied attitude toward the in-group is positively related to attitude toward out-groups. This challenges the belief that the rejection of out-groups is an almost inevitable concomitant of in-group pride and suggests that an unequivocally positive group identification can be functional for societal integration. The differences in the findings and inferences of the present study as compared to previous researches underscore the necessity of specifying the type(s) of group identification under consideration. Such specification is pre-requisite to further advances in our understanding of the causes, processes, and consequences of group identification.

REFERENCES

1. ADELSON, J. "A Study of Minority Group Authoritarianism" in M. Sklare, ed., *The Jews.* Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958, pp. 475-492.
2. ADORNO, T. W., FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK, E., LEVINSON, D. J., & SANFORD, R. N. *The Authoritarian Personality.* New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950.
3. BIERSTEDT, R. *The Social Order.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963, second ed., pp. 469-474.
4. CHRISTIE, R. "Authoritarianism Re-examined" in R. Christie and M. Jahoda, eds., *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality."* Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954, pp. 123-196.

[10] The relevant data regarding the social correlates of out-group prejudice among Negroes are presented in chapters III and V in 17.

5. CLARK, K. B. "Racial Prejudice Among American Minorities." *International Social Science Bulletin*, 1950, 2, pp. 506-513.

6. COUCH, A., & KENISTON, K. "Yeasayers and Naysayers: Agreeing Response Set As Personality Variable." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1960, 60, pp. 151-174.

7. DAVIE, M. R. *Negroes in American Society.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949.

8. DITZ, G. "Outgroup and Ingroup Prejudice Among Members of Minority Groups." *Alpha Kappa Deltan*, 1959, 29 (#2), 26-31.

9. FAIRCHILD, H. *Race and Nationality.* New York: Ronald Press, 1947.

10. FRAZIER, E. F. *Black Bourgeoisie.* Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957.

11. GRODZINS, M. *The Loyal and the Disloyal.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956.

12. GROSSACK, M. M. "Perceived Negro Group Belongingness and Social Rejection." *Journal of Psychology*, 1954, 38, 127-130.

13. GROSSACK, M. M. "Group Belongingness Among Negroes." *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1956, 43, 167-180.

14. HIMELHOCH, J. "Tolerance and Personality Needs: A Study of the Liberalization of Ethnic Attitudes Among Minority Group College Students." *American Sociological Review*, 1950, 15, 79-88.

15. JOHNSON, R. B. *The Nature of the Minority Community.* Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1955.

16. LEWIN, K. *Resolving Social Conflicts.* New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948.

17. NOEL, D. L. *Correlates of Anti-White Prejudice.* Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1961.

18. RADKE-YARROW, M., & LANDE, B. "Personality Correlates of Differential Reactions to Minority Group Belonging." *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1953, 38, 253-272.

19. ROSE, A. *The Negro's Morale: Group Identification and Protest.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949.

20. ROSS, R., & VAN DEN HAAG, E. *The Fabric of Society.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1957, pp. 64-74.

21. ROTHMAN, J. "In-Group Identification and Out-Group Association: A Theoretical and Experimental Study." *Journal of Jewish Communal Service*, 1960, 37, 81-93.

22. ROTHMAN, J. "Minority Group Status, Mental Health and Intergroup Relations: An Appraisal of Kurt Lewin's Thesis," *Journal of Intergroup Relations*. 1962, 3, 299-310.

23. SIMPSON, G., & YINGER, J. M. *Racial and Cultural Minorities.* New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958, rev. ed.

24. WALTER, P. A. F. *Race and Culture Relations.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952.

Status Position, Mobility, and Ethnic Identification of the Negro

Seymour Parker and Robert Kleiner

A considerable body of literature has emerged concerning the relationship between the Negro's social status position and his "racial" or ethnic identification (i.e., his attitudes toward, and feelings of kinship with, other Negroes). This literature fails to distinguish between attitudes of those socialized in a given status position and those who have moved into that position. The purpose of this study is to investigate not only the relationship between ethnic identification and status position, but also between identification and mobility. Research efforts in this area have encountered serious methodological problems, such as eliciting directly an individual's private attitudes toward this emotionally-charged subject. Consequently, the literature often represents inferences from oblique questionnaire probes or clinical-type interviews with unrepresentative samples. Another purpose of this paper is to determine whether our results can be encompassed within a unified conceptual framework.

The issue of ethnic identification is currently a controversial topic within the Negro community itself. In recent issues of popular lay journals, Lomax (1960) and Fuller (1963) accuse the dominant (mainly middle-class) Negro leadership of being white "carbon copies" and of feeling covert contempt for the Negro masses. In the professional literature, one of the most widely-known theses on the relationship between status position and ethnic attitudes of Negroes is Frazier's *Black Bourgeoisie* (1957). Frazier maintains that upper- and middle-class Negroes are ambivalent, both toward the wider Negro community and the white middle class with which they identify. These Negroes internalize many of the negative or patronizing white middle-class attitudes toward the Negro masses; in addition, they resent their own inability to disassociate thmeselves from their ethnic group, which is regarded as a barrier to their social mobility aspirations. Their internalization of white middle-class goals and values and the concomitant nonacceptance by the white community, engender hostility toward the very group they wish to emulate. These individuals often compensate for their devalued self-image as Negroes and for their marginal position in the white community by becoming leaders in the Negro community. Frazier does not consider the relative effect

85

on such reactions of mobility *into* the higher Negro status position, or of socialization *within* these positions. This is one of the major issues to be considered in this paper.

Reference group theory, as discussed by Hyman (1942) and Merton (1957), provides a wider context for Frazier's ideas about the dilemma of the "black bourgeoisie." In fact, Hyman (1942, p. 84) cites Negro identification patterns as a special instance of reference group behavior, and Lewin (1948) makes use of the same formulations in his discussions of the Jewish group. The pertinence of Merton's position on reference group theory for Frazier's characterization can be illustrated by the following:

> The marginal man pattern represents the special case in a relatively closed social system in which the members of one group [the "black bourgeoisie"] take as a positive frame of reference the norms of a group from which they are excluded in principle [non-acceptance by the white middle-class]. Within such a social structure, anticipatory sociali- zation [expectation of acceptance by white middle class] becomes dysfunctional [acceptance of negative stereotypes about Negroes and of white middle-class values and goals] for the individual who becomes the victim of aspirations he cannot achieve and hopes he cannot satisfy" (Merton, 1957, p. 266).

In this paper, we intend to utilize concepts from reference group theory to explain the ethnic identification patterns of socially mobile and non-mobile Negroes.

In a given status position there are three types of individuals: those socialized at that level (i.e., "stable" individuals), those who have experienced upward mobility, and those who have been down- wardly mobile. How is the ethnic identification of these types of individuals related to their reference group behavior? We assume that the ethnic attitudes of socially mobile individuals are determined by the reference values of their former status level (i.e., parental position), and of their current level. On the basis of this assumption, we expect the attitudes of mobile individuals to include components of both status levels. For example, the individual currently in a status group having negative attitudes toward Negroes, but who has come from a group with comparatively positive attitudes, will exhibit more positive attitudes than "stable" persons at his present level. Specific predictions flowing from this general rationale will be presented in a later section.

Procedure

The data for this paper were collected as part of a larger project[1] investigating the relationship between mental illness and the dis-

---

[1] Supported by Research Grant M-3047, National Institutes of Health,

crepancy between aspiration and achievement. Information was gathered from two different populations: (1) a psychiatric sample (N = 1,423) admitted as in- or out-patients to selected public and private agencies during the period March 1, 1960–May 15, 1961; and (2) a sample drawn from the Philadelphia Negro community (N = 1,489). Individuals in the two samples were Negroes, age 20 to 60 years, living in Philadelphia, both they and their parents had been born within the continental United States. Since this report is concerned only with data collected for the community sample, the description of the procedure will be limited to this group.

The interview instrument was a 206-item questionnaire, designed for a person-to-person interview in the home. The questionnaire was introduced to the respondent as part of a study concerned with the attitudes and health status of the Philadelphia Negro, conducted jointly by the institutions with which the authors were affiliated.[2] The 28 interviewers were also Negroes, age 20 to 60 years, with a mean education of 15.1 years. The initial objective was 1,500 community interviews, with a 1/200 probability of selection for any given individual. The sampling procedure was divided into a five-stage design, based on stratified and proportionate sampling.

In the coding procedure reliability checks were made between: (1) the Project Directors; (2) each of the Project Directors and the supervisor of the two coders; (3) the supervisor and each coder; (4) the coders. The average reliabilities at all levels were over 90 percent.

Since the project involved a Negro sample, a class index based on the various criteria of social status mentioned by members of the Philadelphia Negro community itself was developed. Respondents were asked: "What things do you think of when you decide what social class a person belongs to? Choose three from the list, in order of importance." The list included one's education, neighborhood, income, family background, occupation, color of skin, membership organizations, influence in the community, and any other factor specified. In order to weight the responses for importance, a first choice was multiplied by three, a second by two, and a third by one; the weighted choices were summed for every response category. The three components of the index were weighted according to the relative difference in the summed weighted scores for each category

(education, 4.4; income, 2.5; and occupation, unweighted).[3] Measures of each of the selected index components were collapsed into a seven-step scale so that these relative weights would be the principal determinants of the index score. Rather than use occupational prestige scales developed with primarily white populations, a new seven-step occupational scale was developed from a special study of a Negro sub-sample. The final index score for any individual was determined as follows:

(Education $\times$ 4.4) + (Income $\times$ 2.5) + (Occupation $\times$ 1).

The index score for housewives was determined by using the respondent's own educational level, and the income and occupational level of the head of household. The social status scores for the community sample were divided into four approximately equal groups, designated as status position 1 (lowest) through 4 (highest). Subsequent sections of this paper will focus on data showing a consistent increase or decrease from position 1 to 4.

In the present paper, 16 items from the 206-item interview schedule will be evaluated. The paper will be divided into three sections:

(1) The distribution, by status position, of responses for each of the 16 items will be presented.

(2) The proportion of individuals, by status position, showing each of three types of ethnic identification response patterns will be determined. These response configurations (ambivalence, consistent weak, and consistent positive, identification) are defined in terms of combinations of selected responses to each of six pairs of questions involving different hypothetical conditions:[4]

Situation 1: reaction to "passing" vs. reaction to favorable ("award") headline;

Situation 2: reaction to unfavorable ("arrest") headline vs. reaction to favorable headline;

Situation 3: reaction to "passing" vs. reaction to unfavorable headline;

---

[3] Although occupation was used as a component of the final index, it was not selected as the third most important determinant of social status. We had included numerous questionnaire items on occupation, under the assumption that this would be an area of major concern to our population.

[4] For example, considering the questions covered in Situation 6: anger at a friend's "passing" and condoning a Negro's arrest, or, conversely, condoning a friend's "passing" and an assumption of discrimination against the arrested Negro, may be considered ambivalence patterns; condoning a friend's "passing" coupled with condoning a Negro's arrest, may be considered a consistent weak identification pattern; anger at a friend's "passing," combined with an assumption of discrimination against the arrested Negro, may be considered a consistent positive identification pattern.

Situation 4: reasons for reactions in pair of questions under Situation 1;

Situation 5: reasons for reactions in pair of questions under Situation 2;

Situation 6: reasons for reactions in pair of questions under Situation 3.

In the definition of Situations 1–6, those responses were selected that showed a systematic relationship to status position.

(3) The relationship between type of identification response pattern (i.e., ambivalence, weak, or positive) and educational mobility (i.e., upward, downward, or stable) will be analyzed.

It is important to note that, since all data are based on interviews, we cannot distinguish between an individual's private or public expression; however, we can point out the nature of his conflicts, as reflected by his responses.

All the data discussed are significant at less than the .001 level of confidence, unless otherwise indicated.

Results

1. *Relationship Between Questionnaire Items and Status Position*

a. *Aspirations for self and for hypothetical son.* Frazier's thesis states that the Negro "bourgeoisie" internalize the values and goals of the white middle and upper classes. This is consistent with reference group theory, which predicts that an individual or group moving toward a higher status position will incorporate the goals and values of the aspired group. Educational aspirations of graduate school (Level 7, Table 1) for a hypothetical son, a highly-prized goal in the white community, increase in occurrence from status position 1 (lowest) through 4 (highest). On the other hand, the number of individuals who would be satisfied with some high school or high school graduation (Levels 3 and 4, Table 1) for a hypothetical son decreases from position 1 through 4.

Occupational aspirations at the professional level (Level 7, Table 1) for a hypothetical son were expected to increase from position 1 through 4; this expectation is confirmed. On the other hand, those with occupational aspirations for a hypothetical son at Levels 1 and 2 (i.e., unskilled and semi-skilled) and 3 and 4 (i.e., skilled and clerical), decrease from position 1 through 4.

It was predicted that occupational aspirations for oneself would also rise with status position. The percentage of those aspiring to occupational Levels 1 and 2 (i.e., unskilled and semi-skilled) diminishes from the lowest to the highest status position (see Table 1). Conversely, aspirations to occupational levels 3 and 4 (i.e., skilled and

clerical), 5 and 6 (i.e., minor professional and business), and 7 (i.e., major professions) increase from the lowest to the highest position.

The percentage of those with income aspirations at the highest level (Level 7, Table 1) increases from status position 1 through 4. The percentage of those aspiring only to Levels 3 and 4, however, decreases with increasing status position.

In summary, data on educational, occupational, and income goal striving for self and hypothetical son confirm the prediction that

TABLE 1

ASPIRATIONS FOR SELF AND HYPOTHETICAL SON, BY SOCIAL STATUS POSITION*

Aspiration Level	Occupation-Son Social Status				Income-Self Social Status				Education-Son Social Status				Occupation-Self Social Status			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1 and 2	63	51	40	14	11	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	13	10	5	3
3 and 4	17	28	34	38	63	49	39	16	26	15	17	7	19	16	12	7
5 and 6	17	19	19	36	19	36	39	39	62	66	61	53	21	21	17	18
7	1	2	6	12	6	13	22	44	12	19	22	39	47	53	64	71

* Each percentage is based on the total number of individuals in any given social status group.
Position 1: N = 354.
Position 2: N = 350.
Position 3: N = 386.
Position 4: N = 382.
Position Unknown: N = 17 (Excluded from analyses).
Any total percentage < 99 for a given status group reflects those in individuals for whom status position could be computed, but who gave no response to the particular item.

internalization of prevailing attitudes in the larger white community will increase with status position.

b. *Blue or white collar occupational preferences.* Since white collar-high prestige occupations are valued by the white middle and upper classes, we predicted an increasing preference for these occupations, from position 1 through 4. Conversely, an increasing preference for blue collar-low prestige occupations was predicted as status position goes down from 4 through 1. For each of three choice situations (Set I, II, and III, Table 2) these predictions are confirmed.

c. *Racial composition of achieved (or actual) and aspired neighborhood.* Another characteristic ascribed to the Negro "bourgeoisie" by Frazier is a desire to live in predominantly white communities. Reference group theory predicts similar preferences for individuals aspiring to membership in some coveted group. In the present study, respondents were asked to describe the racial composition of the

neighborhood in which they actually resided, and of a neighborhood in which they would like to live. The percentage of those describing their actual neighborhood as "predominantly white" (i.e., encompassing responses of "almost all white," "mixed-mostly white," and "half-and-half") increases from status position 1 through 4 (i.e., 6%, 7%, 8%, and 9%, respectively). The small number of cases in each status group precludes any statistical evaluation. As status position rises, there is also an increase in the proportion of respondents describing their neighborhood as "mixed-mostly Negro" (i.e., 53%, 58%, 64%, and 66%, respectively), and a decrease in the proportion

TABLE 2
BLUE OR WHITE COLLAR OCCUPATIONAL PREFERENCES,
BY SOCIAL STATUS POSITION[*]

Blue/White Collar Preference	Social Status			
	1	2	3	4
	%	%	%	%
Set I:				
Bricklayer @ $120/week	53	41	35	23
Teacher @ $90/week	47	58	65	77
Set II:				
Machine Oper. @ $100/week	59	52	46	38
Gov't Clerk @ $80/week	41	48	54	62
Set III:				
Factory Worker @ $80/week	67	65	62	46
Sales (dept. store) @ $60/week	33	35	38	54

[*] See footnote to Table 1.

who live in an "all Negro" neighborhood (i.e., 40%, 35%, 28%, and 24%, respectively).

It is noteworthy that a majority of respondents in each of the four status groups describe their actual neighborhood as "mixed." These findings, if valid, are inconsistent with the generally accepted assumption that Negroes live in all Negro neighborhoods. It is possible that respondents use the characterization "mixed-mostly Negro" loosely (e.g., a white storekeeper on an otherwise Negro residential block). If there is a tendency to exaggerate the "mixed" quality of one's neighborhood, which reflects a desire to live in such a neighborhood, the preference for predominantly white neighborhoods should increase with status position (as Frazier predicts). Our data show this to be the case (see Table 3). At the same time, the preference for all Negro neighborhoods decreases from position 1 through 4.

Approximately 40 percent of all status groups express "no preference" about the racial composition of an aspired neighborhood. This is particularly important because the pre-coded response choices do

not include "no preference"; this response was recorded only at the respondent's insistence. These findings could mean either that subjects actually have "no preference," or that they would like to select a neighborhood without considering the racial issue. If "no preference" actually determines neighborhood choice, moving patterns would be more diffuse. In reality, Negroes move into "broken" areas, or those already predominantly Negro. It seems more likely that those giving a "no preference" response would like to select a neighborhood on a basis other than its racial composition, but are not free to do so.

In summary, the data show that as status position rises, the proportion of those describing their actual neighborhood as "mixed" or "predominantly white" increases. There is also an increase in those

TABLE 3
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF ASPIRED NEIGHBORHOOD, BY SOCIAL STATUS POSITION*

Racial Composition	Social Status			
	1	2	3	4
	%	%	%	%
Almost all white ⎱ Predominantly Mixed-mostly white ⎰ White Half-and-half	13	21	24	30
Mixed-mostly Negro	20	21	22	21
All Negro	26	19	10	5
No preference	40	38	43	44

* See footnote to Table 1.

who aspire to a predominantly white neighborhood, and a decrease in those who aspire to an all Negro neighborhood, from position 1 through 4. These findings confirm the predictions about the relationship between status and interest in living among whites.

d. *Reactions to hypothetical situations.* Frazier predicts a decreasing involvement and identification with the Negro community with an increase in status position. Respondents in our study were asked how they would feel if they saw the (unfavorable) headline, "Negro Seized in Camden." The percentage of those feeling "very uncomfortable" or "fairly uncomfortable" decreases as status rises, while "slightly uncomfortable" and "no feeling" responses increase from status position 1 through 4 (see Table 4). Respondents were also asked their reactions to the (favorable) headline, "Negro Receives Major Award." The percentage of those who feel "very" or "fairly proud" changes relatively little from status position 1 through 4 (i.e., 90%, 89%, 89%, and 87%, respectively). Similarly, the number of those who would be "slightly proud," have "no feelings," or be "slightly annoyed" shows no variation with status position (i.e., 10%

11%, 11%, and 13%, respectively). It is interesting that 59 percent of those in position 1 (lowest) feel "very uncomfortable" or "fairly uncomfortable" about the unfavorable headline, whereas 90 percent are "very" or "fairly proud" about the favorable headline. Among those in position 4 (highest), 36 percent feel "very uncomfortable" or "fairly uncomfortable," in contrast to 87 percent who are "very" or "fairly proud." These contrasting response patterns indicate that more upper than lower status individuals deny their involvement in unfavorable publicity situations; however, at the same time they profess to be equally proud and enthusiastic about the reported success. This suggests more inconsistent emotional involvement in racial matters among higher status individuals.

TABLE 4

REACTIONS TO HYPOTHETICAL RACIAL SITUATIONS, BY SOCIAL STATUS POSITION*

Reaction to Hypothetical Racial Situation	Social Status			
	1	2	3	4
	%	%	%	%
Unfavorable Headline: "Negro Seized in Camden"				
Very or fairly uncomfortable	59	53	47	36
Slightly uncomfortable or no feelings	39	46	51	63
A Friend's "Passing"				
Mixed feelings toward him	27	34	35	38
Angry with him	28	24	21	17
Glad for him; no feelings; other	45	41	42	45

* See footnote to Table 1.

In a third hypothetical situation, reactions to a friend's intention to "pass" were elicited. The data show no differences by status position for the responses "glad for him," "no feeling," and "other" (see Table 4). However, the proportion of those with "mixed feelings toward him" increases from position 1 through 4. The chi square is 11.03 ($p = < .02 > .01$). This response indicates conscious feelings of conflict within the individual about an act which denies one's racial identity. The number of respondents who would be "angry with him" decreases as status position rises. The chi square is 14.40 ($p = < .01$).

It is clear that the higher status individuals deny involvement in the unfavorable situation, express mixed feelings toward a friend who would "pass," and profess pride in the favorable situation. On the other hand, lower status individuals show more feelings of discomfort about unfavorable publicity, greater feelings of anger at a friend who would "pass," and pride in the favorable situation. The data suggest weaker or more ambivalent involvement in the racial aspects of a situation for those in upper status positions.

e. *Reasons for reactions to hypothetical situations*. Table 5 includes only the percentages for the significant response categories for the four hypothetical situations. The major finding about "reasons for

TABLE 5

Reasons for Neighborhood Aspirations and for Reactions to Other Hypothetical Racial Situations, by Social Status Position[*]

Reasons	Social Status			
	1	2	3	4
	%	%	%	%
Aspired Neighborhood[**]				
Positive statement about Negroes	26	22	14	10
Unfavorable Headline[**]				
Assumption of discrimination and/or injustice; or Positive identification with Negroes	40	32	30	21
Empathy with individual (race not explicit)	11	8	6	4
Defers judgment	12	20	25	24
Favorable Headline[**]				
Accomplishment of Negro (explicit)	59	54	51	48
Concern with improvement of public image	11	20	22	24

[*] See footnote to Table 1.

[**] Only the significant "reasons" responses are presented. The complete content categories for neighborhood aspirations and other hypothetical racial situations are as follows:

Aspired Neighborhood: Race irrelevent; Positive statement about Negroes; Negative statement about whites; Negative statement about Negroes; Positive statement about whites; Better neighborhood—emphasis on physical characteristics; Better neighborhood—emphasis on social characteristics; Concern for integration; Other.

Unfavorable Headline: Race irrelevant; Concern with public image; Assumption of discrimination and/or injustice; Empathy with individual (race not explicit); Negative statement about Negroes; Condones seizure; Defers judgment; Positive statement about Negroes; None; Other.

Favorable Headline: Accomplishment of Negro (explicit); Concern with improvement of public image; Accomplishment of a person (race not explicit); None; Other.

"Passing": Up to individual; Approves without qualification; Approves with qualification; Decision not practical; Detrimental to race (e.g., "traitor to race," "deserter," etc.); Should affirm Negro identity; Other.

neighborhood aspirations" is the decrease in "positive statements about Negroes" as status increases.

Considering the reasons for respondents' reactions to the unfavorable headline, the percentages for "race irrelevant," "concern

with public image," "condones seizure," and "defers judgment" in-
crease with status position. However, "defers judgment" is the only
category significantly related to status when analyzed alone. It is
possible that individuals giving one of these responses either (1)
deny the racial aspects of the situation; (2) are more concerned
with the image of the Negro presented to the larger white com-
munity; (3) assume the arrested person to be guilty, possibly show-
ing an acceptance of the white stereotype about Negroes as criminals;
(4) assume an "objective" point of view, thereby also denying the
racial aspects of the situation.

Two of the response categories (i.e., "assumption of discrimi-
nation and or injustice" and "positive identification with Negroes")
increase as status goes down from position 4 through 1. The response
involving "discrimination and/or injustice" assumes that the individual
arrested by the police is innocent. Since the headline gives no facts
other than that of arrest, any more detailed interpretation of the
situation must reflect respondents' projections. The proportion giving
the response "empathy with the individual" increases as one moves
down the status hierarchy. If those giving this response are not, in
fact, oriented to the racial aspects of the situation, those in lower
status groups would seem to have greater ability to sympathize with
individuals in trouble.

Thus, the data show an increase in the proportion of those who
have weak identification with the Negro community, or who deny the
racial characteristics of the hypothetical "arrest" situation, as status
position goes up. In addition, the proportion of those who have
positive identification with the Negro community, or who express
empathy for individuals in trouble, increases as status position goes
down.

In regard to reasons for reactions to the "award" headline, the
proportion of those individuals concerned with the "improvement of
the public image" of the Negro increases from position 1 through 4
(paralleling the trend noted for the same response category in the
"arrest" headline context). As social status decreases from position 4
through 1, there is an increase in feelings of satisfaction with the
"accomplishment of a Negro." It should be noted that this category
includes only those responses involving explicit references to the
Negro aspects of the situation.

None of the response categories dealing with reasons for reactions
to "passing" is significantly related to social status. There is a tendency
for the percentage of those who feel one "should affirm his Negro
identity" to increase as status position goes down. There is also some
indication that the proportion of those who feel the decision to "pass"
is a personal one increases from position 1 through 4.

2. Response Pattern Analyses by Social Status Position

Up to this point, we have been concerned only with the distri-
bution of responses for single items, by social status groups. Although
we may characterize different status groups by this type of presentation
(e.g., Kleiner, Parker, and Taylor, 1962), it will be more fruitful to
determine to what extent the responses of a given individual coincide
or conflict with one another. Specifically, we intend to show that
attitudinal trends by social status position at the group level reflect
these same trends within individuals occupying the different status
levels.

TABLE 6

INTERRELATIONSHIP OF ACHIEVED NEIGHBORHOOD AND ASPIRED NEIGHBORHOOD,
BY SOCIAL STATUS POSITION*

Achieved Neighborhood	Aspired Neighborhood															
	Predominantly white (cf. Table 3)				Mixed-Negro				All Negro				No preference			
	Social Status				Social Status				Social Status				Social Status			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Predominantly white (cf. Table 3)	45	57	48	50	5	4	7	11	23	4	3	—	27	26	41	39
Mixed-mostly Negro	12	18	22	26	23	25	24	24	16	14	7	3	49	42	45	47
All Negro	10	18	21	31	19	20	22	20	40	30	19	12	30	33	38	37

* See footnote to Table 1.

Frazier's thesis predicts a greater preference for predominantly
white neighborhoods as social status increases. Table 6, in effect,
determines the relationship between aspired neighborhood and social
status, controlling for achieved neighborhood. This type of presentation
also indicates the extent to which the respondent's aspired neighbor-
hood is influenced by the characteristics of his actual neighborhood.
As status goes up, those living in "mixed-mostly Negro" and "all
Negro" neighborhoods aspire increasingly to predominantly white
neighborhoods. (The chi square for the "mixed-mostly Negro" category
is 8.74 ($p = < .05 > .02$)). There is no relationship between any of
the types of achieved neighborhoods and the proportion of individuals
aspiring to a "mixed-mostly Negro" neighborhood. However, for each
of the three achieved neighborhood categories (i.e., "all Negro,"
"mixed-mostly Negro," and "predominantly white"), the percentage of
those who prefer an "all Negro" neighborhood decreases from status
position 1 through 4. The significance of "predominantly white"

(actual), compared to "all Negro" (aspired), was not evaluated because of the small number of cases in status positions 1 and 2.

These data clearly show an increasing preference for predominantly white neighborhoods from status position 1 through 4, and an increasing preference for "all Negro" neighborhoods as status position goes down.

The remainder of the Results section will deal with the relationship between three types of response patterns (ambivalence, consistent weak, and consistent positive ethnic identification) and social status. Several of the previous item analyses indicate a diminishing positive identification with the Negro community at the group level, from status position 1 through 4; in other analyses, the reverse appears to be the case. By considering several responses simultaneously, for any given *individual*, we may determine whether a response showing positive identification in fact reflects conflicting attitudes about ethnic identification.

Table 7 shows the percentage of individuals in each status position who manifest one of the three types of ethnic identification patterns already defined. A consideration of Frazier's thesis, along with our earlier data, leads to a prediction of more frequent ambivalent or weak identification patterns in the higher status groups. Only for Situation 2 does ambivalence increase from status position 1 through 4 (see Table 7). For Situation 1, the proportion of those showing ambivalence increases from position 1 through 3 and drops in position 4. However, the chi square for status positions 1 and 2 (combined), compared to positions 3 and 4 (combined) is significant. Conversely for Situation 3, ambivalence decreases from position 1 through 4, but these percentages are not significant.

The results presented previously suggest that ambivalence increases from status position 1 through 4. The present data, however, do not overwhelmingly confirm this prediction.

Except for Situation 2, the consistent weak ethnic identification pattern increases with status position for the four other Situations.[5] However, only Situations 3, 5, and 6 are significant. It is interesting that for this same Situation (i.e., 2) ambivalence patterns did increase with status position. This suggests that a Situation can show either increasing ambivalence or weak identification, with status position, but that it would be difficult for both patterns to appear. The data, therefore, show an increase in weak identification from position 1 through 4.

In each of the six Situations, the percentage of those with a consistent positive identification pattern increases significantly as status

---

[5] There were too few cases in each status position to compute percentages for Situation 1.

goes down, except for Situations 1 and 3 ($p = < .10 > .05$). The consistency of this data and the degree of significance clearly support Frazier's statement that positive identification diminishes as status increases.

TABLE 7

ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION AND SOCIAL STATUS POSITION[*]

Ethnic Identification	Social Status			
	1	2	3	4
	%	%	%	%
Ambivalence				
Situation 1[**]	22	28	34	32
Situation 2	26	39	42	47
Situation 3	29	27	25	21
Situation 4	26	25	32	29
Situation 5	25	36	35	33
Situation 6	33	36	37	31
Consistent Weak				
Situation 1[**]	—	—	—	—
Situation 2	4	6	4	7
Situation 3	9	15	18	24
Situation 4	5	8	10	10
Situation 5	6	10	12	15
Situation 6	17	21	27	30
Consistent Positive				
Situation 1[**]	21	21	17	14
Situation 2	48	45	41	31
Situation 3	17	14	12	9
Situation 4	26	22	18	16
Situation 5	37	23	20	18
Situation 6	23	12	12	10

[*] Each percentage is that part of 100% in each status group manifesting the particular response pattern.

[**] The nature of "ethnic identification" is inferred from selected responses to the following pairs of questions:

Situation 1: Reaction to "passing" vs. reaction to favorable headline;
Situation 2: Reaction to unfavorable headline vs. reaction to favorable headline;
Situation 3: Reaction to "passing" vs. reaction to unfavorable headline;
Situation 4: Reasons for reaction to "passing" vs. reasons for reaction to favorable headline;
Situation 5: Reasons for reaction to "passing" vs. reasons for reaction to unfavorable headline;
Situation 6: Reasons for reaction to unfavorable headline vs. reasons for reaction to favorable headline.

It should be emphasized that the observed correlations between identification and status position probably operate independently of one another. As mentioned earlier, Situations 1-6 were defined in terms of particular responses (i.e., those showing a systematic relation-

ship to status) to selected questions. Although all those in each status group were used to determine percentages, every individual did not necessarily manifest one of the three identification patterns.

3. Mobility and Ethnic Identification

Having related ethnic identification to status position, we will consider the influence of mobility itself on such patterns. We have discussed the rationale for predicting that an individual's identification is an approximate equilibration of the norms of his present and past status groups. In the present paper, an individual's mobility is defined in terms of his own and his parental educational level. If the educational achievements of his parents differ, the higher of the two is selected. The use of education for this purpose is based on three considerations: (1) educational achievement is known for each individual in our sample, and for at least one of his parents; (2) education has been found to be an important element in the Negro's social mobility; (3) both education and the social status index are significantly correlated with each ethnic identification pattern.

On the basis of reference group theory, we hypothesize that the mobile individual (either upwardly or downwardly) holds attitudes deriving from two reference points: his former and his current status position. Thus, specific predictions (Table 8 and 9) rest on the modal response patterns of the various status levels (Table 7).

In Table 8, parental educational level is held constant, and the individual's mobility is estimated from this point. Of the nine predictions, the comparisons made for eight are in the expected direction, and one is inconclusive (by Sign Test p = < .004). Five of the eight predictions are significant (p = < .05). Only for the consistent positive identification pattern are there significant differences between the two mobile groups and the "stables." As the individual moves upward from his parental status level, he shows significantly less positive ethnic identification, and significantly more ambivalent and weak patterns. The downwardly mobile individual tends to show less ambivalence and weak identification, and more positive identification than the "stables" at his parental (higher) status level. It should also be noted that for all three identification patterns, the upwardly mobile differ significantly from the "stables"; the downwardly mobile differ only in positive identification.

In order to determine the relative influence of current status and past mobility on ethnic identification, comparisons of the different mobility groups were made within given status levels (see Table 9). Eight of the nine predictions are in the expected direction, and one is not (by Sign Test p = < .04); two of the eight are significant. Although the findings do not indicate overall significant differences between the mobile groups and the "stables," or between each other, there are

consistent tendencies suggesting that mobility is a relevant factor. The uwardly mobile tend to show less ambivalence and weak, and more positive, identification than the "stables" in their current status group. The downwardly mobile manifest significantly more ambivalence, and significantly less positive identification than the "stables."

TABLE 8

PREDICTIONS OF TYPES OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION OF MOBILE AND "STABLE" INDIVIDUALS, USING PARENTAL EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AS A POINT OF ORIGIN

Predictions of Types of Ethnic Identification	Confirmed**	Not Confirmed	Level of Significance (By Sign Test)
*Ambivalence**			
Upwardly mobile higher than "stable"	17	4	.004
Downwardly mobile lower than "stable"	9	8	.50
Upwardly mobile higher than downwardly mobile	8	4	.19
Consistent Weak			
Upwardly mobile higher than "stable"	15	4	.01
Downwardly mobile lower than "stable"	8	8	.60
Upwardly mobile higher than downwardly mobile	8	5	.29
Consistent Positive			
Upwardly mobile lower than "stable"	17	5	.008
Downwardly mobile higher than "stable"	16	6	.03
Upwardly mobile lower than downwardly mobile	13	1	.001

* See second footnote to Table 7.
** The number of tests for each prediction is influenced by three factors:
(a) instances in which the percentages for any two groups in a given prediction are equal;
(b) the number of Situations actually analyzed (i.e., Situation 1–6 for Ambivalence and Positive; Situations 2–5 for Weak);
(c) instances in which the parental educational level precludes comparisons (e.g., an individual at the lowest parental educational level cannot be downwardly mobile).

When Tables 8 and 9 are examined independently, the findings relating mobility and identification patterns appear inconsistent. This apparent difference is reconciled when the tables are viewed in juxtaposition. The attitudes held by the upwardly mobile are significantly different from those of the "stables" in their parental status group (see Table 8), but not significantly different from those of the

"stables" in their current status group (see Table 9). Although the upwardly mobile are not identical to the "stables" at their present status level (for weak and positive identification patterns—see Table 9), they use them as their primary reference group. The downwardly mobile differ from the "stables" of their current group

TABLE 9

PREDICTIONS OF TYPES OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION OF MOBILE AND "STABLE" INDIVIDUALS, USING RESPONDENT'S EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AS A POINT OF ORIGIN

Predictions of Types of Ethnic Identification	Confirmed**	Not Confirmed	Level of Significance (By Sign Test)
Ambivalence*			
Upwardly mobile lower than "stable"	8	7	.50
Downwardly mobile higher than "stable"	11	2	.01
Upwardly mobile lower than downwardly mobile	8	4	.19
Consistent Weak			
Upwardly mobile lower than "stable"	13	8	.19
Downwardly mobile higher than "stable"	10	8	.76
Upwardly mobile lower than downwardly mobile	9	5	.21
Consistent Positive			
Upwardly mobile higher than "stable"	14	9	.20
Downwardly mobile lower than "stable"	20	4	.001
Upwardly mobile higher than downwardly mobile	8	10	—

* See second footnote to Table 7.
** The number of tests for each prediction is influenced by three factors:
  (a) instances in which the percentages for any two groups in a given prediction are equal;
  (b) the number of Situations actually analyzed (i.e., Situations 1–6 for for Ambivalence; five Situations for Positive; and six Situations for Weak);
  (c) instances in which the respondent's educational level precludes comparisons (e.g., an individual at the lowest educational level cannot be downwardly mobile with respect to parental educational level).

(see Table 9); apparently the latter are *not* their primary reference point. This is clarified by the fact that the downwardly mobile do not differ significantly from their parental status level in two of the three identification paterns (see Table 8). It is interesting that both mobile groups attempt to maximize their self-esteem by selecting the higher of their two potential reference groups (the parental level for the

downwardly mobile, and the current level for the upwardly mobile).
Furthermore, although both mobile groups equilibrate their attitudes,
the higher reference point determines the degree of change. While the
predictions based on equilibration of norms go in the expected direc-
tion, they all become significant when the probabilities of their *joint*
occurrence are considered.

Summary and Conclusion

The data presented in sections 1 and 2 of the Results clearly
support Frazier's thesis of the Negro "bourgeoisie." Negroes in the
higher status positions tend to have values more similar to those of the
white middle class, stronger desires to associate with whites, more
internalization of negative attitudes toward other Negroes, and rela-
tively weaker ethnic identification, than individuals in lower status
positions. By examining the compatibility of responses to different
questions (using the individual as the unit of analysis), we note that
both ambivalence and consistent weak identification patterns increase
with status, while consistent positive identification decreases. Refer-
ence group theory permits us to understand Frazier's ideas and our
related findings. It also allows us to make a series of predictions about
the relationship between identification and social mobility (regardless
of direction) from a consistent theoretical point of view. The identifi-
cation patterns of the upwardly and the downwardly mobile can be
explained by two factors: the simultaneous influence of two reference
groups, and the choice of the higher as the primary one, in an attempt
to maximize self-esteem. These conclusions are congruent with results
and interpretations reported in experimental studies with small groups.

The consideration of another potential reference group, the
aspired status group, might have enabled us to predict with greater
accuracy. This factor should be carefully evaluated by future re-
searchers in this area.

REFERENCES

FRAZIER, E. F. *Black Bourgeoisie*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957.
FULLER, H. W. Rise of the Negro Militant. *The Nation*, September 14, 1963, **197**,
    No. 7, 138-140.
HYMAN, H. H. *The Psychology of Status*. New York: Archives of Psychology,
    No. 269, 1942.
KLEINER, R. J., PARKER, S., AND TAYLOR, H. *Social Status and Aspirations in
    Philadelphia's Negro Population*. Philadelphia: Commission on Human
    Relations, 1962.
LEWIN, K. *Resolving Social Conflicts*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948.
LOMAX, L. E. The Negro Revolt against "the Negro leaders." *Harper's Magazine*,
    June 1960, **220**, No. 1321, 41-48.
MERTON, R. K. *Social Theory and Social Structure*, revised edition. Glencoe,
    Illinois: The Free Press, 1957.

Portrait of the Self-Integrator*

Helen MacGill Hughes and Lewis G. Watts

De Tocqueville found that the European, transplanted to North American shores, became a new man. Historians ever since have been busy distinguishing various regional Americans, defining each by peculiarities which are the mark of the geographical and social frontiers to which he had repaired. And it might be said that the Negro American is the latest in the succession of new men, evolving like those before him in response to new conditions of life. Among Negroes today the Northern, city-bred proletarian—urban in greater proportions than his white fellow-citizen—is a dominant type. The newest of all the new men, however, is a different Negro, one who is achieving recognizable shape before our eyes as a consequence of a generation or two of education and experience with city life and the modern organization of society.

It must be said at the outset that the everlasting special truth of the Negro bourgeoisie in the United States is not Negro history but white history. The early Negro middle-class, the minuscule elite of educated mulattoes and freedmen in the Southern towns, was devout, puritanical and devoted to the advancement of the race in a white society. In *Black Bourgeoisie*, Frazier describes another much later type of middle-class Negro as he saw it, with undisguised scorn.[1] He speaks of its members as seeking in conspicuous expenditure in a make-believe world of glamorous play some compensation for the recognition the white world withholds; as having money, but not enough of it, and no mission. Their news is personal gossip; their heroes are white playboys and the stars of the entertainment world; their cause is not the struggle against poverty and ignorance but for white acceptance; and their lives, he says, lack content and significance.

Still another reaction to white pressure was already apparent

[1] E. Franklin, Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 235-238.

when Frazier wrote, but its exemplars are now much grown in numbers and importance. Briefly put: in social type and style of life it is nearly impossible to distinguish them from their white counterparts. With them, the self-integrators, we are here concerned.

There have always been Negroes who "pass" by concealing their identity, who bury a Negro past and live a white present. They play a dangerous game and they play it solo. And there are some who "pass" on the job by day and return to the local Harlem after hours. But here we are discussing the *self-integrators*, the Negro family which takes the plunge, moves out of the Negro ghetto and establishes itself in the midst of white neighbors *as a Negro family*. This is the very opposite of passing; they conceal nothing but live a white present while remaining exactly what they are—or what they look.

This phenomenon is not "block-busting," which occurs when a real estate agent instigates a Negro family to move into a white street which is then rapidly filled up by more Negro families and eventually—things being what they are—is converted into a slum: an unhappy and all too familiar aspect of segregated housing. This new thing is quite different: the settling in a stable, middle-class and wholly white suburb of a single family of "respectable" Negroes whose presence seems to have no more effect upon property values or the social composition and population density of the neighborhood than would that of a white family of like standing. New and rare, the phenomenon of self-integration merits scrutiny and discussion, even though, the number being small and their experience brief, any generalizations must be tentative.

The Setting and the Study

Washington Park, a small section of Roxbury, which is Boston's Negro section, is in part to be rehabilitated, in part to be demolished and rebuilt as a project of urban renewal. Relics of long-departed comfort and decorum remain here and there in roomy New England mansions, curving driveways and tree-arched streets. Most of them are abused and neglected, but on certain streets well-to-do Negro property-owners carry on the prideful modes of the neighborhood's past; they have landscaped the grounds, air-conditioned the big houses, and their sports cars stand in the portes-cochères. But, cheek by jowl with them—this being a ghetto and a slum and cursed with the twin blights of segregation and over-crowding—are ramshackle buildings, their broken windows stuffed with paper and rags, their porches sagging, their paint blistered and peeling. There has been constant movement of Negro families from Washington Park,[2] but

---

[2] Time will tell if this is the "unslumming" Jane Jacobs speaks of in her controversial book, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York:

for the most part it does not remove them from the Negro world. Here we will describe nine self-integrating families who formerly lived in certain school districts of Washington Park and are now established in white suburbs. As far as we know, they are all who have done so in the past five years. The wives were our informants.

If it is hard to draw a composite picture of the self-integrators, it is perhaps because they range fairly widely through middle-class occupations and experiences. In all cases but one, the bread-winners are professional men: a $25,000-a-year physicist, a $15,000-a-year general medical practitioner, a $10,000-a-year dye designer, a $9,000-a-year computer programmer. The teacher whose salary is $9,000 is the only one with an employed wife, a teacher also, with a salary of $7,000; a third teacher earns $7,300, the mechanical engineer makes $8,000, the personnel officer, $7,000. The lowest earnings are those reported by the lone non-professional, a $6,000-a-year skycap at the airport, but he enjoys a handsome unspecified supplement in the form of tips. The families are small and young. In skin color the suburban couples are concentrated at the light end of a scale of six shades,[3] but the wives are the lighter. Four of the latter are rated as light, of whom two are light enough to "pass"; two are dark. Four husbands are also at the light end of the range, but none is very light; three are dark.

The self-integrators are city people. Half the spouses were born in Boston and the rest in northern cities, but for a wife from Ashville, North Carolina, one from Warrington, Georgia, and a husband from Dallas, Texas. Of the two women, the first was taken to Boston at the age of seven and has lived there for 45 years; the second came at eight and remained in Roxbury for 37 years. Two wives were life-

Random House, 1961), pp. 279, 284. She notes that "unslumming" in a racial ghetto comes hand-in-hand with relaxed discrimination: ". . . inner cities will go on losing too much of the Negro middle-class almost as fast as it forms until, in actual fact, the choice of remaining there no longer means for a colored person an implied acceptance of ghetto citizenship and status" (p. 285).

[3] As a device for rating skin color, interviewers were given a card depicting six hands in a row, colored in six shades, from nearly white to very deep brown. Repeated tests of the judgements of a number of the interviewers confirmed their ratings and justified confidence in the instrument.

This is to consider skin color in relation to "whiteness." But there is a more intriguing aspect of skin color: as a variable between husband and wife. It belongs in the sociology of color, a subject first broached in 1941 in *Color and Human Nature: Negro Personality Development in a Northern City* by W. Lloyd Warner, Buford H. Junker and Walter A. Adams (Washington, D.C.: The American Council on Education.) In three of the self-integrating couples, the wife was the darker. Would she shrink from the image of herself, conspicuous and marooned among white neighbors, while her lighter husband, accepted by his white colleagues in the office, is ready, perhaps even eager, to hazard residential integration?

long residents of Roxbury, and two more came from other parts of Boston.

The most striking attribute of the self-integrating couples is their prolonged schooling. Of the suburban husbands, all but one finished high school, and six had graduated from college. They named Lincoln, Fisk, Howard, Virginia State and Texas College, and the integrated schools, Boston University, Northeastern, Michigan, Illinois, M.I.T., and Harvard. Four had Master's Degrees and one is a Ph.D. Of their wives, seven had gone to college. Not only are they educated themselves, but several grew up in educated families.

Thus education among most of the suburbanites has meant not only a lengthy period of preparation for highly respected careers but for most of them association with white classmates and instructors in an atmosphere where equality is more nearly a fact than anywhere else in the United States.

Our interviews with the wives in 250 families of middle income still living in Washington Park[4] establish the fact that in many of their social characteristics[5] they, like the self-integrators, are middle-class. Thus, leaving the ghetto cannot be explained as simply a matter of social economics. Yet it is safe to say that qualities of middle-classness are prerequisites of moving into a suburb—just as with white people.

Why and How They Moved

The self-integrators' stated reasons for moving are in no sense racial—at first glance. They are the reasons that Rossi found actuate white families to move.[6] The Washington Park schools with their double shifts, their broken windows, their hordes of children from lower-class families lately arrived from the South, would supply a reason for moving in the mind of any middle-class parent.[7] Nor are

---

[4] To reduce housing problems to race, the criteria set up for the sample were selected so as to eliminate attributes which would make financing the purchase of a house difficult. Thus, the households were headed by couples (none widowed or divorced); none was over the age of 52; incomes were over $5,000; and none was in a disqualifying occupation. In short, all were, on the face of it, acceptable credit risks.

[5] Which are primary properties and which are their consequences is a moot question tackled by Hortense Powdermaker, for one, as long ago as 1939. (*After Freedom*, New York: Viking Press, p. 70.) Historically, a light skin was primary; a well-regarded occupation, income and prestige followed. *Cf.* Glenn's recent discussion of this point: "Negro Prestige Criteria: A Case Study in the Bases of Prestige," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVIII, no. 6 (May, 1963), p. 645.

[6] Peter H. Rossi, *Why Families Move: A Study in the Social Psychology of Urban Residential Mobility* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955).

[7] James A. Davis established the fact that the strongest correlate of advanced

the next-commonest reasons, the need for more space and to be closer to the husband's work, related to race; nor the determination to escape disorder, vice and crime, the filthy, unsafe streets and the ignorant, roistering neighbors; nor the shrewd calculation arrived at by two of the wives that money goes further for rent, food and clothing, elsewhere.

To attribute moving to ambitions for their children's education is a generally acceptable and praiseworthy version of the mobile Negro family's aspirations, whereas—as Horace Cayton pointed out in a recent conversation—to admit to a longing to join the white man in the white man's world is doubly dangerous. On the one hand, the whites may slap down invaders; on the other, the Negroes will cry "Traitor!" There is, no doubt, honest and urgent conviction behind the plea of education, but at the same time, may there not be a readiness to claim it, before others and themselves, that is not extended to their more complicated and ambivalent motives which, things being what they are, are racial reasons? Be that as it may, urban renewal, it seems, is just the final spur to an action long contemplated and desired, and typically precipitated by the school situation.

The wife of the doctor, now established in one of the "good" suburbs, related:

You somehow just put off moving. . . . We may have looked at half-a-dozen places before we bought. With the eldest in a good private school and the two younger children doing well for the time being in the Roxbury school, we could take our time. It will be several years before the two little ones will be ready for junior high school. But then we heard about this house. The owner was a Veterans' Administration doctor who was being transferred. He told my former boss, who is the head of the psychiatric department of the medical center; I was his secretary. But he found this house was not big enough for him and he told me about it. I phoned the owner and I told him we were colored—so there would be no trouble—but he said he did not care. And I loved this house at first sight. It cost us $23,000. We paid $8,000 in cash and we had no trouble in getting an FHA loan for improvements. Most of our friends who are professional people are ready to leave Roxbury now. They have the money. Maybe a few don't but they'll be tickled pink when they get the money for their houses from the Redevelopment Authority and can buy a new house with it. The push is what they need—and that's what urban redevelopment is: a push.

Race was not an immediate issue with her story. But not all transitions were so happy. To begin with the bitterest:

education is a mother who had it herself. *Cf. Great Aspirations: Volume I: Career Decisions and Educational Plans During College.* National Opinion Research Center Report 90, March, 1963. (Chicago, Ill.: The National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago.)

The personnel man's wife made 1,000 phone calls between 1958 and 1961 (but that may mean an average of just one a day). She believes the address and telephone exchange betrayed them on the occasions when she did not specify they were colored buyers, and she is sure they were treated prejudicially. The Chinese owner of an apartment refused to sell to them, and they resorted to the Fair Housing Committee and the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, which induced the owner to change his mind. The apartment is in a white suburb formerly of very high standing but now going downhill. Here they pay $150 a month, but the difference between that and the $70 they had been paying in Washington Park is much reduced by the fact that the larger rental includes utilities and heat and the new quarters are twice as large.

In all these trials they were encouraged by a white friend of the husband's in the office, who lives in the same section. Their neighbors, all white, have been cordial and helpful. The couple hopes eventually to buy a house there—which makes it appear they are reassured after their initial rebuff.

Of the other families, some were denied chances to buy; others thought they were; for example:

The suburban science teacher wanted better schools for his children, a shorter journey to work and more commodious quarters for himself, his wife and two small boys than they had when living in a $55-a-month apartment with relatives in Washington Park. They were sold a house by a family whose children had been his pupils. His wife had been rebuffed twice by agents and suspected more incidents of discrimination when agents made excuses. But when they bought their $19,000 house it was through a realty firm in their suburb and with a mortgage insured by a local bank.

To summarize: six dealt directly with owners and four of the seven who bought (two rented) got money for the purchase or for improvements from local suburban institutions. One family bought through a white broker in a neighboring suburb and one raised money in a Boston bank. At least three had the active help of white colleagues in finding new quarters. In the experience of these buyers, discrimination is most likely to be met with at the hands of owner or agent and may be encountered again at the bank. Thereafter the way is smooth. In nearly every case the new neighbors have proved helpful and congenial.

This is not to say that the self-integrators are completely at ease. The physician's wife, recounting amiable gestures made in her direction on the street and at a PTA meeting, more than once interjected, "Do they go out of their way to be nice because I'm colored, I wonder?"

How They Live

With astonishing rapidity, the self-integrators' lives take on the character and tempo of the white suburbanites', all about them. Said the doctor's wife:

When we decided to move out to this suburb, my husband and I thought it all out and we vowed we would not change churches or Sally's Brownie Troop or neglect our old friends in Roxbury, or change the children's music teacher. I kept the two younger ones in school until the end of the term and for two months I drove them every day back to Roxbury and then called to bring them home. The elder boy goes to a private school in another suburb and is driven there by an M.D. (white) with a son in the school; and I drive the boys home.

And now we've been here six months and we find it just can't be done. The days aren't long enough for all that running around. Sally has a new lot of friends here in school, and she wants to be in *their* Brownie troop. And I just can't run back and forth to Roxbury for her music lessons, though she had a fine teacher there. Besides that, she's in the community music center now, and it's just wonderful. The community has the money to try out new methods and keep up first-class equipment. It's a wonderful opportunity for her, and how could I keep her away from it?

The children go back to Roxbury to their friends' birthday parties, and our friends there come here to ours. But it's true, too, that when we go back to see our friends we keep finding they are moving away, too. I don't know any professional family in Roxbury that would not move now; they can afford it.

We do keep some ties, though. We are still going back to Roxbury to church. But the new bishop (he is a Negro) and his wife have both called on us and remarked that they hope to see us in church in the locality—they live here, too. But so far we have not changed.

I still do voluntary work at the hospital in Roxbury on certain mornings, and I try to get to the board meetings of the neighborhood house there, but it is hard for me to get away from here in the evenings the way I used to when I lived just a few blocks away from it. And I still work on the Cancer Drive and the March of Dimes, and I'm still in Am Vets. But now I'm a room-mother in the school here where our children are. My husband belongs to a lot of organizations, as well: The Elks, Am Vets, The Boston Professional Credit Union and others. But he never goes. Our pediatrician is white, a woman. She has her office on the outskirts of Boston, but she's on the staff of the Roxbury hospital where my husband is.

We have five dentists, between us! You know, professional courtesy prevents them from charging a doctor's family. So we spread it out. And all five are Negro dentists in Roxbury—all friends of ours.

Our lawyer is a Roxbury man. In fact, we have two, both Negroes. We go out of our way to get colored professional help whenever we can. There are so many good Negro lawyers. My husband's medical practice is ninety percent colored."

This is a picture of family which has had to make deliberate choices in almost every area of its life and has ended, so far, with what seems to it to be the best of the alternatives, sometimes drawing upon Roxbury, sometimes turning to resources convenient to their new home and perhaps better. Of course, none of the self-integrators has lived for long in the suburbs and with the passing of time they may commit themselves more deeply to suburban life. But some measure of living with one foot in the city, the other in the outskirts, may be common to all suburbanites. Thus two Negro and eight white medical doctors are consulted by the self-integrators. Of the latter, one, a woman pediatrician, has an office in Roxbury, but four are in the same suburbs as the patients, and two more are in nearby communities, for the mother needing a pediatrician or family doctor evidently does not hesitate to drop the Roxbury connection for help nearer at hand. They have thirteen dentists, of whom ten are Negro, Roxbury based. The only dentist consulted in the patient's own suburb was white. Needing lawyers when buying their houses, the self-integrators turned to two who are white, eight Negro: of the latter, six are in Roxbury.

Where the sense of racial identity is strong, the uprooted family may regularly return to the Negro church, that particular and almost symbolic institution. But several families in the suburbs have not yet made up their minds about church. "Our church in Roxbury," observed the science teacher's wife, "is friendly and church is a social occasion as much as religious. Everyone makes a point of greeting everyone else. But here people are more reverent (formal?) and not so friendly and they don't all speak to each other when they come out." Nevertheless, two Roman Catholic, one Congregational and one Episcopalian family have joined suburban churches. Three maintain their membership in Roxbury congregations (including the physician, 90% of whose patients are in Roxbury), and two compromise by joining an interdenominational university chapel whose chaplain is a well-known Negro minister.

The special art of pressing hair is a wholly racial practice; indeed, at the handling of their hair, many Negroes say the untrained hairdresser is inept and it is not surprising that four of the suburban housewives go to Roxbury and three go to one of the big Boston department stores with specially trained operators. Children are attended to at home or taken to suburban establishments.

The suburban husbands go back to Roxbury barbers. One wonders if, as much as anything, they are drawn back by the convivial atmosphere of the accustomed Roxbury barbershop, that haven "where the women cease from troubling and the wicked are at rest!" It is not irrelevant that the suburban school teacher complains that he never sees any Negro men any more and that when he wants a

game of golf he has to go all the way to Roxbury for partners. For
it may be that the suburbs offer the adult Negro male little by way
of relaxed fun. In his new middle-class orbit he—she, too, must, or
thinks he must, watch every gesture made in his direction and judge
whether it is calculated or sincere. To exchange the knowns of the
ghetto for the perhaps perilous unknowns of the white world in some
induces a nervous watchfulness—"Lately I've been going with my
husband to the agency's parties," confessed the personnel man's wife,
"and I felt peculiar and a bit uncomfortable when the boss asked
me to dance. This is the first time I have ever danced with a white
person."—"Did the school principal remember my name, among all
those people at the PTA meeting," asks the doctor's wife, "because
of what we are?"

Yet, even within the race, the self-integrators are not to any
notable degree joiners. They lean toward social, fraternal and pro-
fessional clubs and are not quick to ally themselves with specifically
racial organizations. Only three families among them contain members
of the NAACP, and one husband is on the board of the Urban League.
None belong to CORE. All in all, their attitude to the racial organiza-
tions appears to be one of passive approval. But the Black Muslims
they logically repudiate as separatist—though the doctor's wife ob-
serves that they imbue their members—("the ones I know are poor
and not well-educated")—with racial pride and morale.

Several of the suburban spouses who belong to social clubs or
college fraternities or sororities report that they find it too far to
go to the meetings; or, as the science teacher's wife admitted, it costs
too much. The wife who teaches, the doctor's and the engineer's wives
return to Roxbury to give their services to a settlement house, but
each complains of the long trip. Yet the engineer's wife appreciates
the institution as a bridge between the families "brave enough to
move out" and their friends back in the slums.

Little by little the suburban families are for the most part dis-
engaging themselves from their ties to the city and becoming en-
meshed in school, church and neighborhood where they now find
themselves. But if they end by abandoning their churches and clubs
and their share in Washington Park's communal life, most of them
were not, in any case, leaders there. The race leaders remain in Rox-
bury. A few politicians, ministers and other civic leaders in Roxbury
tried to dissuade one or two of the self-integrators from moving: for
one thing, they deplore the attrition of Roxbury's elite and, for an-
other, they have high hopes that urban renewal is about to usher
in a revitalized, well-balanced Negro life there.[8] But for these and

---

8 Whereas in Chicago and New York and certain sections of Boston, urban
renewal is denounced as "Negro clearance," in Roxbury it is supported by local
Negro leaders. A local congregation is organizing to draw up its own plans for

an occasional ambivalent or disapproving individual, the families and friends of the suburbanites have acclaimed their moving with enthusiasm.—"My sisters just love to come here," exclaims the personnel assistant's wife.—At their children's birthday parties, the self-integrators' conscientious hospitality includes guests from the old and the new localities and cuts across race lines. Several of the suburban couples have already begun to play a part in their new communities. Four parents go to PTA meetings; two are leaders in children's groups: the Boy Scouts, Brownies and Little League baseball. The teacher's wife has already entertained the nominating committee of the "young marrieds" of the Congregational Church—but she admits wryly that several Southerners among the members have not yet spoken to her. The physicist's wife remarks that fifty members of the suburban Congregational Church have invited her to join them. At the same time, her Roxbury social club has met in her new home and she herself goes thrice weekly to engagements in town. The dye designer's neighbors have asked him to be a candidate for selectman. Thus the web of life of the Negro suburbanite changes decisively at critical points.

Meanwhile, it must be said that the child integrators have played their social roles well and apparently at no great emotional cost to themselves. But as an educational experience, suburban life may here and there prove traumatizing at first. A second-grader transplanted from the ghetto may find himself demoted to the first grade in the new school. For, as the doctor's wife was warned by her seven-year-old son's teacher and as the boy himself is learning by hard experience, it is one thing to mark time with slum children in a Negro school and another to compete with ambitious Jewish children in the suburbs!

How Much Integration Do They Want?

The children for whose sake the drastic step was taken have, on the whole, become happy and successful suburbanites, even when they are the only ones of their race in their classrooms. The dye designer's 13-year-old boy had to fight his way to acceptance on the school ground and finally succeeded, but his four little sisters, too young for school, have taken longer to find friends. Their experience suggests the hypothesis that the self-integrating child's sex may enter into his adjustment.

The mothers are all looking ahead to the time when their sons

rebuilding a tract and to apply for federal aid. Of the 250 Washington Park wives, 64% think urban renewal will promote integration in housing and 72% said, "Yes" when asked: "Do you think urban renewal will improve housing opportunities for you?"

will want teen-aged girl friends. (Of 23 children in the self-integrating families, the only three of high school age are boys; all the others are very young.) The doctor's wife is "not offended" by mixed marriages but "would not wish it" for her own children. But the teacher's wife thinks that when the time comes she will let the child decide, though she knows her husband would never consent even to mixed dating— "and the white girl's parents would not want it, either." Although the 17-year-old son of the school-teaching couple, a popular high school football captain, is already having dates with white girls, his mother, unequivocally opposed to intermarriage, speaks of "cultural differences." On the other hand, the program director's wife, who had dates with white boys when in high school, says she has no objections to interracial social life at all; nor does the dye designer's wife, mother of a 13-year-old and four small girls; and she adds that her husband agrees. Briefly, their opinions cover the range of conventional stands on *ethnic* mixture, as though the situation paralleled the Cohens-and-Kelleys dilemma. But the realities are yet to be faced.

Conclusions

This is a portrait of the new Negro. A few outstanding men of the race have become personages in the bigger world of white people, hitherto, but always because of some signalizing talent. But the self-integrators of Boston are not touched by genius. The frontiers on which they press are those of personality and class; self-confidence— or desperation—and bourgeois aspirations.

Such people hold dear good schools, the regard of congenial neighbors and a clean, orderly community—values of the middle class to gain which they will plan and save, deferring immediate gratification.[9] Socially mobile, they move their place of residence, as middle-class Americans do, to match their rising socio-economic status.

But this status cannot be matched in the ghetto-slum. Nor can they remain there if they are to rescue their children from the negligible challenge of the slum school and slum classmates and give them the education suited to their class in appropriate settings. And over and above the indictment of the racial ghetto is the longing to be part of the better world of white people—to enter the main-stream of American life, as two of the wives put it—that is not always

9 *Cf.* comparison of the key values of the middle and the working class in *Status of the Working Class in Changing American Society,* by Lee Rainwater and Gerald Handel (Chicago, Ill.: Social Research Inc., 145 E. Ohio St., no. 173 1, February, 1961), pp. 47, 78-86. The authors show the middle-class spends to achieve status, the working-class, comfort; the middle-class plans for their children's education, and 33% of their sample families were already saving toward it, but the working-class talk of it yet only 14% were putting money by. These findings are also reported in the authors' *Working Man's Wife* (New York: Oceana Publications, 1959).

acknowledged, perhaps not always admitted to full consciousness, and is not inconsistent with their determined efforts not to lose touch with members of their own race. Their personal experience has imparted to the nine self-integrating families not enough of the too-often well-grounded fear and dread of whites which, as Cayton so tellingly describes it, has in many Negroes become an almost crippling phobia,[10] to keep them from moving out.

Given his education and his professional mentality, the new middle-class suburban Negro is, properly speaking, a function, too, of something else: the expanding housing market. In Boston there are houses which Negroes can buy in large enough supply to permit reasonable choice[11] and the self-integrators are precisely the individuals with the class-bound qualities and ambitions, the money and the urge to seek suburban life for what it offers. And if the transplanting calls for courage and encouragement, they have enough of both. As the physicist's wife put it: "The real problem in race relations is the lower-class Negro. In Boston the upper- and middle-class family has no great handicap—but many of them don't know it."

In the suburbs the self-integrator's style of life matches that of the other residents, different in color but alike in social class. While most of them belong in the Negro elite,[12] in white suburban Boston

[10] Horace R. Cayton, "Psychology of the Negro Under Discrimination," in Arnold M. Rose (ed.), *Race Prejudice and Discrimination: Readings in Intergroup Relations in the United States* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 276-290 Also James Baldwin, "Down at the Cross," in *The Fire Next Time* (New York: The Dial Press, 1963), pp. 67-70, 82-83. Of the 250 wives interrogated in Washington Park, 9% though it "unsafe" for Negroes to buy or rent in white neighborhoods; 10% said "Yes" to the question: "Do you think homes purchased by Negroes in white neighborhoods in Boston are ever destroyed by bombs or fire?"

[11] The Federation of Fair Housing Committees between March and November, 1962, had listed 400 houses and apartments in the center and suburbs of Boston whose owners agreed to put them on the market without restrictions as to race or creed. They range in price from $10,000 to over $40,000. This supply far exceeds the demand.

An analysis of the housing market as it extends to Negroes in Boston appears in Lewis G. Watts, *The Mobility Inclinations of Middle-Income Negro Families Residing in a Neighborhood Undergoing Urban Renewal*, esp. Chapter VI: "Can Negro Middle-Income Families Integrate?" (On file at The Florence Heller Graduate School for Advanced Studies in Social Welfare, Brandeis University.)

[12] The disparity between class position in society including both races and in society of Negroes only is shown in the following data from the sample of Washington Park wives:

"Compared with most people—white and Negro—what class do you consider yourself in? Lower, working, middle, or upper class?"

	Lower	Working	Middle	Upper	Don't Know
no.	2	98	133	13	4
%	0.8	39.8	54.1	5.3	1.6

they fit into the human surroundings as middle-class, of middle-class income, though several will certainly have had an education superior to their neighbors'.

But to be self-integrators it is not at all necessary to be assimilationists.[13] They think of themselves as Americans who differ from their white neighbors in certain biological ways which they expect to see perpetuated in their children. The suburban Negro family—if this small sample is any test—looks like just that: a Negro family living in the suburbs.

"How about comparison with Negroes only? Lower, working, middle, or upper?"

	Lower	Working	Middle	Upper	Don't Know
no.	0	64	140	36	10
%	0.0	26.7	58.3	15.0	4.0

The social distribution of these families, as rated by Warner's Index of Social Characteristics, in the middle categories is:

	Upper Lower	Lower Middle	Upper Middle
no.	69	94	24
%	27.6	37.6	9.6

Judith R. Kramer and Seymour Leventman report the upper class among third-generation Jews as more acculturated than the middle and lower classes. Cf. *Children of the Gilded Ghetto: Conflict Resolutions of Three Generations of American Jews* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961). If, for the moment, integration may be equated with acculturation, then the suburban Negroes, like the country-club Jews of the "gilded ghetto," lead the way.

13 Parenthetically, the road traveled by the immigrant from Europe is, of course, far from fully comparable to that of the Negro. The latter, for one thing, had no competing culture to repudiate. For another, he entered at the bottom, not of urban society, as did the Irish and the immigrant Jews, but of agrarian, which has long been a shrinking fraction of the national economy, and so has had additional adaptations to make, apart from the encumbrance of color and high visibility.

Biographical Sketches

Issue Editors

THOMAS F. PETTIGREW is a Lecturer in Social Psychology in the Social Relations Department of Harvard University. Prior to joining the Harvard faculty, he received his Ph.D. in social psychology from Harvard, conducted race relations research at the University of Natal in Durban, South Africa, and taught at the University of North Carolina. He is co-author of a volume on the Little Rock ministry, *Christians in Racial Crisis*, and recently completed a volume on the psychological characteristics of Negro Americans, *A Profile of the Negro American.*

DANIEL C. THOMPSON is Professor of Sociology at Howard University. He holds the M.A. in Social Relations from Harvard University and the Ph.D. in Sociology from Columbia University. He has lectured widely on race relations and has published several articles on that subject. He is co-author of *The Eighth Generation* and is author of *The Negro Leadership Class.*

Other Contributors

KURT W. BACK is Professor of Sociology in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology and of Medical Sociology in the Department of Psychiatry at Duke University. He received his Ph.D. from the Research Center of Group Dynamics at MIT and has been working at the Bureau of the Census, Bureau of Applied Social Research, University of Puerto Rico, and University of North Carolina. He is author of *Slums, Projects and People*, and co-author of *Social Pressures in Informal Groups, The Family and Population Control, The Survey Under Unusual Conditions*, and articles in the fields of social psychology, methodology, family planning and decision making.

WILLIAM F. BRAZZIEL, an Ohio State Ph.D., is the Director of General Education for the Norfolk Division of Virginia State College. He formerly held posts at Central State College in Ohio and Southern University in Louisiana; he has also served as a consultant to the U.S. Department of Labor's Office or Manpower Automation and Training. In addition to numerous journal publications, he has recently contrib-

uted to both *Higher Education in Engineering and Science* and *Problems in the Retraining of Adult Workers*.

BERT R. BROWN is Research Associate and Assistant Instructor at the Institute for Development Studies of the New York Medical College, Department of Psychiatry. He received his M.A. degree in 1961 in social psychology from Columbia University and is currently completing requirements for his doctorate. He was on the staff of The Psychological Corporation during 1960 and served as Assistant Director for Research on the National Purpose project during 1961.

MARTIN DEUTSCH is Associate Professor of Psychiatry and Director of the Institute for Developmental Studies at New York Medical College. A social and developmental psychologist, he has, since receiving his Ph.D., been engaged in research in cognitive development, learning disabilities, prejudice and discrimination as well as the effects of disadvantaged environments on a range of psychological functions.

EDGAR G. EPPS is a Professor of Sociology at Florida A. and M. University. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology at Washington State University, with a thesis on interrelationships among socio-economic status, race, level of aspiration, and juvenile delinquency. He has maintained an active research interest in processes associated with these variables, and has co-authored a number of papers.

JACOB R. FISHMAN is Assistant Professor of Psychiatry and Program Director of the Center for Youth and Community Studies at the Howard University College of Medicine, Washington, D.C. He received his M.D. degree from Boston University Medical School, and psychiatric training at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, New York City. He is formerly Research Psychiatrist in the Adult Psychiatry Branch of the National Institute of Mental Health. His major research interests are in social psychiatry and the psychosocial and psychoendocrine aspects of adolescent development, with emphasis on youth and social action.

HELEN MacGILL HUGHES, the last to take the doctorate under Robert Park at the University of Chicago, was a correspondent for *Time* magazine, a Sociology Fellow of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, and in 1944 joined the staff of the *American Journal of Sociology*. She was the *Journal*'s managing editor from 1954 to 1961. She is at present consultant to a study of mobility of Negro families in Boston being conducted at Brandeis University, and to a delinquency study and the National Principalship Study of Harvard University.

IRWIN KATZ is an Associate Professor of Psychology and a Project Director in the Research Center for Human Relations at New York University. For the past several years he has been conducting experimental research on the determinants of Negro intellectual efficiency in biracial environments, using principally male college students as subjects. He is the author of numerous research papers in this area, as well as *Conflict and Harmony in an Adolescent Interracial Group* (NYU Press), 1955.

ROBERT KLEINER is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at Temple University. He received his Ph.D. in Social Psychology from the Department of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania. From 1956 to 1962, when he joined the Temple University faculty, he was research director of the Eastern Mental Health Center of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare. His major areas of interest are motivation theory and reference group theory, especially in their relationship to mental disorder.

DONALD L. NOEL is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Washington. He received his Ph.D. in 1961 from Cornell University. Currently, he is pursuing his interests in minority group identification and reactions to intergroup situations with the planning of work with Japanese-Americans.

SEYMOUR PARKER is an Associate Professor at Michigan State University, with a joint appointment in the Departments of Social Science and Sociology and Anthropology. He is a Cultural Anthropologist, having received his Ph.D. from Cornell University. Prior to joining Michigan State University in 1963, he spent six years with the Department of Psychiatry at Jefferson Medical College, Philadelphia. He is particularly interested in the socio-cultural and social-psychological factors in mental disorder.

JAMES M. ROBINSON is an assistant principal of a public high school in Nashville. He received his M.S. in Education from Howard University, where he also did graduate work in Psychology. In 1950 he was an Assistant Research Psychologist and Instructor in Psychology at Fisk University. He has co-authored research publications on factors in motor and intellectual performance.

IDA HARPER SIMPSON is assistant professor of sociology at Duke University. She received her Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of North Carolina and has also been affiliated with the College of William and Mary, Pennsylvania State University, and the Schools of Nursing at the University of Illinois. She has written numerous articles

in the fields of occupational sociology, and sociology of the professions, and has just completed editing with her husband, Richard Simpson, a reader in introductory sociology which is being published by Wiley.

FREDERIC SOLOMON is the National Institute of Mental Health Career Teaching Fellow in Psychiatry at the Howard University College of Medicine. He is also a candidate of the Washington Psychoanalytic Institute and a Fellow in Child Psychiatry at the Children's Hospital of the District of Columbia. He holds the M.D. degree from the University of Chicago and was formerly a Clinical Associate and Research Psychiatrist at the National Institute of Mental Health in Bethesda, Maryland. His main research interest has been in the social and developmental psychology of adolescents and college students, with special emphasis on social action.

LEWIS G. WATTS is Executive Director, Hunter's Point Youth Opportunities Center, San Francisco, California. He received a Doctor of Philosophy Degree from the Florence Heller Graduate School for Advanced Studies in Social Welfare, Brandeis University and is the co-author of the forthcoming book, *The Middle Income Negro's Stake in the Ghetto*. He is also the author of *Racial Tensions in a Northern City*. Prior to Brandeis, Dr. Watts was the Executive Director of the Seattle, Washington Urban League.

PATRICIA WALY is a Graduate Assistant in Social Psychology at New York University's Research Center for Human Relations. Her interests include motivation and performance, and psychometrics.

BACK, KURT AND SIMPSON, IDA H., The Dilemma of the Negro Professional,
   J. soc. Issues, 1964, 20, 2, 60-70.

   The pattern of response to the position of the Negro professional, who is
at once in favored (professional) and disfavored (Negro) minorities is analyzed.
Analysis of Census data shows that in the South Negroes tend to cluster in
"protected" professions, while outside differences in distribution among professions
cannot be explained in this way. To investigate this matter further, a group of
Negro medical students were studied and three types are distinguished: "non-
salient" (apathetic on racial discrimination), "optimists" (wanting protected
clientele), and "pessimists" (opposed to discrimination). The previous experiences
and career plans of these three types are analyzed.

BRAZZIEL, WILLIAM F., Correlates of Southern Correlates of Negro Personality,
   J. soc. Issues, 1964, 20, 2, 46-53.

   The study attempted to explore the effects of segregated social systems and
caste sanctions on the personalities and need structures of Negro college students.
Results of the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule for Negro college Ss in a
deep south institution were compared with need patterns of Negro college Ss in a
border state institution. Both were compared to white norm groups in northern
and western colleges. Significant differences were found in needs involving
dominance, autonomy and deference factors in favor of norm groups and border
state Ss. Differences were more pronounced when rural deep south Ss were
compared alone.

DEUTSCH, MARTIN AND BROWN, BERT, Social Influences in Negro-White
   Intelligence Differences, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, 2, 24-35.

   Negro and white first and fifth grade children in the New York City public
schools were given the Lorge-Thorndike non-verbal tests of intelligence followed
by a series of home interviews and mail questionnaires which were sent to their
parents. The relationship between I.Q., socio-economic status (SES) and a variety
of environmental-deprivational variables was explored. Intelligence test perform-
ance was found to be significantly related to race, SES, family stability (e.g.,
absence or presence of father in the home) and whether or not children had a
formal pre-school learning experience such as day care center or nursery school
attendance. The findings lend support to a "cumulative deficit" hypothesis
regarding the incremental effects of social deprivation on intelligence test
performance.

HELEN MacGILL HUGHES and LEWIS G. WATTS, Portrait of the Self-Integrator, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, 2, 103-114.

In advance of urban renewal, nine Negro families have recently left Boston's Negro ghetto and taken up residence in various white suburban communities. These, the self-integrators, are light-skinned; were reared in Northern cities, have had advanced education, usually in integrated institutions; and are families supported by a single breadwinner, the husband, whose occupation brings him white colleagues. They are, in short, at home in the white world. They move to escape slum conditions and to rescue their children from slum schools. Established in the suburbs, they keep some ties with the Negro community but also enter into the local life.

KATZ, IRWIN, ROBINSON, JAMES M., EPPS, EDGAR G., and WALY, PATRICIA, Race of Experimenter and Instructions in the Expression of Hostility by Negro Boys, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, 2, 54-60.

Negro male high school students were informally given a disguised verbal test of aggression by a Negro adult, and again at a later time by either a white or a Negro adult who described it either neutrally or as an intelligence test. Under neutral instructions average scores in both the white-tester and Negro-tester groups remained about the same. But with test instructions the aggression scores *increased* when the experimenter was Negro, and *decreased* when the experimenter was white. The interpretation is that hostile impulses aroused by test instructions could be expressed only with the Negro tester.

NOEL, DONALD L., Group Identification Among Negroes: An Empirical Analysis, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, 2, 71-84.

Group identification is characterized as a multi-dimensional phenomenon composed of several types of group pride and group disparagement. Data from 515 Negro respondents provide independent measures of *militant* pride and *general* disparagement enabling classification of the respondents as positive, negative or ambivalent in their pattern of group identification. Analysis indicates that (positive) identification with the minority in-group is positively associated with social class, NAACP membership and interracial social contact and negatively associated with frustration, authoritarianism and generalized prejudice. It is concluded that the correlates of group identification vary significantly with the type of identification.

PARKER, SEYMOUR AND KLEINER, ROBERT, Status Position, Mobility, and Ethnic Identification of the Negro, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, 2, 85-102.

This paper is based on a larger study concerned with goal striving and psychopathology in an urban Negro population. Our theoretical purpose is to show that Frazier's characterization of the "Black Bourgeoisie" can be subsumed under current formulations of reference group theory. The specific problems are: (a) the attitudes and values of individuals at several social status levels, (b) the extent to which conflicting attitudes about ethnic identification, observed at the group level of analysis, are reflected in individual members of the group, and (c) the differences in ethnic identification among stable, upwardly mobile, and downwardly mobile individuals at each of the status levels.

PETTIGREW, THOMAS F., The Negro American Personality: Why Isn't More Known?, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, 2, 4-23.

Three reasons why there is not more scientific understanding of Negro American personality are offered: (1) the narrowness and atheoretical nature of many of the studies on the problem; (2) the methodological difficulties inherent in this research and the widespread failure to overcome these problems; and (3) the need for a broad social psychological theory of Negro American personality. The necessary theory must treat the unique historical and socio-cultural forces behind the group, the subtle reflections of these forces within the Negro's personality, and the mediating mechanisms operating between these two levels of analysis. The salience and importance of the area demand urgent theoretical and empirical attention.

SOLOMON, FREDERIC AND FISHMAN, JACOB R., Youth and Social Action: II. Action and Identity Formation in the First Student Sit-In Demonstration, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, 2, 36-45.

This paper deals with the personal history of one of the four students who initiated the student civil rights movement by "sitting-in" at a lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina on February 1, 1960. Discussion is focused primarily upon the identity possibilities and accompanying affect of some Negro college students, and how issues of self-esteem and identity formation may be tentatively resolved through "pro-social acting out" on behalf of racial equality and social justice. An attempt is made to document a unique intersection of personal psychosocial development with contemporary social change.

SUPPLEMENT*

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES
Volume XX, Number 2, 1964

Introduction

The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues has for some years been following the practice of organizing Work Groups among its members to consider in depth particular social problems that seemed amenable to psychological clarification and public action. High on the priority list of such problems were ones that related to desegregation. It was plain that the Supreme Court decision of 1954 was only a first step toward achieving equal opportunity, that many additional steps would be necessary if educational equality for all Americans was to be a reality. In 1961 a Work Group under the chairmanship of Professor Joshua A. Fishman was formed; its members were Drs. Martin Deutsch, Leonard Kogan, Robert North, and Martin Whiteman. Their specific objective was to explore ways in which the talents and capacities of minority group children could be assessed so that they might be wisely guided with regard to their future education. Conventional instruments of mental testing, experience had shown, were too often fashioned to fit the intellectual and social ways of middle-class children with the result that minority group children were being excluded from opportunities for training because of the accident of what has come to be called "cultural deprivation."

The present report examines how this unfortunate situation may be remedied and its objective is to set down some criteria for interpreting test scores obtained from children who do not have the advantages of the middle-class child. But it is more than that, for the guidelines set forth can also serve as a basis for constructing more appropriate testing instruments. It is the hope of the Society that the report will stimulate a reformulation of the issue of intelligence testing of such an order that present, often inadvertant, injustices can be removed.

<div align="right">

Jerome S. Bruner, *President*
Society for the Psychological Study
of Social Issues

</div>

Guidelines for Testing Minority
Group Children*

Introduction

American educators have long recognized that they can best guide the development of intellect and character of the children in their charge if they take the time to understand these children thoroughly and sympathetically. This is particularly true with respect to the socially and culturally disadvantaged child.

Educators must realize that they hold positions of considerable responsibility and power. If they apply their services and skills wisely they can help minority group children to overcome their early disadvantages, to live more constructively, and to contribute more fully to American society.

Educational and psychological tests may help in the attainment of these goals if they are used carefully and intelligently. Persons who have a genuine commitment to democratic processes and who have a deep respect for the individual, will certainly seek to use educational and psychological tests with minority group children in ways that will enable these children to attain the full promise that America holds out to all its children.

Educational and psychological tests are among the most widely used and most useful tools of teachers, educational supervisors, school administrators, guidance workers, and counselors. As is the case with many professional tools, however, special training and diagnostic sensitivity are required for the intelligent and responsible use of these instruments. That is why most colleges and universities offer courses in educational and psychological testing. It is also the reason for the growing number of books and brochures designed to acquaint educators and their associates with the principles and procedures of proper test selection, use and interpretation.[1]

---

* Prepared by a Work Group of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (Division 9 of the American Psychological Association), Martin Deutsch, Joshua A. Fishman, *Chairman*, Leonard Kogan, Robert North, and Martin Whiteman.

[1] See, for example, Katz (1958), Froelich and Hoyt (1959), Cronbach (1960), Anastasi (1961), Thorndike and Hagen (1961).

Responsible educational authorities recognize that it is as unwise to put tests in the hands of untrained and unskilled personnel as it is to permit the automobile or any highly technical and powerful tool to be handled by individuals who are untrained in its use and unaware of the damage that it can cause if improperly used.

The necessity for caution is doubly merited when educational and psychological tests are administered to members of minority groups. Unfortunately, there is no single and readily available reference source to which test users can turn in order to become more fully acquainted with the requirements and cautions to be observed in such cases. The purpose of this committee's effort is to provide an introduction to the many considerations germane to selection, use and interpretation of educational and psychological tests with minority group children, as well as to refer educators and their associates to other more technical discussions of various aspects of the same topic.

The term "minority group" as we are using it here is not primarily a quantitative designation. Rather it is a status designation referring to cultural or social disadvantage. Since many Negro, Indian, lower-class white, and immigrant children have not had most of the usual middle-class opportunities to grow up in home, neighborhood, and school environments that might enable them to utilize their ability and personality potentials fully, they are at a disadvantage in school, and in after-school and out-of-school situations as well. It is because of these disadvantages, reflecting environmental deprivations and experiential atypicalities, that certain children may be referred to as minority group children.

The following discussion is based in part on some of the technical recommendations developed for various kinds of tests by committees of the American Psychological Association, the American Educational Research Association, and the National Council on Measurement in Education (1954, 1955). Our contribution is directed toward specifying the particular considerations that must be kept in mind when professional educators and those who work with them use educational and psychological tests with minority group children.

Critical Issues in Testing Minority Groups

Standardized tests currently in use present three principal difficulties when they are used with disadvantaged minority groups: (1) they may not provide reliable differentiation in the range of the minority group's scores, (2) their predictive validity for minority groups may be quite different from that for the standardization and validation groups and (3) the validity of their interpretation is strongly dependent upon an adequate understanding of the social and cultural background of the group in question.

I. Reliability of Differentiation

In the literature of educational and psychological testing, relatively little attention has been given to the possible dependence of test reliability upon subcultural differences. It is considered essential for a test publisher to describe the reliability sample (the reference group upon which reliability statements are based) in terms of factors such as age, sex, and grade level composition, and there is a growing tendency on the part of test publishers to report subgroup reliabilities. But to the best of our knowledge, none of the test manuals for the widely used tests give separate reliability data for specific minority groups. Institutions that use tests regularly and routinely for particular minority groups would do well to make their own reliability studies in order to determine whether the tests are reliable enough when used with these groups.

Reliability Affected by Spread of Scores

In addition to being dependent on test length and the specific procedure used for estimating reliability (e.g., split-half or retest), the reliability coefficient for a particular test is strongly affected by the spread of test scores in the group for which the reliability is established. In general, the greater the spread of scores in the reliability sample, the higher the reliability coefficient. Consequently, if the tester attempts to make differentiations within a group which is more homogeneous than the reference or norm group for which reliability is reported, the actual effectiveness of the test will find to be lower than the reported reliability coefficient appears to promise. For many tests, there is abundant evidence that children from the lower socio-economic levels commonly associated with minority group status tend to have a smaller spread of scores than do children from middle-income families, and such restriction in the distribution of scores tends to lower reliability so far as differentiation of measurement with such groups is concerned.[2]

Characteristics of Minority Group Children that Affect
Test Performance

Most of the evidence relating to the contention that the majority of educational and psychological tests tend to be more unreliable, i.e., more characterized by what is technically called "error variance," for minority group children, is indirect, being based on studies of social class and socio-economic differences rather than on minority group performance *per se*. Nevertheless, the particular kinds of minority groups that we have in mind are closely associated with the lower

---

[2] See Anastasi (1958) and Tyler (1956).

levels of socio-economic status. The results of studies by Warner, Davis, Deutsch, Deutsch and Brown, Havighurst, Hollingshead, Sears, Maccoby, and many others are cases in point. Many of these studies are discussed by Anastasi (1958), Tyler (1956) and Deutsch (1960).

For children who come from lower socio-economic levels, what characteristics may be expected to affect test performance in general, and the accuracy or precision of test results in particular? The list of reported characteristics is long, and it is not always consistent from one investigation to another. But, at least, it may be hypothesized that in contrast to the middle-class child the lower-class child will tend to be less verbal, more fearful of strangers, less self-confident, less motivated toward scholastic and academic achievement, less competitive in the intellectual realm, more "irritable," less conforming to middle-class norms of behavior and conduct, more apt to be bilingual, less exposed to intellectually stimulating materials in the home, less varied in recreational outlets, less knowledgeable about the world outside his immediate neighborhood, and more likely to attend inferior schools.

Some Examples

Can it be doubted that such characteristics—even if only some of them apply to each "deprived" minority group—will indeed be reflected in test-taking and test performance? Obviously, the primary effect will be shown in terms of test validity for such children. In many cases, however, the lowering of test validity may be indirectly a result of lowered test reliability. This would be particularly true if such characteristics interfere with the consistency of performance from test to retest for a single examiner, or for different examiners. Consider the following examples and probable results:

Example: A Negro child has had little contact with white adults other than as distant and punitive authority figures. *Probable Result:* Such a child might have difficulty in gaining rapport with a white examiner or reacting without emotional upset to his close presence. Even in an individual testing situation, he might not respond other than with monosyllables, failing to give adequate answers even when he knows them. The examiner, reacting in terms of his own stereotypes, might also lower the reliability and validity of the test results by assuming that the child's performance will naturally be inferior, and by revealing this attitude to the child.

Example: Children from a particular minority group are given little reason to believe that doing well in the school situation will affect their chance for attaining better jobs and higher income later in life. *Probable Result:* Such children will see little purpose in schooling, dislike school, and will reject anything associated with school. In

taking tests, their primary objective is to get through as rapidly as possible and escape from what for them might be an uncomfortable situation. Their test performance might, therefore, be characterized by a much greater amount of guessing, skipping, and random responses that is shown by the middle-class child who never doubts the importance of the test, wants to please his teacher and parents, and tries his best.

Special Norms Often Needed

When the national norms do not provide adequate differentiation at the lower end of the aptitude or ability scale, special norms, established locally, are often useful. For instance, if a substantial number of underprivileged or foreign-background pupils in a school or school district rank in the lowest five per cent on the national norms, local norms might serve to provide a special scale within this range. If the score distribution with the first few percentiles of the national norms is mainly a function of chance factors, however, a lower level of the test or an easier type of test is needed for accurate measurement of the low-scoring children.

Responsibilities of Test Users

The sensitive test user should be alert to reliability considerations in regard to the particular group involved and the intended use of the tests. In assessing reports on test reliability provided by test manuals and other sources, he will not be satisfied with high reliability coefficients alone. He will consider not only the size of the reliability samples, but also the nature and composition of the samples and the procedures used to estimate reliability. He will try to determine whether the standard error of measurement varies with score levels, and whether his testing conditions are similar to those of the reliability samples. He will ask whether the evidence on reliability is relevant to the persons and purposes with which he is concerned. He will know that high reliability does not guarantee validity of the measures for the purpose in hand, but he will realize that low reliability may destroy validity.

The examiner should be well aware that test results are characteristically influenced by cultural and subcultural differentials and that the performance of under-privileged minority group children is often handicapped by what should be test-extraneous preconditions and response patterns. He should not necessarily assume that the child from a minority group family will be as test-sophisticated and motivated to do his best as are the majority of environment-rich middle-class children.

If the examiner finds—and this will be typical—that the reliability sample does not provide him with information about the reliability of

the test for the kind of children he is testing, he should urge that the test results not be taken at face value in connection with critical decisions concerning the children. Very often, careful examination of responses to individual test items will indicate to him that the apparent performance of the child is not adequately reflecting the child's actual competence or personality because of certain subcultural group factors.

II. Predictive Validity

Of course, if an individual's test scores were to be used only to describe his relative standing with respect to a specified norm group, the fact that the individual had a minority-group background would not be important. It is when an explanation of his standing is attempted, or when long-range predictions enter the picture (as they usually do), that background factors become important.

For example, no inequity is necessarily involved if a culturally disadvantaged child is simply reported to have an IQ of 84 and a percentile rank of 16 on the national norms for a certain intelligence test. However, if this is interpreted as meaning that the child ranks or will rank no higher in learning ability than does a middle-class, native born American child of the same IQ, the interpretation might well be erroneous.

Factors Impairing Test Validity

Three kinds of factors may impair a test's predictive validity. First, there are test-related factors—factors or conditions that affect the test scores but which may have relatively little relation to the criterion. Such factors may include test-taking skills, anxiety, motivation, speed, understanding of test instructions, degree of item or format novelty, examiner-examinee rapport, and other general or specific abilities that underlie test performance but which are irrelevant to the criterion. Examples of the operation of such factors are found in the literature describing the problems of white examiners testing Negro children (Dreger and Miller, 1960), of American Indian children taking unfamiliar, timed tests (Klineberg, 1935), and of children of certain disadvantaged groups being exposed for the first time to test-taking procedures (Haggard, 1954).

It should be noted that some test-related factors may not be prejudicial to disadvantaged groups. For example, test-taking anxiety of a disruptive nature (Sarason et al., 1960) may be more prevalent in some middle-class groups than in lower-class groups. In general, however, the bias attributable to test-related factors accrues to the detriment of the culturally disadvantaged groups.

The problem of making valid predictions for minority group children is faced by the Boys' Club of New York in its Educational

Program,[3] which is designed to give promising boys from tenement districts opportunities to overcome their environmental handicaps through scholarships to outstanding schools and colleges. Although the majority of the boys currently enrolled in this program had mediocre aptitude and achievement test scores up to the time they were given scholarships, practically all of the boys have achieved creditable academic success at challenging secondary boarding schools and colleges. In this program, normative scores on the Otis Quick-Scoring Mental Ability Test and the Stanford Achievement Test are used for screening purposes, but they are regarded as minimal estimates of the boys' abilities. The Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) is frequently used in this program to supplement the group tests. The boys typically score 5 to 10 points higher on the WISC than on the Otis, probably because the WISC gives less weight to educational and language factors.

Interest and Personality Inventory Scores

When standardized interest inventories are used, special caution should be observed in making normative interpretations of the scores of culturally disadvantaged individuals. When a child has not had opportunities to gain satisfaction or rewards from certain pursuits, he is not likely to show interest in these areas. For example, adolescent children in a particular slum neighborhood might rank consistently low in scientific, literary, musical, and artistic interests on the Kuder Preference Record if their home and school environments fail to stimulate them in these areas. With improved cultural opportunities, these children might rapidly develop interests in vocations or avocations related to these areas.

Scores on personality inventories may also have very different significance for minority group members than for the population in general (Auld, 1952). Whenever the inventory items tap areas such as home or social adjustment, motivation, religious beliefs, or social customs, the appropriateness of the national norms for minority groups should be questioned. Local norms for the various minority groups involved might again be very much in order here.

Predicting Complex Criteria

A second class of factors contributing to low predictive validity is associated with the complexity of criteria. Criteria generally represent "real life" indices of adjustment or achievement and therefore they commonly sample more complex and more variegated behaviors than do the tests. An obvious example is the criterion of school grades.

---

[3] Information about this program is obtainable from The Boys Club of New York, 287 East 10th Street, New York, N.Y.

Grades are likely to reflect motivation, classroom behavior, personal appearance, and study habits, as well as intelligence and achievement. Even if a test measured scholastic aptitude sensitively and accurately, its validity for predicting school marks would be attenuated because of the contribution of many other factors to the criterion. It is important, therefore, to recognize the influence of other factors, not measured by the tests, which may contribute to criterion success. Since disadvantaged groups tend to fare poorly on ability and achievement tests (Anastasi, 1958; Tyler, 1956; Masland, Sarason, and Gladwin, 1958; Eels et al., 1951; Haggard, 1954), there is particular merit in exploring the background, personality, and motivation of members of such groups for compensatory factors, untapped by the tests, which may be related to criterion performance.

In some instances, such as in making scholarship awards on a statewide or national basis, test scores are used rigidly for screening or cut-off purposes to satisfy demands for objectivity and "impartiality." The culturally disadvantaged child (quite possibly a "diamond-in-the-rough") is often the victim of this automatic and autocratic system. Recourse lies in providing opportunities where the hurdles are less standardized and where a more individualized evaluation of his qualifications for meeting the criterion may prove to be fairer for him.

For example, the following characteristics that may be typical of minority group children who have above-average ability or talent are among those cited by DeHaan and Kough (1956), who have been working with the North Central Association Project on Guidance and Motivation of Superior and Talented Secondary School Students:

> They learn rapidly, but not necessarily those lessons assigned in school.
>
> They reason soundly, think clearly, recognize relationships, comprehend meanings, and may or may not come to conclusions expected by the teacher.
>
> They are able to influence others to work toward desirable or undesirable goals.

Effects of Intervening Events on Predictions

A third set of contributors to low criterion validity is related to the nature of intervening events and contingencies. This class of conditions is particularly important when the criterion measure is obtained considerably later than the testing—when predictive rather than concurrent validity is at stake. If the time interval between the test administration and the criterial assessment is lengthy, a host of situational, motivational, and maturational changes may occur in the interim. An illness, an inspiring teacher, a shift in aspiration level or in direction of interest, remedial training, an economic misfortune, an

emotional crisis, a growth spurt or retrogression in the abilities sampled by the test—any of these changes intervening between the testing and the point or points of criterion assessment may decrease the predictive power of the test.

One of the more consistent findings in research with disadvantaged children is the decline in academic aptitude and achievement test scores of such children with time (Masland, Sarason, and Gladwin, 1958). The decline is, of course, in relation to the performance of advantaged groups or of the general population. It is plausible to assume that this decline represents the cumulative effects of diminished opportunities and decreasing motivation for acquiring academic knowledge and skills. When such cumulative effects are not taken into consideration, the predictive power of academic aptitude and achievement tests is impaired. If it were known in advance that certain individuals or groups would be exposed to deleterious environmental conditions, and if allowances could be made for such contingencies in connection with predictions, the test's criterion validity could be improved.

Looking in another direction, the normative interpretation of the test results cannot reveal how much the status of underprivileged individuals might be changed if their environmental opportunities and incentives for learning and acquiring skills were to be improved significantly. In the case of the Boy's Club boys mentioned above, estimates of academic growth potential are made on the basis of knowledge of the educational and cultural limitations of the boys' home and neighborhood environment, observational appraisals of the boys' behavior in club activities, and knowledge of the enhanced educational and motivational opportunities that can be offered to the boys in selected college preparatory schools. With this information available, the normative interpretation of the boys' scores on standardized tests can be tempered with experienced judgment, and better estimates of the boys' academic potential can thus be made.

In situations where minority group members are likely to have to continue competing with others under much the same cultural handicaps that they have faced in the past, normative interpretation of their aptitude and achievement test scores will probably yield a fairly dependable basis for short-term predictive purposes. When special guidance or training is offered to help such individuals overcome their handicaps, however, achievement beyond the normative expectancies may well be obtained, and predictions should be based on expectancies derived specifically from the local situation. In this connection, it should be recognized that attempts to appraise human "potential" without defining the milieu in which it will be given an opportunity to materialize are as futile as attempts to specify the horsepower of an engine without knowing how it will be energized.

"Culture Fair" and "Unfair"—in the Test and in Society

The fact that a test differentiates between culturally disadvantaged and advantaged groups does not necessarily mean that the test is invalid. "Culturally unfair" tests may be valid predictors of culturally unfair but nevertheless highly important criteria. Educational attainment, to the degree that it reflects social inequities rather than intrinsic merit, might be considered culturally unfair. However, a test must share this bias to qualify as a valid predictor. Making a test culture-fair may decrease its bias, but may also eliminate its criterion validity. The remedy may lie in the elimination of unequal learning opportunities, which may remove the bias in the criterion as well as in the test. This becomes more a matter of social policy and amelioration rather than a psychometric problem, however.

The situation is quite different for a test that differentiates between disadvantaged and advantaged groups even *more* sharply than does the criterion. The extreme case would be a test that discriminated between disadvantaged and advantaged groups but did not have any validity for the desired criterion. An example of this would be an academic aptitude test that called for the identification of objects, where this task would be particularly difficult for disadvantaged children but would not be a valid predictor of academic achievement. Here, one could justifiably speak of a true "test bias." The test would be spuriously responsive to factors associated with cultural disadvantage but unrelated to the criterion. Such a test would not only be useless for predicting academic achievement, but would be stigmatizing as well.

While certain aptitude and ability tests may have excellent criterion validity for some purposes, even the best of them are unlikely to reflect the true *capacity for development* of underprivileged children. For, to the extent that these tests measure factors that are related to academic success, they must tap abilities that have been molded by the cultural setting. Furthermore, the test content, the mode of communicaion involved in responding to test items, and the motivation needed for making the responses are intrinsically dependent upon the cultural context.

Elixir of "Culture-Fair" Tests

The exilir of the "culture-fair" or "culture-free" test has been pursued through attempts to minimize the educational loading of test content and to reduce the premium on speed of response. However, these efforts have usually resulted in tests that have low validities for academic prediction purposes and little power to uncover hidden potentialities of children who do poorly on the common run of academic aptitude and achievement tests.

In spite of their typical cultural bias, standardized tests should not be sold short as a means for making objective assessments of the traits of minority-group children. Many bright, non-conforming pupils, with backgrounds different from those of their teachers, make favorable showings on achievement tests, in contrast to their low classroom marks. These are very often children whose cultural handicaps are most evident in their overt social and interpersonal behavior. Without the intervention of standardized tests, many such children would be stigmatized by the adverse subjective ratings of teachers who tend to reward conformist behavior of middle-class character.

III. The Validity of Test Interpretation

The most important consideration of all is one that applies to the use of tests in general—namely, that test results should be interpreted by competently trained and knowledgeable persons wherever important issues or decisions are at stake. Here, an analogy may be drawn from medical case history information that is entered on a child's record. Certain features of this record, such as the contagious-disease history, constitute factual data that are easily understood by school staff members who have not had medical training. But other aspects of the medical record, as well as the constellation of factors that contribute to the child's general state of health, are not readily interpretable by persons outside the medical profession. Consequently, the judgment of a doctor is customarily sought when an overall evaluation of the child's physical condition is needed for important diagnostic or predictive purposes. So, too, the psychological and educational test records of children should be interpreted by competently trained professional personnel when the test results are to be used as a basis for decisions that are likely to have a major influence on the child's future.

There are several sources of error in test interpretation stemming from a lack of recognition of the special features of culturally disadvantaged groups. One of these may be called the "deviation error." By this is meant the tendency to infer maladjustment or personality difficulty from responses which are deviant from the viewpoint of a majority culture, but which may be typical of a minority group. The results of a test might accurately reflect a child's performance or quality of ideation, but still the results should be interpreted in the light of the child's particular circumstance in life and the range of his experiences. For example, a minister's son whose test responses indicate that he sees all women as prostitutes and a prostitute's son whose test responses give the same indication may both be accurately characterized in one sense by the test. The two boys may or may not

be equally disturbed, however. Clinically, a safer inference might be that the minister's son is the one who is more likely to be seriously disturbed by fantasies involving sex and women.

There is evidence to indicate that members of a tribe that has experienced periodic famines would be likely to give an inordinate number of food responses on the Rorschach. So too might dieting Palm Beach matrons, but their underlying anxiety patterns would be quite different than those of the tribesmen. Or, to take still another example, the verbalized self-concept of the son of an unemployed immigrant might have to be interpreted very differently from that of a similar verbalization of a boy from a comfortable, middle-class, native-American home.

A performance IQ that is high in relation to the individual's verbal IQ on the Wechsler scales *may* signify psychopathic tendencies but it also may signify a poverty of educational experience. Perceiving drunken males beating up women on the Thematic Apperception Test may imply a projection of idiosyncratic fantasy or wish, but it may also imply a background of rather realistic observation and experience common to some minority group children.

For children in certain situations, test responses indicating a low degree of motivation or an over-submissive self-image are realistic reflections of their life conditions. If these children were to give responses more typical of the general population, they might well be regarded as sub-group deviants. In short, whether test responses reflect secondary defenses against anxiety or are the direct result of a socialization process has profound diagnostic import so that knowledge of the social and cultural background of the individual becomes quite significant.

What Does the Test Really Measure

A second type of error, from the viewpoint of construct and content validity,[4] might be called the "simple determinant error." The error consists in thinking of the test content as reflecting some absolute or pure trait, process, factor, or construct, irrespective of the conditions of measurement or of the population being studied. Thus, a fifth-grade achievement test may measure arithmetical knowledge in a middle-class neighborhood where most children are reading up to grade level, but the same test, with the same content, may be strongly affected by a reading comprehension factor in a lower-class school and therefore may be measuring something quite different than what appears to be indicated by the test scores.

Generally, the test-taking motivation present in a middle-class

---

[4] For a discussion of various types of test validity, see Anastasi (1961), Cronbach (1960), Guilford (1954), Thorndike and Hagen (1961), Lindquist (1950).

group allows the responses to test content to reflect the differences in intelligence, achievement, or whatever the test is designed to measure. On the other hand in a population where test success has much less reward-value and where degree of test-taking effort is much more variable from individual to individual, the test content may tap motivation as well as the trait purportedly being measured.

Caution and knowledge are necessary for understanding and taking into account testing conditions and test-taking behavior when test results are being interpreted for children from varying backgrounds. A child coming from a particular cultural subgroup might have very little motivation to do well in most test situations, but under certain conditions or with special kinds of materials he might have a relatively high level of motivation. As a result, considerable variability might be evident in his test scores from one situation to another, and his scores might be difficult to reconcile and interpret.

How a question is asked is undoubtedly another important factor to consider in interpreting test results. A child might be able to recognize an object, but not be able to name it. Or, he might be able to identify a geometric figure, but not be able to reproduce it. Thus, different results might be obtained in a test depending upon whether the child is asked to point to the triangle in a set of geometric figures or whether he is required to draw a triangle.

Response Sets May Affect Test Results

In attitude or personality questionnaires, response sets[5] such as the tendency to agree indiscriminately with items, or to give socially desirable responses, may contribute error variance from the viewpoint of the content or behavior it is desired to sample. To the extent that such sets discriminate between socially advantaged and disadvantaged groups, the target content area may be confounded by specific test format. Thus, a scale of authoritarianism may be found to differentiate among social classes, but if the scale is so keyed that a high score on authoritarianism is obtained from agreement with items, the social class differences may be more reflective of an agreement set rather than an authoritarian tendency. If authoritarian content is logically distinct from agreement content, these two sources of test variance should be kept distinct either through statistical control, by a change in the item format, or by having more than one approach to measurement of the trait in question.

From the standpoint of content validity, there is a third type of error. This may be termed the "incompleteness of content coverage" error. This refers to a circumscribed sampling of the content areas in

---

[5] For a discussion of this and related concepts, see Anastasi (1961), Cronbach (1960).

a particular domain. In the area of intelligence, for instance, Guilford (1954) has identified many factors besides the "primary mental abilities" of Thurstone and certainly more than is implied in the unitary concept of intelligence reflected by a single IQ score. As Dreger and Miller (1960) point out, differences in intellectual functioning among various groups cannot be clearly defined or understood until all components of a particular content area have been systematically measured.

Familiarity with the cultural and social background of minority-group children not only helps to avoid under-evaluating the test performance of some children, but also helps to prevent over-evaluating the performance of others. For example, children who have been trained in certain religious observances involving particular vocabularies and objects, or those who have been encouraged to develop particular skills because of their cultural orientations, might conceivably score "spuriously" high on some tests or on particular items. In other words, any special overlap between the subgroup value-system of the child and the performances tapped by the test is likely to be an important determinant of the outcome of the test.

Failure Barriers May Be Encountered

Failure inducing barriers are often set up for the minority-group child in a testing situation by requiring him to solve problems with unfamiliar tools, or by asking him to use tools in a manner that is too advanced for him. To draw an analogy, if a medical student were handed a scalpel to lance a wound, and if the student were to do the lancing properly but were to fail to sterilize the instrument first, how should he be scored for his accomplishment? If he had never heard of sterilization, should his skillful performance with the instrument nevertheless be given a "zero" score? Similarly, if a child from a disadvantaged social group shows a considerable degree of verbal facility in oral communication with his peers but does very poorly on tests that stress academic vocabulary, can he justifiably be ranked low in verbal aptitude?

In a broad sense, most intelligence test items tap abilities involving language and symbol systems, although opportunities for developing these abilities vary considerably from one social group to another. One might reasonably expect that a child living in a community that minimizes language skills—or, as depicted by Bernstein (1960), a community that uses a language form that is highly concrete—will earn a score that has a meaning very different from that of the score of a child in a community where language skills are highly developed and replete with abstract symbolism. It is important, therefore, to interpret test results in relation to the range of situations and behaviors found in the environments of specific minority groups.

Some Suggested Remedies

While this analysis of the problems involved in the use and interpretation of tests for minority group children may lead to considerable uneasiness and skepticism about the value of the results for such children, it also points up potential ways of improving the situation. For example, one of these ways might consist of measuring separate skills first, gradually building up to more and more complex items and tests which require the exercise of more than one basic skill at a time. With enough effort and ingenuity, a sizable universe of items might be developed by this procedure. Special attention should also be given to the selection or development of items and tests that maximize criterial differentiations and minimize irrelevant discriminations. If a test is likely to be biased against certain types of minority groups, or if its validity for minority groups has not been ascertained, a distinct *caveat* to that effect should appear in the manual for the test.

Furthermore, we should depart from too narrow a conception of the purpose and function of testing. We should re-emphasize the concept of the test as an integral component of teaching and training whereby a floor of communication and understanding is established and *learning* capabilities are measured in repeated and cyclical fashion.

Finally, we should think in terms of making more use of everyday behavior as evidence of the coping abilities and competence of children who do not come from the cultural mainstream. Conventional tests may be fair predictors of academic success in a narrow sense, but when children are being selected for special aid programs or when academic prediction is not the primary concern, other kinds of behavioral evidence are commonly needed to modulate the results and implications of standardized tests.

Conclusion

Tests are among the most important evaluative and prognostic tools that educators have at their disposal. How unfortunate, then, that these tools are often used so routinely and mechanically that some educators have stopped *thinking* about their limitations and their benefits. Since the minority group child is so often handicapped in many ways his test scores may have meanings different from those of non-minority children, even when they are numerically the same. The task of the conscientious educator is to ponder what lies behind the test scores. Rather than accepting test scores as indicating fixed levels of either performance or potential, educators should plan remedial activities which will free the child from as many of his handicaps as possible. Good schools will employ well qualified persons to use good tests as one means of accomplishing this task.

In testing the minority group child it is sometimes appropriate to compare his performance with that of advantaged children to determine the magnitude of the deprivation to be overcome. At other times it is appropriate to compare his test performance with that of other disadvantaged children—to determine his relative deprivation in comparison with others who have also been denied good homes, good neighborhoods, good diets, good schools and good teachers. In most instances it is especially appropriate to compare the child's test performance with his previous test performance. Utilizing the individual child as his own control and using the test norms principally as "bench marks," we are best able to gauge the success of our efforts to move the minority group child forward on the long, hard road of overcoming the deficiencies which have been forced upon him. Many comparisons depend upon tests, but they also depend upon *our* intelligence, our good will, and our sense of responsibility to make the proper comparison at the proper time and to undertake proper remedial and compensatory action as a result. The misuse of tests with minority group children, or in any situation, is a serious breach of professional ethics. Their proper use is a sign of professional and personal maturity.

REFERENCES

American Educational Research Association and National Committee on Measurements Used in Education. *Technical recommendations for achievement tests.* Washington, D.C., National Educational Association, 1955.

American Psychological Association. Technical recommendations for psychological tests and diagnostic techniques. *Psychol. Bull.*, 1954, 51, No. 2.

ANASTASI, A. *Psychological testing.* (2nd Ed.) New York: Macmillan, 1961.

ANASTASI, A. *Differential psychology.* (3rd Ed.) New York: Macmillan, 1958.

AULD, F., JR. Influence of social class on personality test responses. *Psychol. Bull.*, 1952, 49, 318-332.

BERNSTEIN, B. Aspects of language and learning in the genesis of the social process, *J. child Psychol. Psychiat.*, 1961, 1, 313-324.

BERNSTEIN, B. Language and social class. *Brit. J. Sociol.*, 1960, 11, 271-276.

CHRONBACH, L. *Essentials of psychological testing.* (2nd Ed.) New York: Harper, 1960.

DEHAAN, R., AND KOUGH, J. Teacher's guidance handbook: Identifying students with special needs (Vol. I Secondary School Edition). Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1956.

DEUTSCH, M. *Minority group and class status as related to social and personality factors in scholastic achievement.* (Monograph No. 2) Ithaca, New York: The Society for Applied Anthropology, 1960.

DEUTSCH, M. The disadvantaged child and the learning process: some social psychological and developmental considerations. In H. Passow (Ed.), *Education in depressed areas.* New York: Teachers College Press, 1963.

DEUTSCH, M., AND BROWN, B. Some data on social influences in Negro-white intelligence differences. *J. social Issues*, XX, No. 2, 24-35.

DREGER, R., AND MILLER, K. Comparative psychological studies of Negroes and Whites in the United States. *Psychol. Bull.*, 1960, 57, 361-402.

EELLS, K., ET AL. *Intelligence and cultural differences.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.

FISHMAN, J. A., AND CLIFFORD, P. I. What can mass testing programs do for-and-to the pursuit of excellence in American Education? *Harvard Educ. Rev.,* 1964, 34, 63-79.

FROEHLICH, C., AND HOYT, K. *Guidance testing.* (3rd Ed.). Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1959.

GUILFORD, J. *Psychometric methods* (2nd Ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954.

HAGGARD, E. Social status and intelligence: an experimental study of certain cultural determinants of measured intelligence. *Genet. Psychol. Monogr.,* 1954, 49, 141-186.

KLINEBERG, O. *Race differences.* New York: Harper, 1935.

KATZ, M. *Selecting an achievement test: Principles and procedures.* Princeton: Educational Testing Service, 1958.

LINDQUIST, E. (Ed.) *Educational Measurement.* Washington: American Council of Education, 1950.

MASLAND, R., SARASON, S., AND GLADWIN, T. *Mental subnormality.* New York: Basic Books, 1958.

SARASON, S. ET AL. *Anxiety in elementary school children.* New York: Wiley, 1960.

THORNDIKE, R., AND HAGEN, E. *Measurement and evaluation in psychology and education.* (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley, 1961.

TYLER, L. *The psychology of individual differences* (2nd Ed.). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AS USED IN THE TEXT

Criterion. A standard that provides a basis for evaluating the validity of a test.

Cultural bias. Propensity of a test to reflect favorable or unfavorable effects of certain types of cultural backgrounds.

Culture-fair test. A test yielding results that are not culturally biased.

Culture-free test. A test yielding results that are not influenced in any way by cultural background factors.

Error variance. The portion of the variance of test scores that is related to the unreliability of the test.

Educational loading. Weighing of a test's content with factors specifically related to formal education.

Norms. Statistics that depict the test performance of specific groups. Grade, age, and percentile are the most common type of norms.

Normative scores. Scores derived from the test's norms.

Reliability. The degree of consistency, stability, or dependability of measurement afforded by a test.

Reliability coefficient. A correlation statistic reflecting a test's consistency or stability of measurement.

Standard deviation. A statistic used to depict the dispersion of a group of scores.

Standard error of measurement. An estimate of the standard deviation of a person's scores that would result from repeated testing with the same or a similar test, ruling out the effects of practice, learning, or fatigue.

Validity. The extent to which a test measures the trait for which it is designed, or for which it is being used, rather than some other trait.

SUBSCRIPTION FORM

Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues
Institute for Social Research
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Name ....

Street Address ....

City and State ....

☐ Please begin this subscription to the *Journal of Social Issues* with Volume XVIII, No. 1. I enclose $5.50 for my subscription to Volume XVIII (4 numbers).

☐ I enclose................for a subscription for..........years, beginning with Volume...................., Number 1.

Total Enclosed: $.......................

BACK NUMBER ORDER FORM

The Journal of Social Issues
Acme Printing and Reproductions
611 South Maple Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Name ....

Street Address ....

City and State ....

Please send me the following previous issues of the *Journal* (Specify Volume and Numbers): ....

....

....

Total Enclosed: ....
(Payment *must* be enclosed with all orders of $3.00 or less. Make checks payable to: *Journal of Social Issues*.)

Schedule of Prices

Number of copies ordered	1	2-9	10-24	25-49	50-199	200-299
Price per copy	$1.50	$1.00	85c	70c	65c	60c

(Prices are the same for regular numbers and supplement numbers.)

The Journal of

SOCIAL
ISSUES

spssi

Volume XIX
1963

INDEX
Journal of Social Issues

Previous Issues

Kurt Lewin
Memorial Address
1964

ALFRED J. MARROW

Education as
Social Invention

JEROME S. BRUNER

spssi

XX July, 1964 / No. 3

THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES

Published Quarterly

© Copyright 1964 by The SOCIETY FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
STUDY OF SOCIAL ISSUES

A Division of

THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
Annual Subscription: $5.50   Single Copy $1.50

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues is a group of over a
thousand psychologists and allied social scientists who share a concern with re-
search on the psychological aspects of important social issues. SPSSI is governed
by Kurt Lewin's dictum that "there is nothing so practical as a good theory." In
various ways, the Society seeks to bring theory and practice into focus on human
problems of the group, the community, and the nation as well as the increasingly
important ones that have no national boundaries. This Journal has as its goal the
communication of scientific findings and interpretations in a non-technical manner
but without the sacrifice of professional standards.

The Journal typically publishes a whole number on a single topic. An
occasional number will be devoted to contributed papers relevant to the purpose
of the Journal. Proposals for new issues and individual papers should be sent to
the Incoming General Editor.

ROBERT CHIN, *General Editor JSI* Human Relations Center, Boston University,
Boston 15, Massachusetts

JOSHUA FISHMAN *Incoming General Editor, JSI*, Graduate School of Education,
Yeshiva University

spssi

The Journal of
SOCIAL
ISSUES

spssi

Contents

The Kurt Lewin Memorial Award Presentation to Alfred J. Marrow

Los Angeles, September 5, 1964

Donald W. MacKinnon

Today we meet for the presentation of the Kurt Lewin Memorial Award and to hear the Lewin Memorial Lecture. Thus for the sixteenth time the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues honors a man who, like Kurt Lewin, has contributed significantly to the development of psychological research and social action.

In a year which has been marked by the passage of the Civil Rights Act and marred by mounting racial tensions we are especially mindful of the contributions of Kurt Lewin, and those who have followed in his footsteps, to the resolving of social conflicts, and at the same time keenly aware of how unfinished is the task to which Kurt Lewin literally gave his life. In this year the selection of Alfred J. Marrow as the recipient of the Memorial Award seems especially appropriate, for, of all those who knew Lewin and worked with him none has labored more effectively or more devotedly to bridge the gap between social theory and social action in industry and society than has Alfred Marrow.

While still a student Marrow discovered the exciting researches of Kurt Lewin then appearing in the *Psychologische Forschungen* and would have gone to study with him in Berlin had the economic and political climate in Germany at that time been more favorable. Instead in this country he undertook for his doctoral dissertation a typically Lewinian research in which he investigated very carefully the relation between the intensity of need and the Zeigarnik quotient. The results of this research were published in Marrow's papers on "Goal tension and recall."

Already at work in the textile industry while still a graduate student Marrow was attracted to an academic and research career, on the one hand, and a business career on the other. In this situation, as so often in his life and in the lives of others, he achieved an effective and creative resolution of conflict, for though he chose a career in

1

industry, he saw to it that his factories were also centers for action research. As early as 1939 he interested Lewin in problems of interpersonal relations and group dynamics in the industrial setting of his own factory. In the years thereafter the Harwood Manufacturing Company was an important research facility in which such coworkers of Lewin as Alex Bavelas and John R. P. French conducted a series of pioneering action-research projects which have become well known as the Harwood Studies.

Marrow also collaborated with Lewin in establishing two agencies in which Lewin was to develop his new methods of action research for the study of group dynamics and the resolution of social tensions: the Commission on Community Interrelations of the American Jewish Congress and the Research Center for Group Dynamics.

Words once used by Marrow to describe Lewin are equally applicable to himself, for like Lewin he has "an extraordinary talent for dramatizing social science to lay people and for making them understand how research [can] be scientifically meaningful and socially useful." In addition to some forty papers which he has written, there are his four books: *Living Without Hate* (1951), a study of the application of scientific methods to the reduction of those community tensions that make for intergroup conflict; *Making Management Work* (1957), a report of two decades of psychological research on motivation and morale among employees of industry; *Changing Patterns of Prejudice* (1962), which gives us a new look at today's religious, and cultural tensions, a book enriched by Marrow's years of service on the New York City Commission on intergroup Relations of which he was Chairman from 1956 to 1960; and his latest book, *Behind the Executive Mask* (1964), a report on the use of sensitivity training in industry.

The honors and awards which Alfred Marrow has received attest to his many contributions as social scientist and concerned citizen, as do his services on many boards: appointment by the Department of State as consultant to the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, a member of the Board of The New School for Social Research, of The National Training Laboratories, of The Center for the Behavioral Sciences of George Washington University, of The Hebrew University in Jerusalem, of the American Foundation for Managerial Research. After serving many years as President of the Harwood Company whose programs of action research have contributed so greatly to our increasing knowledge of industrial psychology, he serves now as Chairman of the Board of the expanded Harwood-Weldon Company.

The selection of Alfred J. Marrow as this year's recipient of the Kurt Lewin Memorial Award has brought congratulatory messages from Senator Hubert H. Humphrey and Mayor Robert Wagner. Their noting of this award is indicative of the effective liaison which Alfred

Marrow as ault between the realm of social science and the field of political action.

Mrs. a Wagner's wire reads, "Please extend my sincerest congratulations to Dr. Alfred J. Marrow on this auspicious occasion. The 1964 Kurt Lewin Memorial Award is indeed a high honor and I feel sure Dr. Marrow's experience and contributions to the understanding and improvement of social life in the United States makes him uniquely qualified to accept this award."

For all your accomplishments SPSSI has the honor of presenting to you Alfred Marrow, this scroll, inscribed as follows.

Kurt Lewin Memorial Award
granted by the Society for the
Psychological Study of Social Issues
to
Alfred J. Marrow
1964
for furthering in his work, as did
Kurt Lewin, the Development and integration
of psychological research and social action.

It is now my privilege to present to you Dr. Marrow whose Memorial address is entitled, "Risks and Uncertainties in Action Research."

KURT LEWIN MEMORIAL AWARD ADDRESS—1964

Risks and Uncertainties in Action Research

Alfred J. Marrow[1]

Seventeen years ago Kurt Lewin's heart failed, bringing sudden death to him in the midst of his remarkable career. He combined, as no other psychologist of his generation, scholarship of rare brilliance in the scientific study of the human mind, and moral commitment to establishing freedom and lasting peace in human affairs. His contributions to theory and practice are undimmed by the passing of time. He brought to psychology gifts of unparalleled richness.

I recall three lectures in remembrance of what he was and what he taught which were given at the annual convention of the American Psychological Association in 1947. I was privileged at that time to deliver one of these lectures together with Professors Gordon Allport and Edward Tolman. I said then that something unforgettable had gone out of our lives because Lewin's everyday activities were so interwoven with our own.

He had said of himself 11 years earlier—in 1936—that he was "unable to think productively as a single person" and that he needed a collection of friends interested in "all fields of psychology and concerned as much with experiments as with theories."[2] And this same need to work with a group has been equally true of those of us who, attracted by his teachings, had gathered round him during the late 1930's and formed a closely knit team. None of us is precisely a Lewinian disciple repeating the Lewinian discipline. He would have been irked by such a relationship. But each of us, in his own way, has found in the postulates of his system of psychology, in their experimental testings, and

---

[1] Address prepared for delivery in accepting *The Kurt Lewin Memorial Award* of The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues at the American Psychological Association Convention, Statler Hilton Hotel, Los Angeles, California, September 5, 1964.

[2] Lewin, Kurt. Principles of Topological Psychology, McGraw Hill, 1936.

in their outcome as well as their promise, the most reliable guidelines
for our diverse endeavors.

"Psychology," Dr. Ebbinghaus said, "has a long past and a short
history." Our particular mode of psychologizing has a shorter history
than most. My memory goes back to the late 30's when Lewin was
still much of a newcomer here. I remember the spirited yet always
good-natured sessions often extending long past midnight in a com-
pany that included friends like Bavelas, Cartwright, Dembo, French,
Likert, Lippitt or colleagues like Wertheimer, Kofka, Kohler, Moreno,
Mead, McGregor and many others, discussing the theoretical and
practical roles of psychology and how they might serve in bettering
human relationships.[3] Our discussions led to empirical studies; to ef-
forts to initiate new field inquiries into group phenomena; to rethink
social processes in terms of topological and vector dynamics; and to
devise experiments on complex social situations.

Lewin's[4] own studies during his last years reached into many
fields of interpersonal and intergroup relationships; each with its own
line of fruitful development since his death. In two of these I had
the good fortune to work very closely with him for a long period. One
project was concerned with social research and action to meet prob-
lems of prejudice and discrimination in community life; the other was
concerned with reaching a scientific understanding of the management
of people in industry. It is of these two fields that I shall speak on this
day of remembrance for Kurt Lewin.[5]

To me the two overlap; many of their components are organically
interdependent. At least in terms of the postulates that we have come
to call group dynamics they can be treated as coming under one head-
ing and shaping into one design. And as such, they challenge the in-
sights of the psychologists who seek to improve social practice and to
gain a better understanding of the nature of society and group life.

The cluster of problems constituting the challenge are of course
those that keep recurring in every human institution and human so-
ciety. Their solutions have been as transient as the problems have been
recurrent. They require of the psychologists working on them to be
alert to their own limitations and to seek not only new insights and
new methods but also new guiding principles for applying scientific
knowledge to social practice. We have learned from Lewin the vital
importance of these requirements and we have striven to satisfy them.

Lewin in the late 1930's had reasons for urgency. The growing
menace of Nazism, the aftermath of the Depression, and the threat of

---

[3] Lewin, Kurt. Character and Personality, 1935, 3, 175-187.

[4] Lippitt, R. Sociometry 1947, 10, p. 87 contains a bibliography of Lewin's
writings.

[5] Many of the references to Lewin's point of view quoted in this paper are
from unpublished memoranda in the personal files of the author.

the Second World War, impelled him to urge psychologists to seek deeper explanations of why people and groups behave as they do. "We must be equally concerned," he said, "with discovering how people can change their ways so that they learn to behave better. Psychology," he insisted, "must turn its attention to the social issues which are significant for our time."[6] It was not until several years later (1944) that Lewin found the opportunity to work on projects intimately related to the harsh realities of intergroup relations in American life. This opportunity would never have come into being without Lewin's singlehanded initiative, enthusiastic support and brilliant intellect.

These projects were made possible by a new agency—the Commission on Community Interrelations. It was set up with a $1,000,000 grant from the American Jewish Congress. This organization had devoted much of its energy to combating anti-Semitism and other forms of prejudice. The leadership of the organization was doubtful, however, about the effectiveness of its efforts. They were ready to call in social scientists in the hope that "they could discover how people could learn to behave better." And they invited Lewin, who in the fall of 1944 undertook to organize and direct CCI.

Lewin's design for the Commission was based on using the scientific methods of action research. "This combination," Lewin said, "was ideal for scientists whose chief concerns were geared towards action, towards doing something, towards changing the world as it is, while at the same time contributing to the acquisition and ordering of human knowledge."

As CCI planned it, there were three distinguishing characteristics of action research: first, it would be conducted jointly with people who wanted practical answers; second, it would be carried out under community rather than laboratory conditions; and third, measurement of attitudes and behavior would be made both before and after each action step to discover which methods succeeded and which failed.

The emphasis was to be on action, but action as a function of research. Each step taken was to be studied. A continuous evaluation of all the steps would be made as they followed one another. The rule was: no research without action, no action without research. In short, action-research.

In keeping with this rule a number of designs for experimenting were employed with the view to a more realistic understanding of the "what" and "why" of prejudice and discrimination and the "how" of reducing or eliminating it.

The program called for cooperation with as many local community groups as possible. Research projects would be selected from com-

---

[6] Lewin, Kurt. Resolving Social Conflicts, Harper Bros., 1948.

munity situations and carried on with the aid of local citizens who were in a position both to contribute practical data and to apply findings through action programs. Thus, in keeping with the overall program of CCI, social scientists would join forces with community members in realistic programs of research and action.

Under the direction of Stuart Cook and Isidor Chein there followed a series of field experiments spread over five years.[7] They concerned such issues as integrated housing; equal employment opportunity; the origin of prejudiced attitudes in children; the most effective training of community leaders; and the best handling of street gangs. Professor Chein also assembled material concerning the psychological effects of enforced segregation. This was later cited by the United States Supreme Court in its historic decision outlawing segregation in the public schools.

Two CCI projects deserve special mention. The first was the Community Self-Survey, which won the Intergroup Relations Award of this Society in 1949 "for contributing the best action-related research on the problem of improving relations between groups within the United States." In announcing the award, the judges declared: "In this study, citizens are prepared, after a period of discovery and training, to play a more constructive role in their communities in matters pertaining to intergroup relationships. For their originality, therefore, for their regard for high standards of investigation, and for their demonstrated value in improving relations between groups of people, we select this offering of the Commission on Community Interrelations."

The CCI staff was satisfied that the Self-Survey represented a great step forward. Its low cost would permit wide application. It became a guide to communities undertaking to compare their discriminatory practices. It made possible an annual self assessment whereby a town could measure its progress in a variety of issues: for example, on the adjustment of Negros and whites in integrated situations and the factors affecting this adjustment.

The survey could show what kinds of persons adapt most readily, what kinds of previous training facilitates that adaptation, what human problems are developed by the arrival of Negroes in an all white neighborhood, what methods of dealing with these problems resolve them most readily, under what circumstances does a neighborhood that is open to Negroes become all Negro and what permits it to stay mixed. The Self-Survey, in sum, provided communities with the tools to do their own job on discrimination.

However, few such self surveys have been made. Much public and private money continues to be spent at the wrong time, in the wrong place, in piece meal and uncoordinated fashion to attain the wrong

---

[7] Marrow, A. J. Living Without Hate, Harper Bros. 1950.

goals. Like many other scientific findings that offer great promise of success the Self-Survey continues to be ignored. For this the social scientists are in part responsible, since many are more concerned with discovery than with application.

On the other hand a CCI project conducted jointly with M.I.T. had a different practical outcome. It has been widely applied. It began as a leadership training workshop set up in 1946 for the Connecticut Interracial Commission. The success of this workshop led in the following year to the founding of the National Training Laboratories in Bethel, Maine.[8] During the past seventeen years more than 10,000 people from business, government, education and other fields have received laboratory training at centers here and abroad.[9] It has been called the most significant educational innovation of the century and described as a system of retraining that may well carry more promise for the amelioration of social problems than any other current method.

Despite CCI's six years (1944-1950) of positive achievement the financial support required to keep it going was not forthcoming. Although its program was scientifically meaningful and socially useful to an unusual degree, this was not recognized by the local welfare federations across the country on which the American Jewish Congress depended for its resources. But responsibility for this is also ours, since we had not produced among responsible laymen an understanding of the value to community welfare of a science of human relationships.

Efforts to gain foundation support were equally unsuccessful. I am particularly troubled by the failure of the great private foundations to support research in this area. The reason some gave was fear that the Internal Revenue Bureau would challenge their tax exempt status if they participated in what could be interpreted as "political activity." Apparently the problems under study were too controversial.

The foundations that previously provided funds for pioneering studies of racial and religious conflict have reduced their grants or eliminated them entirely. The Federal Government itself is spending millions of dollars in this field but unhappily none of this money is going to badly needed scientific research.

I turn now to the Commission on Intergroup Relations of New York City and its uses of the Lewin heritage.[10] COIR as we call it was established as a functioning city agency in 1955 with a larger budget and far greater powers of investigation and enforcement than any similar governmental agency in the United States. It was directed to

---

[8] Bradford, L. P., Gibb, J. R., and Benne, K. D. T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method, John Wiley & Son, N.Y., 1964.

[9] Marrow, A. J. Behind the Executive Mask; American Management Association, N.Y., 1964.

[10] Marrow, A. J. Changing Patterns of Prejudice, Chilton, 1962.

devise ways of dealing with tensions between people of different ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds.

I served on that commission for five years (1955 to 1960), four of them as chairman under appointment by Mayor Robert Wagner.

My association with CCI had been a major factor in my selection and I approached the assignment familiar with the difficulties yet confident that substantial progress could be made. I soon discovered my confidence was naive. I found that COIR—to a much greater extent than CCI—was a convenient target for a diversity of interests to snipe at: extremists of the left demanding drastic changes; extremists of the right opposing all changes; go-fast factions; go-slow factions; special interest groups demanding special privileges for their followers and crying "Discrimination!" when they didn't get what they wanted. "Freedom" and "equality" were everyone's ideal but only a few were willing to embody them in their own behavior.

I recognized then and do now that this is a condition intrinsic to the democratic process but I believe that it need not be an insuperable obstacle to accomplishment.

COIR had to deal with urgent problems requiring immediate action. The kind of situations in which we were involved may be discerned from a brief review of three incidents. The first occurred a few minutes before midnight on Saturday, September 21, 1958. I was at home reading when my telephone rang. Police Commissioner Stephen P. Kennedy was calling from Harlem Hospital. He said, "I'm at Harlem Hospital. Dr. Martin Luther King has just come out of surgery and the outlook is favorable. May I come to your house to discuss the situation." The evening newspapers, the radio, and television had already flashed the news that Dr. King had been stabbed in a Harlem bookstore.

Through the still small hours of the morning the Police Commissioner and I discussed the problem to be faced the following day in Harlem and other Negro neighborhoods. The attack on Dr. King had already caused wild rumors in Harlem: that the White Citizens Council had hired an assassin to murder Dr. King; that the police knew Dr. King had been threatened, yet had done nothing to protect him; that there had been a deliberate delay in getting Dr. King to the hospital. These were some of the rumors carried that night from person to person in a mounting tension among the crowded tenements and on the street corners of Harlem.

So we went into action. The rumors carrying misinformation were answered by accurate information. Community leaders were consulted. The results of these and other steps were to calm a situation that threatened to explode into violence.

Another kind of situation, this one with worldwide repercussions, arose when a resident of Forest Hills, New York sent his 15-year-old

son to take tennis lessons at the West Side Tennis Club near his home. After the boy had had several lessons the coach suggested his joining the club as a junior member. Accordingly the boy's father telephoned the club president to ask how to become a member. The father was Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, Under Secretary of the United Nations. As Dr. Bunche later told me, the president of the West Side Tennis Club had bluntly advised him that the club's policy was not to admit either Negroes or Jews as members. Again we took steps. Most of you remember the outcome. The reaction in the city, across the country and around the world was such that the president of the club resigned and Ralph Bunche, Jr. was invited to join the club.

Still another kind of problem, perhaps the most potentially dangerous, took shape at dusk of Memorial Day 1958. Julio Ramos, a Cuban youth of 23, and his girl were seated quietly on a bench in Jefferson Park. Suddenly he was set upon by six Italian youths who, before the eyes of the horrified girl, beat Julio to death. The young Cuban and his girl had taken a bench in a section of the park that by an adolescent gang's decree was "reserved" for Italians only.

The six alleged killers were quickly arrested, and the neighborhood went as quickly into turmoil. A Puerto Rican gang calling themselves the Victory Dragons sent warnings of retaliation to relatives of the Italians charged with the murder. An epidemic of racial outbreaks followed. There was a mass battle between Negro and white students in a subway station. This was succeeded by teenage riots, some involving whites and Negroes, others Negroes and Puerto Ricans.

These instances are samples of intergroup dynamics whose range and significance are best measured in big cities like New York. An unofficial census in 1960 put the number of "conflict gangs" at 150, all of them of an ethnic character. The conflicts started by the ethnic gangs—Irish, Italian, Negro, Puerto Rican—threatened a chain reaction of still greater racial explosions among desperate, fearful, and easily panicked adults. That COIR should intervene was indispensable and happily its intervention was effective.

Each situation called for immediate action to reduce the likelihood of riot and disorder. We could not wait for our research into "facts." We had to rely on applying certain postulates—postulates of group dynamics to reduce community tension.

The postulates proved reliable because formulated in them was a more mature understanding of the nature and causes of tensions between people and of the methods by which these tensions might be released. We sought to utilize whatever disciplines applied: psychiatry, sociology, social psychology. Not infrequently we had to act so quickly that decisions had to be made on the basis of our intuitive insights, made sharper by our firsthand observations of the intergroup struggle.

Some may argue that as scientists we must wait until all the

evidence is in, until we know more about why people in groups behave as they do. I cannot agree. We can't wait for all the evidence. We must try to end gang wars, ease neighborhood tensions and speed community integration using the knowledge we now have. Such action itself leads to more reliable knowledge. Thus we revert to Lewin: action becomes research, research becomes action.

Our experience also led us to conclude that an intergroup relations agency must be independent enough to resist political influence and yet flexible enough to work within a political system. It must be kept immune to the pressures of ethnic, racial and religious blocs and yet it must be able to work cooperatively with them all. It must have a staff that meets the highest educational and professional standards, yet it must avoid what Robert Merton called "group soliloquies." Finally, it must persuade minority members that they cannot rely solely on government or on legislation; ultimately it is the citizenry whose reciprocal respect will make the law workable. This means that every possible technique must be tried to gain voluntary compliance by citizens to drastic changes in their social customs.

COIR faced an even greater dilemma in the problem of how to desegregate the schools. Leaders of civic groups fought to outmaneuver each other in drastic demands for "go fast" integration—regardless of consequences.

Deliberate segregation has been illegal in New York City schools since 1900. Nevertheless public schools in New York City have been segregated in fact for years because the school populations follow dwelling patterns. Today more than 75% of the children in Manhattan public elementary schools are either Negro or Puerto Rican. Nearly 1/3 of all the children in the entire city attend parochial or religious day schools. And the number of white pupils in the public schools seems likely to decrease. In cities such as Baltimore and St. Louis, where local school boards firmly desegregated their school systems, white parents simply removed their children from the schools. The result is the phenomenon we call resegregation; Baltimore, for example, has more segregated Negro schools now than it had before the Supreme Court decision in 1954.

Yet civil rights organizations, clergymen, well intentioned citizens and others continue to assert the educational value of forced racial balancing. The evidence is not at all clear.[11]

In fact few scientific studies have even dealt with the problem. Many school officials report that the stress and anxiety experienced by Negro pupils in newly integrated classes frequently inhibits learning. They report frustration, anger and lowered self esteem among

[11] Katz, Irwin. Review of Evidence Relating to Effects of Desegregation on the Intellectual Performance of Negroes. American Psychologist, May 1964.

Negro children who find themselves ignored or overtly rejected by their white classmates in a desegregated school. The result can be serious damage to the personality of the Negro pupils when their deficiencies are exposed by their having to compete with more affluent and more culturally advantaged white children.

We know that there is little dependable knowledge about the extent to which the achievement of Negro children is impaired by these social inequities or how the Negro child is affected by unfriendliness in the white teachers.

Observations of school officials clearly disclosed that Negro pupils often led *segregated* lives in *integrated* schools. Negro parents in Princeton, New Jersey recently confirmed this when they reported that "white attitudes—conscious and unconscious," cause the "paralyzing" of Negro children psychologically and academically in their school work. In consequence, most Negroes wind up in the "dummy section," this in the school system that pioneered and gave its name to the "Princeton Plan" of school pairing to reduce racial imbalance.

If the principle of scientific evaluation of each step of an action research program were followed today, we would have some idea of how to better the methods of desegregating schools. We would seek out the conditions that lead to such unfavorable effects as isolation, rejection and feelings of inferiority. Barker, Dembo and Lewin[12] as long ago as 1941 observed that pre-school children showed considerable regression in their play when placed in frustrating situations.

A Harwood Study[13] of learning in an industrial setting showed that as a feeling of frustration accumulates the employee builds up a feeling of failure. Nearly 50% of all learners in an on-the-job training program who quit their jobs did so out of fear of failure.

When, to remove the threat of failure, the training program was changed to a planned series of success experiences, not only did performance improve sharply but the drop-out rate was halved. Is it not likely that similar feelings of frustration or fear of failure are causative factors in the Negro drop-out rate in schools? We need scientifically reliable answers on how to build success feelings.

It seems evident that desegregation of schools barely begins to be a solution to the basic problems of the Negro. By itself, it can hardly affect the primary relations between Negro and white. Much more is required—changes in the attitudes of Negroes and whites towards each other and, most important, changes in the *Negro's attitude toward himself*.

In the apathy and despair that afflict so many of our American

---

[12] Barker, R., Dembo, T., and Lewin, K. Frustration and Regression, University of Iowa study. *Child Welfare*, 18, 1.

[13] Marrow, A. J., and David, G. Why Do They Really Quit. *Management Review*, 41, 1952.

poor (of whom most are Negro) we see a verification of Kurt Lewin's formula: B = f (P + E)—behavior is a function of personality and environment. Here Lewin gave us a guide to measuring the relative importance of the two factors P and E. "Let us," he emphasized, "take the situation as it is viewed by the participants themselves. . . . Caste and class influence behavior," he said, "to the extent that they have become part of the personality of the individual through his needs and perceptual processes."

The situation of which Lewin speaks is a critical component of the problem. The behavior of the American Negro is based on an image of himself that he has shaped and transmitted over three centuries of his collective history—and the first three years, or perhaps less, of his personal history. This self image must be changed if the collective and personal history of the Negro is today to take a new and positive direction.

The Negro who is determined to face the challenge of changing his self image must have the courage to begin in the upbringing of his children; the courage to deal candidly with the Negro as well as the non-Negro causes of their condition and how to overcome them.

But the Negro parent who seeks to raise his children's sights must raise his own self image as well. Adults as well as children, confused by their status—as virtually all members of minorities are likely to be—feel unsure about themselves. They need help—adults *and* children—in defining their images of themselves as members of a group seeking a better future; in identifying those situations in which the fact of their belonging to a minority culture is pertinent and those in which it is irrelevant; and in appraising what they share with and what they do not share with the "majority" culture. As suggested by Isidor Chein,[14] "We now want to know what are the conditions for perceiving communality of values despite differences and what are the conditions under which differences blind one to the communality of values."

"Minority group members," Lewin often said, "will rapidly learn to overcome their shortcomings if they can be induced to face them." It is neither healthy nor helpful, then, to meet shortcomings by crying "Prejudice!" Negroes can help themselves more, not less, by facing the statement that many of them are satisfied with low achievement; are apathetic toward self improvement; have a high crime rate (especially for crimes of violence); often are disciplinary problems in school; fail to support their own organizations; and too frequently depend on the generosity of whites.

Because he knows these statements are at least in part true, the Negro's self image is a depressed one. To lift it he must recognize the reasons for this partial truth, so that he may overcome it.

[14] Chein, Isidor. *Journal of Social Issues,* 1956, XIII, No. 3.

The Negro self image has to be strengthened to the point where he sees himself as a person who can choose to live in a segregated community or an integrated one—as he sees fit—and who can apply for a job as a school bus driver or school principal and list his race with confidence and with pride. When the whole Negro community is able to realize this too, it will have become part of the union of the diverse, as Horace Kallen put it, of that unique America in which different people know themselves to be equal as different and choose for themselves whether or not to preserve their separateness.

There is a point Lewin made for members of all groups to ponder. "To reverse self segregation," he said, "a minority should demand substantial sacrifices from its members. Sacrifice gives each member a greater stake in the group; he will not falter in a cause to which he has given so much of himself."

What is needed in this whole area of discontent is a coordinated scientific program of nationwide dimensions under Federal sponsorship but conducted locally to deal with problems in both short range and long range categories.

Social scientists have demonstrated that attitudes, motives and behavior can be measured and modified. A well developed methodology is ready for use. These methods could yield results which would materially reduce human suffering, lessen the likelihood of riot and disorder and ultimately save billions of dollars. Obviously only the Federal Government could be responsible for a program of this magnitude.

I now turn to my third instance testifying to the seminal influence of Kurt Lewin. This is our joint experience in an industrial setting in the plant of the Harwood Manufacturing Corporation of which I was an officer. Lewin first visited the Harwood plant in 1939, when we initiated a collaboration between psychology and industry that now has continued for a quarter of a century during which there has been applied the postulates of group dynamics to the problems of management.

The conception of labor-management relations which guided management at Harwood when Lewin first came to it was what is usually called "enlightened." Harwood's key executives believed that the productivity and profits of a business depend on the teamwork of its personnel, that these are a function of the management of the men, not merely the handling of machines. But they also felt they were not using their human resources to best advantage; that somehow they were failing to mobilize their employees' "will to work." It was their hope that the then new psychology might help define a policy of human relations that would bring about a more satisfying man-to-man relationship and a more willing and active cooperation in the day-to-day work.

Lewin proposed a program of action-research into the dynamic

relationships between group standards, resistance to change, group decision and leadership training. Alex Bavelas came from the University of Iowa to direct the inquiries; when he was called to other duties, John R. P. French, Jr. took his place. In due course other members of the Research Center for Group Dynamics helped Harwood plan and execute its on-the-job action-research.

The original studies began with small groups of from three to five production workers. Over the years the inquiries have been expanded to include as many as 1,000 employees at all managerial levels in five plants as Harwood grew and expanded.[15]

The record of the inquiry from 1939 to date may well be without parallel. Its practically continuous research and application provides data for a scientifically grounded long view rare in any of the social sciences.

To summarize the experience of 25 years we may, for example, say that workers' participation in planning, decision making and so forth requires time to develop. Where workers have been conditioned to blind obedience, where they have been ruled with a heavy hand for long periods, they may interpret any sudden change in the emphasis on authority as a sign of weakness in the management.

This became quite apparent at a new Harwood plant in Puerto Rico. The manager, who was not Puerto Rican, had actively begun to encourage employees to participate in problem-solving meetings. Soon after the personnel manager noticed a sharp increase in employee turnover. His inquiry into the reasons revealed that the workers had decided that if management was so ignorant of the answers to its problems that it had to consult its employees, the company was badly managed and would soon fail. So they quit to look for jobs with well managed companies that did not consult their employees but told them what to do.

The induction of employees to participation in decision-making of any kind or degree must be gradual. Workers who have long been treated like children do not, any more than children, grow to maturity in a day; employees do not learn to work independently by being kept dependent. Only slow and careful reeducation can change their habitual relations to their bosses and their work.

This is one of the significant accomplishments of the ongoing action-research at Harwood. It attained the practical objectives which management there endeavored to satisfy; they were maximum job satisfaction, maximum company production. Central to the Harwood philosophy is a recognition that every employee can make a contribution to the company economy not limited by his skill as a workman on the job. It recognizes that the more excellent his perform-

---

[15] Coch, L., and French, John R. P. Jr. *Human Relations*, 1, 1948.

ance, the greater his satisfaction and the greater the employee's bene-
fit. It, therefore, maintains its organization by taking into account in-
dividual as well as company goals. Harwood employees are trained to
assume responsibility and are given the opportunity and the authority
to exercise it.

At Harwood it was possible to carry out Lewin's commitment to
seek a scientific understanding of group life never far removed from
close contact with everyday life. "A close link with practice," he often
stated, "can be a blessing for the development of theory." Both scien-
tific and practical objectives were pursued—sometimes concurrently,
at other times independently. Experimentation was, of necessity, sub-
ordinated to practical factory needs and promising research was often
interrupted because of unexpected changes in production schedules or
operating plans.

In the course of 25 years substantial evidence has been accumu-
lated to support the original views of Lewin and more recently those
of Argyris, Bennis, Likert, McGregor, and others, on the need to
develop new organizational practices and to change traditional prin-
ciples of management if the interpersonal and intergroup needs of the
employees are to be satisfied as company performance is improved.

In 1962 the Harwood organization took over a competitor, the
Weldon Manufacturing Company. The two concerns were about the
same size, both employed about 1,000 people, their plants were about
the same age—30 years—their product was similar, both sold many
of the same accounts and at competitive prices. But in one respect
they differed. What it was did not appear until some months after
Harwood acquired Weldon. The managerial styles of the two organi-
zations diverged widely. Where Harwood encouraged employee par-
ticipation in planning, problem solving, goal setting and decision-
making, Weldon operated under the traditional authority-obedience
system.

Making Weldon a unit of Harwood therefore provided a unique
opportunity to study the two modes of management and how they af-
fect employee productivity and job satisfaction as well as the economic
health of the companies. The first step was a comparative study of
the two companies on the crucial cost factors: man-hour productivity,
skill level, standards of performance, turnover, waste, general ef-
ficiency, and readiness to innovate. Here it was found that the Har-
wood plant operating under participative managerial principles was
superior on each of the items.

The second step therefore was a challenge to Harwood. Could the
Weldon managerial relationships of supervisors and employees be
changed to one of interdependence, participation and shared responsi-
bility? Could fixed habitual attitudes be unfrozen? Could they be re-
placed by their contraries and could those be stabilized? For example,

how could the Weldon supervisory staff be motivated to assume greater
risks, make more decisions and accept greater responsibilities? Could
they change their attitudes towards their subordinates and encourage
them to participate more freely in defining how best to work at their
jobs? Harwood's problem was to muster the experience of action-
research so as to change from the Weldon to the Harwood style of
employer-employee relations in the quickest, easiest and most fruitful
manner for all concerned.

Lasting changes could be achieved by applying Lewin's[16] prescrip-
tion for change: first unfreezing the present level; second, moving to
the new level, and third, stabilizing on the new level.

Estimates of the time required to bring about the desired changes
in the existing employee attitudes and managerial practices ranged
from four to six years. The technological changes it was believed could
be completed in one year.

The implementation was begun in July 1962, six months after
Weldon became a unit of Harwood. To the engineering and production
specialists from within the Harwood organization, which manage-
ment assigned to Weldon, it added representatives of four outside
technical consultants. In addition Harwood employed Stanley Sea-
shore and David Bowers of the University of Michigan as psychological
consultants to measure, interpret and analyze employee attitudes. They
were also to observe the events that took place, record what was done,
what happened, and what changes in attitudes and behavior occurred.

A second team of behavioral scientists, Gilbert David and Robert
Pearse, was employed to design and carry out a program of specific
changes to increase managerial competence, improve interpersonal
relations and introduce employee participation in problem solving and
decision making.

Harwood called in these two separate groups of psychologists
mindful of Stanley Seashore's observation[17] that "For practical reasons
the research plans in field experiments should, in many cases, provide
some kind of division of labor between those who do the theoretical,
analytic and interpretive work, on the one hand, and those who engage
in active and personal interventions in the subject organization."

Thus the University of Michigan consultants, Seashore and Bowers,
began collecting their data about six months after Weldon was ac-
quired. By means of observations, interviews, questionnaires and other
diagnostic devices they surveyed all levels of management (about 50)
as well as production workers (about 1,000).

They found the Weldon managerial group confused by apparent

---

[16] Lewin, K. Group Decision and Social Change. *Readings in Social Psychol-
ogy.* Henry Holt Co., 1947.
[17] Seashore, S. Field Experiments with Formal Organizations. *Human Or-
ganization,* Summer, 1964, **23,** No. 2.

inconsistencies and contradictions in policy. They found the morale of the production workers low and many planning to seek other jobs.

The few harmonious relationships reported were overshadowed by numerous complaints of interpersonal conflict. People in the chain of command faithfully took orders from those above them but had little or no opportunity to exercise a measure of authority on their own.

The top management having been advised, the standard steps for improving attitudes were taken. But it must be noted that during the first year after Weldon was incorporated in Harwood the chief task was to provide the plant with the technological improvements it so much needed.

When this was being done attitudes and behavior of the staff continued as they had been. The old fears, suspicions, conflicts, disagreements continued to characterize their relationships to one another.

As soon as possible during the second year a program of Sensitivity Training was provided for all levels of management under the direction of David and Pearse, with dramatic results. An immediate change in morale was apparent. Managerial competence was significantly improved. Supervisors began to deal more effectively with interdepartmental conflict and personal rivalry.

A sense of increased self confidence was expressed by supervisors because of the new understanding they had gained of themselves and others. Many referred to the Sensitivity Training program as among the most important experiences of their adult life.

David and Pearse continued to help the staff resolve their interpersonal problems through individual counseling, through group meetings devoted to problem analysis and problem solving, through skill training, and through occasional brief refresher sessions using T-Group methods.

The improvements in cooperative relationships were noted by the technical consultants and production workers as well as by the Michigan researchers. The change in motivation and morale was reflected in the following ways:

Average earnings of piece rate workers increased by nearly 30%. At the same time total manufacturing costs decreased by about 20%. Turnover dropped to half of its former level. Length of employee training was substantially reduced. Interviews by the Michigan consultants reflected vastly more friendly attitudes towards the company. The image of the company in the community changed and the organization began to show a profit.

This was attained without a single replacement in managerial or supervisory personnel at the plant. All the original members of the staff continue in their same jobs.

The basic wage structure has not been changed. The increases in

earnings were a result of heightened motivation and improved managerial skills. Increases due to technological changes were adjusted within the existing rate setting structure.

In the Harwood-Weldon study there was a united effort on the part of engineers, accountants, psychologists, and technological consultants to work collectively for practical answers that would please the profit conscious executive without neglecting the humanization of managerial skills or employee satisfactions.

The three year period assigned for this study does not end until next January 1, 1965. The methods described continue in use. They are in large part distinguished by the characteristics of action-research; they are conducted jointly with people who want practical answers; they are performed under factory rather than laboratory conditions; they include measurement of attitudes and behavior changes both before and after the action steps.

To link knowledge with application is admittedly a difficult task. But industry has found that science is ultimately the most effective means of understanding and meeting its human problems.

Is the same outcome possible in dealing with the critical problems arising out of the conflicts among racial and ethnic groups? Can we repeat our success there? Will the same approach work?

I believe it can. The road is long. The risks are great. The outcome uncertain. But there is encouraging evidence that solutions to the problem of prejudice and discrimination may be available in the science of human relationships of which Lewin was a prophet and a pioneer.

Education as Social Invention

Jerome S. Bruner

I am deeply moved and honored to be giving this Presidential Address to the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, for the Society has always represented to me the conscience of American psychology. Its past presidents make up a roster not only of distinction, but also of goodwill and generous spirit.

We have been a Society that has tended in the main to concern itself with those social issues that press for immediate solution either within the academic community or in the society at large—war and peace, poverty, academic freedom, discrimination and desegregation, through the list of issues of deep contemporary concern. I hope that our Society will continue to take such matters to conscience and to bring them before our colleagues for debate and, finally, for such action as we can take as socially responsible psychologists.

But there are other issues that do not have such immediate concern, that in their nature do not move swiftly enough to mobilize the moral indignation they merit as social issues. We must be sure that we do not neglect these, for they are often the forces that shape our lives and our future. One such issue is the nature of the education a society provides for the generation that is to follow. I should like to address myself to this issue, to argue the critical importance of redefining afresh the nature, direction, and aims of education if man is to remain free to develop his full potential as a human being. I shall do so as a psychologist concerned with social issues, for I deeply believe that education must be viewed as a social and moral issue before it can be approached sensibly as a technical one.

It seems to me that there are four particularly important bases in terms of which the redefinition of education must proceed if we mean to give man his full freedom to develop.

The first of these derives from our increasing understanding of man as a species. As one reads the enormously rich reports of the last decade or two, it is plain that there has been a revolution in our conception of the species *Homo*, and it is a revolution that forces us to reconsider what it is we do when we occupy man's long growing period in certain ways now familiar as "schooling."

A second basis for redefining education is the increase in our understanding of the nature of individual mental growth. There have been profound reorientations in developmental theory in the last generation, changes that have been hastened by studies of normal and pathological growth, by analyses of the effects of different types of early environments, by studies of the development of language and its impact on thought. All of this work has forced us to reconsider the role of man's symbolic operations.

Thirdly, there is reason to believe that we have come to understand the process of education somewhat more clearly than before. This has been an intense decade of educational experiment involving many of the finest minds of our generation. It has given me pause to see in what measure an eight-year-old can be led to grasp what a poem is, or come to a conception of the conservation of momentum, or arrive slowly but surely at the powerful generality of a quadratic function as a set of sets in which the elements in each set are the same as the number of sets.

Finally, and most obviously, the changing nature of the society in which we live forces us to redefine how we shall educate a new generation. John Dewey's *My Pedagogic Creed*, a movingly concerned document, was composed principally in the basis of reflections prior to the first Great War—a yearningly long time ago.

I shall consider each of these matters, how we as psychologists might enter the debate. But before I do, I must confess some of my own doubts. It is reasonably plain to me that however able we are as psychologists, it is not our function to decide upon educational goals any more than the ablest general decides whether a nation should or should not be at war. Whatever I know about policy making reinforces the conviction that technicians and scientists often lack the kind of follow-up commitment that is the requisite of wise social policy. I cannot work up much enthusiasm for philosopher-kings, psychologist-kings, doctor-kings, or even mixed-committee kings. The political process—and decisions about the aims of education must work their way through that process—is slow, perhaps, but is committed to the patient pursuit of the possible.

Yet it is also clear that generals do in fact have a strong influence on the politics of war and peace and that scientists have had and will have a powerful influence on our defense and other policies. It is not so clear, the distinction between ends and means, between goals and their implementation. And perhaps it is just as well, for there is an intuitive familiarity that generals have with what is possible and what is not possible in war and in containing its threat, and there is a certain familiarity that we psychologists have with how one can get somebody to learn or to pay attention or to stay free of anxiety. While these are not ends in the strict sense, they shape our ends in

educational policy as in defense policy. It is, if you will, the psychologist's lively sense of what is possible that can make him a powerful force. It is in his delineation of the possible that he enters the political process. If he fails to fill his role as a diviner and delineator of the possible, then he does not serve the society wisely. If he confuses his function and narrows his vision of the possible to what he counts as desirable, then we shall all be the poorer.

You will forgive me for this diversion from the main theme, it is a matter that my brooking has not clarified. The psychologist is the scouting party of the political process where education is concerned. He can and must provide the full range of alternatives to challenge the society to choice. And now back to the main theme.

How evaluate education in the light of our newly gained knowledge of man as a species? Let me begin by proposing a view that might best be called evolutionary instrumentalism. Man's use of mind is dependent upon his ability to develop and use "tools" or "instruments" or "technologies" that make it possible for him to express and amplify his powers. His very evolution as a species speaks to this point. It is consequent upon the development of bipedalism and the use of spontaneous pebble tools that man's brain and particularly his cortex developed. It was not a large-brained hominid that developed the technical-social life of the human, but rather the tool-using, cooperative pattern that gradually changed man's morphology by favoring the survival of those who could link themselves with tool systems and disfavoring those who tried to go it on big jaws, heavy dentition, or superior weight. What evolved as a human nervous system was something, then, that required outside devices for expressing its potential. It was a swift progress. The first primitive primates appear 5×10^6 years ago and man reaches his present morphology and brain size about 5×10^5 years ago—with the major developments from higher hominid to tool-user occupying, likely, less than half a million of these years between. From then on, all major changes in the species are, in Weston La Barre's (1954) startling phrase, by prosthetic devices, by man learning how to link himself to amplifiers of his muscles, of his senses, and of his powers of ratiocination.

The British biologist Peter Medawar (1963) remarks in his recent Huxley Lecture that it is likely that at about this same point in human history (reckon it in same multiple of 10^5) that human culture becomes sufficiently elaborated for evolution to become Lamarckian and reversible rather than Darwinian and irreversible. It is a figure of speech, of course, but Medawar's point is well taken: what is transmitted by the culture is indeed a pool of acquired characteristics, a pool that can get lost just as surely as the Easter Islanders, the Incas, and Mayans lost whatever skills made it possible for them

to leave such splendid ruins to disabled descendants whose genes were probably not one whit changed.

I know that the terms "tool" or "technology" or even "instrument" offend when one speaks of man being dependent upon them for the realization of his humanity. For these words denote "hardware," and it is mostly "software" that I have in mind—skills that incorporate tools. Language is perhaps the ideal example of one such powerful technology with its power, not only for communication but for encoding "reality," for representing matters that are remote, as well as immediate, and for doing all these things according to rules that permit us not only to represent "reality" but to transform it by agreed upon rules. All of this depends on the external resources of a grammar, a lexicon, and (likely as not) a supporting cast of speakers constituting the linguistic community.

Language happens to be a tool of the most general sort in the sense that it provides direction and amplification to the way we use our muscular apparatus, our senses, and our powers of reflection. But each of these domains also has its skills that are expressed through various kinds of tool using. There are time- and strength-saving skills for using our muscles and they are built into the tools we devise for them. There are attention-saving skills in perception (Attneave's "economical transformations" [1954]) that are imparted and then become the basis for understanding the ikons we construct for representing things by drawing, diagram, and design. And there are, finally, and most importantly, strain-reducing heuristics to help you figure out things—how to fill your seven slots with gold rather than dross, to use your head and save your heels, to cancel out nuisance parameters, and so on.

Many of these skills are taught in the subtle interaction of parent and child—as in the case of primary linguistic skills. And as in the case of language learning, where the pedagogy is highly unself-conscious, it is probably true that most of the primitive skills of manipulating and looking and attending are also taught in this way. It is when the society goes beyond these relatively primitive techniques that the less spontaneous instruction of school must be relied upon. At this point the culture necessarily comes to rely upon its formal education as a means toward providing skills. And insofar as there has been any innovation in tools or tool using (taking these expressions in the broadest sense), the educational system is the sole means of dissemination—the sole agent of evolution, if you will.

Let me break off here without drawing conclusions for education, since it would be better first to consider our changing views of human development and of pedagogy, and to look at the changing nature of our society.

Consider now our understanding of the nature of human onto-

genetic development. Several important conclusions stand out. None of them, so far as I know, have been seriously considered in defining the aims and conduct of education.

The first is that mental growth is not a gradual accretion either of associations or of stimulus-response connections or of means-end readinesses or of anything else. It appears to be much more like a staircase with rather sharp risers, more a matter of spurts and rests than of anything else. The spurts ahead in growth seem to be triggered off when certain capacities begin to unfold. And certain capacities must be matured and nurtured before others can be stimulated into being. The sequence of their appearance is highly constrained. But these steps or stages or spurts or whatever you may choose to call them are *not* very clearly linked to age; certain environments can slow the sequence down, others move it along faster. In the main, one can characterize these constrained sequences as a series of prerequisites. It is not until the child can hold in mind two features of a display at once, for example, that he can deal with their relationship—as in a ratio.

The steps or stages have been variously described by a variety of investigators working in centers as various as Geneva, Moscow, Paris, London, Montreal, Chicago, and Cambridge, but they seem to have an interesting likeness, even though the proposed dynamism varies. The first stages are relatively manipulative or sensori-motor, marked by highly unstable attention (or distractibility), very single track (or single channel, as we might now say). It is recognizable as Hebb's (1949) early stage of establishing cell assemblies, as Piaget's (1951) preoperational stage in which assimilative and accommodative tendencies are working toward a more stable equilibrium, as Vygotsky's (1962) earliest stage in which no external speech has been internalized, as the period of enactive representation in the jargon of the Center for Cognitive Studies (Bruner, 1964).

There follows a period of larger-scale functioning in which the young human being is now capable of an internal representation of greater chunks of the environment. In Geneva one finds the beginning of conservation, in Moscow the shop talk is of complexive thinking and the second signal system, in Chicago and Palo Alto it is attentional control, in Cambridge one hears words like the simultanizing effects of imagery, and so on. Lenneberg's (in preparation) compilation of data on aphasia indicates that at this age, brain injury produces something more than a transitory effect on speech, but not an irreversible one. The turning point into this stage is between five and seven—at least as of 1964. Various writers propose different substeps within, but this need not concern us.

Finally, there is general agreement that something very special happens around adolescence. One seems to be able to consider

propositions rather than objects; there are more serious and lasting effects from brain injury, concepts become more exclusively hierarchal in structure, alternative possibilities can be handled in a combinatorial fashion. There is considerable doubt whether all these things have anything directly to do with the onset of physiological adolescence—for there are equally sharp cognitive turning points at the onset of language, and at the age five-to-seven turning point without much discernible assist from hormonal tides. And hormonal adolescents in technically less mature societies never enter this so-called stage.

What comes out of this picture, rough though I have sketched it, is a view of human beings who have developed three parallel systems for processing information and for representing it—one through manipulation and action, one through perceptual organization and imagery, and one through the symbolic apparatus. It is not that these are "stages" in any sense, but rather emphases in development: that one in some measure must master the manipulation of concrete objects before there can be perceptual decentration, or in simpler terms, that you must get the perceptual field organized around your own person as center before you can impose other, less egocentric axes upon it, and so on. In the end, the mature organism seems to have gone through a process of elaborating three systems of skills that correspond to the three major tool systems to which he must link himself for full expression of capacities—tools for the hand, for the distance receptors, and for the process of reflection.

It is not surprising in the light of this that early opportunities for development have loomed so large in our recent understanding of human mental growth. The importance of early experience is only dimly sensed today. The evidence from animal studies (Freedman, et al., 1961) indicates that virtually irreversible deficits can be produced in mammals by depriving them of opportunities that challenge their nascent capacities. Now in the last few years there have been a sufficient number of reports to indicate the crippling effect of depriving human environments—as well as indications that "replacement therapies" can be of considerable success, even at an age on the edge of adolescence. The principal deficits appear to be linguistic in the broadest sense—the lack of opportunity to share in dialogue, to have occasion for paraphrase, to internalize speech as a vehicle of thought. None of these matters is well understood, save that there appears to be the operation of the rule discussed earlier: that unless certain basic skills are mastered, then later more elaborated ones become increasingly out of reach. It is in the light of this fact that we can understand the increasing difference in intelligence with age between such culturally deprived groups as Southern Negroes and more culturally privileged

whites. In time, and with sufficient failure, the gap is reinforced to irreversibility by a sense of defeat.

Again, I should prefer to postpone drawing any educational implications from this account until the whole picture is before us.

What has been learned about the educational process that may give guidance to our task of redefinition? Very little that is certain, but some extremely interesting impressions that can possibly be converted into testable hypotheses.

The "curriculum revolution," so-called, has made it plain even after only a decade that the idea of "readiness" is a mischievous half-truth. It is a half-truth largely because it turns out that one *teaches* readiness or provides opportunities for its nurturance, one does not simply wait for it. Readiness, in these terms, comprises mastery of those simpler skills that permit one to reach higher skills. Readiness for Euclidian geometry can be gained by teaching intuitive geometry or by giving children an opportunity to build increasingly elaborate constructions with polygons. Or to take the aim of the new, so-called "second generation" mathematics project, if you wish to teach the calculus in the eighth grade, then begin it in the first grade by teaching the kinds of ideas and skills necessary for its mastery later. Mathematics is no exception to the general rule, though admittedly it is the most easily understood from the point of view of what must be clear before something else can be grasped. Since most subjects can be translated into forms that place emphasis upon doing, or upon the development of appropriate imagery, or upon symbolic-verbal encoding, it is often possible to render the end result to be achieved in a simpler, more manageable form so that the child can move more easily and deeply to full mastery.

The second thing that emerges from pedagogical experiments of the last decade is that cognitive or intellectual mastery is rewarding. It is particularly so when the learner recognizes the cumulative power of learning, that learning one thing permits him to go on to something that before was out of reach, and so on toward such perfection as one may reach. It is a truth that every good athletic coach since the Greek Olympiad has known; teachers have also gained pleasure when a student learns to recognize his own progress well enough so that he can take over as his own source of reward and punishment.

The third result of contemporary exploration in teaching is the conclusion that educational experiment has, in the main, been conducted and is being conducted in the dark—without feedback in real time or in usable form. The substitute for light (or usable feedback) is evaluation after the job has been completed. After the working party has been scattered, the evaluators enter. By then, it is so late in the day that only patching can be done. Indeed, such is the latitude in the

choice of criteria for evaluation, that something nice can usually be
said about practically any course or curriculum. It would seem much
more sensible to put evaluation into the picture *before and during*
curriculum construction, as a form of intelligence operation to help the
curriculum maker in his choice of material, in his approach, in his man-
ner of setting tasks for the learner.

Finally, one is struck by the absence of a theory of instruction as a
guide to pedagogy—a prescriptive theory on how to proceed in order
to achieve different results, a theory that is neutral with respect to ends
but exhaustive with respect to means. It is interesting that there is a
lack of a "memorializing theory" in pedagogy, that in its place there is
principally a body of maxims.

As our technology grows increasingly complex in both machinery
and human organization, the role of the school becomes more central
in the society, not simply as an agent of socialization, but as a trans-
mitter of basic skills. To this we turn next as our final basis for redefin-
ing education—the changing society.

In recent years I have wondered, particularly in connection with
work in West Africa, why societies are not more mindful of the role of
education in shaping their futures. Why in Africa, for example, is the
short term political allure of universal primary education given priority
over training a corps of administrators, teachers, and technicians? In
many cases, the second is financially precluded by the first, and the
long-run result may prove a terrible time-bomb as semi-literate youths
flock into the new urban Africa with no marketable skills, their familial
and tribal boats burned, and no properly trained corps of teachers and
civil servants to maintain stability.

That is what set me brooding, and while I have no answer to the
African problem, I do have some thoughts about our own. They crys-
tallized while reading an essay by the distinguished Italian architect-
designer Pietro Nervi (in press). Nervi was describing the loss in
freedom of the architect-designer in an age of technological maturity.
You can build a road or a path in any meandering shape you wish
provided the only users are men on foot, or on horse, or in wagons, or
in slow cars. But the moment the speed of the vehicle passes a certain
critical point, fantasy is constrained and you must conform to the idea
of a containing arc. A car at seventy cannot turn on a fanciful gazebo.

There was a great deal of public soul searching at the time of
Sputnik as to whether our educational system was adequate to the task
ahead. In fact, much new curriculum reform had started before then—
out of a sense of the frightening gap between expert knowledge of our
technology and public knowledge. I rather suspect that there will
never again be such a period of careless or ritualistic regard for public
education—but then, universal public education as a working concept
is not yet a century old!

It may well be the case that not only are we entering a period of technological maturity in which education will require constant redefinition, but that the period ahead may involve such a rapid rate of change in specific technology that narrow skills will become obsolete within a reasonably short time after their acquisition. Indeed, perhaps one of the defining properties of a matured technology is that there exists a lively likelihood of major technological change within the compass of a single generation—just as ours has seen several such major changes.

I entertained myself and some young students with whom I was working this past summer to devise a social studies curriculum by formulating Bruner's Rule—critical changes related to the order of magnitude in years away. I used this as an extension of the square law for the retinal angle—that the size of the image was the reciprocal of the square of the distance of an object. Therefore, the further away a period of time, the larger it would have to be to be discerned. Here goes.

5×10^9	5,000,000,000	Birth of Earth
5×10^8	500,000,000	Vertebrates
5×10^7	50,000,000	Mammals
5×10^6	5,000,000	Primates
5×10^5	500,000	Present man
5×10^4	50,000	Great migrations
5×10^3	5,000	Recorded history
5×10^2	500	Printing
5×10^1	50	Radio/mass education
5×10^0	5	Artificial intelligence

What I learned from my charts (never mind the students for a moment) was that things were coming thick and fast. Life probably started about 2.5×10^9 so that half the history of the Earth was lifeless. Some 99.999% of the Earth's life has been manless, and from there on out the record is impressive and awesome. It would seem indeed as if the principal thing about tools and techniques is that they beget other more advanced ones at ever increasing speed. And as the technology matures in this way, education in its very nature takes on an increasing role by providing the skills needed to manage and control the expanding enterprise.

The first response of educational systems under such acceleration is to produce technicians and engineers and scientists as needed, but it is doubtful whether such a priority produces what is required to manage the enterprise. For no specific science or technology provides a metalanguage in terms of which to think about a society, its technology, its science, and the constant changes that these undergo with innovation. Could an automotive engineer have foreseen the

death of small-town America with the advent of the automobile? He would have been so wedded to his task of making better and better automobiles that it would never have occurred to him to consider the town, the footpath, leisure, or local loyalty. Somehow, if change is to be managed, it requires men with skills in sensing continuity and opportunity for continuity. This is a matter to which we shall return shortly.

And what may we conclude from this exercise? It seems to me that four general policies follow from the issues that we have passed in review.

The first has to do with what is taught. It would seem, from our consideration of man's evolution, that principal emphasis in education should be placed upon skills—skills in handling, in seeing and imaging, and in symbolic operations, particularly as these relate to the technologies that have made them so powerful in their human expression.

It is hard to spell out in specific terms what such an emphasis upon skills entails, but some examples might provide a concrete basis for criticism. With respect, first, to the education of the perceptual-imaginal capacities, I can suggest at least one direction to travel. It is in the training of subtle spatial imagery. I have recently been struck by the increased visual power and subtlety of students exposed to courses in visual design—all differently designed and with different objectives in view: one for undergraduates given by I. A. Richards at Harvard, another for teachers by Bartlett Hayes at Andover, and the third for city planners given by Gyorgy Kepes and Kevin Lynch at M.I.T. All of them produced what seemed to me like fresh discrimination in viewing the altered environment of urban America; all provided the students with new models in terms of which to analyze and sort their surroundings. My colleagues Gerald Holton and Edward Purcell have been experimenting with instruction in visual pattern as a mode of increasing the visualizing subtlety of concentrators in physics—visual subtlety and capacity to represent events visually and non-metrically. I do not think that we have begun to scratch the surface of training in visualization—whether related to the arts, to science, or simply to the pleasures of viewing our environments more richly. Let me note in passing, by the way, that Maria Montessori, that strange blend of the mystic and the pragmatist, was groping toward some such conception as this.

At the level of symbolic operation, I think the work of Martin Deutsch (1963) with underprivileged children provides an interesting case in point—a conscious effort to lead children to verbal skills, to a sense of paraphrase and exchange. It surely should not be limited, such an effort, to the underprivileged. The new mathematics curricula illustrate how much can be done in training symbolic skills.

This brings us immediately to a second conclusion. It relates literally to the meaning of the word *curriculum*, a word that derives from a course to be run. It is perhaps a wrong word. A curriculum should involve the mastery of skills that in turn lead to the mastery of still more powerful ones, the establishment of self-reward sequences. It is clear that this can be done in mathematics and science. But it is also the case that reading simpler poetry brings more complex poetry into reach. or that reading a poem once makes a second reading more rewarding. I am urging that the reward of deeper understanding is a more robust lure to effort than we have yet realized.

A corollary of this conclusion is that there is an appropriate version of any skill or knowledge that may be imparted at whatever age one wishes to begin teaching—however preparatory the version may be. The choice of the earlier version is based upon what it is one is hoping to cumulate. The deepening and enrichment of this earlier understanding is again a source of reward for intellectual labors.

The third conclusion relates to change. If there is any way of adjusting to change, it must include, as we have noted, the development of a metalanguage and "metaskills" for dealing with continuity in change. What these might be is, of course, a moot point, but not completely so by any means. Mathematics is surely the most general metalanguage we have developed and it provides the forms and patterns in terms of which regularities in nature are comprehended. I find myself forced to the conclusion that our survival may one day depend upon achieving a requisite mathematical literacy for rendering the seeming shocks of change into something that is continuous and cumulative. But by the same token, there is a second discipline that deals with the search for likeness beneath the surface of diversity and change. It is, of course, the discipline of poetry, the vehicle for searching out unsuspected kinship.

A second speculation about preparation for change is that we are bound to move toward instruction in the sciences of behavior and away from the study of history. Recorded history is only about 5×10^3 years old, as we saw. Most of what we teach is within a multiple of 10^2, for the records before that are minimal while the records after are relatively rich. But just suppose that the richness of record increases as a function of our ability to develop systems for storing and retrieving information. In 10^3 years from now we will be swamped. One would surely not dwell then with such loving care over the details of Brumaire or the Long Parliament or the Louisiana Purchase. These are the furbelows of documentary short supply. But there is a more compelling reason to shift away from history toward the social or behavioral sciences.

It has to do with the need for studying the possible rather than

the achieved—a necessary step if we are to adapt to change. It is the behavioral sciences and their generality with respect to variations in the human condition that must be central to our presentation of man, not the particularities of his history. This is not to say that we should "give up" study of the past, but rather that we should pursue such study with a different end in view—the end of developing style. For the development of style, be it style of writing or loving or dancing or eating, requires a sense of contrast and concreteness, and this we do not find in the behavioral sciences.

Finally, it is plain that if we are to evolve freely as a species by the use of the instrument of education, then we shall have to bring far greater resources to bear in designing our educational system. For one thing, if we are to respond to accelerated change, then we shall have to reduce turn-around time in the system. To do this requires greater participation on the part of those at the frontiers of learning. A distinguished mathematician and teacher, John Kemeny, did a survey of high-school mathematics teaching a decade ago and found no mathematics newer than 100 years old being taught! That has been remedied somewhat in the decade since, but it has hardly begun.

Another resource that must be brought to bear is modern psychology. Something happened to educational psychology a few decades ago that brought it to the low status it now enjoys. The circumstances need not concern us save in one respect. Part of the failure of educational psychology was its failure to grasp the full scope of its mission. It has too readily assumed that its central task was the application of learning theory to education—or, in turn, the application of personality theory or of group dynamics or whatnot. In fact, none of these efforts produced a major contribution to educational practice largely because the task was not really one of application in any obvious sense, but of formulation. Learning theory, for example, is distilled from descriptions of behavior in situations where the environment has been arranged either for the convenience of observing learning behavior or out of a theoretical interest in some special aspect of learning—reinforcement, cue distinctiveness, or whatnot. But a theory of instruction, which must be at the heart of educational psychology, is principally concerned with *how* to arrange environments to *optimize* learning according to various criteria—e.g., to optimize transfer or retrievability of information or whatnot. And so, too, in the domain of "applying" personality theory: such theories, principally based upon the close study of pathological processes, have not provided much guide beyond the cautionary negatives of avoiding anxiety or minimizing conflict.

Let me urge, finally, that psychology itself will be the richer for finding once again its roots within education. I hope I have justified that claim in what I have said. But it is not for the pursuit of such

riches that I urge that we psychologists reenter the field of education, but rather that we do so to make our contribution to man's further evolution, an evolution that now proceeds through social invention. For it is psychology more than any other discipline that has the tools for exploring the limits of man's perfectibility. By doing so, it can, I think, have its major social impact by keeping lively the society's full sense of what is possible.

REFERENCES

ATTNEAVE, F. Some informational aspects of visual perception. *Psychol. Rev.*, 1954, **61**, 183-193.

BRUNER, J. The course of cognitive growth. *Amer. Psychologist*, 1964, **19**, 1-15.

DEUTSCH, M. The disadvantaged child and the learning process: some social psychological and developmental considerations. In H. Passow (Ed.), *Education in depressed areas*. New York: Teachers College Press, 1963.

FREEDMAN, S., RIESEN, A., HELD, R., AND TEUBER, H. Symposium: sensory deprivation: facts in search of a theory. *J. nerv. ment. Dis.*, 1961, **132**, 17-43.

HEBB, D. *Organization of behavior*. New York: Wiley, 1949.

LABARRE, W. *The human animal*. Chicago: Univer. Chicago Press, 1954.

LENNEBERG, E. *Biological bases of language*, in preparation.

MEDAWAR, P. Onwards from Spencer: evolution and evolutionism. *Encounter*, 1963, **21**(3), 35-43.

NERVI, P. Is architecture moving toward forms and characteristics which are unchangeable? In G. Kepes (Ed.), *Structure in art and science*. New York: Braziller, in press.

PIAGET, J. *Play, dreams and imitation in childhood*. New York: Norton, 1951.

VYGOTSKY, L. *Thought and language*. (Ed. and trans. by Eugenia Hanfmann and Gertrude Vakar). New York: Wiley, 1962.

BRUNER, JEROME S., Education as a Social Invention, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, 3, 21-33.

Four bases for re-defining psychology's contribution to education are discussed. First, man as a species has developed by evolutionary instrumentalism, his use of tools, including language. Second, there has been increased knowledge of individual mental growth through research. Third, the recent curriculum revolution has suggested some testable propositions. Fourth, the rapidly changing nature of society seems to pose requirements for the educational enterprise. 1964 Presidential Address to SPSSI.

MacKINNON, DONALD, The Kurt Lewin Memorial Award Presentation to Alfred J. Marrow, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, 3, 1-3.

A review of the accomplishments of A. J. Marrow in community and industry in light of Lewin's interests, serving as the introduction to Marrow's address.

MARROW, ALBERT J., Risks and Uncertainties in Action Research, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, 3, 5-20 (with photograph).

The results of Lewin's concern with social research and social action are traced in two areas: prejudice and discrimination in community life; and management of people in industry. The issues in the work of the Commission on Community Interrelations, and of the Commission on Inter-Group Relations are evaluated, and the programs in the Harwood Company are reported in terms of postulates of group dynamics.

PHYLON

THE ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
REVIEW OF
RACE AND CULTURE

OLDEST MAJOR PUBLICATION IN THE WORLD DEVOTED
EXCLUSIVELY TO TRENDS AND EVENTS IN RACIAL AND
CULTURAL RELATIONS ON THE WORLD SCENE

Subscription rates: $3.00 per year; a two-year subscription or two subscriptions, $5.00; Canada and Foreign, $3.50 per year, two years, $6.00.

Indexed in the *International Index to Periodicals, Psychological Abstracts, Bulletin of Public Affairs Information Service, Sociological Abstracts* and *Index to Selected Periodicals.*

Microfilms beginning with Volume XVII are available to regular subscribers from University Microfilms, 313 N. First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

PUBLISHED BY ATLANTA UNIVERSITY, ATLANTA, GEORGIA

Address all correspondence and/or manuscripts to:

PHYLON, Atlanta University
Atlanta 14, Georgia

British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology

Edited by MICHAEL ARGYLE and JACK TIZARD

Contents of Vol. 3, Part 1, February 1964

British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology

Contents of Vol. 3, Part 2, June 1964

HUMAN RELATIONS

VOLUME 17 NUMBER 4 NOVEMBER 1964

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION
(Act of October 23, 1962; Section 4369, Title 39, United States Code)

Publisher
File two copies of
this form with your postmaster.

1. DATE OF FILING
July 14, 1964

2. TITLE OF PUBLICATION
Journal of Social Issues

3. FREQUENCY OF ISSUE
Quarterly

4. LOCATION OF KNOWN OFFICE OF PUBLICATION *(Street, city, county, state, zip code)*

5. LOCATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS OR GENERAL BUSINESS OFFICES OF THE PUBLISHERS *(Not printers)*
~~RxxQxxRaxx~~ Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, P. O. Box 1248 Ann Arbor, Mich.

6. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF PUBLISHER, EDITOR AND MANAGING EDITOR

PUBLISHER *(Name and address)*
Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, P. O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor Mich.

EDITOR *(Name and address)*
Robert Chin   270 Bay State Road   Boston 15, Massachusetts

MANAGING EDITOR *(Name and address)*

7. OWNER *(If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual must be given.)*

NAME	ADDRESS
does not apply	

8. KNOWN BONDHOLDERS, MORTGAGEES, AND OTHER SECURITY HOLDERS OWNING OR HOLDING 1 PERCENT OR MORE OF TOTAL AMOUNT OF BONDS, MORTGAGES OR OTHER SECURITIES *(If there are none, so state)*

NAME	ADDRESS
does not apply	

9. Paragraphs 7 and 8 include, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting, also the statements in the two paragraphs show the affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner. Names and addresses of individuals who are stockholders of a corporation which itself is a stockholder or holder of bonds, mortgages or other securities of the publishing corporation have been included in paragraphs 7 and 8 when the interests of such individuals are equivalent to 1 percent or more of the total amount of the stock or securities of the publishing corporation.

10. THIS ITEM MUST BE COMPLETED FOR ALL PUBLICATIONS EXCEPT THOSE WHICH DO NOT CARRY ADVERTISING OTHER THAN THE PUBLISHER'S OWN AND WHICH ARE NAMED IN SECTIONS 132.231, 132.232 AND 132.233 POSTAL MANUAL *(Sections 4355a, 4355b and 4356 of Title 39, United States Code)*

	AVERAGE NO. COPIES EACH ISSUE DURING PRECEDING 12 MONTHS	SINGLE ISSUE NEAREST TO FILING DATE
A. TOTAL NO. COPIES PRINTED *(Net Press Run)*	4,000	5,000
B. PAID CIRCULATION 1. TO TERM SUBSCRIBERS BY MAIL, CARRIER DELIVERY OR BY OTHER MEANS	3,200	3,200
2. SALES THROUGH AGENTS, NEWS DEALERS, OR OTHERWISE	none	
C. FREE DISTRIBUTION *(including samples)* BY MAIL, CARRIER DELIVERY OR BY OTHER MEANS	100	100
D. TOTAL NO. OF COPIES DISTRIBUTED *(Sum of lines B1, B2 and C)*	3,300	3,300

I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.

(Signature of editor, publisher, business manager, or owner)
Caroline Weichlein, Exec. Secty
SPSSI

POD Form **3526** Aug. 1963

Previous Issues

Youth and Social
Action

spssi

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues is a group of over a thousand psychologists and allied social scientists who share a concern with research on the psychological aspects of important social issues. SPSSI is governed by Kurt Lewin's dictum that "there is nothing so practical as a good theory." In various ways, the Society seeks to bring theory and practice into focus on human problems of the group, the community, and the nation as well as the increasingly important ones that have no national boundaries. This Journal has as its goal the communication of scientific findings and interpretations in a non-technical manner but without the sacrifice of professional standards.

The Journal typically publishes a whole number on a single topic. An occasional number will be devoted to contributed papers relevant to the purpose of the Journal. Proposals for new issues and individual papers should be sent to the Incoming General Editor.

spssi

The Journal of
SOCIAL
ISSUES

YOUTH AND SOCIAL ACTION

Issue Editors: Jacob R. Fishman and Fredric Solomon

Values and Social Action Analyses: A Preface

Robert Chin

Behavioral scientists have often applied their conceptual and research skills to those behaviors which are either in opposition to or at least block the attainment of the values of the analyzer. Such analyses tend to show, in explaining the behaviors, how the non-logical, non-rational and the irrational are at work and cause the behavior. And in so doing, seemingly attribute some degree of psychological aberration to these behaviors and to the individual actor. The Journal of Social Issues has indeed published articles which analyze the behaviors of opponents to fluoridation, member and adherents of extremist political groups and of opponents to social change in general.

In this number, the Journal is publishing a symposium devoted to understanding the psychological factors in the advocates and participants in fostering social change through concerted action. Peace demonstrations, civil rights actions, social change and volunteer programs for improving mental health programs are examined within a more or less consistent conceptual schema so that the psycho-social forces underlying these actions, and values, are brought out into the open. It is worthy of note that the same conceptual framework of analysis of youth in action is applied to not only these valued positions and social issues, but also applied to young conservatives on American campuses and to extremist groups among the youth in Japan. The conceptual framework of Erik Erickson, presented by him as a Memorandum in this number, is used and extended by the authors analyzing these different social action movements.

In portraying the psycho-social determinants underlying both valued and disvalued, pro-social and anti-social actions, we are confronted with the problem of the *validity* of a value system and value beliefs as the basis of social action. The incautious reader of such analyses and researches may well ask whether in showing the psychological roots or "causes" of such actions and values, we are wiping out the independence and validity of the social values. Do such reports and studies reduce the value level to the psychological? Are social

values, then, merely manifestations of unresolved psychological issues? We do not think it has to be so. Pro and anti-social movements can contain components of the rational and problem solving behavior and idealistic motivations. Value systems, thought through and not based on unrecognized forces, can be present. Of course, when individual action flows together to form a "movement" which in turn takes on a life of its own, a life which can be as potent as "the cause," for the individual, we have a further webbing in which the values and ideals are played out. Social values determining the choices of actions in social issues can be autonomous under specific able circumstances.

This number of the Journal does not tackle directly the integration of the analysis of valid social values with the psycho-social and personality factors. We do need a new conceptual schema which integrates these levels without neglecting each. One admonition may undercut and destroy this dilemma: the analysis of psycho-social determinants of pro-social action in a movement does not imply of course that the actors are aberrant and are in need of psychotherapeutic help, any more than any one of us.

APRIL 1965

Note: The authors should not be accused of prescience in approach or fact. References to events and occurrences after the publication date on the cover are possible because the actual publication date is much later.

Youth and Social Action: An Introduction

Jacob R. Fishman and Fredric Solomon

The past few years have witnessed what appears to be a significant increase in social and political interest and action on the part of youth in various parts of the world (4, 14, 21, 26, 27, 29, 30, 38, 43, 45, 46 48–53). This is not a new phenomenon in Europe where the traditions of the youth movement as an important force on the political scene go as far back as the late 19th century *Wandervogel* (25). The youth movement is, however, an important new factor in the developing and newly independent nations of Asia and Africa. Furthermore, such modern states as Israel, Egypt, Ghana and Turkey are, in large measure, products of youth movement revolutions (2, 20, 22, 28, 40). Widespread social action by youth also appears to represent a relatively recent social development in the United States, including not only widespread campus demonstrations and student political movements, but also the vanguard of the civil rights revolution (34, 44, 46). These activities in the contemporary world have ranged the entire spectrum from armed revolution and guerrilla warfare, to election campaigning, peace marches, freedom rides, violent and nonviolent public demonstrations and volunteer service for a variety of social causes—including mental health, the anti-poverty program and the Peace Corps.

The unique intersection of adolescence[1] and social change raises many questions of interest to social and behavioral scientists as well as to the formulators of government and community policy. For example, what forces and influences—psychological, social, political, historical—turn adolescents into a dedicated, significant and often volatile force for social change? As pointed out by a number of investigators, the process of social change itself may be a potent enzyme in the development of social action groups among youth (8,

---

[1] Adolescence and Youth are used interchangeably in this paper. Chronologically, we mean the period from approximately 12 to 21 years of age. Conceptually, we mean the psycho-social stages of adolescence and late adolescence.

13). What is not usually as obvious is the fact that the directions and pace of social change may be heavily influenced if not instigated by the activities of these young people. As may be seen in daily headlines, these actions may become a destructive social force or may turn to constructive and creative channels. The movements may be totalitarian or in the best traditions of the democratic process. What kinds of youth become involved in social action? What are the factors which influence ideology, commitment, choice of action and risk-taking? What is the influence of social change and, conversely, what effect do these youth have on the process of change itself?

Questions such as these led the staff of the Howard University Center for Youth and Community Studies and the Department of Psychiatry, College of Medicine, to invite twenty behavioral and social scientists active in these areas to participate in a three-day Conference to share their findings and discuss some of these issues. The papers in this volume were among those presented (in earlier versions) to that conference in October 1963.[2] These papers have been selected to represent a range of disciplines. They were also chosen to cover a variety of social action movements and activities. The selection runs the range of youth groups from potentially violent revolutionaries (Lifton—Japanese Students) to rebels acting within the framework of perceived Constitutional law (civil rights and peace demonstrators—Erikson, Coles, Solomon & Fishman) to those dedicated to upholding the existing order and the perceived old values and traditions (conservatives—Schiff) and, finally, to a group partly sponsored by adult professional or social forces in the community (mental health volunteers—Gelineau & Kantor).

The contributors have concentrated on the factors motivating and affecting youthful participants in movements for social or political change, upon typology and upon the impact which their activity may have on the youth themselves as well as upon the surrounding community. In this introductory article the issue editors will attempt to bring together some of the "common denominators" which appear in these papers and elsewhere and will pose some questions for further consideration and research. Few areas of behavioral research seem to be of such contemporary importance yet have received so little systematic study.

---

[2] The conferees also spent several hours in interview discussions with student civil rights workers. The personal statements of these young people are not presented in this volume, but the interested reader is encouraged to see the April 1965 issue of *Commentary* Magazine which contains a sample of first hand data from two Negro leaders of SNCC (41). Two white workers in the student civil rights movement have written of their experiences (6) and one Negro girl's views have also appeared in print elsewhere (42).

Identity Issues

The need for the development and confirmation of both self and social identity is, to most observers, a major task of adolescence. The concept of identity involves both a subjectively and socially perceived image which might be dissected and analyzed into a number of roles and relationships to persons, tasks and situations which include linkages with both past and future. Erikson has pointed out the sense of continuity between past, present and future as a crucial ingredient of healthy or "positive" identity. The search for identity and the confirmation of its validity, seem to be important on many levels for all youth groups—be they Zengakuren, SNCC, Nazi youth, Conservatives, Peace demonstrators or delinquent gangs.

In this generation, as in no other, we are learning the intrinsic relativity and impermanence of both values and knowledge. This has given rise to a state of almost continual upheaval and discontinuity. If the mathematics taught in the elementary schools seems foreign to the college educated parent in our society, then the discontinuities for Japanese, Southern Negro and African parents and youth are a hundredfold greater. The need for each generation of young people to find "new" identities is a contemporary phenomenon of the greatest psychological consequence. Identity for the adolescent, as some authors have pointed out (11, 13, 34) consists to some degree of a synthesis of *both* identification *with* and rebellion *against* parents and past. The degree and intensity of the rebellion may be related to the dislocation and discontinuity evident at the time and to the inappropriateness of both past and present to evolving needs. The congruence of individual rebellion with historical change is such that the rebellious struggle for identity of an individual against his parents may become identical with the struggle of a people for identity and "adulthood". This is exemplified by the situation of Negro youth in this country and in Africa and of Zionist youth of a decade and a half ago. In this context social change may come so rapidly that the adult, clinging to traditional values and patterns of living, finds himself out of phase with what has become the newly emergent identity of a people and society. The quality of identity (negative versus positive) for the youth under the circumstances cannot be defined only in terms of this rejection of parents and their values. It must also be related to the emergent social changes in the society. These social changes may well be crystallizing a new social identity for the community—one that is quite syntonic with the adolescent rebellion itself.

It might be hypothesized that the conservative youth is involved in a "safe" rebellion (Schiff) endorsed by what he perceives to be social validation and parental support. However, he asserts his own

unique method of defending those values and that identity—in current danger—which his parents do not seem sufficiently able to protect. For the radical who is openly rebelling in the face of conservative parents and asserting his own position, the identity issue is rather clear. However, other young radicals may have "liberal" parents who essentially agree with their viewpoints. Nonetheless, he perceives himself taking the public action and risks which his parents refused to take. He thereby rebels against the limits and hypocrisy of parental "conservatism." Thus, a Negro youth in SNCC sees his parents as covertly approving of his goals or actions even though the parent gives the "outward" appearance of being an "Uncle Tom." To some extent it is necessary for the youth to perceive, precipitate, or rationalize the issue of rebellion in order to sustain and validate his own new and unique identity, and thus enhance his individuality and autonomy.

Another common denominator involving identity appears to be a search for the past. No matter how intense the revolution, part of the struggle in social action involves a search for the old or "lost" values or roots which are then used to validate new directions. For the youth trying to consolidate his sense of identity in a time of great dislocation, this may represent an attempt to overcome the uncertainties and diffusions of the present. Examples can be found in conservative youth, Lifton's Japanese "restorationists," and in those Negro youth who are searching for the folk symbols necessary to use as a basis for a new identity different from the servile ghetto identity of their parents.

Roots are often sought which precede the coming of civilized "imperialism," "slavery" and/or "dependency." This phenomenon was quite apparent in the search of Zionist youth for the biblical roots which antedated the degradation, vulnerability and dependency of the ghetto (1, 37). On another level, one may find this in the search of the fascist youth movements of Spain, Argentina and Rumania; in the Nazi youth movement's fascination with the pagan and powerful traditions of the old gods and the tribal hordes; and in the Italian fascist movement's nostalgia for the imperial traditions of Rome;—all of which preceded what was considered to be the degradation, powerlessness and limitations of modern morality, society and religion (25). For youth involved in "total transformation" as described by Lifton or as characterized in Communist youth movements, there is still evident an intense nostalgia for the simple cultural roots and traditions. All groups seem to exhibit much romanticizing and idealizing of folk songs and folk traditions (even while sometimes denouncing them). This is coincident with the adolescent tendency to romanticize and idealize even when being most intellectual and rational.

Identification may take place not only with parents but with the perceived "aggressor" as well. This is similar to the paradigm of rebel-

tion and identification with the image of the domineering and repressive father. Among Negro students, public protest and nonviolent aggression often involve rebellion against images of a passive "Uncle Tom father," identification with the (mother's) wish fulfillment fantasy of a father who would be assertive if not for "circumstances," and identification with the assertive, dominant white male aggressor (13, 34). One wonders how this pattern compares with that found in the countries of Asia and Africa now emerging from white colonialism— and how important a factor this sort of issue may be in the behavior of the leaders of many "developing" nations in Asia and Africa.

One must consider the middle-class, professionally motivated youth who may find a socially acceptable, adult-validated and admired, and personally satisfying "altruistic role" with poor people or the mentally ill. The Peace Corps and student mental health volunteers seem to fit into this category. How much does the uniqueness and "off-beat" quality of their activity, combined with its intrinsic professional and social worth, provide a vehicle for these youth to form a rebellious new identity with controlled risk which is professionally and academically secure?

In this context one is lead to wonder to what extent the "existentialist approach" described by Gellineau and Kantor in this volume masks a dislocation with past and future by presenting the appearance of professionalism—an attempt to substitute the current as the only reality because of this dislocation with the past and fear of the future.

Pro-Social Action and Altruism

Common to all the youth movements described is a *pro-social* group identity (13, 34). The members see themselves as acting on behalf of ideals, the social good, and towards the benefit of others. This is obvious in the descriptions of the Conservative youth, Zengakuren, Peace Demonstrators and civil rights workers. It appears also to be true of the self-perception and stated ideals of Communist youth, Nazi and fascist movements of Europe, Viet Cong, Castroites, and Venezuelan terrorists (25). These groups were or are consciously prosocial according to their own definition. Our concept of what is "prosocial" must in part be based on the rationalizations and perceived values of youth, as "misguided" as these may appear to a particular observer. Although the interest in and commitment to helping and bettering the lives of others ("building a better world") may be distorted and put to ultimately harmful use, it is nonetheless an important force potentially capable of great good both to the community and to the youth.

In another context the Negro demonstrator in the South con-

sciously breaks laws and challenges social traditions which many in the community hold valid. Typically for youth movements however, he does this on behalf of a "higher law" (the Constitution and democratic traditions) and a "higher good" (basic tenets of Christianity). The actions of most juvenile delinquents, on the other hand, would be termed *anti-social* mainly because of their purely destructive quality, without any attendant altruism towards the society at large.

Identity and commitment must also be studied in terms of the short- and long-term consequences for persons other than those of the immediate group and the attitudes which the group has towards the possible suffering and hurt inflicted on others. Even though sensitive to such suffering, the group members influenced by education, rationalization or social circumstances may see their activity as belonging ultimately to the social and communal good and see the victims as "necessary cost." The more extreme the group the greater the defenses against recognizing and sympathizing with the suffering of others incident to the achievement of goals. In this connection, Erikson's notion of the need for "ethical guidance" by adults reacting to youth movements is an especially challenging concept.

When and how does this altruism or social concern first begin? In studies of peace and civil rights demonstrators we have tentatively noted that "first memories" of social concern and sympathy seem to cluster around the ages of 5–7 and 12–15. This coincides with periods of great personality and role transition in the individual. Perhaps the awareness of and discomfort with change in the self increases the tendency to displacement and projection and thus enhances sensitivity to and sympathy with suffering in others.

Do all youth and children experience much the same feelings? At these ages? If so, why do some have the tendency to act on these feelings and others not? If these experiences are not alike, what accounts for the differences? (Family? Culture? Social class? Personality?) What factors influence the need for and the intensity of altruistic commitment? What is the relationship between the *altruism* of adolescence and the *ethics* of young adulthood of which Erikson has recently written? (10)

What then happens when alienated and dislocated youth without opportunity or future such as those living in poverty in our urban areas are presented with a program in the context of a *social movement* as currently underway at HARYOU (18), Howard University Center for Youth and Community Studies (3) and Mobilization for Youth in New York City? What are the differences between anti-social, pro-social, and even asocial identity and attitude? Can the negative identity of the lower class delinquent be transformed into the pro-social or positive identity of the social reforming youth of SNCC or other movements?

Social Change and Discontent

The unique susceptibility and responsiveness of youth to social change is a well documented phenomenon; it pervades all the papers presented here. Adolescence and late adolescence in the contemporary world is a time of transition, preparation, uncertainty and exploration. The transition from childhood to adulthood is heavily influenced not only by tradition and family, but also by the opportunities, restrictions, and uncertainties of the social and economic world. For the child, the changing social world is not yet relevant. The adult, already "established," must adapt as best he can to social change within the framework of established individual patterns. But the adolescent has a lowered threshold to all things affecting the verification of the past, the events of the present, and the possibilities of the future. Erikson describes this phenomenon as the unique intersection of life history with history (8). In another context, one might describe it as a congruence of the unique needs of the adolescent and the changes of value and circumstance during social upheaval.

The life histories of contemporary Japanese and Negro youth, as described in this issue and elsewhere (5, 8, 13, 33, 34) are quite relevant in this sense. The adolescence of both groups took place during a time of radical social change and resultant discontent. For the Japanese, the Second World War was followed by the overthrow of old traditions and patterns and the opening of society to concepts of social freedom, relativity of values, and new forms of social and economic competition. For the Negro youth, early adolescence included the period of the Supreme Court Decision of 1954, followed by an increasing momentum of political and social change in which the long-standing patterns of social, political and economic segregation which had characterized their childhood were undermined and questioned. At the same time dark-skinned "underdogs" in other parts of the world found it possible to rebel and assert their nationhood and adulthood. In this sense, historical dislocation may play a major role in the development of adolescent social action. This dislocation brings uncertainty and discontent, undermines the authority of the older generation, and leaves the adolescent with a need as well as a justification for finding new norms to supplant the old.

It is apparent in this that *change* may involve combinations of new challenges (mental hospital), new threats (nuclear war) or dangers to old values (the conservative movement), and the bubbling over of long-standing discontent (segregation and civil rights). One repeated image in youth movements is the representation of history as a continual dialectic struggle between the uncertainties and hopes of youth on the one hand and the fears and rigidities of age on

the other. Does this "conflict of generations" become most intense during times of social dislocation when old values and powers are weakened or deprived of what theretofore held unquestioned validity? How do parents and families reflect the impact of social change and thus somehow transmit the "license" for discontent to some youth? Which psychosocial variables in the youth make them most responsive?

Autonomy, Adulthood, and the Peer Group

Adolescent strivings for adulthood usually emphasize a desire for autonomy of action, behavior, thought and feeling. The activities of the youth movement are also characterized by this attempt to achieve independence from adults and adult values. Autonomy can feel "real" to those youths whose total lives are caught up with the movement and whose finances, life space, and social relations are totally integrated into those of the "organization." Such young people have found in the movement a vehicle for accelerating the break with family, have been able to move away from childhood dependency and find support for this in the dedicated peer group. They may come home on weekends for meals or accept an occasional check from the family, but they do this with a display of condescension and complaints that their parents are trying to "buy them." Movements may be "extreme" not only in the political sense but also in the degree to which they encourage and support this kind of autonomy or a break with family ties. For the college student living away from home, his movement identification may bolster his first experience with independence.

On the other hand, as with youth generally in our culture, this autonomy may be more a group-supported fantasy than a reality. Social, political and ideological activities provide an illusion of adulthood, importance and power. Of course, real power may actually accrue to the movement as a result of the degree and intensity of social action, the instability of a social situation, or the "clay feet" of a government. In a more democratic society power may be gained from the importance given to a group by government and the opposition. It may also derive from the effectiveness of the public image and sympathy mobilized by youth demonstrating, sitting-in or exposing themselves to physical injury. Certain civil rights and peace demonstrators are perhaps a good example of this latter kind of potency.

Even when the autonomy and powerfulness perceived by the adolescent is illusory it may nonetheless serve important functions both in strengthening the peer group and in providing an important vehicle for individual ego development. Indeed, the activities in the movement provide a role-testing opportunity for later adulthood and may be an important contributant to the development of community leader-

ship later on. The ranks of student demonstrators, freedom-riders, and others may provide the core of future leadership in much the same way and for many of the same reasons that movements have supplied the current leadership of Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Indonesia, both Chinas, Cuba and Ghana, to note but a few.

Through rebellion the youth assumes an aspect of the adult decision-making role in the community around issues which affect his own future. For Negro youth, affected by the stereotypes and psychosocial traditions of the South, socio-political assertion and powerfulness become identified very closely with the achievement of male potency and adulthood. Achieving the vote in our society may be analogous to possessing the machine gun in a chaotic society or a uniform in an authoritarian one.

The search for powerfulness is heavily bolstered by the use of formulations of magic and omnipotence which are both typical of the adolescent ego and also representative of a regression to the security of childhood thinking. The omnipotent and magical slogans utilized serve not only an ideological function, increasing commitment, but also bolster courage, emphasize the sense of invulnerability, and motivate towards risk-taking behavior which might otherwise be shunned. An example of this is a common youth movement slogan which may be paraphrased: "If you will it, it is no dream."

A continuum might be noted based on the relationship between an adolescent's social action struggle and his personal struggle to move from dependence to independence. We might thus characterize both movements and individuals within movements in terms of a range in which dependence and conservatism are at one end and independence and extremism at the other.[8] At one pole one might place the conservative students who maintain close dependence on adults for direction and support; then the mental health volunteers, followed by the bulk of the Peace Demonstrators. Towards the other end of the continuum are student civil rights workers and beyond that the Japanese student extremists (Zengakuren).

Similarly, *within* any individual movement at one extreme one finds a core of totally dedicated youth whose lives and destinies have at least for the time being become totally and intensely identified with the work and future of the movement, accompanied by a break with family ties. In the other direction, one finds lessening degrees of attachment and commitment reaching out to the extreme periphery where there are those youth with only a tenuous and sporadic interest or occasional participation in a demonstration or social activity. A member typically becomes attached through involvement in either

---

[8] Extremism is herein defined either as extremes of social action and/or extremes in the break with convention and adult ties.

social activities or a demonstration, through friends or chance associa-
tion and—depending upon his own psychosocial readiness, the evan-
gelical state of the movement and other social factors—he may then
move in varying degrees towards the core. In the course of this process
of involvement a member is required to prove himself in different ways
in order to demonstrate his commitment. This commitment usually
involves some readiness for personal sacrifice and renunciation of
"conformist" values, patterns and ties.

To some degree, then, the adolescent substitutes for the depend-
ency on parents a dependency on the peer group in which, however,
he now has equal status or vote—at least in principle if not always in
practice.

The association of "equals" seems to provide not only an oppor-
tunity for social testing and mutual reinforcement, but also a vehicle
for close personal loyalties and social relationships with persons one's
own age of both sexes. It provides an opportunity to test one's self
against others in the context of unified action rather than through
overt individual competition. This communal experience is one of the
most important aspects of the movement life and the intense relation-
ships developed here persist long beyond other friendships made at
any other period of life. Time perspective is greatly telescoped. This
is a product of the intensity of experience generated in the movement
and of the bonds of group identity which develop from sharing risks,
suffering, affect and action for a common goal.

The authors have heard statements from a number of SNCC
members to the effect that after they have joined the movement
nothing seems the same anymore. The old patterns and values at
school seem empty, uninteresting, and "not real," and the activist does
not think he can ever go back to university life. This characterizes the
profound identity change which these youth undergo in the movement
—a transformation which includes some reorganization of the cogni-
tive map. They now have a new reality as well as a new identity.

It is typical of the peer sub-culture that it develops a disdain for
the outside world, for adults, for the opposition and, even more im-
portant, for unaffiliated youth. Within the movement there is a great
deal of pressure for conformity, even when conformity with the values
and patterns of the *outside world* is deprecated. This pressure sup-
ports group identity, but may be more relentless and intolerant than
any criticism directed towards the outside world.

Immersion in the intense communal life of the group facilitates a
great deal of social and sexual exploration and role-testing. This is
possible because there exists a much less threatening context than on
the outside, particularly when activities are consonant with the mores
of the group. In some cases mores may be much freer and uninhibited

than those in the adult culture, especially where the adult culture tends to be restrained and puritanical in its behavior.[4] On the other hand, there is the paradoxical example of contemporary Israeli youth movements whose members are much more puritanical than their elders. The latter, in liberating themselves from the inhibition and oppression of the religious ghettos of Europe had been generally free and casual about sexual and marital relationships. Such phenomena suggest that the issues of identity and autonomy can take precedence in determining many aspects of adolescent sexual behavior.

Expressive Behavior and Public Recognition

Demonstrations, parades and other assertive activities which involve public display serve to meet an important need for recognition and exhibition in the adolescent. These activities may include uniforms, placards, ceremony, ritual, chanting and other dramatic trappings. These activities provide visibility, admiration, respect and/or fear—symbolic community recognition of adulthood, identity and potency. They also serve as communal symbols in enhancing group affect and identity.

Not only is this limelight gratifying, but with the increasing importance of public opinion as molded through the news media, it is easier to obtain and it carries some import for political power. Demonstrators have learned the strategic importance of utilizing the television camera, the reporter, and the wire service for mobilizing public sympathy as a political weapon. These become such crucial elements that the leadership frequently organizes activities with these media heavily in mind. Possible examples include the Japanese student riots, peace demonstrators in Washington and recent activities of the civil rights movement.

Though seldom recognized as such, many movement activities (slogans, skits, publications, songs, demonstrations and other expressive group activities) serve the same function for the individual as do the more traditional art forms. However, the former provide both media and motivation for goal-directed self-expression in a much more exciting and peer-group reinforced form than that which ordinarily can be found in school or community.

---

[4] Yet even in the framework of sexual "freedom" within a movement, there is a brother-and-sister quality frequently observable in the heterosexual relationships. A pragmatic twist to the "Movement-must-come-first" orientation is humorously displayed in the following line from a song of the University of California Free Speech Movement: "Sleeping on the lawn in a double sleeping bag doesn't get things done" (47).

Risk-Taking Behavior

The impulsive urge to immediate action which is so much a part of adolescence seems to lead to a great deal of risk-taking in many groups, over and beyond that which is calculated to achieve certain social ends. The decision for risk-taking is usually made with group support and helps to develop feelings of autonomy as well as to prove bravery and the willingness to endure suffering on behalf of one's principles. The sequential experience of impulsive action, risk-taking, and suffering goes far to solidify feelings of unity and identity. Demonstrators derive great strength from their experiences in jail or in the midst of hostile crowds. This is well illustrated in observations made on sit-in demonstrators in the South. However, the factors of group support and the requirements for proof of fidelity do not seem ample to explain why some members act and take risks whereas others feel commitment to the same goals and principles but never engage in risk-taking activity. The psychosocial determinants of risk-taking behavior have received little consideration outside of the narrow confines of the laboratory.

Ideology

The formulation of ideology serves to structure and make intellectually meaningful the social goals and strategies of the movement. However, it appears to be much more than an intellectual process. Attempts are made to link meaningfully the past with the present and to draw inferences and mandates for the future. Sooner or later ideology around specific social issues becomes broadened to embrace a more or less coherent world-view (*Weltanschäuung*). The world view is the intellectual vehicle for transforming feelings of discontent into a program of action which provides self-justification and a sequence of progressively expanding goals. Together with the sense of commitment it appears to be a basic ingredient in the experience of "meaning" and provides a frame of reference for one's social identity.

A movement may be born in a demonstration around a given issue (involving a single grievance or a generalized discontent) and then expand gradually through experience, extrapolation, and the broadening of youthful horizons to include much more. The sit-in movement, for example, seemingly began at Greensboro around the rights of a few Negro youths to sit at a segregated lunch counter. Members of the student civil rights movement have since expanded their commitment and concern to include political, economic and social rights in the total society, the problems of the poor, and even the rights of people in South Africa and Viet Nam. Is this process due to a natural expansion of adolescent emotional and intellectual horizons? Is it simply a logical

political sequence arising from the widening application of basic premises, or is it due to the chance contiguity of issues of concern and discontent at a given time? Is there a psychosocial tendency for persons to polarize politically around radical-liberal-conservative-reactionary dimensions? If so, is the crucial variable commitment to values of the past and the status quo versus commitment to discontent, reform and change?

Much has been written about the "non-ideological" youth now involved in social protest movements in America. In their papers here Solomon and Fishman, Coles and Gellineau and Kantor have sketched what appears to be the humanistic, moralistic, rather unstructured world outlook of many contemporary young activists. Yet the humanistic approaches of these young people to issues of the day is really quite a powerful ideology, and their automatic rejection of various impersonal dogmas and theories is in itself a significant ideological stance (39). "These kids don't read Marx. They read Camus," remarked a leader of SNCC (41).

One of the papers in this volume explores the explicit ideology of conservative students from the point of view of "totalistic" conversion and commitment. Both Erikson and Schiff write of totalism and exclusive identity in such terms as to lead an uninitiated reader to suspect certain biases in favor of liberal or anti-authoritarian movements as being more "whole" or more healthy *per se.* Such biases would, of course, represent a pitfall for the researcher, since the potential for totalistic identification seems to be present in every adolescent and in every youth movement. Holistic identification, as Erikson implies, is not only very rarely studied but is itself a perishable commodity even under the best of adolescent circumstances. Both wholeness and totalism, then, are dynamic processes subject to many vicissitudes during adolescence and are not really established among the more fixed features of the personality until the phase of young adulthood has been entered.

What determines the "choice" of ideology for a particular person at a particular time in his life? This question is touched upon in all of the papers and indeed is a key issue. Four patterns of influence might be extracted from the papers:

1. *Chance association with a committed peer group or "cause" during a particularly susceptible time of life (e.g., early adolescence or the first year of college).*

Here there may be an almost coincidental intersection of the developmental need for meaning and commitment with the presence of a strong outside influence, or with a time when old traditions have been forcefully challenged.

2. *Identification with or rebellion against the attitudes and values of one's parents.*

Here the crucial variables include the individual dynamics of the adolescent and his family as well as the family's social background. In movements which are oriented to conservative or status quo positions the need may be one of strong emulation of parental values. The overt issue of discontent is usually minimized in this situation or projected to the opposition. The young conservative, as Schiff points out, does see himself as a change agent but one who is "changing the direction of, or halting, a radical change" (a common anti-Communist position). In liberal families, as pointed out in the paper by Solomon and Fishman, the ideology of the parents may be passed down to the youth; the rebellion and discontent are then displayed in method, degree and autonomy of action, as well as in the belief that parents have not been true to their own ideals. The task for these students is further change in the society. In more radical or extreme groups the ideology may represent rebellion against parental and adult values, no matter what they are. Overdetermination may push the youth into sometimes seemingly absurd positions. These positions are nonetheless viewed with a great deal of commitment and consistency by the youth and, although they may be at times "neurotically" determined, still result in a unique identity and ideology with an internal consistency quite independent from what might be to the adult world "social reality."

3. *The impact of social and cultural influences, particularly in the context of a rapidly changing social system in which a new set of values is emerging.*

Emergent ideology here usually contains a combination of the old and new. The ideology of the conservative includes fidelity to old values which are being newly challenged. The civil rights demonstrators have developed an ideology combining their experience of the 1954 Supreme Court Decision and subsequent social change with a passive-aggressive psychosocial heritage of submission and covert or displaced rebellion. To this is added a dedication to what are perceived as the basic traditional values of Christianity and democracy. The result is an ideology of democracy and social change which includes the effective use of nonviolence—an essentially passive-aggressive mode. Another example of the effects of social and cultural change is presented in Lifton's paper on the imagery of post-war Japanese youth movements.

4. *Various features of adolescence itself.*

Such ideological common denominators might include: a pro-social outlook, although goals and methods may differ widely; a future-orientation; a general optimism of outlook, possibly masked in a number of ways; discontent with aspects of the present and past; an emphasis on the importance of action; dedication and self sacrifice; a sense of moral superiority; oversimplification of issues; rejection of

compromise, pragmatism and relativity; the framing of issues in all or nothing terms; choice of risk-taking positions in preference to caution; and an emphasis on "universal" truths and principles.

The ideology of each youth group may represent a relatively unique combination of the above patterns. The tendency to action and oversimplification puts youth frequently close to the position of totalism. In this context it might be hypothesized that youth is much more prone to embrace exclusive, totalistic ideologies under conditions of repression of activities, dislocation, or personal disruption. Other contributants probably include long-standing cultural factors, deprivation of social and economic needs, and—in some cases—chronic psychosocial disturbance (e.g., fringe and extremist groups). Such ideologies present a simple, unified, more certain and secure frame of reference in which decisions are either readily made by others or derived from a set of rules. Totalistic commitment and ideology can help the individual contain and overcome anxiety arising from the complexities of modern life.

What influences the choice of violent as opposed to nonviolent ideology and action? The editors have referred above to their observations and hypotheses concerning the origin of the uniquely successful nonviolent ideology and political method utilized by the desegregation movement in this country (13). On the other hand, even in the midst of the most fervent idealism and "prosocial commitment" some youth and some movements can be remarkably callous to the suffering of those who get in their way. Tendencies to violence and to totalism seem to be closely related. Yet the choice of either or both may be a response to short term variables rather than persistent characteristics.

Each of the papers in this volume presents something of a typology of ideologies or of psychosocial "types" present in a given social and cultural situation. Lifton refers to three profiles of Japanese activists—the *transformationists* (dedicated to extreme change with at least a superficial rejection of the past), the *restorationists* (the "conservative" or even "reactionary" seeking to preserve or restore the old order in the face of new threats) and the *accommodationists* (who may have a little of both outlooks but are trying to accommodate to or compromise with current realities and changes). One might inquire about possible relationships between this richly documented typology and the more familiar continuum of radical-liberal-conservative-reactionary.

It is surprising how little this area has been investigated. Even more surprising is what little attempt has been made to collect existing data from different fields to help understand the formation of ideology, choice of action and extent of commitment of young people in a given situation. Our nation's current problems with the youth of

Viet Nam on both sides are poignant testimony to this lack of knowledge.

Fidelity

Commitment to a "cause" and a group allows one to identify with universals and values beyond the self. This identification provides security, a sense of being and meaning, and an ego-expansion in which secondary omnipotence is not a small factor. Through his fidelity the member strengthens the movement and is in turn strengthened as he becomes an integral part of something much larger than the self. Erikson describes very eloquently in this volume and elsewhere (8) the psychosocial significance of fidelity. It is the action movement's cement—involving emotional dedication to one's companions as well as to the group's goals and ideals. At the same time, in extreme groups fidelity can be used as a vehicle for totalism and totalitarianism.

The need for fidelity and commitment seems to transcend issues of ideology. This is illustrated by the phenomenon of crossover from one movement to another which one frequently finds in societies where there are several co-existent youth groups. It occurred quite frequently in the early days of the German Republic among the free German youth movement, the Communists and the Socialists. As Solomon and Fishman point out in their follow-up study of peace demonstrators, this overlap between movements has been a common phenomenon during the last few years in this country among the members of the civil rights movement, the peace movements, and other groups. To some extent this may express the search of youth for a broadening of commitment beyond the individual issues with which they may begin. On the other hand, it is perhaps a process of selection by which youth with the particular capacity and need for this kind of commitment move into the "world" of social action in which ideological choices and group affiliations may shift as a result of social change, peer group influences, or of attraction groups which seem stronger, more aggressive, more dedicated, or more in touch with success or with the issues of current importance.

Fidelity represents the answer to an emotional need for belonging and for being committed to the group to which one belongs. To some extent it becomes a creative substitute for the emotional dependency of childhood. Perhaps there is no time of greater certainty and feeling of wholeness than during a period of total commitment in thought and deed. Doubts are resolved, conflicts displaced and projected, all things are in place, one's roots are secure, and the recognition and support of companions is at a peak. The capacity for commitment in the individual (including acts of religious faith) remains a major unexplored area of developmental social psychology today.

Morality, Purity and Sacrifice

The adolescent concern with morality is not unique to the Judeo-Christian heritage and may be found as well in the Chinese, Japanese, and Indian youth movements (8, 22, 27, 40). The search of the youth group for goodness and purity is consonant with the morality taught during early childhood. A much oversimplified and even childlike view of good and bad in the world may be found in many youth movements. Though "unreal" this may provide a magical cloak of invulnerability and assurance of inevitable success. The act of self-sacrifice, as does the act of faith, strengthens the group. When ritualized or dramatized it illuminates the moral lagging of others and, by way of example and implied shame, urges the members on to greater effort. The self-sacrifice or dramatic renunciation, particularly that which becomes glorified and legendary, usually contains an important element of purification and the rejection of "sensual" or physical gratification. Examples can be seen in the South Vietnamese Buddhist girl immolating herself in fire; Horst Wessel in the Nazi youth movement dying after refusing the transfusion of "Jewish blood"; the fasting of certain peace demonstrators; the civil rights workers' exposure to risk and beating without retaliation and violence; the ascetic habits of the Zengakuren leaders; and the sacrifice of recreation and study time of the mental health volunteers.

There is a strongly romantic element present here. It includes a fantasied wish for the effectuality of the individual act to overcome the banal and mediocre patterns of middle-class life, the spiritual triumph of will over material objectives, and the possibility of individual and simple heroic deeds changing the complex course of events. The resultant conflict of the romanticized individual act with the demands of group discipline is an important and frequent topic for youth group dialectics.

Purity is juxtaposed to corruption and hypocrisy in all spheres—social, political, personal and sexual. The cultural norms of the movement are built around these concerns. In the sexual sphere, even if there develops a pattern of extra-marital relations it is usually far from license and "sleeping around." Sexual norms are regulated in the group and viewed as rebellion against and emancipation from the hypocrisies and insincerities of the adult or traditional society. Sexual and personal relations emphasize sincerity of motive, feeling and attachment. The violation of the principle of purity and sincerity by "opportunism" or free and easy behavior is frequently seen as a sign of decadence and hypocrisy. It represents moral irresponsibility or, at the very least, impedes the progress of the movement. Sensuality is a poor second to work in the system of values. In this sense every youth movement has a puritan streak.

This moral position is enhanced by a restless seeking out of hypocrisies and inconsistencies of the adult world as additional justification for rebellion. There is great sensitivity to contamination of members of the movement with these outside impurities. One may note, however, a not unusual discrepancy between these role-models and ideals and actual behavior. This discrepancy is a continuing source of great disillusionment in the movement. After all, the models are themselves unrealistic and childlike in their emphasis on the absolute and on the search for signs of hypocrisy in others. The world is never really absolute and consistent and the youth frequently finds himself or colleagues in hypocritical or "contaminated" positions. This is a typical dilemma of adolescence. It may be handled by denial; guilt and self-sacrifice; a process of soul searching; mutual confession and criticism; projection; or disillusionment and withdrawal. The birth (or rebirth) of morality, purity and honor is also an important part of developing nationalism and is again a possible point of intersection of history with the developmental issues of adolescence.

Mental Health

It is of great interest to note reports of the short-term effects of social protest movements upon crime and mental illness. A recently reported study has described a substantial drop in violent crimes committed by Negroes in three Southern cities during periods of civil rights activity in those cities (32). In one city, the SNCC leader "converted" about 200 members of juvenile gangs into nonviolent workers for voter registration. A recent article about the University of California Free Speech Movement cites the report of the director of the student psychiatric clinic at that University. He states that the referral rate for the treatment of emotional disturbance in students had dropped precipitously during the semester with the greatest amount of public protest activity (39).

Reports such as these seem to confirm more informal observations on the possible beneficial effects to be derived from participation in a movement. Taking *action* consonant with one's beliefs in a "pro-social" mode may reduce the need for acting out in more socially destructive or self-destructive patterns (13, 32, 34). The issues of identity, fidelity and work may be at least temporarily resolved. This can be of especially great value to young people who are otherwise "borderline" individuals suffering from identity diffusion or work paralysis. Pro-social action and the commitment to movement, identity and goals may be very powerful vehicles towards ego development and integration for the healthy adolescent as well as for the young person of borderline adjustment.

Feeling or "affect" states are often profoundly influenced by the

stimulation to be found in movement activities. Absorption in the fun and work of a movement can provide such "kicks" as to become almost addicting to some young people—especially to those who are to some extent using the movement to deal with ego-alien or depressive tendencies[5] (34). On the other hand there is insufficient data to suggest that the effects of prolonged movement participation in contemporary American society is of any particular psychological benefit to the individual (5, 34).

It would be of great interest to study the differential rates of attraction which specific youth movements have for different personality variables. For example, do movements differ in their ability to capitalize upon and reinforce paranoid, manic, sociopathic, ascetic or altruistic tendencies? How are such trends integrated into the developing personalities of late adolescent and young adult members?

Youth and Nationalism

The rise of nationalism which began in the nineteenth century and has of late developed so much momentum in Africa and Asia provides a uniquely fertile medium for the expression of youth needs through movements. Nationalism seemingly bears a relationship to a developing nation similar to the relationship which a movement has to youth. It mobilizes the same issues, feelings and action for the people and provides a vehicle for identity, independence, fidelity and assertion. The "behavior" of a nation undergoing a nationalistic revival is much like that of the adolescent in the movement and perhaps this analogy can provide some insights into the behavior, direction and attitudes of both the nation's leaders (who are often former or current youth movement leaders) and the people and organization which form the vanguard of nationalist activity. A stimulating and possibly illuminating exercise may be had by applying the various characteristics described in this volume to recent actors and events in nations undergoing the throes of intense nationalist activity. Of particular interest is the subjective phenomenon both in the movement and the

---

[5] The authors have observed interesting common clinical trends in several movements. During peaks of activity, when identity is most definite and group exhilaration greatest, many previously borderline or depressed young persons are symptom-free and seem to present rather high levels of ego integration. Indeed, for a few students, otherwise socially distressing symptom patterns of a sociopathic, paranoid or manic variety may become socially "syntonic" and actually advantageous at these times. During periods of movement inactivity or when these youth are for one reason or another estranged from the group, however, the symptoms of depression and identity diffusion often appear to an incapacitating degree. To a lesser degree this pattern may be observed in those youth whose social adjustment is generally considered to be quite good. This seems to be a most significant area for systematic "clinical" study.

nation of "rebirth" or "awakening"—the break with a past of dependency, non-identity, impurity, impotence and unenlightenment.

Leadership

An infrequently studied but quite significant role is that of youth movement leader. He is usually recruited from the movement, given special training and is included in the nucleus of the dedicated and committed. Not infrequently his social, intellectual and recreational activities are totally absorbed in the movement. An important part of the leadership role is that of group education. The leader teaches and formulates ideology and strategies for action. Even though he may take a minimum salary for living expenses from the group funds, the more "non-professional" (i.e., committed) he is, the more status he has as an ego model in the group, as compared to the paid professional found frequently in the more adult-sponsored youth organizations. The role combines various characteristics of group worker, ideologist, ego-model, educator and preacher.

The youth leader is typically in his twenties or early thirties. His own adolescence is prolonged through this role and he frequently has the charisma of this age period. Perhaps this is one of the important self and group selection criteria of effective youth leaders. Although older—he retains many adolescent traits and seems to be still working through, perhaps quite creatively, many of the issues of adolescence.

A striking contrast exists between leaders noted in the Japanese movements, SNCC and the peace movement—these leaders fit the above model—and the leaders of the conservative movement where this role is seen partly as a career vehicle for entry into adult society.

Social and Educational Dislocation

Rapid social change may disarticulate youth from the social, educational and economic structure and make the knowledge, skills and the values of the past seem irrelevant to the present (and future). Perhaps this is the reason why the breaking away of youth into movements of rebellion and discontent began among the middle-class students of late 19th century Germany who found themselves with an increasing wealth of knowledge but locked out of the rigid social and political system. At the same time, this system and its values were being undermined by a developing economic and industrial society. These youth found themselves with an irrelevant past but with none of the instruments or pathways which might provide a meaningful, secure and potent future for themselves. The forces of industrialization, modern commerce and liberalism ushered in a period of social change and turmoil in the countries of Europe which

is still in process. Students not only learned about the spirit of the new age and of possible alternatives to current practices but this awareness coincided with a more personalized awareness of the problems implicit in their own role—caught between the new and the old without position or power in either. Youth movements became the vanguard of the new revolutionary parties springing up in all parts of Europe. The movements themselves ranged widely over the spectrum of ideology and social action including the romantic folk nostalgia of the peasant movements (Tolstoian and Social Revolutionary, Iron Guard and German Free Youth); the democratic and Socialist Moderates (Bund, Christian Socialists); the extreme left wing (which became the socialist left and Communists) with their emphasis on the "scientific" view of history and social structure; and the variety of anarchist fringe groups.[6]

The fact that students in the vanguard have traditionally come from the upwardly mobile middle-class suggests the possibility that they had already experienced, through their families, many of the pressures of social change and discontinuity. Other students have traditionally come from minority groups or repressed lower classes where access to social and economic opportunity was cut off more severely through prejudice, class structure or repressive laws. Thus the Jews of Europe were heavily represented in the ranks of revolutionary youth movements, particularly those movements radically rejecting the present and recent past (Zionist, Socialist, Communist). The Nationalist and Facist movements had similar origins but tended to project the reasons for many of their grievances on to scapegoats —particularly minority groups who were seen as parasites and alien contaminants. These movements extolled the simple folk traditions of the past with a strong emphasis on membership in a pure and unified nation with a single direction. Interestingly enough, a number of minority groups developed their own brand of reactive intolerant nationalism (these were generally separatist movements not unlike the contemporary Black Muslims. A striking example was the Zionist-Revisionist Movement in Europe which, in a number of ways, emulated the methods and trappings of the Fascists). These groups exhibit a significant element of identification with the aggressor. The reaction of minority or lower class youth to economic and social blockage may also be seen in the occasional appearance among these groups of more spiritual movements whose attention is turned towards mysticism, moral revival and away from the unpleasantness of social reality.

Disarticulation and the exclusion of students and middle class

---

[6] A small group of high school students has recently appeared in New York and Chicago inexplicably dedicated to anarcho-syndicalism and the writings of Bakunin.

youth in the face of social upheaval are probably crucial factors in the student riots and rebellions in many countries today. These factors may well be affecting the American civil rights workers (white and Negro alike) and other student demonstrators in our own country. In the United States the increase in opportunities for education and prosperity for many has left an increasingly obvious gap between ideal possibilities and social realities for American youth, particularly Negroes (16). One may note in listening to students involved in civil rights demonstrations, peace demonstrations and university "crises" an increasing sense of discontent. They take issue with what they see to be the irrelevancies of much of present-day education. To them it appears to be lacking in its ability to prepare them for "the real world." Instead education seems geared simply to preparing them for traditional careers and self-seeking advancement. They are upset about what they see as the alienation of government and university from serious concern about social problems. They want a voice in the fomulation of social and educational policy, and they desire experiential, first-hand practical knowledge of social issues. What started as a movement to redress the problems and achieve the rights of Negro students is rapidly becoming a movement for *all* students.

We should be particularly concerned with the kind of socialization process and conditions which gear youth to social action within the framework of an open democratic society on the one hand and that which predisposes or forces youth into an extremist position, leading to violent revolution or totalitarianism, quite opposite from the interests and ideals of our own society, on the other. Perhaps this is related to the extent to which the social system tends to lock certain young people out, and the degree to which secondary and higher education which the young person is receiving seems inappropriate for the system which he has to enter. In the youth movement the adolescent may find a "substitute for society" not only in its function of providing a framework for the process of self-definition and indentity development but also because the movement provides access to a social stream.

In the context of a rapidly changing world, as youth look upward and see opportunities closed off with a considerable gap between themselves and those with power, wealth or influence they become ripe for "revolution." This is one of the dilemmas of American foreign policy. In hypothetical African country X independence has come suddenly. Money is provided for economic development. However, without adequate vocational training and planning for job opportunity this may not substantially increase the opportunity for employment for youth. Thus again we have the not uncommon situation of money for the few and no jobs for the many. Or the United States may invest a lot of money in traditional secondary

school education for country X and the results may be youth who have education which is quite inappropriate for available jobs and employment realities which are far beneath the new social and economic horizons for which these youth have been educated.

Work and New Careers

The papers in this issue focus largely on those outlets which movements provide for the expression of discontent, satisfaction of needs for assertion and identity formation, and reduction of alienation. As Gelineau and Kantor emphasize, however, movements often seem to channel these dynamics into a work experience with important consequences for the individual and group. Although not included in what we traditionally regard as the normal career lines of youth, these activities are certainly perceived by youth as meaningful work which is approached with a great deal of motivation, enthusiasm, skill and intensity. As he would in no other situation, the youth who feels alienated from school and job works with all his energy and intelligence towards the goals of the movement and has little regard for a 9–5 schedule, weekends or vacations. There may be clues here for the channeling of adolescent behavior and the transformation of anti-social or asocial attitudes into pro-social commitment and into satisfying pro-social "work" on behalf of society.

The recent experiences in the Howard University Human Service Aide and Community Worker Training programs (3, 12) and at HARYOU (18) in New York seem quite relevant. In these projects some of the dynamics of youth movement activity and motivation are being incorporated into training programs, organizations for community action and anti-poverty work. In the Howard "New Careers" program, youth from disadvantaged and low-income backgrounds, frequently with histories of delinquency, school drop-out and chronic social failure, are trained for and placed in job and career lines as human service aides and community organizers working for social improvement and change in their own communities. This provides a vehicle for mobilizing pro-social dedication and commitment, group identity and loyalty, assertion and self-esteem, and needed vocational training for meaningful jobs in human services. Experimental programs like this in which youth help themselves by helping others in the context of a "cause," may have great potential for the social integration and mental health of low-income youth, as well as for bringing about needed social change in the context of an open democratic society.[7] This is somewhat analogous to the growth of such programs

---

[7] There are several problems intrinsic to these programs. For example, how can government and other social institutions "sponsor" a movement whose goal may be "rebellion" through rent-strikes, picketing and the like? If they do, how

as the Peace Corps, anti-poverty efforts and the civil rights movement in the South and their consequences among American students in work for social improvement. The important "extra" which such programs have for the poor and for the socially disadvantaged is that of a meaningful career which will allow them to gain access to the social system. This opportunity is made available by doing the kind of work which a middle-class youth would normally find himself doing as a temporary moratorium from his school or career line. Even in this latter situation, however, youth are talking increasingly about fusing "movement" work with a developing career line.[8]

It is particularly difficult for a middle-class oriented social structure to find ways to attract the interests and commitment of youth without having this group become a variant of the Boy Scouts or instrument of an adult-sponsored and controlled social organization. Indeed in the latter sense the totalitarian society may use the youth movement as a tool for the maintenance of control and influence. How can an open democratic society provide youth with the models and outlets for rebellion and assertion which youth need, without grave risk to the stability of the society? Perhaps some of the answer lies in the directions pointed to by the new careers training programs and by the youth groups working in the South today. These suggest the need for the development of greater vertical and horizontal social and educational mobility and flexibility to provide the channels and support for new career lines and a number of alternative pathways in the social structure (12).

Youth movements need not be seen only in the context of sudden revolution. Many, while demanding change either towards old values or new ones, are reform movements in nature and over time become important instruments of evolutionary social change in which the older generation is replaced by the younger. In healthy societies, as in a healthy family setting, the father looks to the time when the son will take his place. Similarly, young people in spite of their rhetoric usually look to parents or parent figures for confirmation and support, whether implicit or explicit. In this sense the goals and work of the civil rights movement represent a most important development for our society. The development of work-oriented movements and programs among disadvantaged youth in our society and elsewhere may have equal if not greater potential.

can one avoid having it "bought" by the establishment? How can a fusion be effected between job and social change? These issues are currently being examined by the staffs at Howard University (3), Syracuse University (S. Alinsky) and HARYOU in New York.

[8] The problems of the long-term movement veteran may increase with time as he sees no societally valued role for himself in the kind of *work* to which he is accustomed (5, 34).

•   •   •

What of the student who never becomes involved in a social action group? Various authors note that 75% to 85% of American college students have no interest in "issues" or "causes" (14). Others report a latent attitude favorable to public protest, even where personal action is not contemplated (53).

What are the psychosocial determinants of *action* versus *inaction* in the political and social realms? Coles may well be correct, in his article in this volume, when he casts doubt upon the usefulness of traditional attitudinal and motivational psychology research in differentiating between those who will act and those who will not.

In this introduction the editors have attempted to explore some common variables and questions for further research.° Such research would benefit from longitudinal studies focused on the prediction of behavior. It has been the experience of several authors that in this context observations of multiple variables made during the course of movement activity or demonstrations are invaluable.

REFERENCES

1. BARDIN, SHLOMO. *Jews and the Sea*. American Zionist Youth Committee. New York.
2. BEN GURION, D. (selection). Labor Zionist Organization. New York: 1948.
3. Center for Youth and Community Studies, Howard University, "Community Apprentice Program Report—Disadvantaged Youth in Human Services." Washington, D.C., March, 1965.
4. CHIN, CHARLES (AP). "100 Korean Students Arrested After Rioting." The Washington Post, June 6, 1962.
5. COLES, ROBERT. "Social Struggle and Weariness." *Psychiatry*, (November) 1964, 12, No. 4, 305-315.
6. COWAN, PAUL, et al. "Three Letters Home From Mississippi." *Esquire*, September, 1964.
7. DEUTSCH, MARTIN. "The 1960 Swastika-Smearings: Analysis of the Apprehended Youth." Paper presented at the Howard University Conference on Youth and Social Action, October, 1963.
8. ERIKSON, ERIK, editor. *Youth—Change and Challenge*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1963.
9. ERIKSON, ERIK. "Identity and the Life Cycle." In *Psychological Issues*, edited by George S. Klein, New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1959.
10. ERIKSON, ERIK. *Insight and Responsibility*, "The Golden Rule and The Cycle of Life." New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1964.
11. ERIKSON, ERIK. *Young Man Luther, A Study in Psychoanalysis and History*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1958.
12. FISHMAN, J. R., PEARL, A., AND MACLENNAN, B. "New Careers—Ways Out of Poverty for Disadvantaged Youth." Howard University Center for Youth and Community Studies, Washington, D.C., March, 1965.

° Several important dimensions have not been discussed. These include the functions of social action in the conceptual and cognitive growth of the participants and in the development of "competence" for action in the adult world. (See Gellineau and Kantor.)

13. FISHMAN, J. R., AND SOLOMON, F. "Youth and Social Action: I. Perspectives on the Student Sit-In Movement." *The American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, (Oct.) 1963, XXXIII, No. 5, 872-882.

14. GITLIN, TODD. "The Student Political Scene 1960-63." Paper presented at the Howard University Conference on Youth and Social Action, October, 1963.

15. GLUECK, GRACE. "Fine Art of Fasting." The New York Times Magazine, 1962.

16. GOODMAN, PAUL. *Growing Up Absurd*. New York: Random House, 1960.

17. Habonim Leaders' Manual. Habonim Organization of America. New York City: 1950.

18. Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited, Inc. *Youth in the Ghetto: A Study of the Consequences of Powerlessness and a Blueprint for Change*. New York: Century Printing Co., Inc., 1964.

19. Hechalutz Organization of America. *Builders and Fighters*. New York: 1948.

20. Howard University. Interagency Conference on Youth and Developing Nations. Sponsored jointly by the U.S. State Department and the Center for Youth and Community Studies, May, 1964.

21. HOWE, RUSSELL. "Era of Violent Politics Predicted in Nigeria." The Washington Post, May 28, 1962.

22. JACK, HOMER, editor. *The Ghandi Reader*. New York: Grove Press, 1961.

23. KAPLAN, SAMUEL. "A Summer Walk With Carlos." The New York Times Magazine, July 8, 1962.

24. KENNISTON, KENNETH. "American Students and the Political Revival." Paper presented at the Howard University Conference on Youth and Social Action, October, 1963.

25. LAQUER, WALTER, Z. *Young Germany*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1962.

26. MOWRER, R. S. "Student Tension Grows in Madrid." The Washington Post, Feb. 26, 1965.

27. MURPHY, H. B. M. "Social Action by Chinese High School Students in Singapore." Paper presented at the Howard University Conference on Youth and Social Action, October, 1963.

28. PICK, HELLA. "Nkrumah Molds Ghana in His Image." Manchester Guardian, April 15, 1962.

29. POWLEDGE, FRED. "Eastern College Students Adopt a 'Bill of Rights' Scoring Administrators." The New York Times, March 29, 1965, p. 17.

30. POWLEDGE, FRED. "The Student Left: Spurring Reform/The New Student-Left: Movement Represents Serious Activities in Drive for Changes." The New York Times, March 15, 1965, p. 1, col. 7—p. 26, cols. 1-8.

31. ROCHE, JOHN, P. "Memo to Today's Young Radicals." The New York Times Magazine, Oct. 14, 1962.

32. SOLOMON, F., WALKER, W. L., O'CONNOR, G. J., AND FISHMAN, J. R. "Civil Rights Activity and Reduction in Crime Among Negroes." *Archives of General Psychiatry*, (March) 1965, 12, 227-236.

33. SOLOMON, F., AND FISHMAN, J. R. "The Psychosocial Meaning of Nonviolence in Student Civil Rights Activities." *Psychiatry*, (May) 1964, 27, No. 2, 91-99.

34. SOLOMON, F., AND FISHMAN, J. R. "Youth and Social Action: II. Action and Identity Formation in the First Student Sit-In Demonstration." *The Journal of Social Issues* (April) 1964, XX, No. 2, 36-45.

35. SAVIO, MARIO (quoted leader of Free Speech Movement—University of California, Berkeley). "The University Becomes a Factory." *Life Magazine*, Feb., 1965.

36. SCHNEERSON, J. I. (Rabbi) "The Tzerrah Tzedik and the Haskabab Movement." Brooklyn, N.Y.: Kibot Publication Society, 1962.

37. SPECTOR, ELIEZER. *Characteristics of Palestine Youth*. Israel. Lion the Printer, 1947.

38. TOUCHIN, MARTIN. "200 Students Quit Gideonse Lecture, Say Brooklyn College Lacks Academic Freedom." The New York Times, March 30, 1965.

39. TRILLIN, CALVIN. "Letter from Berkeley." *The New Yorker*, March 13, 1965, pp. 57-102.

40. United States Department of State. External Research Staff Paper "Research on Youth Groups and Young Leaders in the Developing Countries 1957-64," June, 1964.

41. WARREN, ROBERT, P. "Two for SNCC." *Commentary*, April, 1965.

42. WHEELER, JEAN. "Let Us All Be Black Together." *The Negro Digest*, January, 1964.

43. WILSON, ANDREW. "Moscow Kenya Students Clash with Red Officials." The Washington Post, April 14, 1962.

44. ZINN, HOWARD. *SNCC: The New Abolitionists*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964.

45. ———. "Argentine Youth in Nazi Group 'Tacuara' Fights 'Zionism', 'Capitalism,' 'Communism.'" The New York Times, September 16, 1962, p. 29.

46. ———. "Era of Protests Opened by Sit-Ins." The New York Times, May 14, 1962, p. 1.

47. ———. "Free Speech Carols." Phonograph record by Free Speech Movement, University of California (Berkeley).

48. ———. "Portugal Arrests 987 in Student Crackdown." (AP) The Washington Post, May 11, 1962.

49. ———. "Quito (Venezuela) Captures 40 More Rebels." The Washington Post, April 8, 1962, p. 25.

50. ———. "Students Battle Police in Japan." The Washington Post (AP), May 14, 1963.

51. ———. "Students Clash in Athens." (Reuters) The Washington Post, April 11, 1963.

52. ———. "Students Riot as French Feelings Erupt." (AP) The Washington Post, Dec. 13, 1962.

53. ———. "Campus '65." Newsweek, March 22, 1965.

A Memorandum on Identity and Negro Youth

Erik H. Erikson

Introduction

A lack of familiarity with the problem of Negro youth and with the actions by which Negro youth hopes to solve these problems is a marked deficiency in my life and work which cannot be compensated for with theoretical speculation; and this least of all at a time when Negro writers are finding superb new ways of stating their and our predicament and when Negro youth finds itself involved in action which would have seemed unimaginable only a very few years ago. But since it is felt that some of my concepts might be helpful in further discussion, I will in the following recapitulate the pertinent ideas on identity contained in my writings.* This I do only in the hope that what is clear may prove helpful and what is not will become clearer in joint studies.

The fact that problems of Negro youth span the whole phenomenology of aggravated identity confusion and rapid new identity formation—cutting across phenomena judged antisocial and prosocial, violent and heroic, fanatic and ethically advanced—makes it advisable to include remarks concerning the origin of the concept of ego-identity in clinical observation in this review. However, the concept has come a long way since we first used it to define a syndrome in war—neurotics in World War II: I recently heard in India that Nehru had used the term "identity" to describe a new quality which, he felt, Gandhi had given India after offering her the equivalent of a "psychoanalysis of her past."

---

* See: *"Childhood and Society,"* W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., New York, 1950

"Wholeness and Totality," In *Totalitarianism*, Proceedings of a Conference held at the Am. Academy of Arts and Sciences, C. J. Friedrich, ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954

"Identity and the Life Cycle," Monograph, *Psychological Issues*, Vol. I, No. 1, New York: Int'l Universities Press, 1959 with an intro. by D. Rapaport.

"Youth: Fidelity and Diversity" *Daedalus*, 91:5-27, 1962

1. Childhood and Identity

a. The growing child must derive a vitalizing sense of reality from the awareness that his individual way of mastering experience is a successful variant of a group identity and is in accord with its space-time and life plan. Minute displays of emotion such as affection, pride, anger, guilt, anxiety, sexual arousal (rather than the words used, the meanings intended, or the philosophy implied), transmit to the human child the outlines of what really counts in his world, i.e., the variables of his group's space-time and the perspectives of its life plan.

Here is the first observation I made (a decade and a half ago) on Negro children. I will quote it to characterize the point-of-view with which I started. The babies of our colored countrymen, I said, often receive sensual satisfactions which provide them with enough oral and sensory surplus for a lifetime, as clearly betrayed in the way they move, laugh, talk, sing. Their forced symbiosis with the feudal South capitalized on this oral sensory treasure and helped to build a slave's identity: mild, submissive, dependent, somewhat querulous, but always ready to serve, with occasional empathy and childlike wisdom. But underneath a dangerous split occurred. The Negro's unavoidable identification with the dominant race, and the need of the master race to protect its own identity against the very sensual and oral temptations emanating from the race held to be inferior (whence came their mammies), established in both groups an association: light—clean—clever—white, and dark—dirty—dumb —nigger. The result, especially in those Negroes who left the poor haven of their Southern homes, was often a violently sudden and cruel cleanliness training, as attested to in the autobiographies of Negro writers. It is as if by cleansing, a whiter identity could be achieved. The attending disillusionment transmits itself to the phallic-locomotor stage, when restrictions as to what shade of girl one may dream of interfere with the free transfer of the original narcissistic sensuality to the genital sphere. Three identities are formed: (1) mammy's oral-sensual "honey-child"—tender, expressive, rhythmical; (2) the evil identity of the dirty, anal-sadistic, phallic-rapist "nigger"; and (3) the clean, anal-compulsive, restrained, friendly, but always sad "white man's Negro."

So-called opportunities offered the migrating Negro often only turn out to be a more subtly restricted prison which endangers his only historically "successful" identity (that of the slave) and fails to provide a reintegration of the other identity fragments mentioned. These fragments, then, become dominant in the form of racial caricatures which are underscored and stereotyped by the entertainment industry. Tired of his own caricature, the colored individual

often retires into hypochondriac invalidism as a condition which represents an analogy to the dependence and the relative safety of defined restriction in the South: a neurotic regression to the ego identity of the slave.

Mixed blood Sioux Indians in areas where they hardly ever see Negroes refer to their full-blood brothers as "niggers," thus indicating the power of the dominant national imagery which serves to counterpoint the ideal and the evil images in the inventory of available prototypes. No individual can escape this opposition of images, which is all-pervasive in the men and in the women, in the majorities and in the minorities, and in all the classes of a given national or cultural unit. Psychoanalysis shows that the unconscious evil identity (the composite of everything which arouses negative identification—i.e., the wish not to resemble it) consists of the images of the violated (castrated) body, the "marked" outgroup, and the exploited minority. Thus a pronounced he-man may, in his dreams and prejudices, prove to be mortally afraid of ever displaying a woman's sentiments, a Negro's submissiveness, or a Jew's intellectuality. For the ego, in the course of its synthesizing efforts, attempts to subsume the most powerful evil and ideal prototypes (the final contestants, as it were) and with them the whole existing imagery of superior and inferior, good and bad, masculine and feminine, free and slave, potent and impotent, beautiful and ugly, fast and slow, tall and small, in a simple alternative, in order to make one battle and one strategy out of a bewildering number of skirmishes.

I knew a colored boy who, like our boys, listened every night to Red Rider. Then he sat up in bed, imagining that he was Red Rider. But the moment came when he saw himself galloping after some masked offender and suddenly noticed that in his fancy Red Rider was a colored man. He stopped his fantasy. While a small child, this boy was extremely expressive, both in his pleasures and in his sorrows. Today he is calm and always smiles; his language is soft and blurred; nobody can hurry him or worry him—or please him. White people like him.

As such boys and girls look around now, what other ideal (and evil) images are at their disposal? And how do they connect with the past? (Does non-violence connect totalistically or holistically with traditional patience and tolerance of pain?)

b. When children enter the stage of the adolescent Identity Crisis, a factor enters which characterizes the real kind of *crisis*, namely, a moment of decision between strong contending forces. "A moment" means that here something can happen very rapidly; "decision," that divergence becomes permanent; "strong and contending," that these are intense matters.

Developmentally speaking the sense of ego identity is the ac-

crued confidence that one's ability to maintain inner sameness and continuity (one's ego in the psychoanalytic sense) is matched by the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for others. The growing child must, at every step, derive a vitalizing sense of reality from the awareness that his individual way of mastering experience is a successful variant of the way other people around him master experience and recognize such mastery.

In this, children cannot be fooled by empty praise and condescending encouragement. They may have to accept artificial bolstering of their self-esteem in lieu of something better, but what I call their accruing ego identity gains real strength only from wholehearted and consistent recognition of real accomplishment, that is, achievement that has meaning in their culture. On the other hand, should a child feel that the environment tries to deprive him too radically of all the forms of expression which permit him to develop and to integrate the next step in his ego identity, he will resist with the astonishing strength encountered in animals who are suddenly forced to defend their lives. Indeed, in the social jungle of human existence, there is no feeling of being alive without a sense of ego identity. Or else, there may be total self-abnegation (in more or less malignant forms) as illustrated in this observation. And here is an example of total denial of identity:

A four-year-old Negro girl in the Arsenal Nursery School in Pittsburgh used to stand in front of a mirror and scrub her skin with soap. When gently diverted from this she began to scrub the mirror. Finally, when induced to paint instead, she first angrily filled sheets of paper with the colors brown and black. But then she brought to the teacher what she called "a really *good* picture." The teacher first could see only a white sheet, until she looked closer and saw that the little girl had covered every inch of the white sheet with white paint. This playful episode of total self-eradication occurred and could only occur in a "desegregated" school: it illustrates the extent to which infantile drive control (cleanliness) and social self-esteem (color) are associated in childhood. But it also points to the extent of the crime which is perpetrated wherever, in the service of seemingly civilized values, groups of people are made to feel so inexorably "different" that legal desegregation can only be the beginning of a long and painful inner reidentification.

Such crises come when their parents and teachers, losing trust in themselves and using sudden correctives in order to approach the vague but pervasive Anglo-Saxon ideal, create violent discontinuities; or where, indeed, the children themselves learn to disavow their sensual and overprotective mothers as temptations and a hindrance to the formation of a more "American" personality.

If we, then, speak of the community's response to the young

individual's need to be "recognized" by those around him, we mean something beyond a mere recognition of achievement; for it is of great relevance to the young individual's identity formation that he be responded to, and be given function and status as a person whose gradual growth and transformation make sense to those who begin to make sense to him. Identity formation goes beyond the process of *identifying oneself* with ideal others in a one-way fashion; it is a process based on a heightened cognitive and emotional capacity to *let oneself be identified* by concrete persons as a circumscribed individual in relation to a predictable universe which transcends the family. Identity thus is not the sum of childhood identifications, but rather a new combination of old and new identification fragments. For this very reason societies *confirm* an individual at this time in all kinds of ideological frameworks and assign roles and tasks to him in which he can *recognize himself* and *feel recognized*. Ritual confirmations, initiations, and indoctrinations only sharpen an indispensable process of self-verification by which healthy societies bestow and receive the distilled strength of generations. By this process, societies, in turn, are themselves historically verified.

The danger of this stage is *identity diffusion*; as Biff puts it in Arthur Miller's *Death of a Salesman*, "I just can't take hold, Mom, I can't take hold of some kind of a life." Where such a dilemma is based on a strong previous doubt of one's ethnic and sexual identity, delinquent and outright psychotic incidents are not uncommon. Youth after youth, bewildered by some assumed role, a role forced on him by the inexorable standardization of American adolescence, runs away in one form or another; leaving schools and jobs, staying out all night, or withdrawing into bizarre and inaccessible moods. Once "delinquent," his greatest need and often his only salvation, is the refusal on the part of older friends, advisers, and judiciary personnel to type him further by pat diagnoses and social judgments which ignore the special dynamic conditions of adolescence. For if diagnosed and treated correctly, seemingly psychotic and criminal incidents do not in adolescence have the same fatal significance which they have at other ages. Yet many a youth, finding the authorities expect him to be "a nigger," "a bum," or "a queer," perversely obliges by becoming just that.

To keep themselves together, individuals and groups treated in this fashion temporarily overidentify, to the point of apparent complete loss of individual identity, with the heroes of cliques and crowds. On the other hand, they become remarkably clannish, intolerant, and cruel in their exclusion of others who are "different," in skin color or cultural background, in tastes and gifts, and often in entirely petty aspects of dress and gesture arbitrarily selected as *the* signs of an in-grouper or out-grouper. It is important to understand (which does

not mean condone or participate in) such intolerance as the necessary *defense against a sense of identity diffusion*, which is unavoidable at a time of life when the body changes its proportions radically, when genital maturity floods body and imagination with all manners of drives, when intimacy with the other sex offers intense complications, and when life lies before one with a variety of conflicting possibilities and choices. Adolescents help one another temporarily through such discomfort by forming cliques and by stereotyping themselves, their ideals, and their enemies.

In general, one may say that we are apt to view the social play of adolescents as we once judged the play of children. We alternately consider such behavior irrelevant, unnecessary, or irrational, and ascribe to it purely delinquent or neurotic meanings. As in the past the study of children's spontaneous games was neglected in favor of that of solitary play, so now the mutual "joinedness" of adolescent clique behavior fails to be properly assessed in our concern for the individual adolescent. Children and adolescents in their presocieties provide for one another a sanctioned moratorium and joint support for free experimentation with inner and outer dangers (including those emanating from the adult world). Whether or not a given adolescent's newly acquired capacities are drawn back into infantile conflict depends to a significant extent on the quality of the opportunities and rewards available to him in his peer clique, as well as on the more formal ways in which society at large invites a transition from social play to work experimentation, and from rituals of transit to final commitments: all of which must be based on an implicit mutual contract between the individual and society.

2. Totalism and Negative Identity

If such contact is deficient, youth may seek perverse restoration in a negative identity, "totalistically" enforced. Here we must reconsider the proposition that the need for identity is experienced as a need for a certain wholeness in the experience of onself within the community (and community here is as wide as one's social vision); and that, where such wholeness is impossible, such need turns to "totalism."

To be a bit didactic: *Wholeness* connotes an assembly of parts, even quite diversified parts, that enter into fruitful association and organization. This concept is most strikingly expressed in such terms as wholeheartedness, wholemindedness, and wholesomeness. In human development as well as in history, then, wholeness emphasizes a progressive coherence of diversified functions and parts. *Totality*, on the contrary, evokes a Gestalt in which an absolute boundary is emphasized: given a certain arbitray delineation, nothing that belongs

inside must be left outside; nothing that must be outside should be tolerated inside. A totality must be as absolutely inclusive as it is absolutely exclusive. The word "utter" conveys the element of force, which overrides the question whether the category-to-be-made-absolute is an organic and a logical one, and whether the parts, so to speak, really have a natural affinity to one another.

To say it in one sentence: Where the human being despairs of an essential wholeness of experience, he restructures himself and the world by taking refuge in a totalistic world view. Thus there appears both in individuals and in groups a periodical need for a totality without further choice or alternation, even if it implies the abandonment of a much-needed wholeness. This can consist of a lone-wolf's negativism; of a delinquent group's seeming nihilism; or in the case of national or racial groups, in a defiant glorification of one's own caricature.

Thus, patients (and I think it is in this respect that patients can help us understand analogous group processes) choose a *negative identity*, i.e., an identity perversely based on all those identifications and roles which, at critical stages of development, had been presented to them as most undesirable or dangerous, and yet also as most real. For example, a mother having lost her first-born son may (because of complicated guilt feelings) be unable to attach to her later surviving children the same amount of religious devotion that she bestows on the memory of her dead child and may well arouse in one of her sons the conviction that to be sick or dead is a better assurance of being "recognized" than to be healthy and about. A mother who is filled with unconscious ambivalence toward a brother who disintegrated into alcoholism may again and again respond selectively only to those traits in her son which seem to point to a repetition of her brother's fate, in which case this "negative" identity may take on more reality for the son than all his natural attempts at being good: he may work hard on becoming a drunkard and, lacking the necessary ingredients, may end up in a state of stubborn paralysis of choice. The daughter of a man of brilliant showmanship may run away from college and be arrested as a prostitute in the Negro quarter of a Southern city; while the daughter of an influential Southern Negro preacher may be found among narcotic addicts in Chicago. In such cases it is of utmost importance to recognize the mockery and the vindictive pretense in such role playing; for the white girl may not have really prostituted herself, and the colored girl may not really become an addict—yet. Needless to say, however, each of them could have placed herself in a marginal social area, leaving it to law-enforcement officers and to psychiatric agencies to decide what stamp to put on such behavior. A corresponding case is that of a boy presented to a psychiatric

clinic as "the village homosexual" of a small town. On investigation, it appeared that the boy had succeeded in assuming this fame without any actual acts of homosexuality, except that much earlier in his life he had been raped by some older boys.

Such vindictive choices of a negative identity represent, of course, a desperate attempt to regain some mastery in a situation in which the available positive identity elements cancel each other out. The history of such choice reveals a set of conditions in which it is easier to derive a sense of identity out of a *total* identification with that which one is *least* supposed to be than to struggle for a feeling of reality in acceptable roles which are unattainable with the patient's inner means.

There is a "lower lower" snobbism too, which is based on the pride of having achieved a semblance of nothingness. At any rate, many a late adolescent, if faced with continuing diffusion, would rather *be a total nobody, somebody totally bad, or indeed, dead— and all of this by free choice—than be not-quite-somebody.*

Thus, individuals, when caught up in the necessity to regroup an old identity or to gain a new and inescapable one, are subject to influences which offer them a way to wholeness. Obviously, revolutions do the first to gain the second. At any rate, the problem of totalism vs. wholeness seems to be represented in its organized form in the Black Muslims who insist on a totally "black" solution reinforced by historical and religious mysticism on the one hand; and the movement of non-violent and legal insistence on civil rights, on the other. Once such a polarization is established, it seems imperative to investigate what powerful self-images (traditional, revolutionary, and, as it were, evolutionary) have entered the picture, in mutually exclusive or mutually inclusive form, and what the corresponding symptoms are, in individuals and in the masses.

3. "Conversion" and More Inclusive Identity

In a little-known passage, Bernard Shaw relates the story of his "conversion": "I was *drawn into* the Socialist *revival* of the early eighties, among Englishmen *intensely serious* and *burning with indignation* at very *real* and *very fundamental evils* that affected *all the world.*" The words here italicized convey to me the following implications. "Drawn into": an ideology has a compelling power. "Revival": it consists of a traditional force in a state of rejuvenation. "Intensely serious": it permits even the cynical to make an investment of sincerity. "Burning with indignation": it gives to the need for repudiation the sanction of righteousness. "Real": it projects a vague inner evil onto a circumscribed horror in reality. "Fundamental": it promises participation in an effort at basic reconstruc-

tion of society. "All the world": it gives structure to a totally defined world image. Here, then, are the elements by which a group identity harnesses the young individual's aggressive and discriminative energies, and encompasses, as it completes it, the individual's identity in the service of its ideology. Thus, identity and ideology are two aspects of the same process. Both provide the necessary condition for further individual maturation and, with it, for the next higher form of identification, namely, the *solidarity linking common identities*. For the need to bind irrational self-hate and irrational repudiation makes young people, on occasion, mortally compulsive and conservative even where and when they seem most anarchic and radical; the same need makes them potentially "ideological," i.e., more or less explicitly in search of a world image held together by what Shaw called "a clear comprehension of life in the light of an intelligible theory."

What are, then, the available ideological ingredients of the new Negro and the new American identity? For (such is the nature of a revolutionary movement) the new Negro cannot afford any longer just to become "equal" to the old White. As he becomes something new, he also forces the white man as well as the advanced Negro to become newer than they are.

4. Weakness and Strength

a. In my clinical writings I have suggested that delinquent joining stands in the same dynamic relationship to schizoid isolation, as (according to Freud) perversion does to neurosis: negative *group* identities (gangs, cliques, rings, mobs) "save" the individual from the symptoms of a negative identity neurosis, to wit: a disintegration of the sense of time; morbid identity consciousness; work paralysis; bisexual confusion; and authority diffusion.

Unnecessary to say, however, a *transitory* "negative identity" is often the necessary pre-condition for a truly positive and truly new one. In this respect, I would think that American Negro writers may turn out to be as important for American literature as Irish expatriates were in the Europe of an earlier period.

On the other hand, there are certain strengths in the Negro which have evolved out of or at least along with his very submission. Such a statement will, I trust, not be misunderstood as an argument for continued submission. What I have in mind are strengths which one would hope for the sake of all of us, could remain part of a future Negro identity. Here I have in mind such a traditional phenomenon as the power of the Negro mother. As pointed out, I must glean examples from experiences accessible to me; the following observation on Caribbean motherhood will, I hope, be put into

its proper perspective by experts on the whole life-space of the
Negro on the American continent.

b. Churchmen have had reason to deplore, and anthropologists
to explore, the pattern of Caribbean family life, obviously an out-
growth of the slavery days of Plantation America, which extended
from the Northeast Coast of Brazil in a half-circle into the Southeast
of the United States. Plantations, of course, were agricultural fac-
tories, owned and operated by gentlemen, whose cultural and eco-
nomic identity had its roots in a supra-regional upper class. They
were worked by slaves, that is, men who, being mere equipment
put to use when and where necessary, had to relinquish all chance
of being the masters of their families and communities. Thus, the
women were left with the offspring of a variety of men who could
give no protection as they could provide no identity, except that of
a subordinate species. The family system which ensued can be de-
scribed in scientific terms only by circumscriptions dignifying what
is not there: the rendering of "sexual services" between persons who
cannot be called anything more definite than "lovers"; "maximum
instability" in the sexual lives of young girls, whose pattern it is
to relinquish the care of their offspring to their mothers; and mothers
and grandmothers who determine that "standardized mode of co-
activity" which is the minimum requirement for calling a group of
individuals a family. They are, then, mostly called "household
groups"—single dwellings, occupied by people sharing a common
food supply. These households are "matrifocal," a word understating
the grandiose role of the all powerful mother-figure who will en-
courage her daughters to leave their infants with her, or, at any rate,
to stay with her as long as they continue to bear children. Mother-
hood thus becomes community life; and where churchmen could
find little or no morality, and casual observers, little or no order at
all, the mothers and grandmothers in fact also became father and
grandfathers,[*] in the sense that they exerted that authoritative influ-
ence which resulted in an ever newly improvised set of rules for
the economic obligations of the men who had fathered the children,
and upheld the rules of incestuous avoidance. Above all, they pro-
vided the only super-identity which was left open after the enslave-
ment of the men, namely, that of the mother who will nurture a
human infant irrespective of his parentage. It is well known how
many poor little rich and white gentlemen benefited from the ex-
tended fervor of the Negro women who nursed them as Southern
mammies, as creole das, or as Brazilian babas. This cultural fact is,
of course, being played down by the racists as mere servitude while

---

[*] See the title "My Mother Who Fathered Me."

the predominance of maternal warmth in Caribbean women is characterized as African sensualism, and vicariously enjoyed by refugees from "Continental" womanhood. One may, however, see at the root of this maternalism a grandiose gesture of human adaptation which has given the area of the Caribbean (now searching for a political and economic pattern to do justice to its cultural unity) both the promise of a positive (female) identity and the threat of a negative (male) one: for here, the fact that identity depended on the procreative worth of being born, has undoubtedly weakened the striving for becoming somebody by individual effort.

(This is an ancient pattern taking many forms in the modern Negro world. But—parenthetically speaking—it may give us one more access to a better understanding of the magnificently bearded group of men and boys who have taken over one of the islands and insist on proving that the Caribbean male can earn his worth in production as well as in procreation.)

My question is whether such maternal strength has survived not only in parts of our South but also in family patterns of Negro migrants; whether it is viewed as undesirable and treated as delinquent by Negroes as well as whites; and whether America can afford to lose it all at a time when women must help men more planfully not only to preserve the naked life of the human race but also some "inalienable" values.

c. This brings me, finally, to the issue of Fidelity, that virtue and quality of adolescent ego strength which belongs to man's evolutionary heritage, but which—like all the basic virtues—can arise only in the interplay of a stage of life with the social forces of a true community.

To be a *special kind*, has been an important element in the human need for personal and collective identities. They have found a transitory fulfillment in man's greatest moments of cultural identity and civilized perfection, and each such tradition of identity and perfection has highlighted what man could be, could he fulfil all his potentials at one time. The utopia of our own era predicts that man will be one species in one world, with a universal identity to replace the illusory super-identities which have divided him, and with an international ethic replacing all moral systems of superstition, repression, and suppression. Whatever the political arrangement that will further this utopia, we can only point to the human strengths which potentially emerge with the stages of life and indicate their dependence on communal life. In youth, ego strength emerges from the mutual confirmation of individual and community, in the sense that society recognizes the young individual as a bearer of fresh energy and that the individual so confirmed recognizes society

as a living process which inspires loyalty as it receives it, maintains allegiance as it attracts it, honors confidence as it demands it. All this I subsume under the term Fidelity.

Diversity and fidelity are polarized: they make each other significant and keep each other alive. Fidelity without a sense of diversity can become an obsession and a bore; diversity without a sense of fidelity, an empty relativism.

But Fidelity also stands in a certain polarity to adolescent sexuality: both sexual fulfillment and "sublimation" depend on this polarity. * •

The various hindrances to a full consummation of adolescent genital maturation have many deep consequences for man which pose an important problem for future planning. Best studied is the regressive revival of that earlier stage of psychosexuality which preceded even the emotionally quiet first school years, that is, the infantile genital and locomotor stage, with its tendency toward auto-erotic manipulation, grandiose phantasy, and vigorous play. But in youth, auto-erotism, grandiosity, and playfulness are all immensely amplified by genital potency and locomotor maturation, and are vastly complicated by what we will presently describe as the youthful mind's historical perspective.

The most widespread expression of the discontented search of youth is the craving for locomotion, whether expressed in a general "being on the go," "tearing after something," or "running around"; or in locomotion proper, as in vigorous work, in absorbing sports, in rapt dancing, in shiftless *Wanderschaft*, and in the employment and misuse of speedy animals and machines. But it also finds expression through participation in the movements of the day (whether the riots of a local commotion or the parades and campaigns of major ideological forces); if they only appeal to the need for feeling "moved" and for feeling essential in moving something along toward an open future. It is clear that societies offer any number of ritual combinations of ideological perspective and vigorous movement (dance, sports, parades, demonstrations, riots) to harness youth in the service of their historical aims; and that where societies fail to do so, these patterns will seek their own combinations, in small groups occupied with serious games, good-natured foolishness, cruel prankishness, and delinquent warfare. In no other stage of the life cycle, then, are the promise of finding oneself and the threat of losing oneself so closely allied.

To summarize: Fidelity, when fully matured, is the strength of disciplined devotion. It is gained in the involvement of youth in such experiences as reveal the essence of the era they are to join— as the beneficiaries of its tradition, as the practitioners and innovators of its technology, as renewers of its ethical strength, as rebels bent

on the destruction of the outlived, and as deviants with deviant commitments. This, at least, is the potential of youth in psychosocial evolution; and while this may sound like a rationalization endorsing any high sounding self-delusion in youth, any self-indulgence masquerading as devotion, or any righteous excuse for blind destruction, it makes intelligible the tremendous waste attending this as any other mechanism of human adaptation, especailly if its excesses meet with more moral condemnation than ethical guidance. On the other hand, our understanding of these processes is not furthered by the "clinical" reduction of adolescent phenomena to their infantile antecedents and to an underlying dichotomy of drive and conscience. Adolescent development comprises a new set of identification processes, both with significant persons and with ideological forces, which give importance to individual life by relating it to a living community and to ongoing history, and by counterpointing the newly won individual identity with some communal solidarity.

In youth, then, the life history intersects with history: here individuals are confirmed in their identities, societies regenerated in their life style. This process also implies a fateful survival of adolescent modes of thinking in man's historical and ideological perspectives.

Historical processes, of course, have already entered the individual's core in childhood. Both ideal and evil images and the moral prototypes guiding parental administrations originate in the past struggles of contending cultural and national "species," which also color fairytale and family lore, superstition and gossip, and the simple lessons of early verbal training. Historians on the whole make little of this; they describe the visible emergence and the contest of autonomous historical ideas, unconcerned with the fact that these ideas reach down into the everyday lives of generations and re-emerge through the daily awakening and training of historical consciousness in young individuals.

It is youth which begins to develop that sense of historical irreversibility which can lead to what we may call acute historical estrangement. This lies behind the fervent quest for a sure meaning in individual life history and in collective history, and behind the questioning of the laws of relevancy which bind datum and principles, event and movement. But it is also, alas, behind the bland carelessness of that youth which denies its own vital need to develop and cultivate a historical consciousness—and conscience.

To enter history, each generation of young persons must find an identity consonant with its own childhood and consonant with an ideological promise in the perceptible historical process. But in youth the tables of childhood dependence begin slowly to turn: it is no longer exclusively for the old to teach the young the meaning

of life, whether individual or collective. It is the young who, by their responses and actions, tell the old whether life as represented by their elders and as presented to the young has meaning; and it is the young who carry in them the power to confirm those who confirm them and, joining the issues, to renew and to regenerate, or to reform and to rebel.

I will not at this point review the institutions which participate in creating the retrospective and the prospective mythology offering historical orientation to youth. Obviously, the mythmakers of religion and politics, the arts and the sciences, the stage and fiction—all contribute to the historical logic presented to youth more or less consciously, more or less responsibly. And today we must add, at least in the United States, psychiatry; and all over the world, the press, which forces leaders to make history in the open and to accept reportorial distortion as a major historical factor.

Moralities sooner or later outlive themselves, ethics never: this is what the need for identity and for fidelity, reborn with each generation, seems to point to. Morality in the moralistic sense can be shown by modern means of inquiry to be predicated on superstitions and irrational inner mechanisms which ever again undermine the ethical fiber of generations; but morality is expendable only where ethics prevail. This is the wisdom that the words of many languages have tried to tell man. He has tenaciously clung to the words, even though he has understood them only vaguely, and in his actions has disregarded or perverted them completely. But there is much in ancient wisdom which can now become knowledge.

What then, are the sources of a new ethical orientation which may have roots in Negro tradition and yet also reach into the heroic striving for a new identity within the universal ethics emanating from world-wide technology and communication? This question may sound strenuously inspirational or academic; yet, I have in mind the study of concrete sources of morale and strength, lying within the vitality of bodily experience, the identity of individual experience, and the fidelity developed in methods of work and cooperation, methods of solidarity and political action, and methods permitting a simple and direct manifestation of human values such as have survived centuries of suppression. As a clinician, I am probably more competent to judge the conditions which continue to *suppress* and attempt to *crush* such strengths; and yet I have also found that diagnosis and anamnesis can turn out to be of little help where one ignores sources of recovery often found in surprising and surprisingly powerful constellations.

A Matter of Territory

Robert Coles

I will try to describe some of the work I have been doing the past four years and in the course of doing this I will hope to make clear some of the problems and doubts which have stuck fast to this work.

I have been trying to find out how individuals manage under social stress; what brings them to it, how they get along once there. I am not even sure what social stress is, or means. I suspect it has different meanings for different people; but I would describe the current period of developing desegregation in the South as one such example of a time of relatively high tension in numerous communities, indeed in the whole country. Laws and customs are being challenged and changed, and under a conflicting background of pressure toward acceleration and cursory or fierce resistance. Moreover, the South's crisis has become the North's confrontation, and the real problem emerges when we realize that behind words like desegregation, integration, or civil rights are problems of how human beings think about themselves, view themselves, and therefore look at others.

We in the social sciences have spent years of our energies trying to understand the origins of our actions, our feelings, our attitudes both private and public. We find no wrong in talking as I just have, in emphasizing that social or political events are grounded in the individual person and the life of his mind. Yet, we are all here, I suspect, because it may be easier for us to figure out why any given segregationist so passionately hates than to know how to do away with segregation as a living, self-perpetuating custom, habit, or "way" between people. It may be easier for us to understand the sources of anger, guilt, or apathy in whites or Negroes than know what to do about them.

When my wife and I decided to go South we only knew we wanted to talk with Negro and white children. We had no plan or outline, and I suspect if we allowed ourselves to organize such, or even to think carefully about the possible problems involved, we might never have started. I need not go into our motivations in doing this work, except to say that they seem relevant to the work and important to us. (That seems enough to ask of motivation.)

Our research's time fitted well with our country's crisis. I had lived in Mississippi for two years before we started South again; and

43

finding it enough to take on my work as a psychiatrist in the Air Force and my own analysis in nearby New Orleans I had largely ignored the racial question. To this day I must confess daily at least conscious disregard of the most oppressive segregation in America. (There is some lesson perhaps for me in such an occurrence: That there are priorities of concern, or conflicting forces which forbid and allow awareness even in those who would have themselves "sensitive.") In any event, just before leaving to return North to finish my training in child psychiatry I saw—or "could" see or truly "saw"—along the quiet, utterly white sands of the Gulf of Mexico a "swim-in." I recall both horror and fascination, recall thinking "like lemmings to the sea." (I think many whites watching demonstrations are gripped by fear, but also seized and held by the public display of those guilty struggles many know in private.) What brought these light and dark-skinned humans to this bloody, entwined panic on that sunny spring day, sky clear, wind gently moving, sand soft and clean? Here they were, people strangers to one another and yet ready to kill; consumed with rage enough to indicate their own fear as well as hold others helpless in its presence. I could not forget it. After a while I determined to study this difficult social problem in whatever way I could as a psychiatrist.

Our methodology, my wife's and mine, was to drive from home to home, from scene to scene, to talk, to listen, to play, to draw. We went South to find out about the psychological problems in desegregation, among young and old, Negro and white. We needed, of course, our informants (teachers). To reach the handful of Negro children was often rather difficult. To rely upon what we heard and also upon the import of our own responses was to take time which we now realize could not have been estimated but had to be experienced. Going into the third year we still seem to learn, to correct our vision, to feel newly aware or lately wrong. I shudder now at some of my first impressions about how Negroes feel about segregation, or whites, for that matter. Yet, isn't this always the demand of our work, its need for time to gauge accurately what time and its events have "done" to people?

I am thinking of some of the critical moments in our work and how we had to confront them. It was hard for us as whites to come to Negro homes in the deep South, hard to be accepted as guests, and hard for us to realize this, in all its consequences. It seemed easier to note the differences of class and occupation, of personality and behavior. These were there, and important to be known—and also confusing to us in their very existence. We wanted to know who these applicants were who would so risk themselves, as persons and as representatives of others. We wanted to document and catalogue the larger stresses, their approximate number, their method of delivery (phone, mail, passing car) and their variation during the year. We

wanted to observe how families and teachers responded to these
threats, or why some people wanted to initiate them, deliver them to
others.°

I'd like to spend the rest of my presentation illustrating some of
our work by discussing a week I spent recently with about twenty
young Southern students, Negro and white, veterans of innumerable
sit-ins, freedom rides, and similar activities. Their relationship with
me, both when I was with them and obviously still now, is of some
concern to me.

The gist of a request made to me was the following: "We've
assembled about twenty of our finest workers, proven leaders in their
local communities, and we've confined our choice to those who have
worked in the most difficult, the most resistant areas of the 'hard core'
or rural South. These youths, men and women, range in age from 13
(sic) to 22, and we thought that if they came together for several
weeks, and talked with certain people, a political scientist, a sociol-
ogist, a psychiatrist, an historian, they might get some perspective on
what they were doing, and feel less confused by some of the disap-
pointments, the trials and failures, which daily come to them. In other
words, they'll become even more effective." I was to meet with them
for several days, to talk formally about "the psychological effects of
segregation" and to be with them informally so that whatever would
happen between them and me might happen—questions, discussions,
conversations.

Beginning with formal lectures about how children develop in
their minds and hearts was necessary for all of us. I was struck by
this group of youths as I never have been before. (Perhaps because I
had stopped continuous contact with some of them only a few weeks
earlier, had moved North for the summer, and now had returned on
this visit. Sometimes we need distance, literal or figurative, or merely
the fresh view which follows a rest.) Here they were—Negro and
white youths, veterans of jail, of protest and injury during protest, of
dark isolated entry into "desegregated" schools or colleges, or of an
aroused white sympathy. They seemed intent, anxious, curious; but
at other moments simply their age, light-hearted or impatient, prone
to fickle relapses into earlier habits of careless, unthinking, energetic
frolic, but also quick to assume other moments of the coming dignity

---

° One of the most difficult and still perplexing aspects of this work has been
learning *why* certain Negroes took on such risks, or certain whites, too. I have run
some of these people through every psychological, sociological, or psychiatric sys-
tem I know, and I keep on coming back to words like "courage" and "integrity."
They have been poor and rich, educated and ignorant, rural and urban, all char-
acter types, all stages of psycho-sexual development. True, they have lived in a
moment of historical change or crisis, but in our society not even that had to find
them sticking fast as participants—many of their neighbors found ways of
escaping.

and seriousness of their adulthood. They seemed most comfortable asking for facts from me as we started—they wanted to *know*, and they had no embarrassment about such desires, no sense of restraint or pessimism about the worth and availability of facts. "If we can just get all the facts straight then maybe we could get this thing cleared up" a fifteen year old girl said to me, and the words and emotion felt familiar.

We started. I talked about the family, about mothers and fathers and their children in our society, and how each person had to find his way with his world, coming to terms, quietly or noisily, with himself and with those who are his parents and teachers and friends, and with those who share them. Since racial hatred is related to one's view of oneself, one's experience with brothers and sisters, one's sense of worth as a person, or capacity of mind and body, it seemed important to talk about these matters, and we did so for two days. At first we all seemed content, and even exhilirated, they in hearing, I in talking and learning from listening to myself make explicit what seemed before less so. We talked about some of the ways people think, and how our minds find expression for our wishes, troubles, worries, and fears. We talked about what happens to people when they are hurt or abandoned: how they become fearful, and often, later on, sad or angry; how they have trouble in living fully or freely or productively.

Toward the end of the second day I felt that I had come to a sketchy end of my assigned task, and recognition of this came most clearly and emphatically from a 17-year-old Negro boy from Mobile, Alabama, who prefaced his question with an apology: "I don't mean to get off the subject, but—do you think we can change the personality of the segregationist by doing something to the city he lives in? I mean, I don't think we can get to them on the inside, because the damage has been done, like you said, and they won't go near us and they block us all the way. But if we get them used to us, I mean if they keep on seeing us go in those movies or restaurants, they'll forget about some of their old ideas, just like if things had been different in the first place they wouldn't take out all their troubles on us anyway . . . of course, I suppose I'm suggesting to let someone else 'get it' for a while. We've had enough."

I felt both rescued and apprehensive, because I knew it was more than time enough for us to take up social and cultural influences upon individual lives, and yet I am quite in awe of just how complicated racial hatred can be, seizing private fears and despairs and sticking them, as if upon fly paper, on the public, adhesive surface of social doubts, economic tensions and hardships, and political struggles. It seemed easier to dwell upon "mental mechanisms" in splendid isolation, even though they defy us as we watch them in their astonishing variation, their seeming capacity for either useful or hurtful influence.

(Kafka and a Klan leader may both be predominantly paranoid, perhaps, again, we need the distance, the perspective, of those outside social science, of artists or theologians to come to terms with such problems. After all, the matter is one for further research, but what psychiatrist can work with paranoid segregationists and paranoid Negro students and ignore problems of not only history, politics, economics, and sociology, but also of ethics?)

And so we talked of the "social system" and its heavy hand upon each of us. Many individual, personal problems now started emerging in our talks. Perhaps we knew one another better (it was our third day) or perhaps these youths seemed to find their problems easier to relate to those public or social ones of other people, people as groups, than to the words or explanations trying to describe their own more private ones.

In any event most remarks showed these youths deeply concerned with themselves, with how they should act while engaged in obviously perilous behavior which usually lead to jailing, with how best to control themselves, bear their burden of necessary non-violence, with how they should deal with and accept or resist those sexual possibilities which both come their way in Negro communities where they work, but also produce, in those frightened and thus suspicious communities many people of their own race quite unfriendly to them, quite willing to prowl after them and report upon their "immorality." These youths were adolescents, race apart, and American adolescents at that. They not only had their sexual problems or uncertainties, but they felt it their "right," a socially sanctioned encouragement as it were, to have and discuss these problems. They were therefore quick to talk about them and long to stay with them. Yet it soon became clear to me that what one "veteran" student leader, well into his twenties had once told me was quite true: underneath one set of difficulties, perhaps easily spoken, rested another set, much more serious. He had put it this way to me: "They want to talk about sex, and whether they should sleep around in those towns while working. You know, not just with friends, but whenever they get a chance; like a girl comes up and says she heard about what they were doing and she looks like a good prospect, because she's all full of admiration and looks at them like they were heroes or stars. Then their father and mother are likely to find out, if they go off with them, and next thing you know we're in trouble; I mean the reputation of the whole movement is ruined. So, you see, we've got to be careful about how we act, even when we get admiration. But I think a bigger problem that the kids never talk about is the way they get in trouble by fooling around and horsing . . . you know, they'll have a drink or something and next thing you know they're playing games and just kidding and then we have an infirmary

full of accidents and injuries. You'd think the segregationists had come
out with police brutality all over, the way they end up."

A society, then, can allow its youth ways of expressing their con-
cern, and forbid other ways; and youth in protest will find moments
when one set of problems conceals another. I am speculating now, but
I wonder whether 19th century youth talked as easily about sex, and I
suspect they talked a good deal more easily about death and even its
consolations. My historian friends tell me that rebellious students then
(Young Italy, Young France, Young Germany) saw sacrifice and doom
easily and willingly. Dickens certainly had his children facing danger
and hunger with full expression of anger and not a little law breaking
to settle accounts with a society which largely ignored them.

Now our young rebels "translate" the difficulties of their risky and
bold challenges into sexual tensions and fears about how "normal"
their lives are. Death is unthinkable or unmentionable (a dropping
mortality rate and a rich economy makes this somewhat understand-
able) and also violence to people or property not possible (the reasons
for this are a little too complicated for me to put into a parenthesis).

Reflecting what *is* possible in our land, what I heard over and
over again was the conflict in these youths between pursuing a com-
fortable life, which America might *just* be about to offer *some* of them,
and the appreciation that their *work* and sacrifice was its pre-condi-
tion. To resolve this moral dilemma, some were tempted to let a
pregnant girl friend and a new moral problem be the answer. Some
could talk about such possibilities, but found it harder to realize their
anger, their struggle with violent feelings daily denied but stimulated,
too. As adolescents, they *could* talk about sex, and they did, long and
hard, and sometimes mean, too.

Differing attitudes on sexual matters slowly separated other atti-
tudes toward society. Some yielded very much to social codes; others
would fight them as part of a society they were more totally prepared
to reject. After a while, perhaps with some prodding from me, they
made for themselves the distinction between those among them who
felt temporarily committed and those who at least then were prepared
to vow a relatively permanent war. In a sense some were willing to
give up part of their youth, others felt their youth to be their adult-
hood. I had felt some of these differences in other moments with other
youths doing this kind of protest, and I had wondered why some of
their leaders seemed old and others young, and were so, or seemed so,
regardless of actual age. In this group all were "leaders," but some
more than others, and it seemed to me that at issue, perhaps, was the
problem of commitment: to what, for how long, and how deeply, with
what energy, and, as a problem, how to realize it, how to make one's
peace with it.

We moved along into midstream on the fourth day with less "personal" questions, even less social ones (like "what makes a segregationist?" or "how do they think?" They knew very *well* how segregationists think, and did some remarkable "psychodramas" for one another to prove it). Now we began to hear questions whose basic point was skeptical: of what use? or will anything come of our work after all is said and done? I also was asked what *I* was doing, and how I thought this social issue would be resolved. One 14-year-old girl asked me about mass hypnosis as a solution; we all laughed, but I thought her remark well taken in some of its implications. And an 18-year-old boy from Alabama suggested that at least I had a career, and so if nothing much really happened about desegregation, I could always go back to my medical work. "You at least have a job . . . a profession." They were giving their finest possession, their youth, and they were less sure of the outcome, now especially as they talked about it more.

Just as I had noted in my work with those Negro families in New Orleans and Atlanta whose children were leaders in school desegregation, I was now beginning to feel the more open anxieties, angers, and fears and hopes of these youths as they were concerned with white people. Such feelings are directed not to any particular white, but to the white world, and they are concealed by the usual social veneers which cover deeper emotions. With some freedom and trust between the students and myself I was now beginning to receive a good deal of the positive and negative attitudes long directed at our white society. I don't know quite how to talk about this development, but it strikes me as in some ways similar to what happens in the transference relationship in psychoanalysis. The seeking white listener receives feelings meant for the white world of authority, developed toward this world over a long time.

At intervals I found myself pressed hard, as politeness and ingratiation gave way to increasing surges of doubt and pessimism about what would come of all their efforts, and at one point I recall wondering just how much of this was a good idea, how valuable it was for such feelings to come forth from them, at this moment; and it was clear, too, that I was beginning to feel guilty and responsible in some way myself, accused of their possible failure, revealed as one who, at the very least, should be depressed with them, or share their hidden fears.

We seemed, for a few hours, very emotional with one another, shoring each other up as well as feeling low. It was at this point that we were joined by a Black Muslim leader, Mr. Jeremiah X. One of those in charge of Atlanta's budding mosque, he came upon us accompanied by a young probationary cobort who, in his words, had not yet "received his X." The Muslims in the South are few and scattered,

because they are living in a repressive society which tolerates little
open Negro anger, so much so that this often holds among Negroes
themselves, and can be heard in their segregationist slurs upon one
another. However, like Dixie's fate, to listen to some Dixiecrats, the
Muslims are "on the rise" and particularly in those Southern areas
which are on the symbolic geographical rise of becoming more North-
ern in their segregationist habits. ("We've got to learn how to be
Northern segregationists," I heard a Southern businessman say re-
cently.)

    In Atlanta there is a mosque, and I had seen Jeremiah X upon
occasion. Indeed, my wife had attended a small seminar with him
present and participating. In Birmingham I had even found my-
self sharing a meeting and discussion with a very articulate Muslim.
They have a keen eye for youth and for prisoners, for those poor and
hurt people who by age or temperament or past history have enough
energy or fire to make them potential fighters, partisans. He had heard
of our meetings, and had come to visit us.

    I felt their entrance before I saw them (my back was to them)
by the reaction of the students, excitement or a smile, or, mostly,
frowns. I had to decide immediately whether they should stay with my
welcome, or, possibly, remain at their own insistence, and to our con-
fusion. I was nervous and angry, and went through a series of
contradictory thoughts, which either suggested that I should ask them
to leave (what right had they to be there and why should we put up
with such additional troubles when we were in such a critical moment
of our meeting and our relationship with one another?) or let them
stay. (It might be helpful for them to be there, to voice many of their
sharp and powerful comments and thus clarify some of our own feel-
ings.) I could not ask them to leave, and I felt their presence as I was
talking or listening.

    For about two hours we went along, though it was clear that we
were not the same. It was an evening session, starting at seven and
going, usually, to about ten. At about nine Jeremiah joined us, attack-
ing in a statement which I think we all expected or awaited, our pur-
poses and questioning our relationships and motives. I was a "white
lord" in flimsy disguise and it was sad and outrageous that Negroes
should succumb to one more of the white man's tricks.

    African history, American history, Hitler's savagery turned into a
general truth about the basic nature of the white man, all were force-
fully mentioned and the reactions of these youths and myself sharp
and revealing. Most of the students became angry at Jeremiah, and I
found myself annoyed, fighting direct anger with constant efforts of
restraint and "thought." Again and again the youths denounced the
Muslims, though in some there was an air of vague pleasure which I
had slowly been able to notice. We ended the session at 11:30 in a

state of high emotion and excitement, which spilled over into early morning in several pools of talk and argument. Several students having a midnight sandwich with me were quite upset by my failure to ask the Muslims to leave. They had all noticed, too, that I had argued with them, and, for the first time, seemed, to use the words of one of them, "put on the defensive." (He was right. I assume, also, that he might well have wanted me on the defensive before Mr. Jeremiah X had arrived, and it was a contribution, I later realized, for such desires to be brought uncomfortably near the surface.)

The next morning, at our regular meeting, we had our most crucial time, and it was this meeting which several of us said later we wished could be shared with the rest of the country. (How to do that, how to make the knowledge and experience such as we all learned and gathered in that group, useful in the life of the community, or available to it, that was what we all finally wondered about, and without any real answers.) We were unusually silent and hesitant, and I decided to start with an analysis of my own reactions. I thought we were all really in need of some clarification of just what we did feel and it seemed easiest in this meeting at that time for me to take the lead (a half hour of sudden awkwardness and silence had more than persuaded and unsettled me). Carefully, but I think resolutely, I went ahead, telling them that I had been made angry, and telling them why it seemed to me I had been. I talked about my own anxieties and guilts, some of which they now quickly confirmed they had seen during the exchanges between Jeremiah X and myself. I told them I thought it was important for us to know how we felt, and that, with one another, once we knew one another, was probably the best way to find such out. "You mean if we don't always agree with Dr. King and sometimes hate whites instead of love them, we should come out and say it here since we're all friends here, and in the same boat?" That was it, I answered the young man, and added that I didn't think we should go around analyzing ourselves all day (there was a life to be lived) but sometimes a little sharing of one's thoughts was not a bad idea.

We discussed next what you *do* with what you discover about your feelings or those of others. We talked about abstract knowledge, or facts, or even emotional truths or facts about our emotions (insight) and we decided that such information had to be placed in some context of living, of what the information *meant*, or how it fitted into a particular life's actions and purpose. Idle facts, isolated facts, these may be entertaining or interesting, but hardly seemed important for *us*, there. We heard several personal remarks about this time, admissions from a few about just *how* tempting the Muslims can be at certain moments, about how valid some of their statements were, about white arrogance and control, and how endless it seemed, even now,

even for them as fighters. We seemed to be saying slowly that prickly truths had been spoken by Mr. Jeremiah X, and that also he had shown us how any truth must have its context, of other truths and of other people who carry them. We decided we had best look at our responses and what they mean about both us and our accusers, be they Mr. Jeremiah X or Mr. Ross Barnett. ("I think when you know what you feel in your heart and you don't have to think anymore you're alone in it, you're better off.")

By the end of our sessions, many hours later, I think we all agreed that we owed Mr. Jeremiah X much gratitude. He had reached us and affected us, and at what seemed like a ripe moment. Those who had denounced him hardest could see that they *had* to do so; and those most sympathetic could see how hard it is to fight one's rage and sadness. We spent some moments talking about how people all over the world, and in most centuries of man's history, had succumbed to the clear attractions of movements like the Muslims. We were ready for others now, a historian, a political scientist, a sociologist.

In conclusion I would like to say that here was a group of us in a week of our lives, sitting and talking with one another, brought together from widely different towns and backgrounds, of both races, and separated by much in our experiences. At the end of our meetings we seemed a bit closer, able to talk more readily about our denials and evasions; they now were less pressing because faced, and also less "wrong," and, at times, quite "right" or understandable. What had brought us together was our common interest in social change, our common concern about certain serious problems in our country. I think many of us felt we could go on a bit "better," that is, less vulnerable to crippling gloom and confusion. ("I think we can be more enthusiastic now," a girl said, "because we won't have to fight ourselves as much." A girl beside her was very wise, and spoke well: "It won't last always, but I suppose in the worst pinch we can remember back, maybe, sometimes.") The most remembered remark I think we all had, the sharpest, most painful and moving moment, was when Jeremiah X said to us about integration: "I've given up on that. I gave it up a long time ago." And he said it not with anger or mockery, but slowly, sadly, wistfully. I think many of the young men and women were near tears.

"Let me place you," a lad from Birmingham said to me at the end when we were walking away. He was using dialect, and I'd heard the expression in rural Mississippi, and knew he wanted my address. He also wanted to know what I was going to do *now*. He was right: it was he and his kind who would make the changes, and me and mine who could only advise and help in whatever way we could or would. It was a matter of territory, of place, of my address and his. We love and protect our children and teach them, and when they become youths,

like these young men and women, we must know our place, and accept theirs. We cannot protect them from mistakes (unless we think we are gods) but we can hope that they have the right to make them and learn from them; the right to be human.

> "The wisdom of the people's gone.
> How can the young go straight?"

So spoke Yeats. A sixteen-year-old young man from Selma, Alabama said to us: "We've got to make our own way, even if our folks had their lives taken away from them." That seemed to me to be the spirit of a youth taking on social change (leaving his parents and their world to make another). Who would deny him his hopes and attempts? And if we should, as a country, what can we do here anyway?

YOUTH and PEACE: A Psychosocial Study of Student Peace Demonstrators in Washington, D.C.*

Fredric Solomon and Jacob R. Fishman

A. Introduction

On February 16 and 17, 1962 more than four thousand[1] student demonstrators came to Washington, D.C. from colleges and high schools in various parts of the country for the purpose of picketing the White House and Soviet Embassy and meeting with government officials. Most students (75%) were members of various peace organizations whose leaders had joined together under the banner of "Turn Toward Peace" in order to coordinate the demonstration. A variety of executive and congressional offices were visited by groups of students who expressed the following viewpoints: (a) the belief that the arms race was inevitably leading to nuclear war; (b) opposition to civil defense measures; (c) opposition to a resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing by the U.S.A. (an issue of national interest at that time); and (d) their proposals for unilateral peaceful "initiatives" by which the U.S.A. could begin working toward a "disarmed world under international law."

On the second day of the demonstration, the peace pickets were "counter-picketed" by approximately 200 young people from various "conservative" groups in the Washington area. The authors were

[1] Four thousand demonstrators were registered at the "headquarters"; but many students began picketing without pausing to register, and one set of observers counted 8,000 marching. It was reportedly the largest demonstration for any cause Washington had seen in a decade (1).

able to obtain some data from these students for comparative purposes, although the formal part of the study concerned itself with the "peace" demonstrators.

This is a report of the findings of an "on-the-spot" research project which was carried out during the two-day demonstration. The formal research tools were a short-answer questionnaire and a 1½ hour individual interview. Informal observations were made, and group interviews were conducted with peace demonstrators as well as with some of the opposing counter-pickets from conservative student groups. Eighteen months later a follow-up questionnaire was sent to some of the peace demonstrator sample; results of the follow-up study are summarized in Appendix B.

Some of the leading findings of the study of the 1962 peace demonstrators include:

(1) The demonstrators were quite young (18½ was the mean age).

(2) By and large they had no well-formed, comprehensive political ideology.

(3) Many students (though not usually those in leadership positions) expressed themselves moralistically about the cold war and nuclear weapons—this in spite of there being little or no personal religious commitment evident in the majority of demonstrators. In their statements and actions there seemed to be a moralistic quality of "striving for purity," a combination of idealism and protest.

(4) There is suggestive data to the effect that the age period in which first feelings for social or political "causes" is most likely to develop is 12 to 15.

(5) The majority of students came from politically liberal families, but they were "rebelling" in going far beyond parental experience in the realm of public action. About one-fourth of the students characterized their homes as politically conservative or reactionary. Some demonstrators appeared to display a quality of simultaneous rebellion against and identification with parental images.

(6) The older demonstrators, in their middle twenties, seemed to form a separate psychosocial population from the younger students.

(7) The opposing counter-pickets from conservative student groups differed markedly from the peace demonstrators on many parameters of belief and behavior. Particular attention is drawn to the psychosocial dimensions of trust and distrust in comparing the two groups.

B. Method and Procedure

The sample consisted of 247 participants which represented approximately 6 per cent of the total number of registered demonstrators (4,000). Two hundred and eighteen demonstrators filled out short-answer questionnaires, and twenty-nine other subjects were interviewed "in depth" for periods of 1½ to 2 hours each.

The questionnaires were distributed by a group of medical student research assistants who were instructed to choose subjects randomly at various times and in various areas of activity. Most questionnaires were filled out in the registration and resting area in the church which was serving as demonstration headquarters. Some forms were completed by demonstrators in or near actual picketing locations. The research assistants (who were paid for each completed questionnaire) stood near the respondents during the 15 to 30 minutes which it took to complete the forms, in order to discourage formation of informal groups making collective responses to the individual questionnaires.

Subjects for interviews were selected at the headquarters area by the five interviewers (four psychiatrists and one psychologist) who then conducted private interviews utilizing an outline prepared in advance.[2] The authors also did some group interviewing under fairly informal circumstances. The whole research team met subsequently to discuss and compare various observations and data on group phenomena.

C. Results and Discussion

1. Social Data

Let us begin by discussing some of the social characteristics of the demonstrators as revealed in our questionnaire sample. They were, by and large, a group in their early college years. They had come to Washington by bus, train and car from 57 different colleges and universities, mostly in the East and Midwest, but also from as far away as Seattle and Florida. Eleven per cent of the students were

---

[2] There does not appear to be any systematic bias in the sampling of either the "questionnaire group" of subjects or the "interview group" of subjects except for the following two factors: (1) There were proportionately more "older" (mid-20's) demonstrators in the group which was interviewed than there were in the questionnaire sample; (2) Any students who were excessively suspicious would, obviously, have refused to participate in our study at all—so perhaps we sampled only the more trusting or less alienated segment of the demonstrators. We would emphasize, however, that the reason given by those who refused the questionnaire was almost invariably that of being too busy at the moment, with a promise to co-operate later. Furthermore, the questionnaire was anonymous, with a space for optional identification for the purpose of future follow-up studies. Fifty-eight per cent gave their names and addresses and 42 per cent did not do so.

still in high school. Thirty per cent were college freshmen; fifteen percent were sophomores; fifteen percent juniors; and eleven percent were seniors. Only 6 percent identified themselves as graduate students in a university. About 12 percent apparently were not enrolled as students at the time of the demonstration. The mean age of the demonstrators was 18½, with *45 percent of the sample being either 18 or 19 years of age.* Twenty percent were 17 and under; only 14 percent were over 22. Almost all of the organizers of the demonstration and its spokesmen in Washington were undergraduate college students.

> The striking predominance of the late adolescent age group in this public demonstration is quite similar to the authors' earlier findings on the student civil rights movement. (2)(3) Indeed, as we shall discuss later, although 95 per cent of the demonstrators were white, many had been inspired by the important role of *young* college students in the sit-ins and freedom rides of the previous two years. But, the youthfulness of these peace marchers represented a sharp departure from the typical age distribution in previous public demonstrations for peace and disarmament. Thus, a sociological survey of participants in two fairly large annual "Easter Peace Walks" in Chicago shows that in 1960 the predominant age group involved in the demonstration was 30 to 34; newcomers in 1961 generally fell into the age range of 21 to 29.(4) Others have also noted that on most campuses throughout the 1950's "peace activity" was carried on by older graduate students and faculty members, rather than involving college freshmen and sophomores in any significant numbers. (5)(6)

The sex distribution of the sample was 3:2, Male:Female. Approximately three-fourths of the sample had their homes in urban areas, with 19 per cent coming from the New York City area. By and large, students came from small middle-class families with four or more children. Excluding the only children, it is interesting to note that 45 per cent of all demonstrators were the eldest in their families, whereas only 15 per cent were the youngest. Seventy-five per cent of all demonstrators were the oldest child of their sex in their families.

One interesting finding concerned major field of study and vocational plans. Of those who gave answers to questionnaire items pertaining to academic vocational areas, two-thirds (66%) were majoring in the humanities or social sciences, with relatively few in the physical or biological sciences, and very few in pre-professional courses (this occurring at a time of intensified national interest in scientific space research). Career plans were often indefinite and were predominantly centered in teaching, social service and research. This finding stands in marked contrast to the career goals of the "counter-pickets" from student conservative groups. These young people were typically very definite about careers in business or law, and were taking appropriate pre-professional courses of study (see below).

The subjects were asked to indicate their religious affiliations and those of their parents. With over 90 per cent of the sample responding, the largest number (51%) reported that they had no religious preference; this included 10 per cent who claimed to be atheists.[3] Fourteen per cent indicated affiliation with "liberal" Protestant sects (Unitarian and Quaker) and 13.5 per cent with other Protestant groups (Lutheran, Episcopalian, Methodist, etc.). Twenty per cent stated that they were Jewish, and only one student (0.5%) was a member of the Roman Catholic Church.

These statistics on religion have not been compared with those which one might find in a general cross-section of American college students in 1962, or in contrasting political or social groups. Therefore, inferences beyond the immediate statistical breakdown cannot be justified at this time. It was noted, however, that the conservative counter-pickets were largely from Catholic universities in the Washington area; this stood in apparent contrast to the low degree of participation by Catholics in the Peace demonstration.[4]

2. *Perceived Goals of the Demonstration*

When asked what they saw as the concrete goals of this particular demonstration, the majority of peace demonstrators were quick to point out that they did not really expect any change in policy or in the attitudes of government officials to occur as a direct result of their efforts. However, most students mentioned *some* sort of political goal (e.g., some small effect on the government via "balancing off the right-wing").

Secondly, almost everyone hoped that the publicity given the demonstration would somehow result in increased public arousal and awareness of the issues. By influencing the grass roots in this way they hoped to perhaps eventually change the course of national policy. In this respect, there was much talk of future campaigning for political candidates who would incorporate some of these goals into their platforms.[5]

---

[3] The 51 per cent of demonstrators with "no religion" was composed of the following sub-groups, with regard to religion of their families or origin: 14% from families with no religion; 4% (9 students) from Roman Catholic families; 15% from Protestant homes; 14% from Jewish families; and 3% giving no response to the item on family's religion.

[4] Recent communications from leaders of leading conservative and liberal student organizations indicate that since 1962 there has been considerably more mixing of religious group representation in both "movements." On the Right, there has been more substantial participation by people from Jewish backgrounds, (7) and, on the Left, there has been increasing participation by young Catholics and members of more conservative Protestant churches. (8)

[5] A few months later, many of these students did in fact get involved in the 1962 election campaigns in Massachusetts, Vermont, and New York where "Peace candidates" were running for Congress.

A third goal very frequently mentioned was the strengthening and expansion of the student peace movement itself. Surprisingly, among those interviewed this goal was named more frequently than any of the political objectives. The emphasis was often placed on expression of *student* solidarity and effectiveness as a group, rather than simply supporting a point of view. For example, one demonstrator commented, "This is the first attempt of young people to conduct such a demonstration and show their strength."

3. *Personal Motivations to Participate*

What was the range of *personal* motivations identified by interviewed students as being important factors in bringing them to Washington for this particular demonstration?

a. *To Reduce Isolation.* First of all, students regularly perceived the various peace organizations to which they belonged as being small in size and relatively isolated on their college campuses, carrying little weight with either the student body or the school administration. Indeed, many felt that a rather negative or hostile attitude from the rest of the college existed toward their activities. The students reported, therefore, that being part of this demonstration served to reduce feelings of isolation and alienation—both in political and personal terms—as well as to revive and strengthen enthusiasm for activities back home.

b. *To Combat Helplessness, Anxiety and Uncertainty about Future.* On a second personal level, many students emphasized the need to take some clarifying action on an issue which otherwise has become surrounded by helplessness, futility, and inadequacy. One 19 year-old young man said: "I'm scared to death. There isn't much hope, but you have to try. Maybe something will happen." This student was typical in that this action was a means of avoiding depression and anxiety about the future, although he was rather pessimistic and expected things to work out poorly. He saw the government as "frozen" in its position and feared an accidental war.

A possible inference from students' comments about the future is that there is considerable overlap between (a) the uncertainty and inability to master one's fate vis-à-vis the nuclear arms race and (b) some more typical late adolescent concerns regarding personal choices for the future. Our study does not permit either the conclusion that the threat of nuclear war is preventing some students from making firm plans for the future or the conclusion that the more uncertain students are those who are most drawn to peace activities. However, both conclusions are probably true to some extent.

c. *Desire for Political Action.* A third sort of personal motivation mentioned in several interviews was a fairly straightforward desire for assertion and expression—a need to take action rather than merely

use words. "If I believe strongly in these goals, I should try to do something to achieve them." Another student said, "Personally, it's just a nice feeling walking in front of the White House for something you think is right." Others also indicated that they were "trying to take the idea of pressure groups seriously" or, at least, taking fairly literally an American tradition of vigorous political participation by citizens. Their pessimism about their probable effectiveness is rather noteworthy in this context.

d. *Sense of Guilt over Inactivity.* There were still other reasons given for expressing themselves in this way, regardless of whether or not it would be effective in changing anything. One cluster of responses centered around guilt and other unpleasant feelings which would have occurred if the participant had stayed at home. "I have certain guilt feelings. Even if the situation is hopeless I want to have done something to at least have tried to have stopped war," said one 22 year-old male leader.

e. *Striving for Purity.* A 19-year-old girl gave quite articulate expression to the fifth and perhaps most central of the personal motivations identified in this study. It is difficult to give this a name. It seems to be a kind of striving for purity of humanitarian principles, a combination of idealism and protest. She saw the purpose of the Washington project as follows: "To demonstrate that we as students and future intellectual leaders of our communities feel *there is a better way to live,* mankind can live in peace. . . . If I feel there's another way aside from war and bombs, it's my duty to tell others." She added that in her view, "the leaders of the country are going about it all wrong." A 20-year-old boy from Massachusetts spoke in a similar vein: "The students are here trying to correct what they think is *inhuman.*" He personally felt "an obligation to be here. Every man has an obligation to look out for people's benefit, regardless of the effect on himself of the effort."

This sort of orientation is one which includes the vision of a world to be someday governed more by love than by hate. Students were not necessarily denying the existence of conflict between nations but were anxious to oppose the destructiveness and—by their view— madness symbolized by The Bomb. Racial prejudice and various kinds of commercialism were also seen as examples of hypocrisy, sham, compromise, and inhumanity. This striving for purity and uncompromising humanism seemingly provides the idealistic-moralistic side of much of today's youthful involvement in such activities as civil rights action projects, peace demonstrations, and volunteer service in the Peace Corps.

The affirmative idealism is interwoven with protest in all these "movements," but often the onlookers are able to see only the protest. This was illustrated in Washington in the reactions to the peace

demonstrators of several policemen and of a Board member in one of the churches where demonstrators were lodged. These observers became irate about the beards, loose-fitting clothes, lack of make-up, and otherwise apparently offensive appearance of some individual demonstrators. Ideas, issues, and political programs were irrelevant to the Board member and the policemen—their emotions were aroused by what they viewed as a hostile attempt to be "different." Although the self-differentiating aspect of non-conformist wearing apparel would seem to account for some of its appeal to undergraduates, the authors feel that the boys' unshaven faces and the girls' uncurled hair and lack of lipstick can also be seen as part of an attempt to build a less "commercial," more "pure, uncontaminated" image of the self, and, coincidentally, of the world around the self.

4. *Perception of Risk*

Half of the questionnaire sample felt that there was a definite risk in their participation. It was felt by many that government agents (CIA or FBI) were observing and that identities of students were being recorded and might well be used later in denying government jobs to applicants who had participated. It was thought that such action would not be limited to highly classified jobs; many believed that the notion of security risk is interpreted very broadly and loosely in government circles. Although we are certainly not in a position to evaluate the validity of such a perception it is of more than passing interest that a great number of students perceive the workings of the government in this manner.

A small number of students felt that there was a significant risk of social ostracism by fellow students back at the campus resulting from their participation. Very few students felt a substantial personal risk from academic lost time, from school disapproval, or from family disapproval. None reported a fear of possible physical harm (in contrast to the kinds of risks perceived by students in desegregation demonstrations (9)).

5. *Family Attitudes*

The attitudes of the students' families toward their coming to Washington to participate in this demonstration received special attention in both the interview and the questionnaire. Most students were able to state clearly what their parents thought of their participation, although a large number could not respond with certainty because they had come to Washington without mentioning it to their parents. Close to 50% of all demonstrators sampled felt their parents to be in support of their participation. About 22 per cent reported overt opposition from their parents. Another 22 per cent were unable to state a parental point of view—sometimes because of parental apathy

to all politics, but more often because the student could not gauge his parents' reaction. This latter group came almost exclusively from the questionnaire sample. In an interview, any student who said he didn't know how his parents would feel about his coming to Washington was then asked to imagine what the reaction would be. Most often, the student would have expected opposition or a mixed reaction.

Regarding mixed reactions, a small but articulate group of interviewed respondents described their parents' attitudes toward demonstrating in such terms as: "They agree in principle but not in method" or "They disapprove and are fearful in case I might get arrested or somehow jeopardize my future, but they made no attempt to stop me and deep down I think my Father is quite sympathetic" or "Mother said I couldn't go, but really felt otherwise. She finally wished me luck." These perceptions of mixed reactions, as well as perceptions of opposing views *between* the parents came out in about one-fifth of the interviews, but less frequently in the less probing questionnaires.

A related item on the questionnaire evoked some interesting written responses. The question was, "Do any members of your family seem inconsistent in their attitudes toward your activities?" Although almost two-thirds of the students responded "No," there were 23 per cent who found inconsistencies worthy of specific description. The most common response in this latter group was the perception that their parents were "for the same ideas but against doing anything about them." Other descriptions included, "They are Christians but they don't worry about peace;" "They are largely unconcerned. They have their life to live and fallout is much like rainfall—you just can't tell;" "They want me to grow up, but only in their way;" "They don't speak of relevant issues but only of job security or other dangers;" "Demonstrating is 'O.K.' only if you win;" "After church 'O.K.', before church 'No';" "They have humanitarian instincts but are petty;" and so on.

On the questionnaire students were asked to note family opinions on several political issues of the day (unrelated to feelings about demonstrations *per se*). Measures of agreement and disagreement with various family members, including siblings, were also included.

In the interview sample, it was possible to place the 29 families in broad categories of political outlook and activity. We found that 16 of the 29 came from homes which they described as more or less "liberal." Nine of the 29 came from "conservative" homes. Two students had families with no political views or involvement whatever and two other students came from homes where definite splits in outlook existed within the family. Only 7 of the 16 "liberal" sets of parents had been active in anything like election campaigns, public meetings or other sorts of political participation more vigorous than merely voting. Only the parents of one student had ever picketed in peace

demonstrations. On the "conservative" side, only 2 of the 9 sets of parents could be characterized as having ever been "active" politically.

In those cases where some disagreement with parents was reported by students, the father was the family member usually identified as objecting to his child's views—more than twice as many fathers as mothers were listed as being in conflict with students on political issues. One might speculate that this is because men are more likely to have better-formed opinions on such matters, with which to agree or disagree. Another possibility is that women in America are more concerned about the threat of nuclear war.

In summary, more than half of the demonstrators seem to have come from homes with fairly "liberal" outlooks on domestic and foreign matters. A smaller but quite significant group (20-30%) were ideologically in rebellion against politically conservative families. Parental inconsistency or ambivalence was apparent to a number of the students. Where students were in disagreement with family members about politics, the sharpest disagreement was uusally with the father. And, no matter what the family politics were, the students were generally taking a far more active part in a public controversy over national policy than their parents ever had taken.

6. *Present Affiliations and Past Involvement in Social Issues*

Three demonstrators out of four came to Washington as members of some organization participating in "Turn Toward Peace." The Student Peace Union (SPU) was by far the largest organization represented in our sample. Other well-represented groups included the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), Student SANE, Tocsin (a local Harvard group), and the Young People's Socialist League (YPSL). Numerous smaller peace groups which were local to individual campuses were also well represented. Even though one-fourth of the demonstrators stated that they were not "with" any oragnization, only 3 per cent of our sample were totally alone in that they knew nobody else in the demonstration. Indeed, the vast majority of students reported having six or more "friends" who also had come to demonstrate in Washington.

Only a very small proportion of the total sample were members of dedicated pacifist groups such as the Committee for Nonviolent Action and the War Resisters' League. Among these were several veterans of numerous pacifist and anti-nuclear demonstrations (polaris submarine demonstrations, hunger strikes, vigils at a germ warfare center, etc.). Numerically speaking, this small group was greatly overbalanced by the 28 per cent of students who had had *no* experience whatever with action for any "cause" prior to this demonstration.

Of those students *with* previous experience in social or political action (72%), it is of interest to note that about half of them had

participated in civil rights activities. In fact, 18 per cent of the entire sample had had previous experience with civil rights protest but *no* involvement with "peace action" prior to the Washington project. These data, along with many comments in our interviews, strongly suggest that the development of the student civil rights movement (starting with the sit-ins of 1960) has had a profound influence on the nation's campuses in mobilizing the potential for student social action, in demonstrating the possibility of such action being effective, and in focusing attention on the techniques of nonviolent public action and civil disobedience.

Data was gathered in interviews not only on students' first activities for political or social "causes," but also on their memories of the first time they had any *feelings* or *serious* thoughts about political and social "causes." This question was presented in order to leave open the widest possible interpretation, which could include political issues, feelings of sympathy for the poor, charitable inclinations, feelings about racial issues, war, international affairs and the like. Sixty per cent of the group interviewed reported their earliest feelings or "desire to do something" regarding a social issue to have occurred between the ages of 12 and 15, in early adolescence. Twenty per cent of the group reported their first feelings and action during their freshman year at college, when they were eighteen. Only two (7%) reported their "first" after the age of eighteen, but four (13%) pinpointed their feelings between four and six years of age. It is interesting to note that this latter group came entirely from strongly liberal families or families which were very much involved in the subject matter of the early experience, at that time; for example, parents very much involved in religious ideas and activities of a social service nature.

The heavy concentration of earliest remembered experiences in the 12- to 15-year-old age range is quite striking in the interviews and consistent with similar findings by the authors in interviews with Negro desegregation demonstrators (2)(3). In the latter group, this particular age coincided with the occurrence of the Supreme Court's desegregation of schools decision. In the group of peace demonstrators under study (almost entirely white), there appears to be a much broader range of earliest social "cause" experiences, which perhaps is not surprising since the range of focal issues is wider for the white population than for the Negro for whom segregation represents such an intense and immediate issue.

This concentration in the early adolescent period might also be related to what is known of the strivings for identity and assertion which accompany the physiological, social, and psychological changes ushered in by adolescence (10, 11, 12). It does suggest a period of heightened vulnerability to the influence of social and political ide-

ology and "causes," an understanding of which would seem to be of crucial importance to educators and social planners in many different kinds of situations. Our limited data cannot be definitive, of course, about the strength of a determinant or the "choice" of a particular path or direction for one's social feelings at any one time.

It is noteworthy, however, that while the majority of these students come from homes where the "liberal" social and political orientation was encouraged, nevertheless the first experience and activity, when it occurred in this early adolescent period, usually came about outside of and fairly independent of family experience and conscious influence, this is suggestive of the need for independence of action in this group even though the youth might have been identifying with the mainstream of the parental ideology.

For peace demonstrators from "conservative" homes, there appeared to be feelings of much more direct rebellion involved, and frequently a postponement of overt action until the freshman year at college (away from home). An example of this group is a 20-year-old junior from a Southwestern right-wing family who had his first "feelings" as a college freshman when he was 18. They concerned civil rights for Negroes. He became involved in his first social action one year later in a sit-in demonstration against segregation. When another 18-year-old Midwestern freshman with rural, politically conservative parents was 13 years of age, he felt "war or something exciting" was coming during the Hungary and Suez crises; he decided then that he wanted to go to West Point. During the course of adolescence, he became severely alienated from his parents, and his ideology changed to doctrinaire socialism; this peace demonstration represented his first social action.

On the liberal family side, the son of a Quaker minister recalled his feelings at age 5 when he felt intense sympathy for beggars in the street. He attended a Friends' School where social issues were "all around," but only became aware of the integration problem when he was 14. He attended work camps and participated in the "Hiroshima Vigil" in Boston in 1961 as his first public political action at the age of 20 and has been in many since. Another student with politically moderate parents heard things at home as a child about the plight of the Negro but never had much feeling about it at the time. He became interested in civil rights at age 14 and then in civil defense; his first social action was in a civil defense protest at age 15. Another remembers first being aware that some people were poor and less fortunate than he at age 6 or 7. His first political or social action was in a Pro-Castro rally at age 13. Since then, he has been in a variety of demonstrations, particularly against civil defense.

It seems worthy of note that none of the interviewed students from Jewish families reported earliest experiences or feelings involving antisemitism, Zionism, or problems of Jews. We have no explanation for this but might hypothesize that either this was not a relevant issue at the time they were 4 to 6 or 12 to 15, or that, taking the lead from our religious data, this represents a group moving away from Jewish identity, and involved in some degree of displacement or projection. Their early

adolescence included the 1955–57 period (Suez Crisis) and they were 4 to 6 during the period of 1948-50. Their parents lived through World War II and no doubt had memories of Nazi atrocities.

The older participants (over 22) seemed to be a somewhat different population. Although their past histories of social involvement may be parallel to the others, there appears to be more evidence of family pathology and prolonged difficult searching to find themselves during the course of adolescence and young adulthood. Their continued participation in these demonstrations and movements was often at the expense and to the exclusion of career and family; this partially suggests an attempt to prolong features of adolescence and an avoidance of or inability to assume some of the features of adulthood in our society. Interview data with this group tends to substantiate this impression of prolonged identity crisis and emotional conflict. One 27-year-old "student" presently not in school exemplifies this history. His mother died when he was 14 causing him great sorrow. His father is portrayed as cynical, punitive, rejecting, and authoritarian (though anti-military, having escaped service in Germany during World War I). He did a great deal of hunting, fishing and trapping alone during high school. He also had severe behavior problems including fighting and fire-setting. He recalls first hearing of the "class struggle" when he was 14. He was extremely sensitive and felt during adolescence that the "world seemed bigger and bigger and more and more hopeless." He joined the Merchant Marine after high school and went back to college subsequently. He felt a great deal of subjective emotional tension and "trouble." In 1959 (age 25), he "became alarmed at the blindness of international relations." He first felt like escaping and "dissociated myself" by going to Europe for a year. Returning in the Fall of 1960, ready to "accept responsibility," he took part in a White House picket in 1961 and then went on several "walks for peace." His only friends and social life are now within the peace movement.

To summarize, it would seem that with students involved in political or social action there might be three developmental periods of increased susceptibility to the acquisition of social and political awareness (or awareness of "injustice") and the motivation to do something about it. These are the periods of ages 4 to 6, 12 to 15 and the freshman year at college (age 18). Psychodynamic influences and social implications for these periods may well differ, and each may represent the ushering in of new social, sexual, and intellectual vistas at points of intense individual change. It also would seem that social crises and political events occurring coincidentally during those periods may have a profound effect or perhaps be selectively chosen for internalization by other contributing psychosocial influences (e.g., identification with or rebellion against parental values).

In students who came from politically liberal homes, their sense of social or political "identity" seems to involve a synthesis of identification with and rebellion against parental patterns. Indeed, this

process of rebellion within a framework of identification seems widespread among young people we have seen who are involved in various kinds of contemporary social or political action. We have already described this in Negro and white student sit-in demonstrators, and have used the term "pro-social acting out" in connection with certain aspects of this phenomenon (2)(3). In striving for a sense of autonomy, these young people will focus their rebellion around "independence," rather than overt hostility toward (or feelings of oppression by) their parents. In so doing, the students often identify—consciously or unconsciously—with the roots of parental ideology and identity, while going far beyond their parents in the sphere of action. Thus, a student in the peace demonstration might: (1) agree with his parents about certain "issues" like nuclear testing; (2) be in conflict with them about the advisability of demonstrating in Washington; (3) go ahead and demonstrate anyway; (4) cite Thoreau and an old American tradition of public protest, and (5) be quite respectful toward officials in Washington and eager for a good "image" in the news media.

7. *The Leaders, the "Rank and File," and the Opposition: Some Ideological Contrasts*

With certain exceptions, an absence of broad and firm political ideology was characteristic of the large bulk of peace demonstrators —leaders and followers alike. This phenomenon was remarked upon particularly by several observers who recalled student activist days of the 1930's and 1940's when comprehensive ideology played such an important role among the "socially conscious." This is consistent with our previous studies of student civil rights demonstrators, in which we found that the vast majority focused on the issue of desegregation but differed fairly widely in their attitudes toward other political issues; they appeared interested primarily in the "work at hand," the immediate action to be taken.[6] Indeed, many peace demonstrators spoke directly of the civil rights movement as their model for political action.

The position generally held by all the demonstrating peace groups was that the United States should begin a program of unilateral initiatives (not identical with unilateral disarmament) designed to inspire similar peace-promoting moves by the Communist Bloc. Typically, the rank and file demonstrator justified this position in highly moralistic terms, relying heavily on the emotions of: (a) *fear* of the direction of the nuclear arms race, (b) *trust*, insofar as this can be inspired in international relations, and (c) *indignation* at the

[6] Since 1962 there have been trends in the civil rights movement (13), the peace movement (5) and other student movements (14)(15) which indicate growing student concern about broader issues now felt to be interrelated.

government's alleged insensitivity to "evils" like radioactive fallout or the loss of human life in nuclear war.

The demonstration *leaders* typically talked about the issues quite differently from the rank and file. Rather than referring to Bertrand Russell or Gandhi, for example, the leaders might discuss cold war strategy in the "hard-nosed" language of Charles Osgood or Herman Kahn. Thus, in advocating the withdrawal of U.S. missile bases from Italy, Turkey and England they could describe how the cumbersome fueling system for these particular missiles made them useful only for a first-strike and useless for retaliatory purposes, and how, therefore, the government could well afford to evacuate these bases as a step toward reducing Cold War tensions.[7] Government-oriented rhetoric such as this seemed to be almost an "ideology" in itself. The leadership group tended to dress more conservatively than the rank and file and vigorously deplored the bearded and guitar-playing segment of the demonstrator population. The spokesmen tried to influence government officials via persuasive argument and via careful cultivation of good press relations. The rank and file included more of the frankly "humanistic" or "moralistic" young people (although these tendencies were not absent in the leaders—especially when they were seen off guard).

*   *   *

During the Peace Demonstration some 200 counter-pickets from various conservative student groups marched with picket signs across the street from the White House. Although they had not been expected and we were unprepared to gather systematic data, it was possible to observe the group and to conduct several group and individual interviews with ten pickets (5% of the demonstrators). It then became possible to contrast data on general characteristics and attitudes of the group with those of the peace demonstrators.

These demonstrators, too, were mostly college freshmen, age 18 to 19. They had been hastily recruited from the local Washington area campuses primarily by leaders of the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) in an attempt to "respond to the Peaceniks." The students were generally preparing for careers in business, law or foreign service; all of them were white, and the group was predominantly Catholic.

The political attitudes in this group, as might be expected, were in stark contrast to those of the peace pickets, although there were attitudes that represented a fairly wide range—this time of the "right." The contrast was found succinctly and vividly summarized in the slogans on the picket signs carried by both groups (Appendix A).

---

[7] Several months later, the Kennedy Administration did take this step, though not as a publically stated "peaceful initiative."

Their general premises began with an intense distrust of the Soviet Union, partly based on what they described as past performance and partly on an intense antipathy toward the "evils" of Communism, which has as its goal world domination, one way or another. They saw the Russians as cynical and quick to take advantage of any sign of weakness on our part. Their concern was primarily with being strong, and thus unilateral initiatives toward *increased* armaments and toward "pushing back Communism" were the only kinds of unilateral actions which they would countenance. The group seemed to be relatively well-equipped with data about past behavior of the Russians and poorly informed about armaments, nuclear testing and nuclear warfare. They tended to view the possibilities of nuclear war in the same political terms as conventional war—in marked contrast to many of the Peace demonstrators who felt that most political issues were very much secondary to the "new realities" of nuclear warfare and destructiveness.

The group supported civil defense as one means of increasing the strength of our stance and our ability to withstand Russian threats and attacks. Shelters were seen as a means of making victory more likely and less costly in the event of war. However, the group was surprisingly unenthusiastic about the whole shelter issue, in contrast to the peace group which was very strongly involved (in opposition) with this issue. None of the interviewed conservative students had ever seen a bomb shelter, built one, or were even thinking about building one. A simple explanation might well be that on one level shelters may be perceived as part of a cowardly withdrawal, not as a vigorous weapon. The qualities of encapsulation, isolation, and withdrawal which a well-stocked and deeply buried shelter suggests are probably quite repugnant to this group which puts so much emphasis on action, potency, and aggression.

*   *   *

The contrasting approaches to the issues of War and Peace, both *between* the two opposing picket groups and *within* the "peace" group, seem only partially related to rationally formulated positions. Much of the world outlook of which these positions are a part seems related to basic psychosocial attitudes. These attitudes apparently include such coordinates as trust-distrust; cowardice-bravery; caution-foolhardiness; dependency-self-reliance; strength-weakness; nationalism-internationalism; vulnerability-invulnerability; passivity-assertion; sacrifice-survival. The process by which formulation of their attitudes, ideology and action takes place would appear to be an intriguing area for further research.

APPENDIX A

Picket Sign Slogans

(Feb. 17, 1962)

Peace Demonstration	*Counter-Pickets* ("*Conservatives*")
Total Disarmament	Strike for Strength
$2 + 2 = 5$: Arms Race	Isn't Freedom Worth Defending?
Peace with Freedom	Give me Liberty or Death
Peace Race	Peace not Appeasement
"Truce to Terror" (Pres. K.)	Total Victory over Insidious Ideology
Strong U. N.	Goals of International Communism
J.F.K.: We Support your Words—	have not changed
Let us Support your Actions	Peace without Security Isn't Peace
Peace Won't Contaminate Our Milk	Fallout or Sell-out, Choose!
Every Test Kills	They Test, We Test
Deeper the Shelter, Bigger the Bomb	Missiles Not Missives
I'd Rather *BE*	Khrushchev Backs the SPU
Peace The Only Shelter	This is a Pacifist (picture of baby
	pacifier)
	Pacifism is Cowardice
	No Unilateral Suicide
	Purchase Life at the Expense of
	Slavery?
	Pacifism Leads to Communism
	K says "Pacifism for you, not for me"
	They're Not *Red*, They're YELLOW
	When have the Reds Compromised?
	TEST SI, Disarm NO
	BAN THE BUM (K)

APPENDIX B

Summary of Follow-up Study of Student Peace Demonstrators

The post-demonstration history of the organizations and of the student political leaders involved in the February, 1962 Washington project has been described elsewhere (5) and cannot be reviewed here. Those familiar with members of the movement have reported a general impression of a transition away from pure "peace issues" and toward community action issues such as civil rights. The "elitist" orientation toward influencing government decision-makers via persuasive arguments reportedly has diminished, and the more "moralistic" approach has gained in stature since the demonstration. To test these generalizations and in order to further illuminate the "natural history" of youthful involvement in social action, a modest follow-up study was undertaken.

Of those students filling out questionnaires in the original Peace Study, 128 (58%) signed their names for follow-up purposes. Eighteen months after the Washington project, follow-up questionnaires were mailed to these 128 individuals. Nineteen follow-up questionnaires were returned undelivered; the remaining 109 were presumed to have been received by the subjects. A total of 45 follow-up questionnaires were completed and returned for analysis. The respondents thus comprised 35 per cent of the follow-up sample and 21 per cent of the original questionnaire group from the 1962 demonstration.

The respondent group accurately represents the total questionnaire sample on several important dimensions. (For example, positive history of social action *prior* to the 1962 demonstration was found in 71 per cent of the respondent group and 72 per cent of the total questionnaire sample.) The respondent group was, however, somewhat older than the general sample population and somewhat more weighted with males.

Forty of the 45 respondents (89%) were still actively engaged in some sort of political and social action at the time of the follow-up survey. A host of "off-campus" social action issues were listed by the respondents in addition to the one which had brought them together originally in Washington. Several students did draw a sharp line between issues and were still working solely for peace. But for the majority of respondents, peace and disarmament had apparently slipped from the top of the hierarchy of action issues—being surpassed by civil rights.

The factors influencing this shift were varied. Some students had "relaxed" about the threat of war, partly because of the test ban treaty. On the other hand, because of the lack of apparent "progress," many students had come to feel *more* discouraged about peace efforts, and therefore had abandoned them. The majority of students had condemned the Kennedy administration's handling of the Cuban missile crisis. This incident and their subsequent feelings often led them to a "multi-issue" view similar to that expressed by the following respondent: "It made me realize that 'peace' could not be considered separately from political-ideological issues. In the long run the Cuban crisis was the product of the clash of Soviet and American attitudes toward social revolution." Other students emphasized the feelings of personal effectiveness obtainable via involvement in the student civil rights movement, as compared to that gained in the peace

movement. Several students thought that the peace movement might be re-invigorated by using more "direct-action" techniques such as those employed in civil rights activities.

Of special interest among the 45 respondents were those ten students for whom the 1962 demonstration had been an "initiation"—their first experience with public action for a social goal. Eight of these "newcomers" followed up their experience in Washington with continued participation in picketing, public meetings, etc., for various "causes"; the other two had returned to their former inactivity.

Those students who had shunned political and social action since the February 1962 demonstration gave various "reasons" for their behavior, ranging from disillusionment with one's own former naïveté (the government may have "known best" after all) to a return to individual interests (pursuit of intense program of graduate studies).

A somewhat surprising index of the depth of opposition to contemporary military policy was found in the original questionnaire sample when 30 per cent stated that they either intended to register as conscientious objectors or would urge others to do so. An additional 40 per cent replied "maybe" to the same item on the 1962 questionnaire. The responses to the follow-up questionnaire indicated an ongoing concern about the "C.O." question. Two-thirds of the males had been giving consideration to registering as conscientious objectors; two of the 31 males had actually done so, and five others definitely anticipated doing so. Eight males who had responded *negatively* to the inquiry about conscientious objection in 1962 had changed their minds in the next eighteen months and were giving serious consideration to "C.O" status for themselves. Two such students were definitely planning to become conscientious objectors.

REFERENCES

1. The Washington Post, February 17, 1962, p. 1.
2. FISHMAN, J. R., AND SOLOMON, F. "Youth and Social Action: I. Perspectives on the Student Sit-In Movement." *The American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, (Oct.) 1963, XXXIII, No. 5, 872-882.
3. SOLOMON, F., AND FISHMAN, J. R. "Youth and Social Action: II. Action and Identity Formation in the First Student Sit-In Demonstration." *The Journal of Social Issues*, (April) 1964, XX, No. 2, 36-45.
4. LANDRY, L., AND ECKENFELS, E. "A 1961 Peace Walk," *New University Thought*, (Spring) 1962, 2, No. 3, p. 7.
5. GITLIN, TODD "The Student Political Scene, 1960-3," report prepared for the Howard University Conference on Youth and Social Action, October 1963.
6. GOTTLIEB, SANFORD (Political Action Director, National Committee for a Same Nuclear Policy), statement in panel discussion at Annual Meeting of American Sociological Association, August 1962.
7. JONES, DAVID (Executive Director, Young Americans for Freedom), personal communication, August 1963.
8. GITLIN, TODD (President, Students for a Democratic Society), personal communications, August 1963; March 1965.
9. SOLOMON, F., AND FISHMAN, J. R. "The Psychosocial Meaning of Non-violence in Student Civil Rights Activities." *Psychiatry*, (May) 1964, 27, No. 2, 91-99.
10. JONES, ERNEST "Some Problems of Adolescence," in *Papers on Psychoanalysis*, 5th edition. London: Balliere, Tindall and Cox, 1923, 389-406.

11. FREUD, ANNA *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense*. London: Hogarth Press, 1936.
12. ERIKSON, ERIK "The Problem of Ego Identity." *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 1956, 4, No. 1, 56-121.
13. SOLOMON, F., WALKER, W. L., O'CONNOR, G. J., FISHMAN, J. R. "Civil Rights Activity and Reduction in Crime Among Negroes." *Archives of General Psychiatry*, (March) 1965, 12, 227-236.
14. TRILLIN, CALVIN "Letter from Berkeley," The New Yorker, March 13, 1965, pp. 52-107.
15. POWLEDGE, FRED "The Student Left: Spurring Reform/The New Student-Left: Movement Represents Serious Activities in Drive for Changes," The New York Times, March 15, 1965, p. 1, Col. 7-p. 26, Cols. 1-8.

The Obedient Rebels: A Study of College Conversions to Conservatism[1]

Lawrence F. Schiff

The rapidly increasing tempo of American college student activism in the past few years has included one little attended to development that sets apart the current period of resurgence from its historical predecessors. The inclusion of conservative students, and a conservative student movement as a dramatically visible part of the contemporary campus scene, marks the first time there has been noticeable activity from that quarter. This, however, does not mean any sudden appearance of student conservatism *per se*. In fact, as Goldsen et al. (9) noted, extreme political and economic conservatism characterizes the dominant political climate on the American campus.

Nevertheless, although conservatively inclined students are in the majority on American college campuses, non-party affiliated political activism has traditionally been a monopoly of the left wing. The prevailing image of the conservative student sees him as deeply satisfied and content with existing social arrangements, a posture that has remained constant during earlier periods of intense right wing and left wing protest.[2] In the current period, in contrast, attempts to organize campus right wing groups and hence create a

[2] There have been other attempts to organize student conservatives. A group called "Students for America" was formed in 1952 and lasted about two years. At its peak it claimed 2,500 members on 160 high school and college campuses. Except for SFA, however, and a variety of short-lived local campus groups, campus organizations for conservatives have been non-political.

population of *conservative activists* have met with a considerable degree of success. Political conservative groups are active on well over one hundred college campuses in all sections of the nation. The major arm of the campus conservative movement, a group known as Young Americans for Freedom, has upwards of 10,000 campus members and an additional large number of students are active in political conservative groups unaffiliated with YAF. These groups have become an integral part of the current national conservative dissent and so, for the first time, a large number of conservative students find themselves actively identified as members of a minority social protest movement.

Conservative politics in America today is, of course, directed toward massive social change. Regardless of which segments of the American Right one focuses on, the view from the Right is of a society engaged in certain tendencies, trends and directions that are pernicious and need to be altered. In its broadest sense the contemporary conservative leadership aims at establishing a new consciousness and conscientiousness in the society, an awareness of what they perceive as "eternal truths" and a commitment to do battle against forces threatening those truths. Coexistent with these broad aims are conservatism's immediate political goals, at the time of the research very much concentrated on the presidential candidacy of Barry Goldwater,[3] but which operate on more localized "direct action" fronts as well. However, even in its political strategy, the conservative movement seeks to establish new mechanisms, partially outside of the traditional two party framework, of which the campus movement is one of the chief instruments. Thus the narrower political and the broader social goals of the conservative movement are inextricable.

A movement aimed at social change will have to first work its changes on the lives of individuals. It is this active interplay of the individual and the movement, of personal experience and contemporary social, political and historical events that is of primary concern here. That is, it is the involvement of college students in the "new" conservative movement, rather than student conservatives or student conservatism as a whole that is primarily at issue. As a new force on the campus scene, it is necessary for the young conservative movement to stimulate interest, activity and especially a sense of commitment and concern among a student population which, while in many ways containing a sizeable amount of sympathy and agreement with its beliefs, has historically been inert insofar as active espousal is concerned. The social adjustment of the conservative student has usually

---

[3] The research reported here was conducted in 1963; the author has no information on the impact of Goldwater's presidential defeat on student participation.

been a rather peaceful affair, marked off by continual progress through highly organized and sanctioned institutional frameworks into the role of citizen-parent. For the politically interested, the youth groups of the national parties provided the latticework for growth. A considerable part of the movement's success will then ultimately lie in its ability to convert previously apolitical, apathetic, inactive and "moderate" conservatives to its new standard of strident and radical conservatism. The present report is directed to an analysis of those young men who were successfully recruited, the converts to the campus conservative movement.[4]

Primary material for the analysis comes from interviews and a variety of paper and pencil instruments administered to forty-seven conservatives on nine college campuses,[5] all but one in the New England region. The sample, while not representative of the movement nationally, provided an adequate cross section of conservative activity on most of the campuses visited, and, while small in number, it ranged over a considerable amount of demographic and political response variety. Geographically it included students from every region in the country; academically, from drop-outs to Rhodes scholars; economically, parents' incomes ranged from $5,000 to upwards of $75,000; politically, from moderate Republicans through John Birch enthusiasts to unreconstructed royalists; in religion, from avowed atheism to extreme orthodoxy. The diversity so represented (probably due to the diversity among and within the colleges visited), while making generalizations more difficult, gives the sample more significance than if it had been more homogeneous. Further, none of the campuses included presented an overwhelmingly clear conservative environment, thus bringing to the fore the participants' own selective processes and thereby permitting more extensive analysis of the social psychological dynamics involved in the adoption of the conservative activist identity.

Our subject matter broadly speaking is the relation between youth and conservatism, the relationships that hold between the age-specific energies, conflicts and tasks associated with adolescence and the development of an affinity to conservative activism as a particular political orientation. What is it that happens during a

---

[4] For information on the movement itself, see Cain (4), Evans (7) and Forster and Epstein (8). Extensive analysis of the sociopsychological forces behind the general right wing movement will be found in the collection of essays edited by Daniel Bell (3). See especially the papers by Bell, Richard Hofstader, Peter Vierick, Talcott Parsons and Seymour Lipset.

[5] Responses to the paper and pencil instruments were also obtained from ten students active in left-wing groups. The major instrument used was a 160 item adaptation of a personality inventory developed by Arthur Couch (5). See Schiff (11) for a complete report of the instruments and interview schedule.

person's adolescence that would lead him to take on a conservative-activist political identity and what is it in the conservative-activist political identity that appeals to adolescents? Thus it is those respondents whose affiliation with the movement implied some dynamic reorganization of the adolescent or late-adolescent self, the converts, who are the central concern of the present analysis.

Among the subjects in the sample, about one-third could not be considered to be converts to the movement.[6] These are the young men for whom affiliation was simply based on a traditional or continuous pattern of social adaptation, whose *political beliefs* have continued more or less unchanged and are identical with the beliefs of parents and of the community of orientation, and whose *political involvement* is of equally long standing, originating in an environment fostered interest in politics and developing within given institutional settings (e.g., high-school debating and Young Republican clubs) into personal political involvement. The motives for affiliation of these individuals are irrelevant for the understanding of the dynamics of the "new conservatism," for there is nothing new about their new behavior; their's is simply an adjustment to a new situation (the presence or availability of a campus conservative group) employing patterns of behavior long in existence.

For most of the young men in the sample, however, participation in a conservative activist group represented a discontinuity with previous social adaptations sufficient to suggest some direct connection between the potentially new appeals of the campus conservative movement and the underlying developmental needs of the new recruits. The political development of these converts involved one or more of the following characteristics:

a. a sudden, discontinuous political involvement or interest that brings the individual's latent conservatism out into an activistic orientation;
b. a definite movement to the political right in the person's attitudinal or ideological stance; or
c. a "self-initiated" development of a conservative political orientation, one that occurs outside the context of the nuclear family.

Among these converts, about two-thirds of the sample, there was, of course, considerable variation—in the dynamics of their conversions, in their political orientations and political behavior and in their social and psychological orientations in general. Any attempts

---

[6] Such a statistic does not necessarily reflect on the actual proportion of converts and non-converts. Probably the percentage of converts in the whole movement is smaller.

at thoroughly analyzing the complete range of the phenomenon in
the present paper could only lead to an unsatisfactory superficiality.
The following discussion is, therefore, limited to a single type of
conservative convert, a type that includes those among the convert-
ing subjects who most approximate "core" participants in the move-
ment. These converts, by and large, showed the greatest affinity to
the movement; they were the most involved in it and found its gen-
eral outlook, program and spirit most congenial.

The discussion is primarily oriented around the dynamics of
the core participant's conversion experience, its structure, etiology
and consequences. These conversions provided an illuminating entree
into understanding the personal meaning of participation and, further,
while far from a perfect correspondence, those converting subjects
who tended to be most committed to the movement (or the local
campus variation of the movement) and those whose relationship to
the movement's outlook and program tended to be most regular (or
orthodox) also tended to convert to conservative activism under
somewhat similar or equivalent circumstances and in a somewhat
similar manner. The characteristic features of this dominant con-
version pattern will thus be analyzed in detail as a clue to understand-
ing the inner dynamics of campus conservative activism.

Conservative Conversions and the
Experience of Totalism

Adolescence, particularly in its later stages (when this "typical"
conversion tended to take place), is, of course, a period of significant
personal change, and to work a change on (or in) oneself in ado-
lescence is not unusual. Indeed William James (10, p. 199) spoke
of conversion as "in its essence a normal adolescent phenomenon,
incidental to the passage from the child's small universe to the
wider intellectual and spiritual life of maturity." And to Erik Erik-
son, the central task of adolescence, the achievement of a viable and
secure ego-identity, calls for a change akin to conversion in its
search for a "new and yet a reliable identity."

Adolescent conversions can thus come about in benign fashion.
According to James, the "once-born" (the "naturally" healthy and
harmonious individual) is converted through "suggestion and imita-
tion" without a disturbance of his inner tranquility. The idea of
harmoniousness remains central in Erikson's thinking. In the success-
ful quest of ego-identity, a sense of "essential wholeness" will be pre-
served, an adaptation which requires that

> the young person must feel a progressive continuity between that which
> he has come to be during the long years of childhood and that which he
> promises to become in the anticipated future; between that which he

perceives himself to be and that which he perceives others to see in him and expect of him. (6, p. 168)

But such, particularly in our times, does not always come easily, and

when the human being, because of accidental or developmental shifts, loses an essential wholeness, he restructures himself and the world by taking recourse to what we may call totalism . Where the (process of) self-definition, for personal or collective reasons, becomes too difficult, a sense of Role-Diffusion results, the youth counter-points rather than synthesizes his sexual, ethnic, occupation and typological alternatives and is often driven to decide definitely and totally for one side or the other. (6, p. 168)

Striking signs of such rigid counterpointing and totalistic commitment typified the core convert's transformation into a conservative activist. Significantly, these conversions tended to take place at a time of crucial role transition during the period between secondary school graduation and the beginning of the second year in college. Such a period accentuates the need to adapt to a new personal environment and to begin to incorporate (or refuse to begin to incorporate) adult role self-images, while simultaneously making irreversible moves out of the immediate parental orbit, physically and emotionally.

With the transitionary background setting the stage, the conservative conversion was characteristically triggered off by the convert's "shocking" discoveries about his newly widening universe. Often these discoveries were directly tinged with a primitive and totalistic morality.

Herron's conversion took place while he was stationed abroad in the Navy. Disturbed by the "slothfulness" and "self-indulgent habits" of the local citizenry, he had a sudden realization of "the consequences of not subscribing to a strict moral code."

Manning reacted to his college's total climate. He found himself "appalled and amazed" about some of the college newspaper editorials, particularly one espousing the "hard-core liberal" idea that Castro had brought social justice to Cuba. He was "awfully amazed and incredulous —I really didn't understand the mental processes there." He was, at the same time, also "disappointed" with the college's moral climate: "I came to college and I find so many people whom I consider to be upper-crust people . . . who, to my sense of feeling anyway, behave in a manner which is *very* unsuitable for what I think they should be doing. It bothers me a little bit to see so many people who should be virtuous and decent cheating on tests and fornicating all over the place, you know, various things which are generally considered immoral."

Robard, coming East to college, found himself "in kind of a flux" and

"distressed . . . shocked (and) disillusioned" with his new peers. He recalls hearing a conservative professor hissed and booed when he was talking about patriotism, the communist Gus Hall "fervently" applauded by undergraduates and Eisenhower "disintegrated" and "split all over" by the faculty. These things "made an indelible imprint on my mind," they "started me thinking about what were the values of this generation, this group of kids I was associated with. It really surprised me . . . . I couldn't believe it, it was incomprehensible to me."

Barton, a small-town mid-westerner, traces his conversison to his "exposure" to the "undesirable types" he saw in a poor section of the city bordering on his college.

In other situations, the "shock" was more narrowly political, though no less total in its impact.

Rango had been an avowed Democrat and Kennedy supporter in the 1960 campaign. Always a "strong anti-communist," he went at the suggestion of a priest to view the right wing film "Operation Abolition." "I was very shocked and disgusted with the whole thing. I realized that many of the people who I thought were on my side were trying to knock down this film. There the seed of doubt was put into my mind as to whether I could really belong to this element."

Rosa's conservative views "began to build partially out of resentment against my (college) teachers because I felt they were pushing so much stuff down my throat—I got it in every class. There wasn't one teacher I could find that had views any different."

Dorsey recalled all the "liberal indoctrination" he received during his first year at college. "I was shocked, I think, to hear some of the things I did hear."

In each of these cases the individual's relevant personal environment had taken on a new and sinister quality, one which seemed to threaten or challenge some essential and valued component of the self. The crystallization of this challenge into political terms, while sometimes partially fortuitous, was strengthened by the availability of a liberal stereotype capable of absorbing a complex variety of negative attributes.

As Wayne, a sudden convert to political activism, saw them, "rabid liberals" were "characters (who) seemed to be against any idea of God, against any sort of traditional value. They seem to reject any of the traditional concepts of America . . . . Whenever you bring up any tradition, or sort of accepted way of life, like, you know, patriotism, raising a flag, going to church or anything like that, they seem to reject it completely. I often have the impression that they just lead kind of a bare life, that they all seem to be looking for something that isn't there. (While) the members of YAF as far as I can see just seem to be a bunch of, you know, ordinary college students. Very nice kids and nothing

unusual about any of them, nothing to mark them out from the rest of the crowd, like a beard. They just seem to be normal American kids."

For many, the transition from one setting to another itself produced a sense of loss of some stabilizing anchorage preserving an old equilibrium; environs that had been familiar and safe were now unfamiliar and unsafe. Often the move took place through physical and cultural space, though even the simple change of status to that of college student can have a dramatic, even licentious impact:

Manning's parents "were pretty strict with me and didn't give me much freedom . . . . As a senior in high school I was told what my curfew was, while other kids could stay out all night." But immediately upon entering college, his situation changed radically. "They're really funny in that respect. They seemed to have chosen an age (after which) just like that I'm free. As soon as I went to college—no transition at all, just the space of a month—in that space in their eyes I grew from a child into an adult."

With the disappearance of externally imposed social controls, many of these young men seemed to perceive themselves as threatened with becoming something very different from what they were or subconsciously felt they ought to be, a loss of an "essential wholeness" that precipitated a totalistic restructuring. The conversion, which began with the perceptual accentuation of malevolent elements in the environment, was then characteristically brought rapidly to a final and definitive conclusion.

In some cases latent identity components were available to accomplish the redefining process.

Thus Herron, for example, was able to "activate (my) established views" on politics and morality with the resulting conclusions revealing a "correspondence between what I found out on my own and my family's views."

And Barton was able to agree with the previously rejected views of his parents that the idea of "community" demanded "some exclusion."

For others the conversion involved a short period of intensive self-indoctrination (rarely mediated by any close interpersonal contacts) from which the individual emerged with a self-identifiable and settled sense of identity.

Rosa, for whom "the views were always there in me," nevertheless "sought elsewhere for the sake of finding another view (from that of his teachers). I found it in the *Conscience of a Conservative* which I thought was a great book and still do, because it covers such a wide range of *basic* issues, *gut* issues in the great battle of ideologies in the twentieth century. I read it and reread it and reread it and reread it.

It was a real bible to me . . . . Just about everything that Goldwater put forth in that book I would firmly agree with."

The conversion often took place with dramatic speed and results:

Finestock, an upper-middle class Jew, had flunked out of college after two years and had spent a year working. At the time "I had no interest in anything, including politics. . . . In the meantime, this may sound silly, I got ahold of *Conscience of a Conservative* and it just seemed to appeal to me . . . everything that Goldwater said seemed to have fitted in. So after I read this book I started reading Edmund Burke, Locke, and then I realized I should go back to school . . . . I never knew (before) what to call myself."

In Dorsey's freshman year YAF was founded. "I looked it over at the time and decided I wasn't conservative enough, I would not join it . . . . After reading several issues (of *National Review*) over a period of time, over the months, my views shifted and so by Spring and into the Summer at the end of my freshman year I'd become quite solidly a conservative. And during the Summer I read a lot of political things, as much as I could . . . . When I came back . . . I joined the Young Americans for Freedom."

Rango, after viewing the film "Operation Abolition," immediately contacted a member of the John Birch Society, started reading its literature and "realized I couldn't remain the way I was." After a summer of reading, it became "a very clear thing that if students, especially (Catholic) students don't begin working with the same zeal as the Communists, there's not going to be any Western civilization left as far as I can see."

The thrust of these conversions was generally to settle issues by settling on a newly found cloak of identity, to push away any lingering or uncomfortable uncertainty by achieving what might be called "identity foreclosure." In attempting to reconstruct the state of mind that prevailed at the time of these late adolescent conversions, it seems as if the most clearly felt need was to restore (or construct) as rapidly as possible a feeling of clarity and certainty about the self and its position in the new social environment. As Finestock put it, "I never knew what to call myself." Now they knew, and for most, knowing was in itself sufficient. The conservative system was seized upon totally—the response was not to this or that substantive feature of it; nor, as in the case of other types of conversions, was it a response to real or imaginative heroic and exciting individuals. Rather, the conversion seemed directed toward two immediate ends, to disconfirm what one was not (or should not be), i.e., the amoral, deviant liberal, and to confirm a desirable image of the self. In the pursuit of these ends, conservatism was taken up macroscopically, its inner content often less relevant than its outward appearance.

Background of the Conservative Conversions

While the background of these converts varied widely, some common elements are discernible which make the intensity and function of the reaction more comprehensible. The general pattern was composed of two elements, a common configuration in regard to family structure and familial experience and certain shared elements of character structure that shaped the converts' reaction to their personal backgrounds.

In examining the familial backgrounds of the totalistic converts, one is immediately impressed with the striking degree to which American families retain a capacity to generate intensive achievement and characterological demands on their children. In virtually all cases, the early experience of these young men was dominated by a parent (sometimes both parents) with extremely well delineated and ambitious expectations of their children, with the heaviest burden falling on our subjects who were, with but one exception, the eldest or only sons in their families.

Herron's father, a highly successful independent lawyer, early and ardently began to infuse his young son with the spirit of his "adherence to strict moral standards," keeping him isolated from his contemporaries in the process of inculcating high standards of achievement, character and excellence.

Rosa's immigrant parents managed, within a remarkably short time to attain complete economic and stylistic mobility into middle-class standards. Through hard work and "frugality," his father's butcher shop provided his family with a lovely home in an upper-middle class suburban community. The parents joined and were active in a variety of community social organizations and transferred their political allegiance from support of Roosevelt to "ardent" Republicans and "Truman-haters."

Finestock's immigrant father received a primary school education here and then in true Horatio Alger fashion, rose out of this background to put together a fabulously successful business. He intended that his son would actualize his success, starting him off on this path by sending him to a predominantly Protestant, highly ranked prep school.

Dorsey's childhood was dominated by the orthodox religiousity and stern morality of a father with a highly prestigeful/low income occupation. The father sought to perpetuate the symbolic perquisites of his status through the elite schooling of his son.

Manning first felt the weight of his parents' expectations while in the first grade, "when my teacher told my mother that I might be left back. My mother said she wasn't going to have anything like that, so she and my father sat down to teach me to read . . . . My father was ready to slug me (and) after the first few months of screaming 'I can't do it,'

I had it impressed on me that I could." His parents "pushed me pretty hard in school . . . . Mother was always pretty proud of how far back college degrees go in her family. They had been the upper-crusts—not in money or being aristocrats—but in knowledge and virtue and education back for I don't know how many generations . . . . She was quite concerned that I not let down the family line . . . . I think my mother had the attitude that if you're going to be a scholar you have to sit in the garret and read. She told me, 'forget all those frivolous things, they'll come after you get your education.'"

Against enormous pressure to measure up to parental demands and expectations, the converts, each in his own way but always covertly and at times involuntarily, found themselves veering away from the parental blueprint. Unsuccessful at completely conforming to these expectations and unwilling to openly defy them, the converts arrived at the point of conversion bearing, to varying degrees, the weight of unacknowledged intergenerational conflict.

For Herron, dissonance was introduced early. Chafing under the isolation and low impulse gratification of his father's tutelage, he began to channel his energies into activities only marginally related to the development of intellect or character. Faced with a choice between going to a private preparatory school (his father's preference) or continuing in the local school where his newly developing interests could be furthered, he chose the latter and by implication thereby began to repudiate the social role his father had selected for him.

His activities in high school were sufficiently "aristocratic," however, to preserve the trappings of his social position, and he had intended to continue this temporizing rebellion through his selection of a "playboy's" college. Throughout his adolescence he managed to balance off his resentment against his father by avoiding overt disobedience, always by maintaining the form but not the substance of his father's preachments.

The rebellion collapsed, however, before he got to college. Because of complicated external circumstances, he found it necessary to enlist in the Navy for a standard tour of duty and without a commission. He thus suddenly found himself, lacking rank, college education and reputation, without any social prestige. It was precisely at this point that he became interested in politics and "discovered" the "correspondence" between his views and those of his father. The implicit personological shift implied was further realized in the changing of his earlier college plans and his choice instead of an intellectually elite college.

The central themes of Herron's story are found over and over again in the life situation of other converts. Sometimes the conflict between the parental plan and the youthful inclinations was introduced less voluntarily.

Rosa and Finestock were both eager participants in their parents' climb

to the top of the middle. Finestock, for instance, enjoyed his Protestant prep school tremendously, strongly disagreeing with other Jewish students there who were disturbed by latent and overt anti-semitism. But both young men collapsed in their attempt to actualize their parents' plans. Finestock's father had "pulled strings" to get him into a first-rate college, but after two unhappy years there he flunked out. Rosa's parents also stressed education as the means by which their son would continue their own upward mobility. However, by the end of his high school years, Rosa's lack of academic accomplishment was apparent and while other students from his fine suburban high school were going to the better schools throughout the nation, Rosa had to settle for the school of general studies in a second rate urban institution. It was in the immediate context of the manifestation of their academic failures that both young men discovered and enthusiastically embraced conservative activism.

Dorsey's experience further illuminates the relation of the conversion to the parental relationship.

In his five year stay at prep school, he felt stultified by the "monastic" setting, unable to get along with the "New England preppie types" and was consistently unhappy. He began to crack the mold when, after a particularly unpleasant summer experience, he returned to his last year of school and decided against following in the footsteps of his father's career. This decision was not made without unarticulated misgivings. "It was no great revolution against (it) or anything like that. You might say that that now is my second choice.

Nevertheless, the decision presaged a more generalized feeling of emancipation experienced by Dorsey when he entered college. Capitalizing on the heady sense of freedom he now felt, he threw himself into college power politics. Operating under the lingering realization that his politicking displeased his parents, Dorsey's conversion, by implicitly corresponding with certain parentally induced themes (religiosity and status aspiration) served at least in part to mitigate the appearance of disobedience.

As these cases illustrate, the turn to conservatism often played a crucial role in resolving the dissonance between the child and his parents. The pattern of such crisis resolutions differed from case to case, but generally resembled one of "obedient rebellion," a repudiation of repudiation that either served to disguise any overt intergenerational rebellion or transform it. This configuration of two seemingly discordant tendencies, obedience and rebellion, is more intricate than it may at first appear. For one thing we cannot assume that the dissonance introduced into the parent-child relationship was accidental or unintentional in the broadest sense of that word which includes unconscious intentions. Psychodynamically, there was within these subjects a rebellious or hostile tendency, one that led adequately bright young men like Rosa or Finestock to function poorly academically.

Clinically we know that such abrasive encounters do not in any real sense dissolve, but we also know that there is usually no simplified one-for-one displacement of conflicts from one level to another.

In the simplest sense the conversion betokened a fairly straight-forward displacement wherein obedience to parents was enhanced through rebellion against potentially disobedient youthful inclinations projected out into the peer or nonparental social environment. Rosa's conversion of his college faculty into a "negative reference group" is a clear example of the political conversion's use as a defensive mecha-nism to accomplish the ends of continued parental obedience (while still keeping the rebellious inclinations alive).

> Manning provides a somewhat convoluted example of the same processes. Though overtly critical of both his parents, his resentment is strongest against his mother. Since entering college he has, while remaining verbally critical, moved much closer to his father, taking an interest in and participating with his father in the latter's active hobbies. His con-servatism, which he traces to parental and particularly paternal influences, would seem at least in part to be serving the same ends as the other behavior, i.e., moving himself back into his father's good graces.
>
> At the same time it allowed him to bring out a long suppressed expressive-activist mode while continuing to feel obedient. That the latter need was still operative and important was revealed at one point in the interview when, in a plaintive aside as he was criticizing his mother, he said, "I'm not going to let down the family tradition."

The desire to appear as the dutiful son is extremely pronounced in many of the young conservatives. More than half of the college-age converts with siblings (and two of the more deeply involved non-converting conservative activists) appeared in this role in their families. Some of the siblings in question actively defied their parents, adopting religious, political or career lines that directly conflicted with parental wishes. Other siblings were chronic failures or playboy, disobedient types. In every instance where there was sharp contrast or complementarity between siblings, the totalistic convert emerged as the "good boy."

Disobedient inclinations are often most effectively disguised (from both the actor and his targets) by over-obedience. Sometimes this is carried out by a kind of hair-splitting in which any repudiational implication that becoming a conservative activist might imply (as, for example, when the individual appears to be becoming more com-pletely assimilated than his parents) is maneuvered by the individual, sometimes genuinely and sometimes through rationalization, so as to have it appear as a highly sanctioned *extension* of parental precepts. Thus Rango assuaged any ill effects of his "being more accepted in the community" than his first-generation parents by an espousal of a narrow and rigid orthodox Catholicism that exceeded the religiosity

of his parents (who did not want him to go to a parochial high school). By over-obeying on one end, he was thereby freed to move away from his parents on another.

On another level, the obedience and rebellion are fused to an even greater degree. The adoption of a "conservative" political position serves to so thoroughly align the child with the implicit and explicit values of his parents, even to the degree represented by Dorsey and others where the conservatism is almost a caricature of the parents' status-seeking propensities, that the young person is able to use the political identity as a wrap within which he is able to carry on some marginal hell-raising that otherwise might have been subject to disapprobation. The result has the flavor of Herron's adolescent obedience to the form but not the substance of his father's preachments. It seems to be true that whenever the political behavior of the young conservatives displays cantankerous tendencies, it is firmly shored up by a high degree of parent-child correspondence in the realm of moral values, or ironically, with a feeling that parents had not been strict enough, one of the few "complaints" raised by the conservatives against their parents' way of bringing them up.

The Choice of Convervatism

The choice of any particular ideological system and social behavioral orientation emerges out of extremely complex and multiple causes. Given the relatively severe late adolescent crises of the present group, their choice of conservative activism as (part of) a way out of the storm can only receive a series of partial explanations, any one of which (and even all of which taken together) can only make the choice plausible and perhaps probable, but certainly not necessary.

We start with the observed fact that the new conservative program satisfied the needs and was in harmony with the personal characteristics of this group of late-adolescent converts. Drawing on the interviews with them and on "outside" a priori interpretations of that program, we can present an admittedly circular and post-dictive analysis of the bases of the "connections" between person and ideology. It is our feeling, however, that, in contrast with other conversions, the obedient rebellions had a more necessary connection to the essence of conservatism, i.e., that they are, to a large degree, "natural" conservatives for whom no other ideological orientation could nearly so well have served.

The most striking of what we will call the appeals of the conservative package (its "demand" character, those characteristics of conservatism that made it attractive) is its *high symbolic prestige value*. Conservatives today present their position as the "true American" one, as the incarnation of genuine, traditional American values.

Further, all segments of the American community generally identify conservatism with the well-born and highly placed in our society.

In coping with the self-definitional difficulties that for one reason or another were of particular concern to them, the obedient rebels' readjustments were invariably directed either toward the American "core" or to status slots consensually defined attractive because of their "highness" in the social structure. In other words, the direction of these converts is inward and upward and involves a total acceptance of the American mainstream's evaluation of "the good."

Thus:

Herron's conversion served to recapture in his own mind and probably in the image of the self projected to his colleagues, his prestigeful status, which had disappeared from view when he entered the Navy without benefit of any of the ascriptive symbols of his former station in life.

Rosa's conversion served directly and indirectly to maintain the upwardly mobile and assimilationist movement so aggressively begun by his parents.

Finestock's conversion corresponded with his previous experience at a predominantly Protestant prep school where he, in contrast to most of his Jewish classmates, felt and wanted acceptance.

Rango's conversion served similarly "inwardly mobile" aims, but in a more complex way, by enabling him to over-lay his hard-core orthodox Catholicism with a virulent nationalism and permitting the adoption of an economic philosophy amenable to the "third generation," one that contrasts with "the appeal of money and paternalism to immigrant groups" and "goes with being accepted in the community."

Barton's conversion returned him to the cultural *zeitgeist* of his small, mid-western hometown, where there existed a real "sense of community" thanks to its having "very few poor, foreign or non-white people."

Nile's conversion allowed him, to use his own words, to be one of those "conservatives who come from lower income backgrounds and identify with the 'higher orders.'"

Hudson's conversion allowed him to fully identify with the proud and prestigeful family tradition of his mother's side, as embodied in the person of his still living grandfather, a college-educated and highly successful businessman who is also an extreme and active conservative. This identity element contrasted sharply with that provided by his step-father, a poorly educated proletarian.

Behind these status seeking propensities lies, of course, the obedient rebels' psychological acceptance of their parents' values and frames of reference as their own. This obedience characteristic suggests another of the sociopsychological bases of attraction to the new conservatism. Through *its espousal of deference to legitimate author-*

ity and the sanctity of traditional morality, the new conservatism presents a stimulus totally congruent with deep-rooted psychological inclinations of its adherents. Above and beyond the ideological agreement involved, it is able to justify, in an otherwise youthfully attractive package, a parental obedience streak that is somewhat out of place in our contemporary peer-oriented culture. The trait of obedience is probably strongly present in large "pockets" of our society; the New Conservatism would seem to be eminently capable of offering a service for those in whom the trait is especially deeply ingrained and for those in whom the trait is strong while simultaneously being a subject of intra-psychic conflict (the converts being the latter).

The most striking difference that emerged from the administration of personality scales to a group of ten liberals along with the conservatives was that between the groups' scores on an Authoritarian Conformity scale. This scale was designed to assess an orientation to the demands of the social environment as revealed in the *mode* of conformity (authoritarian v. non-authoritarian) adopted by the individual. In contrast to the significant difference between the groups on this dimension, a short scale designed by Allport (2) to indirectly tap prejudice (through the scale items, perception of "the world as a jungle"), along with two of the original F scale items (1) failed completely to differentiate the groups. These data tend to support our feeling derived from the interviews:

that *conventionality is* and *ethnocentrism is not* a salient distinguishing characteristic of the young conservatives;

that the political judgments and perceptions of the young conservatives are based on *social identification factors* but *not ethnic prejudice*;

that the young conservatives' view of social desirability is essentially *open*, i.e., that *anyone can be a member* of the club of good Americans if they are willing to accept the membership requirements; and

that the impelling thrust involved here is the individuals' own sense of marginality or confusion about "belonging," not necessarily the need to exclude others.

As a concomitant of their parental deference tendencies, the young conservatives often find themselves out of step with the prestigeful persons and values on their campuses. (This varies widely from school to school but is somewhat true throughout, as is implicitly conceded in the conservative contention that the "liberal establishment" is everywhere in control.) Here perhaps is the most singularly new contribution of the new conservatism, its presentation of *an intellectual apparatus* with which young collegiates may identify without finding it necessary to change what they feel they "instinctively" are.

The personnel (epitomized by Ivy-League educated and scholarly-sounding William Buckley) and wide ranging publications of the movement (particularly Buckley's *National Review*) have provided a means by and through which the young conservatives can come out in the open on the campus and, more significantly, the embrace of the conservative ideology can come out in the open from within the individual.

There is, of course, a wide range in the degree to which the intellectual rationale is taken seriously. At one extreme was Manning, a voracious reader in general and currently deeply involved in conservative writings. At the other is a remark overheard by the author as he left a particularly obscure and convoluted "academic" speech by Buckley: "I didn't understand a word he said, but I'm glad he's on our side." Between these extremes, and most characteristic of the preponderance of young conservatives (especially of the participants on Eastern campuses), was a low-level attempt to keep this identity element ("young intellectual") accessible, yet secondary.

Another element of appeal in the conservative program brought out by the obedient rebellion conversions is the program's ideological emphasis on *risk-taking* and *romanticization of achievement-oriented* behavior. These young men, though accepting these traditional values as right and proper, are for the most part unwilling or unable to act on them in shaping their own futures. In contrast, their career-plans emerge out of and are eminently compatible with the low-risk, high-security atmosphere that actually prevails for contemporary American college educated youths. This "split" was visible in the frequent references made by the young conservatives to the nobility of risk-taking and profit-seeking behavior, which references were accompanied by personal disclaimers of materialism.

Seen in this light, the conservative program becomes a convenient arena for "acting on" these values in a displaced sense, for example, substituting national risk-taking behavior for unacceptable personal risk-taking. On occasion the entrepreneurial dream edged close to the young conservatives' aspirations in the attenuated form of a political career. But even here, heroic individual accomplishment and ambition were hedged behind the safety of a successful law practice. Security and solvency came first.

The conservative program, by its *intellectual simplicity*, by its *closed and deductive format*, by its *pessimistic outlook* on human perfectibility and by its self-consciously *hard-line* posture was also able to provide comforting assurance for the many among the late adolescent converts whose self-esteem had been transitorily disturbed, those for whom "identity foreclosure" rather than genuine personal change was the way out of a developmental crisis. The precious and difficult

balancing of tentative possibilities during youth's optional psycho-
social moratorium, a necessary step in achieving a genuine change of
the self, requires a characterological capacity to tolerate anxiety and
ambiguity.

By providing a way out of this period, the new conservatism
reveals another of its functions. In a subtle way it legitimates and
hardens a sense of resignation; and, by allowing the growth tendencies
of youth to find other outlets, albeit more sober, "realistic" ones, it
institutionalizes a compromising attitude toward human possibility
that is congruent with the experience of some young people.

The opposite of tolerating anxiety was found to be the second
conservative personality trait that emerged as significantly different
from the small group of left-wingers also given the personality scales.
The conservative group was heavily oriented to the "ego control" end
of an Ego Control v. Manifest Anxiety scale. Since the theoretical
assumption underlying the scales was that the "amount" of anxiety
was not differentially distributed according to outcome on this nuclear
issue; and since the conservatives were also found to be significantly
higher on the Repression scale (the third and last statistically signifi-
cant difference between the groups); and, finally, since, as we have
seen, the young conservatives were involved in their fair share of
anxiety-producing (and revealing) situations, it would seem probable
that the exercising of a tight control over personal anxiety is both a
very strong psychodynamic tendency of the group and one that would
reveal itself in social behavior.

When we pause to examine the nature of the contemporary
political world waiting to be apperceived by politically conscious
young men, the young conservatives' pattern becomes even more
comprehensible. Consider the bombardment of negative stimuli that
nowadays confronts our well-advantaged youth: Americans are, to
most of the world, the fattest, most affluent, self-indulgent people;
Americans are the perpetrators of that most heinous of crimes, atomic
aggression; white Americans are the systematic exploiters of their
black brothers; that most prized American value, making money by
making things work, is now regarded with disdain.

Consider these messages and the fact that every socially aware
young person is exposed unceasingly to them. Some self-preservative
means must be found of coping with these in the course of the young
person's development of an ideology. Our young conservatives, be-
cause of their own peculiar inner-dynamics and character structures,
could do naught but repudiate these collective assaults on their
persons.

In doing so, they consciously become "hard" (the oft-repeated,
"I go along with the hard line foreign policy") and pessimistically

"realistic" (frequently addressing themselves against the liberals' so-called utopianism and naive optimism), and wind up justifying hardness as a valued element of the self—for some at least, this self-denying twist is the only recourse. (We would hazard a guess that young men on the left today have, to a great degree, coped with the "negative stimuli" in a quite different manner, by internalizing it and carrying the guilt within.)

Looked at another way, the need to defend against anxiety involves a need to maintain a high level of self-esteem. Taken together with the heavy emphasis on definitions of the self compatible with those formed in childhood, this would result in a tendency toward preserving a rather narrow concept of the self and of what other social symbols are made a part of the self-system. In this respect the conservative program's *ideological legitimation of self-interest* as a basis for political evaluations and judgments (as in its espousal of national self-interest over concern for the whole of mankind and of the need to maintain [middle-class, white] "individual" freedoms and traditions over the need [of lower class and non-white groups] to achieve equality of access and opportunity) is a powerful buttress to the personal inclinations of the program's adherents.

Observers have often puzzled over the seeming anachronism of the prejudiced person who is at the same time unqualifiedly warm and friendly to those who come within his orbit, the phenomenon of white "southern hospitality" epitomizing this situation. Though our young conservatives are, for the most part, not consciously prejudiced (some are actively anti-prejudicial), the mechanisms by which they arrive at their moderately xenophobic positions probably enters into the non-expressisve component involved in all prejudice.

Our material would suggest, first, that the young conservatives are not lower in "empathy" than non-conservatives (though this proposition was not tested directly, the virtually identical scores of both groups on the emotionality and aggressivity scales point in this direction, as does also the general openness and cordiality that we encountered in the interviews), second, that they are no more hostile, or, indeed, power-oriented in their social perceptions (although some individual scale items give some support to the last possibility), but that their chief contrast with equivalently middle-class left-wing thinkers is their more parochial, narrower, self-oriented frames of reference in determining what and with whom they will identify.

Of course, most young conservatives sincerely do not see their political positions as motivated by self-interest (many counterposed their concern for "what was good for the nation," against "materialistic" liberal groups who were concerned only with their own good). That the "national" interest happens to coincide, sometimes indirectly,

with their own middle-class positions was lost to many of them. What is true, of course, is that all political ideologies conform to an individual's self-interest; what varies is how the self is defined, and the young conservatives' definition of self proceeds from the various psychological and social traits and forces that we have been discussing.

We have left to the end the new conservatism's function as a vehicle for the *displacement of otherwise inexpressable hostility*. This demand quality is really in evidence in all political programs, particularly those with an extreme and totalistic ideology. As we have seen, this "function" of the ideology appears to be neither more nor less important for the right wing than for the left wing systems, and of varying significance to different individuals within either group. There is, however, some evidence (from the personality scales and from the interview impressions) that the "need" to express aggression as a general trait or the need to displace any internal aggressive impulses onto socially approved objects is more characteristic of the right wing converts than of the group of conservatives whose political orientation has evolved toward the center. (This centrist: extremist relationship could hold equally well for the left.) What evidence there is to suggest this comes mainly from the observation that centrist-evolvers as opposed to rightist converts tend to present more emotionally open, warm personalities and seem to be more involved in "positive affective" and non-goal oriented relationships with peers.

Concluding Remarks

In the new conservative program, the late-adolescent converts appear to have come upon an ideology that fits exceptionally well with their character structures, backgrounds and developmental conflicts. On the basis of the multiple points of coincidence between personalities and personal experiences on the one hand and the substance and format of the ideology on the other, it would seem a certainty that no other modern political ideology could have been as harmoniously adopted by the late adolescent converts in our sample. However, any ideology that was capable of exercising a wide-spread appeal to young men like those we have been discussing, would have to have been very much in and of this world, since the obedient rebels have basically secular outlooks. This would pretty much rule out the possibility that religious ideologies could be as fundamentally satisfying as political conservatism, though there is an overlap. Purely technocratic (non-ideological) ideology was, for the reasons enumerated above, not fully adequate to carry these young men into adulthood, though, again, they do not in fact reject technocracy as a guide to conduct.

In this report attention has been limited to a particular type of participant in the campus conservative movement. While most typical of the core member in the present sample, a reminder is warranted about the sample's limited range. It is quite possible, even probable, that its limitation solely to New England colleges has led to an overemphasis on the importance of conventionalizing and self-restricting traits and tendencies and deemphasis on the activist/expressive side of the conservative posture. Further, in spite of the highlighting of totalism in the original conversion, it should be clear that the young men reported on here are not of a totalitarian bent, that in fact they have, for the most part, a well-internalized orientation to democratic modes of thinking and acting. This was, to be sure, not true of all the young conservatives encountered in the investigation. The extremist zealot, the rascist and the anti-democratic reactionary did turn up in the course of the inquiry, but what is most significant here is that these types were neither attracted to the underlying spirit of the campus conservative movement nor were they particularly welcome or influential in the conservative groups on their campuses. The same tendency is, however, equally true of the small number of truly creative and innovative young conservatives. By and large this side of youthful conservatism, which usually is manifested in a rampant individualism and a surprisingly high degree of psychological-mindedness, also was unsympathetic with the campus movement and largely unrecognized by it.[7]

The emphasis placed on the conventionally minded obedient rebel corresponds with the weakness of autonomous overt political action demonstrated both by the most active campus groups in the sample and by the participants at a national YAF convention attended by the author. Keynoting the style of the movement "in action" was a passive, though frequently enthusiastic, obedience to duly constituted leaders, strict hierarchical social organization and a general dependence on adult figures to provide both programs and direction. Self-initiated activity was rare and active participation in any setting by the "rank and file" was even rarer. One is reminded in this respect of the strange ambivalences of the movement's leading hero, Barry Goldwater. Goldwater's reluctance to take the initiative in the national conservative movement, his apparently genuine disavowals of personal ambition, his self-defeating political strategies—all speak to a largely unrecognized proclivity toward posturing rather than program that constitutes one important quality of the complex current conservative impulse in America.

---

[7] For a detailed discussion of these "minor" characters in the movement, see Schiff (9, chap. 4).

REFERENCES

1. ADORNO, T. W. et al., *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York: Harper, 1950.

2. ALLPORT, G. W., "Inquiry concerning social and religious views," Unpublished questionnaire, Harvard University, 1963.

3. BELL, D., (Ed.) *The Radical Right*. Garden City: Doubleday, 1963.

4. CAIN, E., *They'd Rather Be Right: Youth and the Conservative Movement*. New York: Macmillan, 1963.

5. COUCH, A., "Personality Determinants of Interpersonal Behavior," Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Harvard University, 1960.

6. ERIKSON, E. H., "Wholeness and Totality:" in *Totalitarianism* (Friedrich, C. J., Ed.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953.

7. EVANS, M. S., *Revolt on the Campus*. Chicago: Regnery, 1961.

8. FORSTER, A. AND B. R. EPSTEIN, *Danger on the Right*. Random House: New York, 1964.

9. GOLDSEN, R. K., et al., *What College Students Think*. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1960.

10. JAMES, W., *Varieties of Religious Experience*. New York: Longmans, Green, 1902.

11. SCHIFF, L. F., "The Conservative Movement on American College Campuses," Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Harvard University, 1964.

Individual Patterns in Historical Change: Imagery of Japanese Youth*

Robert Jay Lifton

Man not only lives within history; he is changed by it, and he causes it to change. This interplay between individual lives and wider historical forces is many-sided, erratic, seemingly contradictory, charged as it is by capricious human emotions. Yet there are common patterns—shared images and styles of imagery—which men call forth in their efforts to deal with the threat and promise of a changing outer and inner world. These patterns can sometimes be seen most clearly in cultures outside of one's own, and I have found them to be extremely vivid in present-day Japan.

In recent work with Japanese youth[1] I have attempted to study the living experience of historical change through intensive series of interviews with more than fifty young men and women between the ages of 18 and 25. I was thus able to observe, for periods of from several months to two years, intellectual and emotional fluctuations in a group particularly sensitive to historical change. Their sensitivity derived first, from their age group, since as young adults they were at a stage of life characterized by an urge to experiment with the ideologies and technologies which motor historical change; second, from their selection, as they were mostly undergraduates at leading universities in Tokyo and Kyoto, outstanding in their intellectual, organizational, or creative abilities; and third, from their modern heritage—since recent generations of Japanese students and intellectuals have been unique in the impressive combination of eagerness, quick mastery, and inner resistance, with which they have embraced

outside influences, not only during the years following World War II but from the time of the Meiji Restoration almost one hundred years ago.

I have elsewhere described in Japanese youth a *sense of historical dislocation*[2] accompanying the rapid social change their country has experienced: the feeling that traditional ideologies, styles of group and family life, and patterns of communication are irrelevent and inadequate for contemporary life, a tendency which I have also called a *break in the sense of connection*. I suggested that this break is only partial, and that lingering influences of the past have a way of making themselves felt persistently within the individual character structure, creating a series of psychological conflicts which in turn add both pain and zest to their lives. Now I wish to carry this analysis further by delineating three more or less specific patterns of imagery[3] characteristic for Japanese youth in their efforts to break out of their historical dislocation and re-establish a sense of connection with viable ideas and human groups. This imagery includes emotionally charged convictions about one's relationship to his world (ideology) as well as a sense of personal development within the psychological idiom of these convictions (self-process). I shall focus upon the relationship of this imagery to the individual's sense of time: that is, his means of symbolizing past, present, and future, both in his conscious beliefs and in that part of his emotional life which is inaccessible to, and often in direct conflict with, conscious beliefs.

Mode of Transformation

The first of these three patterns may be called the *mode of transformation*, by which I mean a vision of remaking social and individual existence into something that is fundamentally, if not totally, new. This pattern is best represented by the political revolutionary; but it also includes diverse groups of youth and intellectuals who insist upon a radical political and cultural criticism of Japanese society.

Among those I interviewed, the youth who falls into this catagory tends to hold complex but readily identifiable imagery concerning the element of time in the historical process. His quest for human betterment and self-realization attaches itself strongly to a sense of the future. For he sees in the future man's only hope for overcoming the sordid and demeaning elements of existence which he associates with the present and the recent past. Perhaps the most forceful expression

[2] Robert J. Lifton, "Youth and History: Individual Change in Postwar Japan," *Daedalus*, Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1962, 91:172-197.
[3] These patterns of imagery are, of course, by no means absolute or exclusive. They can and do overlap, and appear in various combinations. They may thus be regarded as "ideal types."

of this transformationist image of the future can be found in the ideology of the student movement, particularly the "mainstream" of the *Zengakuren* (All Japan Federation of Student Self-Governing Societies): a vision of "pure communism" which would transcend and eliminate the evils of both the "monopoly capitalism" held to characterize Japanese and Western society, and the "stagnant bureaucratism" seen to dominate most of the Communist nations.

A student leader vividly described these sentiments to me, referring to the goals he and his followers were seeking to achieve by means of their militant behavior during the mass demonstrations of 1960 (including the violence which took place within the Diet grounds):

> We are seeking something new through our own efforts. . . . Our ideal, according to what we have learned from Marx, is that all human beings are equal . . . and that all are entitled to full realization of their capacities. Our ideal is like that of the Renaissance in which human beings reach the highest possible development. . . . Yet what we do does not simply come from an ideal, but rather is for the purpose of changing the present society . . . and to do this we must somehow destroy its foundation. This is our task now, and the society which will be created in the future—well, I do not think that we ourselves will be able to see it in its magnificance. . . .

In this imagery, the future has a near-absolute purity. And in sharp contrast to this purity is the decided impurity of the present. The young transformationist, acutely sensitive to inauthenticity and corruption of any kind, finds much in the contemporary Japanese social scene that grates upon these sensitivities. Combinations of power, wealth, and easy sensuality can trigger off a strong reaction in a youth struggling to integrate his austere ideology, his quest for authenticity, and his own compelling sexual urges. And he may also, with the special intensity Japanese have derived from their recent history, deplore another impurity in the world around him—the threat of war—and seek out, however theoretically, a universal symbol of peace.

The transformationist applies similar judgments of impurity to his own individual life, especially to his vision of his own future. The ambivalent symbol here is that of the *sarariman* (salaried man)—on the one hand, as the Japanese version of the American Organization Man, the personification of impure self-betrayal, of rote, purposeless subservience both to his immediate superiors and to the overall social and economic system; and on the other hand, by no means without

---

[4] Ruth Benedict (*The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1946) tended to stress the element of obligation in *giri-ninjō;* while L. Takeo Doi (Giri-Ninjō: An Interpretation, unpublished manuscript) has stressed the underlying element of dependency which he feels was neglected by Benedict in her general approach to Japanese culture.

attraction, partly because of these very qualities, and partly because of the security, status and even power the *sarariman* may achieve.

The transformationist sees these impurities of the present as having strong roots in the "feudalism" of the past. Under attack here is the complex pattern of human relationships originating in ancient Japanese rural life, and still of great importance for contemporary social behavior and individual psychology. Known as *giri-ninjō*, it involves an interplay of obligation and dependency,[4] in which, beginning with family relationships but extending into all human contacts, there is an unspoken understanding that one will be loved, nourished, or at least taken care of—if one "plays the game." But the young transformationist expresses disdain for the rules of the game, for the endless rituals of reciprocity, and looks upon *giri-ninjō* as a form of hypocrisy and betrayal of self.

Many have described to me highly unpleasant—even suffocating —sensations they experience at the very mention of the words *giri* or *ninjō*. Some simply attempt to ignore these concepts, dismissing them as anachronistic holdovers which have no call upon them; others make them the focus of elaborate ideological condemnation. And this ideological attack may extend to every perceived manifestation of *giri* and *ninjō*, including its appearance in relationships between parent and child, teacher and pupil, superior and subordinate, and political boss and local electorate. For transformationists, these traditional rhythms of obligation and dependency—and especially their often-distorted contemporary remnants—become rhythms of master and slave, which must be abolished if society and the individual are to be liberated. They nonetheless, as Japanese, retain these emotions to a significant degree with themselves, as evidenced by the complex *giri-ninjō* relationships (although they may be called something else) within transformationist political and cultural groups. If, however, these tendencies are recognized, they in turn may be condemned as undesirable remnants of the past. For the past remains the ultimate source of evil, the transformationist's ultimate negative symbol.

Yet I gained the strong impression that these same transformationist youth, more than any other group among those I interviewed, had a profound underlying nostalgia for old cultural symbols. In their more relaxed moments, and in their dreams and associations—frequently coming in direct relationship to discussions of ideology—they would repeatedly describe to me sentiments like these:

> There is a big stream in our village—it is really a river where you swim and fish for *ayu* (a sweetfish). . . . People in our village have a very strong attachment to that river, though it is not especially beautiful. . . . I have memories of its current dashing against the rocks, and it gives me the feeling of a true river—not like those rivers we so often see with strongly artificial beauty. . . . In the old days the water was very

abundant. . . . and there was a castle of a feudal lord. . . . On the site of the ruins of his castle, there are two hills of similar height, and the river flows just between them. In the old days the river was wide and there was a suspension bridge over it . . . and when the water level rose boats would often appear. But now we can no longer see such a scene . . . and the water has greatly decreased. . . .

This is a student leader, not only expressing nostalgic childhood memories, but also speaking symbolically of the beauty, authenticity, and lushness of the past, in contrast to the "dried up" world of the present. And he goes on to reinforce these sentiments in his contrast between new ways of celebrating Christmas (a Western import which has become something of a pagan festival in postwar Japan) and old ways of celebrating the Japanese New Year:

Of course I celebrate Christmas but I don't necessarily find it pleasant. It is just an excuse to go out and drink *sake*—and during the Christmas season you pay 1,000 yen for the same cup of coffee that usually cost you 100 yen. . . . Christmas doesn't matter much to me. . . . But the last night of the year, when people eat what we call *toshikoshi soba* (New Year's noodles), some of the real feelings of the old days come out. . . . I used to go to the shrine on that night together with my family, with a solemn feeling. . . . There would be a priest, and it would be very quiet around the shrine grounds. Then at the time of the night when the moon hovered above us, when the frost made the ground transparent, the priest would offer us sacred wine (omiki). I would clap my hands and, standing in the dark in dim candlelight, I would ring the bell and throw offerings. . . . Only after finishing all of this could I feel relieved and go to bed. . . . These mystical feelings I had during my childhood I no longer feel toward the New Year, but when I look at my mother and father I have the impression that they feel them still. . . .

Here we get a sense of an Ultimate Past in which childhood memory blends with earliest and most fundamental religious ritual of rebirth from the Japanese cultural past. All is in perfect spiritual and aesthetic harmony. The strength of emotional content gives us the sense that this Past (both individual and cultural) predates, and is symbolically more powerful than, the negatively-tinged past we have previously heard about. It has some of the same awesome—one might say "oceanic"[5]—feeling which transformationist youth also express toward the future, and my impression is that it comes from the same psychological stuff. That is, the transformationist youth

---

[5] Sigmund Freud quoted Romain Rolland as looking upon religion as "a feeling which he would like to call a sensation of 'eternity,' a feeling as of something limitless, unbounded—as it were, 'oceanic'. . . ." (*Civilization and its Discontents*, Standard Edition, London: The Hogarth Press, 1961, 64-5). The feeling need not, of course, be limited to specifically religious experience, and its emphasis upon the loss of time boundaries is especially relevent to us here.

embraces a vision of the future intimately related to, if not indeed a part of, his longing for a return to an imagined golden age of the past. Or to put it another way, the transformationist's longing for a golden age of the past—a longing intensified during periods of inner dislocation caused by rapid historical change—supplies a basic stimulus for his future-oriented utopian quest.

Mode of Restoration

When we turn to the second of these individual patterns in historical change, *the mode of restoration*, we encounter what appears to be the very opposite situation. The restorationist youth repeatedly expresses a strong urge to return to the past, to draw upon great and ennobling symbols of the Japanese heritage as a source of sustenance for the present and of direction for the future. Falling into this catagory are the so-called rightist youth, including at their most extreme those willing to assassinate (and die) for their beliefs, as well as many others less fanatical in their actions but sharing the same passionate vision of restoring a past of divine brilliance.

A twenty-one year old leader of a religious youth group with strong rightist tendencies (among the relatively few intellectual youth sharing this vision) told me how, during a visit he made to a sacred shrine area said to be the place where Japan's first Emperor assumed the throne in 660 B.C., "I felt the Emperor Jimmu alive inside myself . . . and the blood of Japanese history running through my veins." And this same young man goes on to describe the absolute purity of the Japanese past, as embodied in the ostensibly unbroken line of Emperors following upon the heavenly origins of this founder:

> The great periods in Japanese history have always been those when the Emperor governed the country himself . . . the time of Prince Shotoku . . . then later on with the Emperor Meiji. . . . We cannot say that the blood of Emperors has never been mixed with that of others . . . but the descent from heaven of the Imperial Family of Japan is the fundamental spiritual idea of our nation . . . so that our *kokutai* (national polity or essence)[6] must always have the Emperor at its center. . . . Since the nation of Japan was descended from gods we call ourselves the nation of truth (*shinri kokka*). . . . I can say that in our history no Emperor has ever governed wrongly, or ever will in the future. . . . It is sometimes said that the Kojiki and the Nihonshoki [the two earliest, and partly-mythological, historical chronicles] do not describe actual history. But even if they are not historical truth, what is important is that they were written by Japanese. The thoughts of the writers are Japanese. . . . They contain the Japanese spirit. . . .

[6] *Kokutai* is a mystical-ideological concept which is impossible to define precisely, but which also contains the sense of "national body" or "national substance"—and could be translated as "national identity." See Lifton, Youth and History, 179-180, and 196, reference note 6.

This East Asian form of fundamentalist imagery characteristic-
ally stresses a *sense of organic connection* with the past. The Japa-
nese version expressed here focuses upon a mystical racial identity so
pervasive that individuals are perceived as being more or less fused
with one another in the pure (unadulterated) racial essence.

Concerning the present, the imagery of the restorationist youth
in many ways resembles that of the transformationist. He too sees
impurity, corruption, and inauthenticity everywhere around him.
But he differs in his vision of the source of these contemporary impuri-
ties. Rather than attributing them to the past, he sees them as the
result of evil new influences from the outside which contaminate the
older Japanese essence. The young rightist we have already quoted,
for instance, condemned the American Occupation for "weakening the
Japanese nation" by destroying its family system, for causing the
perfect harmony of *giri-ninjō* to break down. And he criticized the
overall "materialism" of Western patterns of thought brought to bear
upon Japan during its recent history, including the stress upon
equality, socialism, self-realization, and scientific analysis. Indeed,
he felt that he himself had been contaminated by these ideas, that
his persistent tendency to raise questions about historical and archeo-
logical evidence for the existence and early Japanese Emperors was an
unfortunate legacy of his own postwar exposure to Western ways
of thinking, and that literal scientific findings in these matters were
of much less importance than truths derived from the Japanese
emphasis upon intuition and spirit. For him, as for Asian restoration-
ists in general, it was less a matter of science versus faith than of
science versus feeling.

The young Japanese restorationist's view of the future is com-
pounded of anxiety and a strange form of utopianism. His anxiety
is related to the general forces of change he sees around him, and
aggravated by his inner awareness that these "impurities"—molded
as they are to the whole apparatus of contemporary society—are
becoming increasingly ineradicable. He frequently looks upon trans-
formationist groups (radical youth and intellectuals) as threatening
embodiments of evil, and vents his anxious hostility upon them. But
as a fundamentalist he derives his vision of the future of Japan—and
in this case of all mankind—from the words and prophecies of the
sacred chronicles of the past, as again expressed by the same young
rightist:

> In the Kojiki there is a prophecy of a time of purification (misogi)
> for removing the filth from all of us. This is the time we are in now, a
> period of struggle, of pain before the birth of something new—just like
> that of a mother before delivering her child. . . . We have to undergo
> this birth pain, which is the coming of the third world war. . . . Then,
> after that, there can be a world state, having the whole world as one

family with the Emperor of Japan at its center. . . . Just as Christ claimed to be the King of Kings, we think of the Emperor as the King of Kings. . . . Of course we must try to avoid World War III . . . and to defend Japan's *kokutai* is to contribute to world peace, because the defense of our *kokutai* means the love of mankind. . . . But if World War III comes, Japan's Imperial House will in some way survive . . . by some power of God . . . just as the Imperial House survived after the last war, although Japan was defeated and many royal families in other countries were abolished . . . because truth and righteousness endure always. . . . This is the meaning of our Movement for the enlightenment of mankind, for we believe that world peace can only come when the Emperor is in the center of the world. . . .

Yet even in the expression of these extreme sentiments, or perhaps particularly in such expression, the restorationist's attitude toward new historical elements is by no means as simple as it might appear. One finds that underneath his antagonism toward "new" Western principles of social equality, selfhood, and science lies considerable fascination and even attraction. We have seen our young rightist make use of Christian analogies to his ideological claims and concern himself with the problem of scientific versus mythological historical claims. More significant was his tendency, during discussions with me, to bring up frequently the names of Marx, Einstein, and Freud. Marx he mostly condemned, but he expressed a certain amount of agreement with Marxian economics, and he and his rightist teachers spoke of their anticipated world federation as a form of "Emperor-system socialism." Einstein he approvingly quoted as having favored a world federation (this much was true) with the Japanese Emperor at its center (this was a good deal less true, and apparently stemmed from a false quotation circulated among rightists). And Freud he sought to embrace as a "scientific investigator of the human spirit." He in fact organized a "Spiritual Science Study Group" for the purpose of strengthening the students' spiritual lives and opposing Zengakuren (that is, transformationist) influence; the Group was to take up the writings of Freud as its first topic of study, but as it turned out (much to my disappointment) these were postponed in favor of a reconsideration of Japan's *kokutai*.

The point here is that, however the restorationist seeks refuge in his mystical sense of connection with an undifferentiated past, he at the same time feels himself confronted by the powerful Western cultural and technological tradition which asserts itself so forcefully throughout the world. This tradition is symbolized for him by the frightening and alluring image of Science, which he perceives to be the West's most fundamental cultural intrusion—on the one hand a formidable threat to the whole structure of his thought and identity, on the other a beckoning source of unlimited power.

The restorationist thus calls forth his imagery of the past as a

means of not only combating threatening new influences, but also of coming to terms with these influences—and, however tortuously and ambivalently, of absorbing them and being changed by them. I believe that Japanese history bears out this interpretation. At times of historical dislocation due to strong cultural influences from the outside, there has been a powerfully recurrent theme of restoration of old Imperial power and virtue, and this restoration has itself been a means of bringing about revolutionary changes in both Japan's national experience and the inner lives of individual Japanese: notably during the period of the Meiji Restoration of 1868,[7] but also at the time of the introduction of Buddhism and Chinese learning in the seventh century. Restorationism (like transformationism) always carries within it the seeds of totalism—of an all-or-none psychological plunge into a psuedo-religious ideology.[8] Restorationist movements can, and at various junctures of Japanese history have, become belligerently fanatical —most recently in Japan's prewar and wartime militarism, and in certain postwar demands for a "Showa Restoration" (meaning the reassertion of the Imperial mystique through the person of the present Showa Emperor) much like that expressed by the young rightist we have quoted. But beyond these extreme examples, restorationism must be seen as a general psychological tendency inherent in the historical process. For it is his ambivalent attraction to the symbols of historical change which drives the restorationist back into the past, and this very backward plunge facilitates his partial absorption of these new elements by enabling him to meet them on what is, so to speak, his own psychological ground. He too ends up promoting historical change.

Mode of Accommodation

The last of these patterns, that of cultural and psychological *accommodation*, is by far the most common of the three. More than the other two, it has set the tone of historical change in postwar Japan, though at moments of crisis it has been temporarily superseded by

---

[7] Historians have made analagous observations in relationship to the Meiji Restoration. Thus Albert M. Craig concludes his book, *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961) with the observation: "It was because Japan possessed such [traditional] characteristics when first confronted by the West that it was able so early to achieve a part of the transformation which is the goal of other nations in Asia today. In Japan . . . it is in a large measure to the strength and not to the weaknesses of the traditional society that we must turn to comprehend its modern history." Marius B. Jansen comes to similar conclusions in his *Sakamoto Ryōma and the Meiji Restoration*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. See also the review article on both of these books by Thomas C. Smith, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 1962, 21:215-219.

[8] Robert J. Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism*, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1961. See especially chapter 22.

each of them. Accommodation is a wide catagory of compromise. It includes muted elements of transformation and restoration, and is the catagory encompassing all those who do not fit in to either of these two modes. In relationship to the symbols of time, it tends toward an inner *modus vivendi* for blending imagery of past, present, and future. Rather than the zealous focus upon either past or future which we have so far encountered, the young Japanese accommodationist places greatest relative stress upon time imagery closest to his own life—upon the present, the immediate future, and perhaps the recent past.

Like all Japanese youth, he is thrust into a social environment dazzling in its side-by-side diversity of cultural elements: ideological admixtures of Communism, socialism, liberal democracy, existentialism, nihilism, and many versions of Emperor-centered traditionalism; religious influences related to Buddhism, Christianity, Shintoism, and the spate of new religions which combine elements of all of these in highly idiosyncratic ways; recreational disciplines of baseball, *sumo* (traditional wrestling) golf, *karate* (an old art, something like boxing, originally imported from Okinawa), tennis, flower arrangement, secular Zen, Noh and Kabuki drama, games of bridge, go, mahjong, and the incomparable *pachinko*.[9] Surely there is no other culture in which a young person finds the need to accommodate such an imposing variety of influences. But while the transformationist or restorationist can protect himself from this onslaught with a structured ideological image through which all in turn can be ordered, the accommodationst must face it more or less nakedly. And his psychological equipment for doing so is faulty, since he has been molded by a culture laying heavy stress upon the achievement of inner harmony through following closely prescribed emotional paths within a carefully regulated group structure. No wonder, then, that he places great stress upon ideas of self-realization and personal autonomy as well as group commitment —precisely the things so difficult for him to achieve.

Concerning the past, the accommodationist's imagery lacks the intensity of the transformationist's or restorationist's, but it can be nonetheless painful. He does not escape a sense of historical dislocation, and the feeling that Japan's recent past (and, to some extent,

---

[9] *Pachinko* is a uniquely Japanese creation, a postwar slot-machine game which is a good deal more than a slot-machine game. It involves shooting metal balls in circular trajectories, so that they land, or do not land, in small round holes. It is utterly simple and repetitious. Played in large, crowded *pachinko* parlors, against a background of loud music and the constant clang of the metal balls, it has a strange fascination—to the point of addiction—for its enormous numbers of devotees. It has been called everything from a contemporary expression of Buddhist mysticism to a sign of Japan's postwar moral deterioration, though more often the latter. It is, in the very least, an interesting invention of a culture in transition.

distant past as well) has been dishonored. He feels this way both because of concrete embarrassment at Japan's disastrous military adventures (and the Japanese emotions that went into these adventures), and because this sense of a dishonored past is likely to be present, particularly among the young, in any culture which has been overwhelmed, psychologically or militarily (or, as in Japan's case, both) by outside influences and is undergoing rapid historical change.

Similarly, his approach to the future includes a concerted effort to make his own way in society and at the same time maintain a sense of moral and psychological integrity, rather than envisage a radical transformation of that society or a radical restoration of the past.

We can appreciate the conflicts involved in this process of psychological and cultural accommodation by turning to an individual example—in this case a very brief dream, and the associations to that dream, of a brilliant student of American history who also happened to be devoted to the traditional art of *karate*, but had temporarily withdrawn from the *karate* group of his university, ostensibly because of the pressure of his academic work:

> I was studying *karate* with a certain teacher who is the head of one of the schools of *karate*, and is also a rightist boss. . . . I asked another student there, "Why does the *karate* spirit become associated with ultranationalism? Why are we asked to demonstrate *karate* in front of a shrine?" I said that *karate* should not be like this. Then the master said, "What was it that this youngster was trying to say?". . . . I didn't talk back to him then, but returned to my place and decided to practice more and become more skillful . . . so that I could defeat that master, a master such as that. . . .

The student's sequence of associations to the dream reveals the uncomfortable symbolism represented by *karate*, and particularly by the *karate* master:

> Since I quit *karate*, it seems that there are *karate* problems even in my dreams. . . . My real master, fortunately, is a very understanding person of a high intellectual level, suitable, I believe, for our university. . . . And the master who appeared in the dream has no connection with me in actuality. . . . Recently I came across a book with a very silly article about a man who practiced *karate* during the Meiji era, telling about all sorts of silly things such as spying for rightists and bragging about eating snakes. . . . I was surprised that this kind of book is still sold in the postwar period. . . . Somehow, there seems to be the tendency in Japanese society that once the heat around our throats is gone, we forget about that heat. . . . I feel that studious people should express themselves about these problems. . . . We should continue to recognize Japanese culture, not just forget about it and praise only American culture and Americans. . . . But we should not become intoxicated in doing this and decide that fine things are to be found only in Japanese

culture, and that Japanese culture must be separated from all others. . . .
There are people who do *karate* or *jûdô* or the like without considering
these spiritual disciplines. . . . They are only interested in breaking roof
tiles [which one does with the side of one's hand in *karate* practice]. We,
as young people, should be progressive and create our own society. . . .
But too often we indulge ourselves in mood . . . especially a mood of
helplessness. . . . Hope is not easily realized in any society . . . and this
society is unsteady. . . . But desperation should not be the way of
youth. . . .

We may look upon this dream as the student's embarrassed con-
frontation with undesirable elements in traditional Japanese culture,
symbolized here by *karate*. He cannot yet defeat or even talk back
to this "bad master," this tainted element of his personal and historical
past. But he dedicates himself to an effort to improve his skills—skills
related to the various forms of cultural and psychological accommoda-
tion he tells us about—so that he might eventually defeat the "bad
master" and thus, so to speak, *purify and rescue his own past*. He is
troubled, however, by a suggestion of despair, by the fear that this
rescue by purification might not after all be possible, that he might
not be able to reintegrate the past into his own present and future
life experience.[10]

Thus the psychological tasks of the cultural accommodationist
can be overwhelmingly difficult. During periods of great historical
dislocation, he may readily find that the cultural symbols around him
communicate everything and nothing; he may encounter an unending
series of messages, none of which convey adequate meaning or lead
to the kind of imagery which would enable him to re-establish a
meaningful sense of connection with his symbolic world. His ever-
present prospect, as we observed in the case of the young *karate* practi-
tioner, is that of despair—despair which may take the form of nihilism,
of experimental plunges into various cults of feeling and sensation;
which may lead one to a rote, increasingly constricted journey along
the path of social convention; or which may drive one into the more
extreme forms of transformationism or restorationism.

But it is also a despair from which one can awaken with much
benefit. There is nothing more stimulating to individual and cultural
creativity than this struggle for accommodation in the face of pro-
found historical dislocation. Most young Japanese resolve the struggle
with at least a measure of success, and in the process of doing so

---

10 This dream could, of course, be interpreted in other ways. One could,
in a more conventional fashion, look upon the "bad master" as representing
parental authority; and such a symbol of parental authority can then also be
equated with the authority of the cultural past. I shall pursue these symbolic
relationships in later publications, but here wish to stress (however one-sidedly)
the historical elements of the dream.

gradually shape new cultural forms—artistic, ideational, or institu-
tional. For in the struggle itself, in the effort to make disparate cultural
elements into a meaningful psychological whole, lies the accom-
modationist's special motor of historical change.

Patterns of Imagery: General Principles

What further conclusions are we to draw concerning these elusive
individual patterns in historical change?

First, they are wed to one another in paradox. Those who focus
their imagery most strongly upon the symbolism of the future are,
to a significant degree, driven toward change by their less apparent
nostalgia for the past. Those who feel compelled to reach back into
the past for the symbols with which to fight off historical change end
up by using the same symbols as a means of enhancing such change.
And those who are thrown into despair by their seeming inability to
integrate symbols of past, present, and future, may emerge from it
by "rescuing" their past and creating new cultural forms, so that the
despair itself becomes a vehicle of historical change.

Such paradox exists because it is native to the individual psycho-
logical equipment. And in this cursory exploration, we have been
observing the fundamentally paradoxical operation of the individual
emotional life in the area of historically significant ideas and imagery.
I have approached this difficult area by stressing patterns and themes
—concepts which unify the individual relationship to historical forces
—since I believe this the best way to attempt to extend the insights
of depth psychology into a wider historical frame. And if this analysis
is to be carried further, indeed to its logical conclusion, it leads us to
the ultimate historical experience of death itself. The varying efforts
men make to master historical time—to integrate in immediate ex-
perience both remote past and distant future—derive ultimately from
the ceaseless human effort to transcend death. This effort, carried over
from formal religion, perhaps underlies all historical change, and, in
a sense, history itself.

Second, these patterns of imagery are, to a surprising degree,
interchangeable; young people in particular can readily switch from
one to the other. Thus, one of the transformationist youth I quoted
had made a sudden shift from a more or less restorationist position;
and the restorationist student with the extreme Emperor-system ide-
ology had been converted to this pattern from a near-Communist
transformationist stance. I have, moreover, frequently encountered
conversions from a transformationist position (and occasionally from
a restorationist one) to a pattern of accommodation, particularly at
the time of graduation from the university, when most young people
feel compelled to find a way of life within the existing social frame-
work.

These shifts in imagery—whether polar and dramatic or gradual and invisible—defy easy psychological evaluation. They can often combine the most radical change in world-view, group affiliation, and style of psychological functioning in the one hand, with relatively unchanged underlying character structure on the other. I would suggest that this seeming contradiction is explained by the existence of an emotional substrate and a set of symbols common to all three patterns of imagery, which can be shaped or reshaped into any of the three distinctively different forms we have observed. A significant element in this substrate was expressed (particularly vividly by transformationists and restorationists) in what I have referred to as the quest for an Ultimate Past and Ultimate Future. The "ultimate" element sought here is that of ultimate unity—a state of existence in which men and ideas are so harmoniously blended that conflict and strife cease. The individual model for this unity is the original psychobiological unity of the mother-child relationship, prior to the child's sense of differentiation into a separate individual. The cultural model (clearly evident in Japanese thought and in most non-Western tradition, but also in early Western cultural history) is the stress upon a near-mystical social and racial harmony, a harmony felt to transcend historical time. This emotional-symbolic substrate (or at least the portion of it we have been discussing) tends to take on a maternal coloring which communicates a sense of the perpetuation of life itself, to the point, as already suggested, of transcending the always-threatening fact of biological death.

It is precisely this commonly-held and enduring emotional-symbolic substrate—so enduring that we may well look upon it as a major psychobiological universal underlying all historical change—that makes possible the dramatic shifts from one mode to another. But we must still account for the choice of imagery, whether in conversions or in the establishment of the modes themselves. Here I would stress the interplay of three general factors: Historical influences of the kind I have presented in this paper, which not only supply imagery to the individual but create within him, and within his culture, varying degrees of readiness for that imagery; institutions and organizations, particularly those of youth, which mediate the imagery and supply the group identities necessary for its expression; and variations in individual-psychological background experience, which (although neglected in this paper in favor of other emphases) significantly influence the choice of imagery from among available alternatives, and the manner in which the chosen imagery is held and expressed.

Thus, for young Japanese, transformationist ideology is encouraged by a combination of its general strength, particularly in the non-Western world, and by the existence of historical dislocation;

restorationism has been largely dishonored, but still holds considerable underlying emotional appeal; a vision of ultimate unity (transformationist or restorationist) is encouraged by an extraordinary cultural emphasis upon the undifferentiated intimacy of the mother-child relationship; but accommodation is demanded by an advanced industrial society, encouraged by economic rewards, and reinforced by a long-standing utilitarianism within Japanese character structure.

No matter what the combination, historical change cannot be generated without making use of the individual and cultural past. But in this view of history as "a forward-moving *recherche du temps perdu,*"[11] I do not speak either of "regression" or even of "repetition-compulsion" in the classical psychoanalytic sense (though the latter is closer to what I mean). I refer to the continuous process of fusion of symbols and reshaping of imagery, to the symbolic constellation that comes to exist, in restless equilibrium, within individual minds as a fluctuating self-process; and which may, in significant degree, become the shared symbols of large groups of people to the extent of dominating an entire era.[12]

Finally, a beginning knowledge of these patterns of imagery may shed some light on forces now evolving in various parts of the world, particularly in the underdeveloped areas of Africa and Asia, but also in the industrialized West, including our own country (here too Japan is a particularly valuable laboratory, because it has one historical foot in the underdeveloped Afro-Asian world and another in the "developed" West). These patterns of imagery may appear more or less spontaneously, as in Japan (the three modes described), in France (the transformationism of intellectuals and the restorationism of *colons*), and the United States(the accommodationism of most segments of the population and the restorationism of the Radical Right). They may be manipulated by mass media, as, for instance, in the Middle East (a mixture of transformationist and restorationist imagery). Or they may be stimulated through an organized national program of "re-education" or "thought reform" as in Communist China (mostly transformationist, but with restorationist flashes). In the latter case, and in fact in most manipulated efforts, transformationist and restorationist imagery are stressed, since these forms of imagery

---

[11] Norman O. Brown, *Life Against Death*, Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1959, 93. While I strongly concur with Brown's focus upon the past (he stresses the individual past) as a prime mover of history, I would emphasize the interplay of time symbols, rather than his principle that "repression and the repetition-compulsion generate historical time."

[12] See Erik H. Erikson's *Young Man Luther* (New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1958) for a brilliant exposition of the interplay between individual psychology (in this case the psychological struggles of a great man) and historical change.

stimulate passions most useful—perhaps indispensible—for bringing about social change.[18]

The dilemma presented here is that these same passionate modes necessary to historical change are most prone to excess, or to totalism. But whatever their dangers, transformationism and restorationism, no less than accommodationism, are inevitable elements in the historical process, because they reflect fundamental individual psychological tendencies. The great historical problems then—from the standpoint of this psychological perspective—are to attenuate, or at least make creative use of, the despair of accommodationism, and at the same time moderate the despair-relieving excesses of transformationism and restorationism. While one can hardly aproach these problems with optimism, much hope lies in the constant reshaping of imagery of which men are capable. For just as the full range of human emotional potential seems to be necessary for the achievement of historical change, so might this richness and diversity lead to new combinations of thought and feeling, and to new possibilities for applying historical change to man's benefit rather than to his destruction.

[13] If we turn to more primitive cultures, we can see even more vividly the intimate interplay of the three modes in bringing about historical change—the combination of extremist "cargo cults" (consisting of both transformationist and restorationist elements) with more or less rationalized (accommodationist) techniques for modernization. See Margaret Mead and Theodore Schwartz, "The Cult as a Condensed Social Process," in *Group Processes*, Transactions of the Fifth Conference, edited by Bertram Schaffner, New York: Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, 1958; Margaret Mead, *New Lives for Old*, New York, William Morrow Co., 1956; and Peter Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound*: a Study of "Cargo" Cults in Melanesia, London, MacGibbon and Kee, 1957.

Pro-Social Commitment Among College Students

Victor A. Gelineau and David Kantor

Introduction

Ever since the veterans of World War II disappeared from the academic scene, college students have increasingly become the subject of study and concern. The general tone of numerous observers has not been approving. Today's student is variously seen as neurotic, opportunistic, security-seeking, docile, apolitical and apparently lacking in strongly felt values and a firm sense of identity. A recurrent criticism has been that he demonstrates a lack of engagement with the major problems of the era.

The literature reveals no accurate information on the number of students actively participating in socio-political activity in this or preceding generations. Such information is not available for any range of students either. We don't know who participates. Variations in student characteristics and among institutional settings makes it difficult, if not impossible, to generalize about "the college student" and this is particularly true for the student who engages in pro-social[1] action.

Our study has attempted to examine in some detail the characteristics of students engaged in one type of pro-social action in one university setting. The action of these students is pro-social on several counts:

(1) It has been consistently directed toward the alleviation of mental illness, a major community problem by any criteria.

---

[1] We are indebted to Dr. Jacob Fishman and Dr. Fredric Solomon of Howard University for the term "pro-social." The present usage is our own, however, "pro-social" as it is used here refers to any activity which has as its goal the changing of any social situation or institution perceived by the individual as a problem. The term implies no political direction—left or right—nor does it assume that the change if effected would be either beneficial or harmful. Additionally, the action must be directed at an aspect of the society larger than the academic community. Student agitation over intramural problems, for example, would not be considered pro-social.

(2) It was originally, and has persistently remained, dedicated to the belief that the public mental hospital, as presently organized, should be changed drastically or abolished.

(3) It retains an orientation of change.

(4) It has resulted in the development of an alternative and innovating structure (3) outside the hospital for the handling of chronic patients.

(5) It contains proselytizing and propagandistic[2] elements dedicated to changing attitudes about mental illness and recruiting new members.

Our survey of other colleges shows that student programs similar to the one we studied are operating in not less than seventy-five other academic contexts. We are not, therefore, dealing with what is essentially a local mutation.

Our institutional setting for this pro-social action is Harvard University. The students under consideration are members of the Phillips Brooks House Association which is the central student organization coordinating undergraduate service activities. Within the Association are different semi-autonomous committees, each of which is concerned with a particular service effort. The subjects of our study are members of the Mental Hospital Committee of the Phillips Brooks House Association. During the two years of the study (1960-1961) the membership of this committee, approximately 300 students, constituted approximately 2% of the total student body.

Historically the Mental Hospital Committee was founded ten years ago by a student who perceived the mental hospital as an institutional structure drastically in need of change. Since that time more than 2,000 Harvard and Radcliffe undergraduates, and some students from other local colleges, have worked as volunteers in a large public mental hospital near the university. These volunteers engage in a range of services to patients. Central goals are: to bring to the patients on chronic wards contact with people other than hospital personnel, to reaffirm the patients' essential humanity, and when possible to help patients achieve rehabilitation and release from the hospital. The pro-social action undertaken by these students is of a very special kind. They choose to deal with a severe, persistent form of deviance—chronic psychosis—that is not only in itself often unpleasant, but is found in depressing surroundings. For their services they get little public glory. Nevertheless, the students have been surprisingly successful in their aims (1, 2). The student committee

---

[2] Propaganda is not here used in a perjorative sense, but is taken to mean the effort to influence opinion concerning a situation over which there exists a division of opinion in the community. Thus there is propaganda pro and con a division of opinion in the community. Thus there is propaganda pro and con desegregation.

is a well organized, smoothly functioning, self-perpetuating body which not only directs the volunteers, but recruits and trains new members from succeeding college generations and provides for professional supervision (6).

Partial results of our study show that mental hospital volunteers *do not differ in extreme ways from their counterparts* at Harvard and Radcliffe (4). Here we discuss briefly the characteristics of student volunteers and the *meaning of the process* for different kinds of students. The data on which these results are based is part of a larger research project.[8]

Methods and Materials

Several instruments—questionnaires, scales, and some projective materials were administered to both volunteers and to comparison groups of Harvard and Radcliffe students who did not do this kind of volunteering. Over the two year period of the study, 645 *before* and *after* versions of the master questionnaire were obtained from the volunteer group. Comparable numbers of protocols from scales and projective instruments were also gathered. We also conducted intensive interviews with sub-samples of volunteers, stratified on the basis of sex and experience in the program. Twenty students were interviewed the first year, and twenty-eight the second. These interviews were conducted before, during and after the term of volunteer service.

All of these instruments were constructed to elicit information on a range of dimensions—sociological background information, motivation to volunteer, occupational plans and preferences, knowledge of and attitudes toward problems of mental health, expectations of and reactions to the volunteer experience, value orientations and selected psychological characteristics. Preliminary analysis of some of the variables tapped by these measures allows us to develop what may be termed a "working profile" of the volunteer. It must be emphasized that this profile is tentative and based on an initial analysis of our data.

Some Characteristics of Volunteers

In many ways the mental hospital volunteer is a typical Harvard-Radcliffe citizen insofar as any student is "typical." Our data show that, by Harvard standards, volunteers are neither wealthy nor less economically privileged than other students. Looking further at the stratum origin of the volunteers we find that they are largely from Eastern urban areas, come from highly educated professional family settings and have a secular rather than religious orientation. More

of the volunteers have attended public schools rather than private and in terms of ethnicity a disproportionate number come from Jewish backgrounds while Catholics are underrepresented and Protestants fall closer to the expected distribution. Volunteers are less religious than their parents, who in turn are less religious than parents of non-volunteer students. Slightly more than half of the volunteers are male but this represents a disproportion of females since the pool from which volunteers are drawn contains a ratio of four males to one female. Intelligence, at least as measured by academic performance, seems no differently distributed among the volunteers than the rest of the Harvard population. Numbers in the different grade groups and in the honors program are virtually the same for volunteers and non-volunteers.

Approximately one-third of the volunteers express some interest in mental health and related careers prior to volunteering, and many do ultimately follow these preferences. Additionally, our data on occupational preference show that the program not only attracts those already interested in a career in these professions, but also has a crystallization effect upon career shoppers, and a recruiting effect on the uncommitted. What should be borne in mind, however, is that the actual number of students who are interested in a mental health occupation varies from year to year, and that they are usually a minority in the program, albeit a large one.

If we turn to variables that are more expressive of values and attitudes, certain differences between volunteers, other college students, and the Harvard comparison students appear. Predictably, more volunteers intend to choose an occupation within the field of mental health or in a related profession, and fewer are considering the traditional fields of business, law or natural science. Volunteers have definite ideas about what makes a job desirable and these ideas differ from those of other students. They place more emphasis upon service, personal contact and creativity opportunities in a job than upon independence, income or prestige. This orientation to work goes along with very low economic interests, as measured by the Allport-Vernon-Lindsey scale. Scores on this instrument also revealed a tendency for the volunteers to score high on theoretical and aesthetic interests. When presented with "choice" situations in relation to major life goals volunteers emphasized social and service aims and indicated they would be willing to realize these values at the expense of other goals.

The volunteer then, according to our data, is not a deviant. He is solidly upper-middle class and comes from a particular segment of this stratum. It is the more urban, educated, professional, secular and sophisticated part which feels committed to certain aspects of the American tradition. A fairly large segment of this group continues

to send its children to public schools and historically they have a tradition of service to the community. This group has worked for many different causes in the community and its women dominate the corps of direct service volunteers in thousands of programs around the country.

The cultural and social background of these volunteers, then, would lead to the expectation that they would participate in some form of social service, even though one could not predict that the mental hospital would interest them. Our data seem to indicate that volunteering in the mental hospital program, while it has facets that are substantively different from other kinds of pro-social activity, is not necessarily providing a unique experience for a highly differentiated group of students within the Harvard context. On the contrary, it may be one way among many which may be utilized by college students for the testing and perfecting of various styles of handling those materials of the real world that are related to the difficult job of assuming adult status. If we juxtapose the social and cultural context from which the volunteer comes and his value orientations alongside the opportunities the program offers, it may be seen that there is an approximate fit between gratifications and needs of the student at this point in his life cycle. Like his parents he is secular, urban, sophisticated and intelligent. He seeks an opportunity for creativity, direct human contact and service to others. He is not a "practical" type. He has low economic interests and tends to value the intellectual and aesthetic over the prestigeful and the materially rewarding. Working with the chronic psychotic is uneconomic, requires a willingness to give considerable of oneself, demands creativity in approach, presents a concrete intellectual and serious social problem, and provides the context for a very primary and powerful kind of human communication. It is a setting in which the student can be, in a phrase, sophisticatedly nurturant and realize some strongly held values.

Aside from examining the presumptive fit between the background and values of the student and the opportunities available to him in this program we have also attempted to explore this student activity from a somewhat different vantage point. It is our feeling that student motivation for creative pro-social action is not only the product of placement at a given level in society, but derives its energy from the nature of the college student *sui generis*. This drive seems to be fairly constant over the generations of college students, but manifests itself in different modalities of energy release which, of course, are conditioned by the ethos of the times. We have not explored the social and historical channeling of these modalities, only certain regularities of behavior within one modality, those which have a bearing on pro-social action among contemporary college students.

We assume that the adolescent, by definition, will have dynamic

problems which he is in the process of resolving and that most college students will be embroiled in conscious and unconscious conflicts centering mostly around the problems of personal identity and competence. We have not concentrated on the maze of idiosyncratic psychological subtleties surrounding the *sturm und drang* of relinquishing childhood for the responsibilities of the real world, although we recognize their crucial importance in the individual instance. We focus on what are essentially *patterns of coping* with the maturational and dynamic problems as they are evidenced by the style in which the student experiences his mental hospital work.

Ideologies and Styles

Individual motivation in the volunteering process is an extremely complex phenomenon, but it is our feeling that certain psycho-social characteristics of the adolescent generally and the college student in particular, provide the motivation for pro-social action. The marginal status of the college student, his need to establish an *identity*, prove his *competence* and challenge adult authority when combined with his drive toward *autonomy* and his need to love which can be more safely manifested as *altruism* probably account for the energy which many adolescents pour into social action aimed at somehow "doing something about conditions" or "changing things." The manner in which the college student adapts to the experience in the mental hospital is also subject to other important influences. One of these important influences is that of the organizational focus of the volunteer program. The Mental Hospital Committee transmits to its members goals, aims, beliefs and norms even though it does not propose explicit directives to the volunteers. These goals and norms, while they are not static and do change and also vary in the degree to which they are formally transmitted, are enduring and well enough elaborated to be termed an *ideology*. They constitute an ideology in the sense that they form a complex of values, assumptions and theories falling into a more or less integrated pattern which is taken as a directive to action. Like all ideologies there is a tendency toward logical "closure." The ideology of the program revolves around four central concerns: (a) the nature and status of the mental patient; (b) the role of the volunteer; (c) the role of professionals; and (d) the mental hospital as an institution. Although all are important to the student program (a) and (b) are perhaps most significant.

The greatest agreement and the most explicit assertions are probably on the nature and status of the mental patient. Patients are defined by the ideology as people who are neglected in a miserable situation and who need and deserve help. The patient is seen consistently as one who should be accorded full human dignity, rights, and love—whatever his pathology. Students are united in condemning

any kind of treatment which gives the patient less than full status as a human being. Students generally have a different and more optimistic view of pathology than that taken by others—including many professionals. Although beliefs about the nature of psychosis vary among volunteers it is assumed that there are elements of health in every patient and the "official" assertion of the program tends toward the extreme view that every patient can be helped toward health by the volunteers.

Closely connected with this concept of the mental patient is a view of what the volunteer should be doing for the patient and how he should be doing it. The program ideology assumes that the student should be a friend to the patient and treat him as an equal. The emphasis is upon warmth and respect in an unstereotyped relationship, with interaction rather than insight as the therapeutic tool. As one volunteer has phrased it, "The mission is to be a mensch." Another important aspect of the volunteer role definition is the emphasis upon creativity and ingenuity in matching the attributes and skills of the volunteers with the needs of the patients.

Program ideology toward professionalism is perhaps less clear-cut and elicits less consensus. However, there is a central theme more or less rejecting of many aspects of professionalism. The fact that the students are both untrained and unpaid is capitalized upon in the ideology. To a degree, professional norms which include lack of involvement with patients, concentration upon pathology and viewing patients as cases are rejected. The ideology also carries the implication that in some way the professionals have failed the chronic patient, either in approach or in giving up too soon. This has the corollary that professionalism may be a bad thing and should not be adopted by the student. Student ideology is also protective of volunteer autonomy vis-à-vis the professional and although his legitimacy as an expert is conceded he is looked upon as a consultant whose directives can on occasion be disregarded if they violate the students' conception of the volunteer role.

Ideology about the mental hospital is not monolithic but there is consensus that the public mental hospital as presently constituted is fundamentally dehumanizing, degrading, and inappropriate for the treatment of the mentally ill. Although the ideology does not contain a specific prescription to effect change the situation is seen as a social problem for which the community—and the volunteer as part of the community—is responsible. There is also fairly explicit lack of respect or even hostility toward some categories of staff, particularly attendants. An extreme, but nevertheless occasionally verbalized, view within the ideology is that the hospital is not only a social problem but a malign and evil place which should be destroyed.

In addition to program ideology another set of factors that will

influence the adaptation of the student to his volunteer experience is the nature of the encounter he has with patients and the hospital structure. Patients and staff vary in their responses to volunteers and this means that the individual experience and how it is handled will cover a range of outcomes.

This ideological ground, against which the individual volunteer must position himself upon entering the program acts both as a conditioning factor and a rough definition of a peer group situation where the adolescent student is offered the opportunity to test competence, engage in constructive rebellion against adult failures, exercise autonomy in action, express his altruism, and work at establishing his identity.

The manner in which a given student reacts to the experiential situation is dependent upon his reaction to program ideology, his own individual value system and his dynamic needs—all of which become integrated into a *behavioral style*. These styles, and their accompanying student ideologies, are not random and idiosyncratic but fall into observable patterns. A typology of styles has emerged from our study of the volunteer. This typology represents a series of ideal-type constructs. The constructs are, however, linked closely to systematically observed empirical referrents of verbal and non-verbal behavior. Furthermore while the level of abstraction of the typology partakes of two adjacent levels—the dynamic and the behavioral—and consequently loses something in theoretical elegance, this level is operationally more fruitful in achieving and understanding of the ebb and flow of pro-social action in this context and others.

The ideologies, or lack of them, with which students enter the volunteer program influences the behavioral styles they use. There is variety in the beliefs and theories of students manifesting the different styles but there is also a central unifying factor in their ideologies. This stems from the common *altruism* of the students. If altruism is taken to mean "regard for and devotion to the interests of others" it is accurate to say that it is a value held by all volunteers and taken as a basis for action at least in the context of the mental hospital. Although the roots of this altruism may differ among students and it is not necessarily primary in the value systems of all students, it is a *central* and *common* value commitment for all students engaged in this activity. The search for identity, the competence testing, the assuagement of marginality could all easily take place in another setting. The commitment to altruism does not explain how and why students become *mental health* volunteers but as a value, however acquired, it provides a motivational base for being a volunteer of some sort, for giving to others. From this common base the ideologies of these students branch out in different directions and for varying distances.

Aside from importance as a directive to action, student ideologies differ as to how well intellectualized and consciously elaborated they are and how much of the students' life concerns they cover.

The typology of styles is based upon several sources of data. The first comprises transcripts of intensive interviews with volunteers. Questions elicited information on the volunteers' conscious motivations for volunteering, their prior experiences and family constellation, their relation to and activity with patients, satisfactions and frustrations experienced in the program, and values and important life concerns. The second source was systematic reports on the performance of the volunteers, collected by the professional personnel supervising them. Also regular written reports submitted by volunteers after each contact with the patients were used. We analyzed organizational records which document a range of facts about the volunteer's participation in the program. Too, several years of close connection with the operating aspects of the organization and with individual students has given us the opportunity for direct observation.

Based upon the above data five different styles emerged from our analysis. They are the following:

(1) *professional* or *career-testing*
(2) *political*
(3) *social*
(4) *moral*
(5) *existential*

These styles are differentially distributed among the students with the *professional* most common and the *political* and the *moral* following close behind while the *social* and the *existential* are less frequent and occur in about the same proportion. The sections below will explore each of these organized tendencies which the students develop for regulating the new human and institutional experiences they encounter.

The Professional Style

The student who adopts the *professional* or *career-testing* style has, next to the *political-ideological* student, the most complete ideology and feels it as a directive for himself and others. Professional ideologies generally include a strong intellectual component, an ethic, and a definition of the relationship between professional and client. Like the adult professional the *career-testing* volunteer uses his ideology to structure for him certain parts of the world and other people in it in such a way as to resolve otherwise ambiguous situations. He tends to rely particularly upon the intellectual component—more so than students using other styles. The career volunteer is testing

and learning. He is testing his own potential, interests, skill and possible commitment to a field. He is also testing the range of rewards and opportunities available in the field, and its negative potential. The careerist is guided by the experience largely by conscious reflection although his learning is shot through with affect. The careerist develops an intense interest in technicism and in intellectual methods of controlling reality. These may stabilize as a primary source of satisfaction. He may internalize both professional skill components and the professional ideology. This reduces and channels the affective aspects of the moral and service orientations which are also part of the careerists value committments.

The *professional* style has two subtypes. The first is the student who is already pointed toward a profession which involves norms and skills similar to those needed by the volunteer in mental hospital work. This student probably represents the "purest" career type. The other subtype of *career-testing* student is less focused on a choice of occupation and his primary concern is apt to be a generalized desire to engage in some kind of "people work" which may range from teaching to the diplomatic service.

Professional Resolutions

The career-testing student has set his feet on the path to a competence which may help him resolve his problems of maturation, establish an identity, and sublimate his altruism. A prominent mechanism in the resolution is intellectualization. Although the style is not a rigid mold of behavior the career of the professional type in the program is apt to move along the following lines: He comes to the program with a leaning toward one of the professions dealing in some way with mental illness. He has not yet crystallized his occupational choice. He is, in some measure, morally indignant about the condition of the mentally ill and, again in some measure, wants to resolve the problem through altruistic service. He wants to make patients well and get them out of the hospital. As he becomes involved in the program and with a patient, he begins to have a learning experience and develop his competence. At some point he begins to form a self image of the person who "really sees what goes on in groups" or "has learned a great deal about psychodynamics and understands why people react as they do." He is probably still "too involved" with patients—his moral indignation and his altruism are still operating strongly, he has not fully converted to the professional ideology. As he progresses in his intellectualization of the problems of mental illness he undergoes a preview of the socialization which will ultimately integrate him into a profession. At some point he ceases to become angry and frustrated because "his" patient is not leaving the hospital due to his efforts. He will settle for establishing a "good rela-

tionship." As one career testing volunteer, now in medical school, put it, "I now feel the frustration from an almost theoretical point of view—my interest seems to have shifted from an almost exclusive concern with getting the patient well to the theory per se."

In addition to developing a pre-professional competence by mastering the intellectual and technical problems of a field, the career testing student may get a sense of being involved with a major social problem and coping with it as a quondam member of adult power structures and role systems.

Obviously, the outcome is not the same for all students; some will achieve only certain elements of the resolutions. The optimal resolution for the career testing student is to settle on a career, to develop a competence and the beginnings of a professional identity, to feel that he has entered into some of the significant structures of the adult world and successfully competed with his elders in attacking a major social problem, and to have transmuted his altruism into a professional ethic.

A negative resolution also contains a series of ramifications. If the student finds that he does not derive satisfaction from the mastery of the theory and techniques that relate to mental illness, he has first of all eliminated one of a finite range of choices in a significant area of his life. Two kinds of failure can be involved here. He may prove inept at learning the requisite intellectual and personal skills or while acquiring at least a modicum of the skills may find that the field is basically unsatisfying or repellant to him. If there is failure in the attempt at mastery then he not only loses a profession but he also is deprived of an arena wherein he might firmly establish an identity. While either resolution is an experience of no small significance to an adolescent, the student will not necessarily be crushed by one such event. It would seem to constitute, at a minimum, a learning experience of some importance. The conscious reaction may be expressed in the words of one "career dropout." He says, "Well, it has been an interesting experience—more than that, I would say. I think that I did some good. I didn't cure anybody—that's a pretty tough job. But I don't feel that my time was wasted. I got something out of it too. It showed me that I don't want any kind of a job that has to do with the mental hospital or for that matter mental illness. I don't know as I learned all that much, but I did learn enough to eliminate this area in my thinking about what I want to do."

A paradoxical negative effect of a positive resolution for the career testing student is that his participation may subtly change the nature of the volunteer effort. The student who early assumes the professional stance may become less effective in his volunteering activities. When he loses some of the naive indignation of the adolescent and becomes fascinated with the intellectual and technical problems presented by psychosis, he may stop trying so hard to "move" the patient

and may withdraw from involvement with the patient. Thus he may lose two therapeutic tools we have reason to believe are particularly effective.

Political and Ideological Political Styles

What we have termed the *political*[4] style of approaching the volunteer experience presents two clearly differentiated subtypes. The first is the *ideological-political*. This student has a sophisticated, intellectualized, and extensively elaborated ideology which he sees as a guide to action. The complexity and sophistication of the ideology may vary with individual students, but it is always an intellectualization of moral indignation. The intensity of the moral indignation may differ but *ideological-political* students feel that the world is poorly run and if they were only given a chance at running it, something might be done about the injustices and suffering that are the result of this poor administration. They tend to come from the more intellectual ranks of the college population and a great part of their activities consists of challenging adult competence and spearheading a resistance to the bumbling establishment of the elders.

Often enough these students astutely identify institutional flaws. They are non-conforming and creative in approaching problems dealing with the mental hospital, and often initiate innovations. They may at times become frustrated at the recalcitrance of the institutional structures and the resistance of human material they are attempting in a fashion to remake.

Ideological-Political Resolutions

Students of this style are pushed by intellectualized moral indignation. Competence testing is not carried out by learning a specific professional skill. They are apt to reject professionalism because they do not see this occupational area as one in which they want to achieve mastery and/or establish a base for identity. They often identify the professional with the "establishment" which is presumed to be responsible, if not for the problem, at least for the failure to resolve it. A satisfactory resolution for them is complex and does not reach a neat end point. They are highly critical of adult institutional arrangements and because they value the rational and the intellectual so highly they feel they have to produce solutions. This attitude makes this type of student difficult to deal with at times, but he is often imaginative and effective in developing innovations helpful to the patient. He is often also a rule breaker. The resolution he finds most comfortable is to be able to feel that he is active, alert to any further

---

[4] The common distasteful connotations of "political" are not intended, and are consistently not applicable.

infringement of the patients' rights, and that he is continually pushing the hospital administration and the professionals both to let him try out his ideas and to bestir themselves to greater effort.

The negative resolution for the *ideological-political* student occurs when he feels that he has been outmaneuvered by the establishment, or that his critique is going, not unheeded—he expects this and bolsters his ideology on this fact—but unheard.

The second subtype is the *political* student who, in contrast to the "ideologue," finds greater significance in the political process *per se* than in the ideological rationale. His level of moral indignation is lower, absent, or couched in terms of an organizational critique. He is an organizer, an administrator, and—when necessary—a diplomat. He sees his function as one of keeping the program running smoothly, which he often does. Because political expediency may lead him to sacrifice a remote ideological principle for an immediate gain, he may appear to be using the program for his own ends. But his loyalty to the organization and concern for the patient is seldom at issue. Both political subtypes have a commitment to helping the patient, although it is differently manifested. The patient provides a suitable object for altruism and competence may be tested by developing organizational skills.

For the political student who does not have a fulminating ideology, a satisfactory processual resolution may come about through officership and administration in the program. This type of political student will often come into contact with power structures and role systems far afield from the hospital or the student organization since he acts as a representative of the program. Students in this role have had contact with a range of governmental structures from the local to the federal level, for example.

The political student does not experience so direct, immediate, and neat a set of mechanisms to help him resolve the problems of achieving adult status as does the pre-professional student. He does, however, have the opportunity to be successful in a complicated activity among, and in competition with, his peers and on occasion with his elders.

The negative resolution for this student consists in his exclusion from or failure to gain access to the administrative apparatus of the program. For then he is denied the opportunity to test his competence by helping to organize and guide an effort to do something about a major social problem.

Social Style

In common with all volunteers, the student who experiences his activity in the *social* style is partly motivated by a desire to be of service, by altruism. The primary characteristic of the *social* style,

however, is that there is a strong focus upon interaction with other volunteers. It is important for the social type to feel that he is collaborating with others in work that points toward a common social goal. This student has an ideology that is almost vestigial. It consists primarily of his altruism and a belief in the value of association with others and is not elaborated with any consistency or self-consciousness. The value orientation of the *social* type is apt to be traditional. He appears to follow the upper-middle class emphasis upon pleasant, and perhaps somewhat undiscriminating socializing, and the tradition of service to the community. For this type of student the experience can be functional role playing for his adult status.

There is some evidence that the *social* style may contain two subtypes. Some students of this type place more emphasis upon the purely associational aspects of the experience while retaining a service orientation. Others emphasize more the altruistic, humanitarian, charitable aspects of volunteering almost in a spirit of *noblesse oblige*—stemming from family tradition. Also, the social volunteer may be the gregarious person who finds satisfaction in associating with people in numerous contexts—from the back wards to exclusive Harvard clubs. On the other hand, he may be the student with a history of difficulty in social relationships who wants to enjoy people but doesn't know exactly how. He hopes to find, in a group which deals with "problems," social contacts that are personally satisfying.

Social Resolutions

The *social* student seeks a tangible and definite resolution to his volunteer experience. The base for his identity, although he may be somewhat conflicted about it, lies firmly in his family and subcultural background. He has been taught to value service and pleasant interaction with his fellows. Although his identity is generally made up of additional and complex factors, if he can prove his competence to serve and be popular with peers whom he likes, he has reaffirmed some of the original directives about who he is. This student needs some solid proof that his outlay of time and energy is meaningful. Initially, he needs response from the patients and ultimately he wants to see real improvement in their condition. He also needs to form relationships with other volunteers that are at least as satisfying as those he has made in other contexts. Depending upon whether the social or the service comes first in his value hierarchy, he may need the satisfaction of association to sustain him in any but the slightest efforts to achieve the results he wants with the patients.

The optimal resolution for the *social* student is to realize two firmly held values by finding the group of volunteers he encounters compatible, like-minded and friendly, and by working with a responsive patient who makes appreciable gains within a reasonable

time. Although we have not yet carried out a systematic analysis of factors operating with students who drop out of the program, an educated guess is that a large proportion of them are socials for whom the resolution has been negative. If this kind of student is not sustained in his efforts by satisfaction with his associations in the program, he is apt to drop out fairly early.

Lest the motivation and performance of this student seem to be fragile and tenuous, it must be emphasized that he can and does operate effectively with relatively little reward. If the patient is not making rapid strides, the social student may redefine the situation (I can't make the patient better but I can brighten his life a little). If he feels that through this redefinition his original altruistic values are being realized he can be loyal and effective in sustaining the ability of the chronic patient to maintain contact with someone from the outside world—no mean feat in itself.

Moral Style

The student who elects to experience his volunteering in the *moral* style is in ways blood brother to the *social* type. He belongs in the same humanist tradition as the *social*, but for him it is less of a traditional role to be acted out in service, and more of an immediate philosophical belief. He feels that if people are suffering in the world, something should be done about it. He is not, however, indignant about it and in this sense he is a good representative of the "cool" Harvard student. He lacks any consistent or sophisticated ideological critique of institutionally based wrongs. He rarely has explicit theories about the causes of injustice and suffering, but he does feel a very personalized commitment to do something constructive. He wants to give of himself in a concrete way and preferably in an established and legitimate manner.

The *moral* student chooses to volunteer in the mental hospital because he sees this as an area of great need and intense human suffering where he can personally give. The *moralist* may, in spite of being "cool," move into the experience intensely and need concrete testimony to the goodness of his giving and the value of his labors. Nevertheless, unlike the *careerist* or the ideologue, he is not clear about either the moral or practical solution to the problem. He *is* clear in his conviction that a human and a moral issue does exist.

Moral Resolutions

In some ways the volunteer experience of the *moral* student is more tangential to the rest of his life than it is for the *career-tester*, the *political* or the *existential*. In this he is like the *social* student. The fact that elements of indignation and altruism are more prominent than competence testing and identity formation has implications for his

participation in the program and the kinds of resolutions he seeks. Competence testing and identity are not absent from the hospital context for him, but they do not loom so large. He is of a somewhat philosophical and, or logical turn of mind, and likes to sort and allocate his experiences as they relate to the problems of maturation he is encountering. He is testing his competence elsewhere and more fully, often in the academic arena and in regard to his choice of a career. Nevertheless his selection of the mental hospital as a context in which to realize his humanistic values represents an almost conscious test. As one *moral* student said, "Well, I do have these values—I suppose you can call it vague altruism, but I feel that it is up to *me* to do something about them. When I give money to the March of Dimes or something, I don't feel any sense of having done anything. Working at the hospital is more real—the idea I have of helping people—not only your friends—call it conscience or whatever—seems much more real to me now. I wanted to do something constructive and worthwhile. I've got the feeling now that I can cope with things better, but of course this didn't come just from my hospital experience." It becomes incumbent upon the *moral* student to actualize his values as part of proving his identity as a moral person, and his competence as one who can choose the situation in which to do something "worthwhile" and effectively.

The *moral* style provides probably the narrowest base for maintaining participation of any of the styles. This kind of student, having made the choice of working with the chronic psychotic, needs assurance that in giving altruistically of himself rather than money, for example, he is helping resolve what he sees as essentially a moral problem, a matter of conscience. This assurance has to come primarily from the patient. Often it does not.

The optimal positive resolution for the student who is committed to the moral style is to work directly with a patient whom he can love and to see his offering of love take effect. *Moral* students often form strong bonds with the patients and develop sustained and therapeutic relationships. Barring an optimal resolution on the *moral* student may redefine the situation so that he is convinced that functioning in the administrative end of the program is helping others give to the patients and achieve real results even though he himself cannot.

A negative resolution, the consequence of lack of reward from the patients, means quick withdrawal for the moral student and leaves him with a sense of defeat in his attempt to put his values into practice. What the ramifications of this defeat may be we are not certain but it does carry guilt with it.

Even though attrition may be high among moral students, those who are rewarded enough to stay are dedicated, hard, and faithful workers who function as guardians of the patients' human rights.

They continually emphasize to staff and other volunteers that the patient has a moral claim to be treated with dignity. Even researchers are looked upon with a jaundiced eye or come under direct fire when their activities are considered an invasion of the patients' privacy.

Existential Style

The ideology of the *existential* student is difficult to classify. His mystique, while it represents an all-encompassing value orientation and a view of the universe is in essence a very simple central idea. It is a motivation for action which denies any systematic plan for action. In short the existential ideology means forswearing ideology. This student is at one and the same time the most selfish and the most selfless of the volunteers. He neither expects to gain any ultimate occupational advantage nor does he feel a traditional moral commitment to "humanity," "the community," "society" or any other collective. He has no burning need to be of service. The responsibility he feels is to himself and to the exploration of experience. In this sense he is intensely concerned with self. He is not seeking to change systems or run organizations. Adaptability to new and unpredictable situations rather than traditionalism is an article of faith with the existentialist. Although he abides by a set of definite aims these have a provisional character and tend to change with each new experience. He has an "encounter" with the hospital which he tries to incorporate as part of his own "becoming," in a way that other students do not. All this is the selfish side of the coin.

His selflessness stems, somewhat paradoxically from the overwhelming search for identity. The need to "encounter" leads him to see the patients he works with as whole persons, not as helpless or interesting pathological specimens. It is here that his altruism is strongest. He makes a strong effort to enter the world of the patient and is accepting of deviant reactions. In fact the mournful morgues for the living which we call back wards are tailor-made for the existential commitment. He searches out extreme situations on the logic that these make impossible the use of facades which obscure the naked recognition of the authentic self.

Existential Resolutions

The existential student is probably least threatened by the awful reality found in the back wards and does not require the kinds of resolutions other students do. In a way, the existentialist has a resolution built in—the need to experience intensely. The hospital supplies the opportunity. He seeks his identity here as well as anywhere else and this search for identity assumes a particular mode. He views as a challenge the fact that the chronic ward is a situation where the outcome is unknown and here he can seek an existential moment.

In a real sense he equates an encounter with a Harvard professor and a schizophrenic car washer. His value premises make for an adaptable and imaginative approach to work with patients, and since his aims *are* provisional and not frustrated by new and unpredictable situations, he is not easily discouraged. This means that the optimal resolution for the existential student will hold nothing more tangible than the feeling that he is undergoing a true and intense experience.

He may have a negative resolution if he feels hemmed in by rules and procedures, or if he cannot somehow "encounter" the patients and hospital. The nature of his values means that for him an optimal resolution is quite meaningful. A negative resolution will have less impact on him than it would for the *career-testing* student, for example.

Conclusion

This typology has provided a useful framework for coordinating data and interpreting the behavior of volunteers. It enables an analyst to explain in general why some students drop out or are indifferently faithful while others are fiercely loyal to the program for four years. It makes the differential behavior of the students in relation to patients and to the hospital more intelligible. It is also useful in understanding the internal organization of the students' program, and how some of the organizational imperatives are met.

Implications for the student, the patient, the volunteer program, the mental hospital itself and later the community will vary with the different resolutions of the experience that the students using different behavioral styles come to. For example a *moral* student who has a positive resolution may later be quite active in the cause of mental health on the community level. On the other hand, a *social* student who undergoes a negative resolution may become indifferent and pessimistic toward the whole problem.

The styles we have identified are applicable to a range of human behavior. They may, in fact, constitute relatively fixed approaches to other life experiences the students are confronting. In another area, the conceptualization of styles of behavioral response to problematic situations has been applied successfully to the analysis of the divergent behavior of professional street corner workers (5).

The analysis and definition of the processes discussed in this chapter may provide a useful background for understanding other related phenomena such as differential participation of students in movements for desegregation, the peace corps, political campaigns and other forms of pro-social action. Space does not permit the exploration of more sophisticated theoretical ramifications such as the connections between the behavioral manifestations we have examined and ego development and the relation of these adolescent

adaptive maneuvers to Robert White's concept of efficacy (7). There are major theoretical implications however, which will be explored elsewhere.

REFERENCES

1. BECK, J., KANTOR, D., AND GELINEAU, V. "A Follow-up Study of Chronic Patients 'Treated' by College Volunteers." *American Journal of Psychiatry,* Vol. 120, No. 3, Sept., 1963.
2. GREENBLATT, M., AND KANTOR, D. "Student Volunteer Movement and the Manpower Shortage." *American Journal of Psychiatry,* Vol. 118, No. 9, March, 1962.
3. KANTOR, D., AND GREENBLATT, M. "Wellmet: A Cooperative Student-Patient Half-Way House for Chronic Mentally Ill." *Mental Hospitals,* Vol. 13, No. 3, March, 1962.
4. KANTOR, D. "Intervention into Multiple Patterns of Insularity in a Custodially Organized Mental Hospital." Ph.D. Thesis, Brandeis University, April, 1963.
5. KANTOR, D., AND BENNETT, W. I. "Street Corner Ideology and 'Missionary' Styles." In *Problems in Delinquency Control,* edited by Stanton Wheeler, with the assistance of Helen Hughes, to be published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York. (Presidents's Commission on Juvenile Delinquency, Dept. of H.E.W., Grant #62213.)
6. UMBARGER *et al.,* KANTOR, D., AND GREENBLATT, (EDS.). *College Students in a Mental Hospital.* New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1962.
7. WHITE, ROBERT, W. "The Experience of Efficacy in Schizophrenia," Frieda Fromm—Reichmann Memorial Lecture at Bethesda, Maryland (mimeo) 1964.

Biographical Sketches

ROBERT COLES is a child psychiatrist whose chief interest is in social psychiatry. For the past six years he lived in the South, studying first Negro and white children entering newly desegregated schools, youth of the sit-in movement, and the segregationist resistance to social change; then he observed migrant farm workers and sharecroppers in the region, to determine the effects of their kind of living upon their psychological development. He is now Research Psychiatrist to the Harvard University Health Services.

ERIK H. ERIKSON is Professor of Human Development and Lecturer on Psychiatry at Harvard University. He received his training in psychoanalysis at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute. He is a fellow of the American Psychoanalytic Association, an active member in the Western New England Psychoanalytic Society, and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He was formerly professor of psychology at the University of California and Senior Staff member at the Austen Riggs Center. Professor Erikson is the author of *Childhood and Society, Young Man Luther, Insight and Responsibility,* and he served as editor for the book *Youth: Change and Challenge.* At present he is working on a study of the life of Mahatma Ghandi.

JACOB R. FISHMAN is Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, College of Medicine; Director of the Center for Youth and Community Studies at Howard University, Washington, D.C. and Attending Psychiatrist at Freedmen's and D.C. General Hospitals. He received his M.D. degree from Boston University Medical School, and psychiatric training at Albert Einstein College of Medicine—Bronx Municipal Hospital, New York City. He is a former Clinical Associate and Research Psychiatrist in the Adult Psychiatry Branch of the National Institute of Mental Health. His major research interests are in interdisciplinary studies of social psychiatry and of adolescence.

VICTOR A. GELINEAU is Director of Research in Drug Addiction, Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Received his doctorate at Columbia and taught sociology at Wheaton College, Boston University and Harvard.

He has done research in hospital organization, social factors in schizophrenia, student motivation and career choice and alienation from and identification with work.

He is also a Director of Wellmet Project, Inc., an experimental cooperative half-way house for chronic schizophrenics, staffed by volunteer student residents. He is engaged in continuing research on the half-way house.

DAVID KANTOR is supported under a special fellowship award by the National Institute of Mental Health with an appointment as assistant professor of clinical psychiatry (psychology) at Tufts Medical School.

His present research is on the evolution and maintenance of careers in schizophrenia. He is investigating the interaction of social and personality processes in several social contexts which accommodate the schizophrenic—family systems, acute wards, chronic wards, community residential treatment milieus and work settings. He is also studying "styles" of intervention employed by those who would break into fixed integrations between several types of deviant (gang delinquents, schizophrenics and segregated negroes) and their natural subcultures. He has directed studies of student volunteers, correctional institutions, mental hospitals and is conducting research in a cooperative house occupied by college students and chronic schizophrenic patients.

He has taught in the Department of Social Relations at Harvard and received his Ph.D. from Brandeis in 1963.

ROBERT JAY LIFTON is Foundations' Fund for Research in Psychiatry Associate Professor at Yale University. He has been particularly interested in the relationship between individual character and historical change, especially in China and Japan, and of problems of individual behavior in extreme situations. He has spent more than six years in the Far East, and has recently returned from an extensive stay in Japan during which he carried out a study of psychological patterns in Japanese youth (young men and women between the ages of 18 and 25), as well as an investigation of the psychological effects of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima.

Dr. Lifton has previously held research and teaching appointments at Harvard University, where he was associated with both the Department of Psychiatry and the Center for East Asian Studies; and the Washington School of Psychiatry.

His book, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of "Brainwashing" in China*, was published by W. W. Norton & Co. (and by Victor Gollancz in London) in 1961; and in Norton Library Edition (paperback) in 1963. His papers on Chinese thought reform, Japanese youth, atomic bomb psychological patterns, and related issues concerning the individual in history, have appeared in various psychiatric, psychological, and Asian Studies journals, as well as in general academic and popular publications.

LAWRENCE F. SCHIFF is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology-Anthropology at Brown University. He received his Ph.D. in Social Psychology from the Social Relations Department at Harvard University in 1964. His interests include ideological development in adolescence and the relationship of prejudice and personality.

FREDRIC SOLOMON is the National Institute of Mental Health Career Teacher in Psychiatry at the Howard University College of Medicine and Center for Youth and Community Studies. He is also a candidate of the Washington Psychoanalytic Institute, an affiliate Fellow in Child Psychiatry at the Children's Hospital of the District of Columbia and an Associate Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies. He received his M.D. degree from the University of Chicago and psychiatric training at Johns Hopkins Hospital. He is a former Clinical Associate and Research Psychiatrist at the National Institute of Mental Health in Bethesda, Maryland. His main research interest has been in the social and developmental psychology of adolescents and college students, with special emphasis on social and political action.

COLES, ROBERT, A Matter of Territory, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, 4, 43-53.

This paper draws upon a series of meetings attended by veteran activists of the civil rights movement in the South. The author was asked to lead the meetings, hoping initially to lecture on the psychological aspects of prejudice, but eventually explore some of the feelings of these youths with respect to their struggle with themselves and the world they are trying to change. The paper illustrates the difficulties involved in obtaining frank information from some such youth. The relationship between Black Muslim ideology and some of the susceptibilities rising in tired civil rights workers is illustrated.

ERIKSON, ERIK H., "A Memorandum on Identity and Negro Youth," *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 4, 29-42.

In the context of the recent emergence of "new" qualities in Negro youth, Erikson reviews several of his central formulations regarding ego development and identity. Aspects of identity formation in childhood are discussed, as well as later psychosocial factors in totalism, negative identity, conversion, ideology, fidelity and movement toward more inclusive identity. The intersection of life history with history that occurs in the psychosocial era of "youth" is of special interest because of its potentialities for confirmation of individual and collective identities and for the regeneration of society. Numerous questions are raised for further inquiry, especially about sources of morale or "strength" and possible roots for a new ethical orientation.

GELINEAU, VICTOR A., AND KANTOR, DAVID, Pro-social Commitment Among College Students, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, 4, 112-130.

Of considerable practical interest are those generalizations which can be made about the individuals who become involved in social or therapeutic change operations, about their professional, social, and intellectual backgrounds, and about their *styles*. The issue of styles—the differently patterned behaviors of persons who mediate change—determines in fundamental ways the effectiveness and direction of any change program and greatly influences both its internal events and external effects.

In an analysis of a group of Harvard and Radcliffe students engaged in a systematic effort to modify the schizophrenic adaptations of long-term hospitalized patients, it was found that while these students did not differ radically from the general Harvard-Radcliffe population, five styles of handling the experience of working with schizophrenics could be identified.

These styles which have different consequences for students, patients and the social institutions in which they operate are a combination of behavioral and dynamic factors and are characterized as the career-testing, the political, the social, the moral and the existential.

LIFTON, ROBERT JAY, Individual Patterns in Historical Change: Imagery of Japanese Youth, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, 4, 96-111.

This article describes three patterns of time imagery encountered in contemporary Japanese youth. These are the *mode of transformation*, characterized by a vision of near-total remaking of social and individual existence, and by unconscious nostalgia for the past, the *mode of restoration*, characterized by a conscious urge to return to ennobling symbols of personal and cultural past, and by an unconscious fascination with 'modern' symbols, and a *mode of accommodation*, a quest for a modus vivendi blending imagery closest to present experience, immediate future, and recent past. All three modes, in different fashions, promote historical change. They are frequently interchangeable, as they all share an 'emotional-symbolic substrate' which finds its individual model of unity in the mother-child relationship, and its cultural model in the stress upon social and racial harmony. These principles, although studied in Japanese youth, have general application for any culture undergoing pressures of historical change.

SCHIFF, LAWRENCE F., The Obedient Rebels: A Study of College Conversions to Conservation, *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, 4, 74-95.

The paper details and analyzes the social psychological processes involved in the conversion of a number of college students to strident and activist political conservatism. Two central themes, "obedient rebellion" and "identity foreclosure" are found to characterize the conversions and resulting political orientations of those Ss at the core of the contemporary campus conservative movement. The movement is found to appeal to these Ss on the basis of multiple points of coincidence between program and personality, ideology and social experience. The inquiry is based on interviews and a battery of standardized attitude, personality and background questionnaires administered to forty-seven campus conservative activists and (the questionnaires only) to ten campus left-wing activists.

SOLOMON, FREDRIC, AND FISHMAN, JACOB R., Youth and Peace: A Psychosocial Study of Student Peace Demonstrators in Washington, D.C., *J. soc. Issues*, 1964, 20, 4, 54-73.

A study of student peace demonstrators was undertaken during the course of a Washington, D.C. Student Peace Demonstration early in 1962. Instruments utilized to gather data were a survey questionnaire and depth interviews. The profile of demonstrators sampled as revealed by the obtained data was that of a group with a mean age of 18½ years, having no well-formed comprehensive political ideology and tending to combine idealism and protest via an expressed and implied "striving for purity."

The data suggest that the age period 12-15 may be a critical phase since this period appeared to be the time in which first feelings of awareness of social and political "causes" were most frequently remembered.

A modest follow-up study undertaken eighteen months after the original demonstration revealed that many students had developed interests in other "causes" (especially civil rights) and that commitment to a moralistic approach to United States military and foreign policy had deepened.

CONTENTS FOR VOLUME XX, 1964

Supplement

JULY 1964   No. 3

LEWIN MEMORIAL AWARD

ADDRESS

YOUTH AND SOCIAL ACTION

Issue Editors: JACOB R. FISHMAN AND FREDERIC SOLOMON

CONTENTS:

COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH JOURNAL

Volume I   **Partial Contents**   **1965**

Please enter a one year subscription to the *Community Mental Health
Journal* in the name of:

(Please Print)

_____Payment enclosed

Name_____

Address_____ Amount: _____

City_____ State_____ Zip Code_____   _____Please bill

The Journal of
con*f*lict RESOLUTION

*A quarterly for research
related to war and peace*

DECEMBER 1964 ISSUE (VIII, 4):

SOCIAL VALUES AND FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES
OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN ELITES

Including content-analytic studies by ROBERT C. ANGELL and J. DAVID SINGER; study of Soviet literature by VERA S. DUNHAM.

Book reviews by Allen D. Grimshaw, Richard W. Leopold, James K. Pollock, J. Alan Winter.

Previous Issues